Thom Harley

Following the sale of a mortgaged property, surplus proceeds were interpleaded.

Several execution creditors sought distribution of the funds based on writs existing at the time of the sale.

The respondent ex-spouse brought a motion seeking priority for a family law support order obtained five years after the sale, and to set aside one of the execution creditor's default judgments.

The court dismissed the ex-spouse's motions, holding she lacked standing to collaterally attack the default judgment and that under the Creditors' Relief Act, 2010, a support order made after the creation of the fund cannot take priority over executions existing at the date of sale.

The court granted a motion by one bank to renew its writ nunc pro tunc and ordered the funds distributed among the execution creditors.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a mortgage and obtain a writ of possession.

The self-represented defendant did not dispute signing the charge or defaulting, but argued she was pressured into the agreement by her daughter.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, as the defendant's allegations against her daughter did not affect the plaintiff's legal rights.

Summary judgment was granted, awarding the plaintiff the amount owing, a writ of possession stayed for 30 days, and costs on a solicitor and client basis.

The plaintiff brought motions in two related actions concerning an investment in a cannabis trust.

In the 2021 action, the plaintiff sought to amend a judgment against a defaulting defendant, add a new defendant, and amend the statement of claim to include claims under the Securities Act.

In the 2022 action, the plaintiff sought to discontinue the claim against the new defendant to consolidate it into the 2021 action.

The court granted the unopposed motions to amend the judgment and the statement of claim for existing defendants.

The motions concerning the new defendant were adjourned because he had not been properly served.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits after fracturing his hip in a fall at an intersection.

He alleged he was startled and fell when a turning bus nearly struck him in a pedestrian crosswalk.

The insurer denied benefits, arguing no 'accident' occurred because there was no physical contact between the bus and the applicant.

The Arbitrator found that physical contact is not required if the use or operation of the vehicle directly caused the impairment.

The Arbitrator concluded that the approaching bus startled the applicant, causing him to lose his balance and fall, thereby meeting the definition of an 'accident' under section 2(1) of the Schedule.