Samantha Vienna Bonanno

The plaintiffs sued the Halton Police Board and individual officers for tort damages arising from an alleged trespass and police assault in Fall 2021.

The court heard multiple motions: (1) to amend the statement of claim to substitute and add defendants; (2) to examine a non-party for discovery; and (3) to discontinue a counterclaim.

The court granted leave to substitute Officer Bowes for Officer John Doe #2, Officer Pinkney for Officer John Doe #1, and Sara Nielsen for Jane Doe.

The court dismissed the motion to add Officers Proulx, Forde, Blanchard, and Vander Heyden as defendants due to expiry of the limitation period.

The court dismissed the motion to examine Ekaterina Latour for discovery due to improper service and lack of relevance.

The court permitted discontinuance of Michael Krog's counterclaim and awarded costs against him.

The court also awarded costs to the Police defendants against the plaintiffs for the unsuccessful motion to add defendants.

The plaintiff, a criminal defence lawyer, sued the Halton Regional Police Service and several police officers for negligence after he was shot by a man who was under police surveillance.

The police defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing they did not owe the plaintiff a private law duty of care.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action, finding no special relationship of proximity existed between the police and the plaintiff that would give rise to such a duty.

The court emphasized that police duties are generally owed to the public as a whole, and the circumstances did not establish the plaintiff as part of a "narrow and distinct group of potential victims at risk from a specific threat" before the shooting.

The Plaintiff, Esau Max Wynter Jr., sought costs following a successful 8-day trial where he was awarded $53,231.00 plus prejudgment interest for excessive force used by the Defendants during a search warrant execution.

The Plaintiff requested $117,650 plus HST and disbursements on a partial indemnity scale.

The Defendants proposed $25,000 plus disbursements, arguing the case should have been under Simplified Procedure and costs were disproportionate.

The court, applying Rule 57.01, found the action was complex and not suitable for Simplified Procedure, noting the Defendants made no settlement offer.

The court fixed costs at $100,000 plus HST and $14,988.85 in disbursements, payable by the Defendants.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar's order dismissing his action for delay, nearly four years after the dismissal.

The court applied the established principles for setting aside such orders, requiring a reasonable explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline, promptness in bringing the motion, and rebuttal of prejudice.

The court found no reasonable explanation for the delay, no evidence of inadvertence by the former lawyer, and significant prejudice to the defendants due to the passage of nearly a decade since the incident, impacting witness recollection and the ability to defend.

While the motion was brought promptly after the plaintiff's new counsel discovered the dismissal, the overall delay and resulting prejudice outweighed the plaintiff's plea for indulgence, upholding the principle of finality.

The motion was dismissed.

This costs endorsement followed a successful status hearing motion by the plaintiffs and a partially successful cross-motion by the defendants.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs for the status hearing, citing the defendants' litigation conduct.

The court awarded the plaintiffs partial indemnity costs for the status hearing, finding no basis for substantial indemnity as the criticized conduct related to the general litigation, not the specific motion.

For the cross-motion, where success was divided, the court ordered each party to bear their own costs.

The plaintiffs sought a status hearing under Rule 48.14 to allow their action to proceed despite a five-year delay and requested a timetable.

The defendants opposed, seeking dismissal due to non-compensable prejudice from a key witness's death and alleged spoliation of evidence.

The court found the plaintiffs provided acceptable explanations for the delay, which was largely attributable to interlocutory proceedings and the defendants' actions.

The court also determined that any prejudice from the witness's death or evidence destruction did not arise from the delay necessitating the status hearing and was not so extensive as to prevent a fair trial.

The defendants' cross-motion to strike parts of a reply affidavit was granted in part.

The main motion to allow the action to proceed was granted, and a timetable was imposed.