Jason Randall Barrs

The accused, Spiro Rusha, was charged with multiple counts of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including the quantity and variety of drugs seized, substantial cash, and drug paraphernalia.

The defence argued for personal use and legitimate income.

The court found the accused's testimony lacked credibility and reliability, rejecting his explanations for drug possession and cash.

Applying principles of circumstantial evidence, the court concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the substances were for trafficking and the money was proceeds of crime.

Rusha was found guilty on all counts.

The appellant, convicted of attempting to import cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime, appealed the dismissal of his entrapment claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of the police agent (PA), whose uncorroborated testimony was central to establishing reasonable suspicion for police intervention.

The court highlighted the PA's extensive criminal history, admitted lies, and substantial financial compensation ($400,000 plus monthly fees) as factors requiring a more rigorous credibility analysis.

It also found that the appellant's later eagerness to participate in the scheme did not corroborate the PA's claim that the appellant initiated the criminal activity.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered solely on the entrapment issue.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising two grounds: an alleged error in the severance application regarding charges involving two complainants, and serious errors in the trial judge's credibility analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the high deference owed to severance decisions and credibility findings.

The court found no error in the application judge's decision to not sever the charges, noting the low threshold for similar act evidence at the severance stage and the lack of injustice given the judge-alone trial and partial acquittal.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility assessment, finding no impermissible reasoning or unequal scrutiny.

Dolal Jama was sentenced for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a six-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the serious nature of the offence, the substantial amount of fentanyl, and the offender's criminal record, including prior drug convictions.

However, the court also gave significant weight to the offender's long-standing addiction, his persistent and successful efforts at rehabilitation, and his early guilty plea.

The judge emphasized the principle of proportionality, arguing against a rigid application of sentencing ranges for addict-traffickers.

Ultimately, the court imposed a sentence of two years' incarceration, followed by two years' probation.

The defendant, Guled Mohamed, was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime following a police investigation and search of a residence.

The court found that Mohamed did not have standing to challenge the search of the residence.

Based on circumstantial evidence, including his association with other drug traffickers, surveillance observations, and presence at the residence where drugs were found, the court found him guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

However, he was acquitted of the possession of proceeds of crime charge due to insufficient evidence regarding the amount of cash found.

The appellant was convicted on 42 counts of possession of stolen property and fraud following a trial before a judge alone.

The trial judge used evidence from multiple counts as similar fact evidence to support findings of knowledge and intent, without any request from the Crown to do so.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in applying similar fact evidence without a Crown request and without conducting a proper admissibility inquiry.

The court held that such evidence is presumptively inadmissible and requires an onus on the Crown to satisfy the trial judge that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering in connection with a bank vault theft in Burlington.

He appealed on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that his trial counsel failed to bring a Carosella application for a stay of proceedings based on lost police booking video evidence.

The appellant also appealed his sentence of two and a half years' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that a Carosella application would have had no chance of success given the innocent explanation for the loss of evidence and the appellant's lack of diligence in requesting it.

The court also found that the mid-trial instruction provided by the trial judge was actually more beneficial to the defence than the standard lost evidence instruction.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed as fit and free from error.

The appellant appealed convictions for possession of cocaine and heroin for the purpose of trafficking, and a sentence of 26 months' imprisonment.

The trial judge found that the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant's possession was for trafficking purposes, rejecting the appellant's testimony that the drugs were for personal use due to his addiction.

The appellant's explanation that he obtained funds from online poker winnings was found to be far-fetched and unsupported.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's W.(D.) analysis or sentencing principles.

The victim surcharge was set aside.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

At trial, the appellant argued he had an honest but mistaken belief that the complainant consented to the sexual activity.

The trial judge rejected this defence, finding that the complainant's obvious intoxication vitiated any consent and that the appellant's decision to engage in sexual activity was either reckless or wilfully blind.

The trial judge also found that silence, passivity, and ambiguous conduct do not constitute consent, and that the complainant's actions in the bathtub could not be said to constitute consent to vaginal penetration.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of three firearms-related offences arising from his possession of a loaded .45 calibre handgun discovered during a dynamic nighttime search of his home.

The search warrant was issued via telewarrant and targeted the appellant's son.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the application of the Garofoli step six procedure, the reasonableness of the dynamic entry execution, and sought exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his sentence of 21 months' imprisonment and 2 years' probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and the sentence appeal.

The defendant was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL of blood and acquitted of impaired driving.

This was his fourth drinking-driving conviction, with prior convictions in 1992, 2005, and 2007.

The Crown sought nine months incarceration and a five-year driving prohibition.

The defence argued for a non-custodial sentence based on the defendant's substantial rehabilitation efforts, including completion of withdrawal management and residential treatment programs, stable employment, and strong community support.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence, two years' probation, and a four-year driving prohibition, finding that while custody was necessary for deterrence and denunciation, the defendant's comprehensive rehabilitation warranted a sentence equal to his third conviction rather than a more severe penalty.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and over 80 operation of a motor vehicle on April 13, 2014.

The Crown's case relied on eyewitness testimony from two neighbours who identified the defendant as the driver of the truck, and police observations of impairment.

The defence argued that the defendant did not drive the vehicle and that a paid stranger drove it instead.

The court found the defendant guilty of over 80 operation, finding that the defendant operated the vehicle within two hours of the breath test, satisfying section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was acquitted on the impaired operation charge due to insufficient evidence of impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings as a remedy for an alleged breach of his Section 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time.

The court found that over twelve months had elapsed since arrest, with the matter scheduled for a third trial date.

The court attributed approximately eleven months and twenty-two days of delay to institutional causes, including the court's failure to prioritize the matter on the second trial date.

The court also found that the applicant had suffered prejudice by being unable to afford expert toxicology evidence due to financial hardship caused by the delays.

The court granted a stay of proceedings under Section 24(1) of the Charter.