Thaddeus Ofiara

The Crown prosecuted three accused on sexual assault charges arising from sexual activity in a hotel room after a night of drinking among off-duty colleagues.

The central issues were whether the complainant consented and whether she was incapable of consenting because of alcohol, an unknown drug, or both.

The court applied the reasonable doubt framework and the W.(D.) approach, finding serious reliability and credibility problems in the complainant's evidence, including inconsistencies with prior statements, video footage, text messages, and toxicology evidence.

Although sexual activity was established, the Crown failed to prove non-consent or incapacity beyond a reasonable doubt.

All three accused were acquitted.

The defendants were charged with sexual assault.

The Crown sought to admit expert toxicologist evidence regarding the effects of "date rape" drugs, consistent with the complainant's symptoms of incapacitation, despite no direct evidence of drug administration.

The defence objected, arguing irrelevance due to the absence of a drug charge and late disclosure of new testimonial details.

The court ruled the expert evidence admissible, finding it relevant to the issue of consent and the complainant's incapacitation, even without knowing the exact drug or its administration method.

The court noted that late disclosure, if remedied by adjournment, affects weight rather than admissibility.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault causing bodily harm arising from a group altercation outside a restaurant.

At trial, the judge rejected the appellant's testimony that he was engaged in a consensual two-punch fight or acting in self-defence, instead accepting the Crown witnesses' evidence that the appellant and his friends engaged in a one-sided attack on the complainant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility, and erred in assessing reliability.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were adequate, the burden of proof was correctly applied, and the credibility findings were reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the resulting 18-month sentence.

The Crown's case at trial relied entirely on circumstantial forensic evidence, including the presence of the appellant's DNA on the complainant's underwear.

The appeal court found the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable, as he drew impermissible inferences not supported by the evidence and failed to provide sufficient reasons explaining his credibility findings and rejection of the appellant's exculpatory statement.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to comply with a breath demand and obstructing a peace officer by falsely identifying himself.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter s. 11(b) application alleging unreasonable delay and in finding no breach of his s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge properly attributed significant portions of the delay to defence conduct, including a late disclosure motion and shifting defence strategy, and reasonably concluded that the overall delay did not violate the accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court also found no breach of the right to counsel, as police attempted to contact counsel of choice and the accused was permitted to consult duty counsel while awaiting a potential return call.

The conviction appeal was therefore dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

He argued the trial was unfair because no interpreter was provided despite his limited English, that the trial judge’s questioning created a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the judge erred in finding a realistic risk that the vehicle could be set in motion.

The court held the appellant sufficiently understood and participated in the proceedings and neither he nor counsel requested an interpreter.

The trial judge’s questioning did not create an appearance of unfairness.

Applying the test from Boudreault, the court found the trial judge reasonably concluded there was a realistic risk the impaired appellant could put the vehicle in motion.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence relating to a Charter voir dire, erred in the analysis of the right to counsel of choice under s. 10(b), and improperly accepted expert toxicology evidence.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge’s minor misquotation of the appellant’s testimony did not amount to a material misapprehension of evidence and did not taint the credibility findings.

The court further found no error in the conclusion that police were not required to clarify whether the accused wished to contact private counsel when he merely requested a lawyer and was connected with duty counsel.

The expert evidence on projected blood alcohol concentration was properly admitted and relied upon, and the trial judge reasonably rejected hypothetical bolus drinking scenarios.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for committing an indecent act and dangerous driving.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant of the indecent act based on a perceived legal presumption that intent to act wilfully arises when the act is seen by another person.

The appeal court found this to be a legal error, as no such presumption exists, and ordered a new trial on the indecent act charge.

The appeal against the dangerous driving conviction was dismissed, as the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant's driving in heavy fog was a marked departure from the standard of care.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on an 'over 80' charge.

At trial, the judge excluded the results of the accused's breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the arresting officer should not have arrested the accused without first administering a roadside screening test.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to conduct a proper Grant analysis.

Applying the three-pronged Grant test, the court concluded that the police conduct was in good faith, the breath samples were minimally intrusive, and the evidence was highly reliable and essential to the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The breath sample evidence was ruled admissible, the acquittal was set aside, and a conviction was entered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on an 'over 80' charge.

The trial judge had excluded the Intoxilyzer results under s 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the arresting officer should not have arrested the respondent without first administering a roadside breath test, despite having reasonable grounds for an approved instrument demand.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by failing to conduct a proper s 24(2) analysis.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the police conduct was in good faith, the breath demand was minimally intrusive, and the evidence was highly reliable and crucial to the case.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a conviction entered.