Mabel Lai

This appeal concerned convictions for sexual offences where the appellant, S.M., challenged his convictions on the basis that in-chambers discussions between the trial judge and counsel, without his presence, violated his right to be present at his trial under s. 650 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had expressed concerns about the Crown's case on one count and encouraged a guilty plea, which the appellant subsequently entered for four of five charges.

The in-chambers meetings were not recorded or disclosed to the appellant until years later.

The Crown conceded the breach of s. 650.

The Court of Appeal found that the exclusion of the appellant from these substantive discussions, especially given his self-represented status and the lack of disclosure, constituted a serious procedural irregularity.

Applying the Simon framework, the court determined that the breach could not be saved by the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code, as it prejudiced the appearance of the due administration of justice.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered on the sexual assault counts.

The appellant appealed his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 20 years for second-degree murder, which the trial judge ordered to be served consecutively to a previous parole ineligibility period for first-degree murder pursuant to s. 745.51 of the Criminal Code.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Bissonnette, which struck down s. 745.51 as unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter, the Crown conceded the order could not stand.

The Court of Appeal allowed the sentence appeal to the limited extent of quashing the consecutive order, making the parole ineligibility periods run concurrently.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed the dismissal of his "faint hope" application under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code.

The application judge had applied the 2011 amendments, which increased the judicial screening threshold from "reasonable prospect" to "substantial likelihood." Relying on R. v. Dell, the appellant argued this retrospective application violated s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The Crown conceded the violation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, ruling that the "reasonable prospect" threshold applies to s. 745.6 applications for offences committed between January 9, 1997, and December 2, 2011, and remitted the application for a new screening hearing.

The appellant, Adonay Zekarias, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and committing an indignity to a dead body.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's decisions regarding the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct evidence to establish motive, the reliance on inferences for motive, and the use of after-the-fact conduct to prove intent.

The appellant also raised Charter breaches but conceded them given the outcome.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning on motive or intent, and adjourned the sentence appeal.

The offender, a police officer, was sentenced for multiple offences including breach of trust, unauthorized use of a computer, possession of a firearm obtained by crime, and trafficking by offer.

The offences involved accessing confidential police databases for unauthorized purposes, planning to rob a fictional drug warehouse, stealing a police shotgun, and offering to traffic cocaine.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the severe breach of public trust.

The offender was sentenced to a global term of 7.5 years imprisonment.

The accused, a police officer, was found guilty of multiple offences including unauthorized use of a computer, breach of trust, possessing a stolen firearm, and drug trafficking following an undercover police corruption investigation.

The accused brought an application seeking a stay of proceedings, arguing he was entrapped by undercover officers and that the investigation amounted to an abuse of process.

The court found that the accused was entrapped into committing theft and uttering forged documents relating to a fabricated confidential informant report, as the police induced the offences without reasonable suspicion, and stayed those counts.

However, the court dismissed the entrapment application for the remaining offences, finding that reasonable suspicion existed and the accused was not induced, but rather created his own opportunities to commit the crimes.

The court also declined to grant a general stay for abuse of process.

This is an appeal from convictions for drug and firearm offences and the imposed sentence.

The appellant challenged the validity of search warrants, the warrantless "pinging" of his cell phone, and the calculation of pre-trial custody credit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on the warrants and the admissibility of evidence, including the "judge-shopping" issue.

The sentence appeal was allowed to grant additional pre-trial custody credit.

The accused brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of trial was 99 months.

The court found that the accused had actively evaded arrest in Central America for over four years, characterizing this pre-extradition period as defence delay.

Further deductions were made for defence-requested adjournments and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The net delay was calculated at 24 months, which fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The motion for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The appellant, D.R., sought release pending appeal from convictions for three counts of sexual assault, uttering a death threat, assault, and assault with a weapon.

The primary grounds of appeal concerned the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the appellant and the complainant.

The court reviewed the trial judge's detailed reasons for rejecting the appellant's credibility and accepting the complainant's, finding that the trial judge had engaged in specific analysis of the sexual assault counts and properly considered the complainant's continued relationship with the appellant.

The court concluded that the appellant's credibility-based grounds of appeal did not meet the "not frivolous" threshold required for release pending appeal.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The appeal challenged the admissibility of his in-court statements, the trial judge's refusal to leave self-defence and provocation with the jury, and the 17-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding the statements were not protected, not analogous to an aborted guilty plea, and the appellant had an operating mind.

It also upheld the trial judge's finding that there was no air of reality to self-defence or provocation.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed, as the parole ineligibility period was deemed fit given the brutality of the murder.

The accused, a police officer, was targeted in an undercover corruption investigation.

He was charged with 14 offences arising from his interactions with an undercover officer posing as his partner and another undercover officer posing as a mid-level organized crime figure.

The court found the accused guilty of theft and uttering forged documents for keeping money intended for a fictitious confidential informant and forging the receipt.

He was also found guilty of unauthorized use of a computer and breach of trust for running licence plates for personal reasons and to assist the undercover drug dealer.

The accused was found guilty of possessing a firearm obtained by crime and possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose after he stole a police shotgun in preparation for robbing a drug warehouse.

However, he was acquitted of attempted robbery because his extensive planning had not progressed beyond mere preparation.

He was also convicted of trafficking cocaine by offer and trafficking steroids to the undercover officer.

The Crown applied for an order to retain seized material for an additional year in a complex criminal investigation involving Fortress Real Capital Inc. and related entities.

The investigation, initiated in 2018, concerned allegations of investor fraud through misrepresentation of property values and investment eligibility.

The court granted the application, finding the investigation to be complex due to the large volume of electronic and hard copy material, the need for professional assistance (computer experts, accountants), and significant delays caused by extensive solicitor-client privilege claims over seized documents.

The court emphasized that while asserting privilege is legitimate, it contributed to the complexity and delay, justifying further detention of the material until June 22, 2021.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his application to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity under s. 276 and in admitting the deceased complainant's preliminary inquiry testimony under s. 715.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's rulings, noting the s. 276 application was based on an improper foundation of questions asked in violation of the section at the preliminary inquiry.

The court also upheld the admission of the preliminary inquiry testimony and the trial judge's credibility assessments, dismissing the appeal.

Following trial, the defendant was convicted of breach of trust by a public officer contrary to section 122 of the Criminal Code and attempt to obstruct, pervert, or defeat the course of justice contrary to section 139(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought a conditional sentence of nine months, while defence counsel sought a conditional discharge with six months probation.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of three months to be served in the community, finding that a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest and that a suspended sentence would be insufficient, while a conditional sentence was consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing.

A York Region paralegal regional prosecutor was charged with breach of trust by a public officer contrary to section 122 of the Criminal Code and attempt to obstruct, pervert, or defeat the course of justice contrary to section 139(2) of the Criminal Code.

The charges arose from her involvement in Provincial Offences Act prosecutions where she allegedly used her position to improperly influence outcomes.

The Crown relied on intercepted communications between the accused and a police officer showing discussions about favorable dispositions for individuals connected to the officer.

The trial judge found the accused guilty on both counts based on evidence relating to two specific events: the Carlton Wills matter and the Nicholas Guarino matter.

The judge found that the accused had breached her duty by giving preferential treatment based on personal relationships rather than proper prosecutorial discretion.

The accused was charged with breach of trust by a public officer and attempt to obstruct, pervert, or defeat the course of justice.

The accused applied to exclude her statement to police on the basis that her Charter rights were infringed.

The court found multiple breaches of section 10(b) rights (right to counsel) and section 8 rights (protection against unreasonable search and seizure).

The police failed to immediately inform the accused of her right to counsel, delayed providing access to counsel without reasonable justification, and obtained the accused's phone password before she had an opportunity to speak with counsel.

The court excluded the statement under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that all three Grant factors favored exclusion.

The accused, a York Region paralegal regional prosecutor, was charged with breach of trust by a public officer and attempt to obstruct, pervert, or defeat the course of justice.

She brought an application to stay the charges or exclude evidence, alleging violations of her Charter rights under sections 7, 8, and 11(d) based on the disclosure and use of a Substantive Event Summary containing intercepted communications.

The court found no violation of the accused's Charter rights and dismissed the application, finding that the police disclosure fell within statutory exemptions and was carried out reasonably.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death following a collision between two tractor trailers on Highway 11 near Val Gagne, Ontario on January 11, 2016.

The appellant was sentenced to three years' incarceration plus a five-year driving prohibition.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: that the trial judge erred in considering a near-miss incident with a Home Hardware truck as part of the dangerous driving offence; that the circumstances did not constitute a marked departure from the standard of care; and that insufficient reasons were provided.

The appellant also sought to appeal the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The Crown appealed the respondent's sentence for sexual interference, arguing it was demonstrably unfit.

The respondent was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault (conditionally stayed) following a jury trial.

The offences involved sexual contact with a 15-year-old complainant who was severely intoxicated.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of six months' imprisonment, reduced to 90 days intermittent upon credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence too lenient and substituted an 18-month sentence, but stayed execution of the remaining custodial portion based on the respondent's rehabilitation efforts and time served in the community without reoffence.

The appellant appealed her conviction for fraud over $5,000, alleging that her guilty plea was uninformed and involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant suffered from a permanent intellectual development disorder with an IQ of 42, spoke limited English, and could not read or write in English or Tamil.

Her counsel met with her primarily in the presence of her father and a Tamil interpreter, and advised her to plead guilty.

The appellant did not understand the implications of the plea, particularly the impact of the restitution order on her future social assistance eligibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant was not informed of the consequences of her guilty plea, constituting a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered, but the court exercised its discretion to enter a stay of proceedings in the interests of justice, considering the appellant's intellectual disability, financial hardship, and personal progress.