Mabel Lai

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his sentence of 15 years' parole ineligibility.

The victim was fatally stabbed in the head with a screwdriver during a car break-in.

The Crown's case relied on testimony from an associate that the appellant struck the fatal blow, while the appellant claimed the associate was responsible.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: admission of similar fact evidence, failure to give a proper limiting instruction on such evidence, permitting lengthy re-examination of a witness, and admission of an autopsy photograph.

The appellant also appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm.

On appeal, he challenged the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, jury instructions on incapacity and consent, and the trial judge's response to jury questions regarding bodily harm and consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's discretionary decisions regarding admissibility of prior sexual assault evidence and counselling records, the exclusion of a prior consistent statement, the instruction on incapacity as part of the Crown's case, and the response to jury questions regarding the relationship between bodily harm and consent.

The appellant, a registered investment advisor, was convicted of fraud over $5,000 in connection with a large-scale Ponzi-type scheme perpetrated over eight years.

He defrauded fourteen complainants of $413,500 by falsely representing that their money would be invested in shares or positions in various companies.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony as implausible and found he had deliberately misled complainants about the nature and risks of their investments, ultimately converting the funds to his own use.

The appellant was sentenced to four years in custody with restitution and fine in lieu of forfeiture orders.

On appeal, the conviction was upheld and the sentence was partially modified to include an additional restitution order and increase the fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The Crown applied for a search warrant under s. 487 of the Criminal Code to search the accused's password-protected smartphone, along with an assistance order under s. 487.02 to compel the accused to unlock the device.

The court granted the search warrant but dismissed the application for the assistance order.

The court held that compelling the accused to reveal his password or unlock the phone would violate his right to pre-trial silence and protection against self-incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter, and that the use immunity proposed by the Crown was insufficient to cure the breach.

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions, with a majority substantially adopting Justice Nordheimer’s reasons and a dissent that would have allowed the appeal for reasons substantially aligned with Justice Pardu.

The accused, an on-duty police officer, was convicted of dangerous driving causing death after striking a pedestrian while driving at a high speed to catch up with a surveillance team.

The Crown sought a 12-month jail term, while the defence sought a non-custodial disposition.

The court found genuine remorse and a diminished need for general deterrence compared to other driving fatalities.

The accused was sentenced to 8 months' imprisonment.

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) sought to unseal the remaining redacted portions (approximately 25%) of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant related to an RCMP investigation into alleged investor fraud by Fortress Real Capital Inc. and associated entities.

The Crown resisted, arguing that further disclosure would compromise the ongoing investigation and prejudice innocent third parties.

The court, applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, found that the Crown had justified the redactions, citing a serious and specific risk to the integrity of the investigation due to undisclosed law enforcement techniques and the potential for specific financial harm to an innocent person.

The court also noted the ongoing nature of the investigation and the large volume of unanalyzed seized material as factors supporting continued redaction of other third parties' identities.

The application for further unsealing was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm while prohibited, uttering death threats, kidnapping, unlawful confinement, robbery, break and enter, mischief, and pointing a firearm.

The crimes involved armed home invasions in London.

The case depended entirely on eyewitness identification evidence, which was replete with problems.

The trial judge failed to provide adequate instructions regarding the dangers of in-dock identification and the flaws in the photo lineup procedure.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict unreasonable, as no reasonable jury could have convicted on the evidence presented, and entered acquittals on all counts.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and designated a dangerous offender with an indeterminate sentence.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the evidence of sexual assault of an unconscious, highly intoxicated complainant was overwhelming.

On the sentence appeal, the court confirmed that the trial judge's findings satisfied the requirements of intractability and high likelihood of harmful recidivism established in R. v. Boutilier.

The court rejected arguments regarding misapprehension of prior criminal record, consideration of unproven allegations, and failure to consider Gladue factors and alternative measures.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death and "over 80" causing death following a motor vehicle accident in which his cousin Aaron Knapman died.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant or Aaron was driving at the time of the accident.

The Crown's theory was that the two had switched places after leaving a party.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on evidence from an accident reconstructionist combined with the appellant's post-offence conduct, including multiple false statements to bystanders and police.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: that the trial judge erred in inferring guilt from disbelief of his testimony, that the trial judge erred in treating his falsehoods as fabricated statements, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the law and that the evidence, viewed as a whole, supported the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of criminal harassment by threatening conduct based on her legal name change to that of Mark McBride, with whom she had been obsessed for over a decade.

The trial judge found her not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) due to Delusional Disorder, Erotomanic Type.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the NCRMD verdict was tainted by legal error.

The trial judge had conflated the issues of whether the appellant knew her act was wrong with whether her mental disorder rendered her incapable of knowing it was wrong.

The court substituted convictions and imposed a conditional discharge with one year probation.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 14.5 years incarceration (plus 6 months time served) for armed bank robbery, carrying a weapon, wearing a disguise with intent, and money laundering.

The trial judge imposed a parole ineligibility order under section 743.6 of the Criminal Code, requiring the appellant to serve at least half the sentence before parole eligibility.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit as it departed from the principle of proportionality and resulted from errors in principle, including overemphasis on deterrence and public safety while dismissing rehabilitation prospects despite the appellant's substance abuse and mental health issues.

The court reduced the sentence to 10 years inclusive of time served.

The appellant appealed his conviction on three counts of fraud over $5,000 and his sentence.

The appellant challenged the lawfulness of his detention by police and raised Charter breaches under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the police detention was lawful, as officers had authority to investigate a vehicle parked in an empty community centre parking lot at 3:00 a.m. with its motor running and lights on.

The court declined to address the section 10 Charter issues as they were not raised at trial.

The court affirmed the conviction for fraud, finding the trial judge properly applied the elements of fraud and that the evidence supported guilt on all counts.

The court also found no error in principle in the sentencing decision and declined to interfere with the sentence imposed.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and break and enter following his participation in a home invasion during which another participant stabbed and killed a man.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the voluntariness of his statement to police, arguing that the interviewing officer's repeated inducements and threats rendered the confession involuntary.

The application judge had found the statement voluntary, concluding there was no quid pro quo because police made no explicit promises of assistance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred by applying too narrow a conception of inducements and threats.

The court held that the officer's veiled inducements of decreased jeopardy for speaking and threats of increased jeopardy for silence constituted an implicit quid pro quo.

Considering the appellant's age, Aboriginal background, repeated assertions of the right to silence, and the coercive nature of the interrogation, the court concluded the statement was not voluntarily made and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by reversing the onus of proof, requiring the appellant to explain bruises on the complainant when he had no such obligation.

The court also found that fresh evidence in the form of a CFS report on a penile swab, which showed no female DNA present, was of sufficient cogency to affect the verdict.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction on one count of sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

Originally charged on a sixteen-count indictment alleging sexual offences against three teenage girls under age 16, the Crown invited dismissal of thirteen counts.

The trial judge acquitted on sexual exploitation and sexual assault charges but convicted on sexual interference.

Seven months later, the trial judge set aside the sexual interference conviction and substituted a sexual assault conviction, imposing a suspended sentence and two years' probation.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: improper reliance on evidence of a witness regarding different counts, misapplication of the burden of proof, and inadequate reasons for differential credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law and provided sufficient reasons.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault on three grounds.

The first ground challenged the trial judge's finding that the appellant's Charter s. 10(b) rights were properly advised, arguing the police officer failed to inform him of his right to consult counsel in private.

The Court of Appeal rejected this ground, finding the trial judge properly ensured the appellant understood his rights and made an informed decision to speak without counsel.

The second ground challenged a misstatement regarding drug testing of the complainant, but the Court found this immaterial as the trial judge's finding of incapacity to consent was based on overwhelming evidence of intoxication.

The third ground challenged the trial judge's credibility finding regarding the appellant's fabricated evidence about drinking, but the Court found this finding was open to the trial judge and there were other unimpeachable reasons to reject the appellant's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application for a section 487 Criminal Code search warrant and a section 487.02 assistance order to compel the accused to provide passcodes or PIN codes to unlock his cell phone.

The accused opposed the assistance order.

The court found that while section 487.02 may apply to accused persons, the proposed assistance order violated the accused's section 7 Charter rights, specifically the principle against self-incrimination and the right to silence.

The court declined to issue the assistance order, finding that use immunity did not adequately address the compelled active participation of the accused in his own prosecution.

This appeal addressed whether informer privilege can protect an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip made to obstruct a police investigation.

The Court held privilege does not apply where, on a balance of probabilities, the caller intended to further criminal activity or interfere with the administration of justice.

It confirmed judges should presume privilege exists and determine applicability through in camera proceedings, often ex parte, with fairness safeguards for the defence.

The Court also confirmed judges may review the tip record and may require a preliminary exclusion or probity showing before full litigation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown prosecuted three accused on sexual assault charges arising from sexual activity in a hotel room after a night of drinking among off-duty colleagues.

The central issues were whether the complainant consented and whether she was incapable of consenting because of alcohol, an unknown drug, or both.

The court applied the reasonable doubt framework and the W.(D.) approach, finding serious reliability and credibility problems in the complainant's evidence, including inconsistencies with prior statements, video footage, text messages, and toxicology evidence.

Although sexual activity was established, the Crown failed to prove non-consent or incapacity beyond a reasonable doubt.

All three accused were acquitted.