Mabel Lai

The defendants were charged with sexual assault.

The Crown sought to admit expert toxicologist evidence regarding the effects of "date rape" drugs, consistent with the complainant's symptoms of incapacitation, despite no direct evidence of drug administration.

The defence objected, arguing irrelevance due to the absence of a drug charge and late disclosure of new testimonial details.

The court ruled the expert evidence admissible, finding it relevant to the issue of consent and the complainant's incapacitation, even without knowing the exact drug or its administration method.

The court noted that late disclosure, if remedied by adjournment, affects weight rather than admissibility.

Appeal from conviction for robbery and sentence imposed by Justice Eugene Ewaschuk on June 14 and June 29, 2010.

The appellant was convicted of robbery but acquitted of using an imitation firearm.

The appeal raised five grounds challenging the trial judge's conduct during cross-examination of the Crown's key witness, jury instructions on memory loss due to fear, absence of motive to fabricate, elements of the offence, and criticism of defence counsel's closing analogy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in applying the Truth in Sentencing Act to calculate pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant appealed an indeterminate sentence imposed for convictions of aggravated assault, sexual assault, forcible confinement, and uttering threats.

The sentencing judge had found the appellant to be a dangerous offender under the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that a determinate sentence of 10 years imprisonment followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order would adequately protect the public.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's analysis and conclusion that the appellant's proposed release and treatment plans could not adequately protect the public.

The appellant appealed his conviction for making a threatening gesture (throat-cutting gesture) and his sentence of eight months imprisonment followed by 18 months' probation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasoning.

The trial judge's finding that the appellant made a throat-cutting gesture was fully supported by evidence, including the complainant's testimony and the appellant's own statement.

The gesture was made with the requisite intent to threaten.

The sentence was upheld as appropriate given the seriousness of the offence, the vulnerability of the witness, and the need to protect the judicial process.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from an attack on the victim in his bedroom.

The appellant was acquitted of attempted murder, unlawful confinement, and assault with a weapon.

The trial judge found the appellant was one of three assailants based on evidence including his association with known assailants before and after the attack, the presence of the victim's blood on the appellant's pants, and corroborating testimony.

The Court of Appeal rejected four grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, firearm offences, and attempt to obstruct justice, receiving a global sentence of 8 years.

He appealed his conviction and 2.5-year consecutive sentence for obstruction of justice, which arose from passing a note to his co-accused during the preliminary inquiry asking her to lie about who possessed a gun.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably inferred the requisite intent.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was not unfit and the trial judge did not err in principle or double-count aggravating factors.

The accused, an on-duty police officer, was tried before a jury for dangerous driving causing death after striking a pedestrian while driving an unmarked police vehicle at 115 km/h.

At the pre-charge conference, the Crown requested that the included offence of dangerous operation simpliciter be left with the jury, arguing they might find the driving dangerous but have a reasonable doubt about causation due to the pedestrian jaywalking.

The trial judge ruled there was no air of reality to the included offence, finding that even if the pedestrian's actions were an intervening act, the dangerous driving remained a significant contributing cause of death.

The appellants were convicted in relation to the death of a young man who was assaulted twice in one night—first by Manasseri inside a bar, and then by Kenny outside.

Manasseri was convicted of second-degree murder, and Kenny of assault causing bodily harm.

On appeal, both argued their charges were improperly joined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the joinder ground.

However, the Court admitted fresh expert medical evidence regarding the cause of death, quashed Manasseri's conviction, and ordered a new trial.

For Kenny, the Court applied the newly released Jordan framework, found the 68-month delay unreasonable, and entered a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel and a breach of his section 14 Charter right to an interpreter.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding the ineffective assistance claim but found no miscarriage of justice, noting trial counsel's strategic decisions were reasonable.

The Court rejected the section 14 claim, finding the appellant understood the proceedings and did not require an interpreter.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and the sentence increasing his period of parole ineligibility.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on intoxication and the required intention for murder.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the relevance of intoxication to mens rea and adequately summarized the defence's position regarding an alcohol-induced blackout.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual assault, assault, choking, and forcible confinement.

He argued the trial judge relied on stereotypical notions of common sense and conducted an unbalanced credibility analysis.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or reliance on common sense, noting the trial judge meticulously reviewed the evidence, including security video and independent witness testimony.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence of 18 months minus a day was upheld as fit.

The accused was charged with driving over 80.

Upon arrest, the police informed him of his right to counsel.

When asked if he wanted to call a lawyer, the accused replied, 'No, not right now.' He subsequently provided breath samples at the police station without requesting to speak to counsel.

The trial judge found no violation of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights, concluding he had not invoked his right to counsel, and convicted him.

The summary conviction appeal judge overturned the conviction, finding the accused did not unequivocally waive his right to counsel.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the issue of waiver only arises after a detainee has invoked their right to counsel.

The trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding the accused had not invoked his rights.

The appellant appealed his four-year sentence for criminal harassment and assault of his former partner.

He argued the trial judge erred by denying 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody, sentencing him to a penitentiary term for treatment, and imposing a demonstrably unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in denying the 1.5:1 credit based on the likelihood of bail denial, applying the Summers principle to grant the enhanced credit.

However, the court dismissed the other grounds, finding the penitentiary sentence was not imposed solely for treatment and the four-year total sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the egregious domestic abuse.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's refusal to set aside his guilty plea to aggravated assault, arguing the plea was not unequivocal and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The trial judge had found the plea was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, and that trial counsel was effective.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge and finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice amounting to a miscarriage of justice arising from his trial counsel's conduct.

The appellant was convicted of a large-scale, complex fraud and sentenced to five years' imprisonment with a $100,000 restitution order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasoning, noting that denunciation and deterrence are dominant for such offences.

However, based on sealed material regarding post-sentence events, the parties consented to a sentence reduction.

The Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to three years.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's third reason for disbelieving the appellant—that he perjured himself at a PSA hearing—was unsupported by the trial record.

Because this error greatly affected the credibility assessment, the appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

Five police officers appealed their convictions for attempting to obstruct justice and perjury arising from a warrantless search of a drug suspect's apartment and subsequent efforts to conceal it.

The officers argued various trial errors, including Charter violations regarding the use of their preliminary inquiry testimony, improper jury instructions, and abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors.

The Crown cross-appealed the 45-day conditional sentences.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, finding the sentences demonstrably unfit for police officers committing perjury and obstruction of justice, and substituted 3-year custodial sentences, but stayed their operation due to the passage of time.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and making and possessing child pornography in relation to his nieces.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, improperly used similar fact evidence, reversed the burden of proof, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the reasons adequate, the similar fact evidence properly admitted, and no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or burden of proof.

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending his appeal from convictions for assault causing bodily harm and forcible seizure, for which he was sentenced to three and a half years in prison.

The court found that while the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would surrender into custody, his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court emphasized the viciousness of the offences, the applicant's history of breaching court orders, and the risk he posed to public safety, particularly given outstanding charges for a similar group attack.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless use of a firearm.

The trial judge found he fired a gun to scare a dog in a rural area but made no findings on how the gun was fired.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the conviction.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, finding that without findings on the manner the rifle was used or the trajectory of the projectile, the conviction could not be sustained.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.