Zahra Shariff

The appellant, Lydian Smith, appealed a Divisional Court decision affirming the Landlord and Tenant Board's finding that YouthLink Youth Services' transitional housing program was exempt from the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 under s. 5(k).

The Court of Appeal affirmed that s. 5(k) and the newer s. 5.1 can co-exist, and that "rehabilitative or therapeutic services" in s. 5(k) include broader support services beyond medical care.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board and Divisional Court correctly interpreted the statutory exemptions and that the YouthLink program fell within the s. 5(k) exemption.

The appellant, Tesean Alvarez, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace, arguing the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification reliability, Vetrovec warnings, exculpatory evidence, and cross-racial identification, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instructions on eyewitness identification were inadequate, particularly concerning flaws in the police identification process and the distinction between inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.

While other grounds of appeal were dismissed, the court concluded that the jury was not properly equipped to assess the identification evidence, which was central to the Crown's case.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Todd Howley, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, challenging the trial judge's admission of internet search evidence ("nail gun" searches) and the appropriateness of the Crown's closing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction.

The court found the internet search evidence relevant to planning and deliberation, and that the trial judge's timely curative instructions adequately addressed any impropriety in the Crown's closing, thus not warranting a mistrial or a stay of proceedings for abuse of process.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The appeal challenged the admissibility of his in-court statements, the trial judge's refusal to leave self-defence and provocation with the jury, and the 17-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding the statements were not protected, not analogous to an aborted guilty plea, and the appellant had an operating mind.

It also upheld the trial judge's finding that there was no air of reality to self-defence or provocation.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed, as the parole ineligibility period was deemed fit given the brutality of the murder.

The appellant, Jessy Herlichka, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing three errors by the trial judge: flawed instructions on the defence of intoxication, refusal to qualify a proposed defence expert in a specific area of expertise, and an inadequate curative instruction after a Crown witness suggested the appellant murdered the victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions on intoxication, the limitation of expert testimony, or the curative instruction, concluding that the jury was properly equipped to determine the requisite state of mind for murder.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of six months' imprisonment and three years' probation imposed on the respondent for the sexual assault of a nine-year-old child.

The trial judge had prioritized the respondent's health issues, specifically his reliance on a prosthetic leg, over principles of deterrence and denunciation.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge overemphasized the health issues without evidence that incarceration would cause undue hardship.

The sentence was varied to six months of actual imprisonment followed by 18 months of probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking various drugs, challenging the trial judge's refusal to permit cross-examination of the affiant on the information to obtain the search warrant and the trial judge's conclusion that the warrant was validly issued.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions, finding that while the reasons were imprecise, they were sufficient to permit appellate review when considered in context.

The court found no error in refusing cross-examination on the confidential informant's track record or criminal history, and determined that the information provided by the informant met the Debot criteria for reliability and was sufficiently corroborated to justify the warrant's issuance.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder on the grounds of Crown non-disclosure.

The Crown failed to disclose medical records relating to the appellant's mother's health until partway through the appellant's cross-examination.

These records were relevant to the appellant's defence that his mother, rather than the appellant, killed the victim.

The trial judge initially dismissed the mistrial application, expecting that expert evidence would neutralize any prejudice.

However, the expert changed his evidence at trial.

The Court of Appeal found a reasonable possibility that the non-disclosure affected the overall fairness of the trial process and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his sentence for manslaughter imposed following a guilty plea.

The appellant did not challenge the length of the sentence itself but argued that the trial judge erred in calculating the credit ratio for time spent in custody in the penitentiary following his initial murder conviction, before this court allowed his appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant sought 1.5:1 credit for this time.

The Court of Appeal found that even if an error occurred in the credit calculation, it did not impact the fitness of the sentence ultimately imposed.

The sentencing judge had determined that a net additional sentence of one year was appropriate to reflect proportionality and applicable sentencing objectives.

The appeal was dismissed.