Lisa Dianne Mathews

The appellant appealed his convictions and life sentence for terrorism-related offences, including conspiracy to commit murder.

He raised several grounds of appeal, arguing the trial judge erred in handling national security privilege claims during O'Connor and Garofoli applications, failing to sever his trial from a disruptive co-accused, misdirecting the jury on the law of conspiracy, and finding the co-accused fit for sentencing.

He also alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias based on an out-of-court comment by the trial judge praising an undercover agent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no procedural or legal errors that compromised trial fairness, and upheld the life sentence as fit for the gravity of the offences.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import narcotics in association with a criminal organization.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule (the Carter analysis) and that the conspiracy conviction was inconsistent with his acquittal on a related trafficking charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were functional and not confusing, and that the disparate verdicts were intelligible given the distinct evidence and theories for each charge.

Cameron Ortis, convicted of offences under the Security of Information Act and Criminal Code, sought bail pending appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court granted bail, finding that the appeal was not frivolous, the applicant would surrender into custody, and detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The decision emphasized the significant reviewability interest due to novel issues raised on appeal, including the constitutional validity of s. 14 of the SOIA and the impact of s. 38 Canada Evidence Act redactions on the right to a fair trial, which outweighed the enforceability interest given the strict bail conditions and absence of flight or public safety concerns.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and uttering a death threat, arguing that the wiretap authorization that led to his arrest was unconstitutional.

He contended that sections 185 and 186 of the Criminal Code violate section 8 of the Charter by allowing private communications to be intercepted based on a 'may assist' standard rather than a 'will assist' standard for specific individuals, places, and devices.

A five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming prior jurisprudence that the 'will assist' standard applies to the authorization as a whole, while the 'may assist' standard for naming known persons is constitutionally compliant given the prospective nature of wiretaps and the robust statutory safeguards in place.

The appellant, Thanh Nguyen, appealed his convictions for several possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime offences.

He argued that the verdicts were unreasonable, alleging that the trial judge erred by convicting him on circumstantial evidence that supported innocent inferences, engaged in illogical reasoning, and that the verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittal on a firearm charge.

He also contended that the trial judge erred in admitting unqualified opinion evidence from a police officer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable and any error in admitting opinion evidence harmless under the curative proviso.

Kevin Tran appealed his convictions for narcotics, proceeds of crime, and firearm offences.

He argued that the verdicts were unreasonable, the trial judge erred in not excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the trial judge erred in not staying proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b).

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable, the s. 24(2) decision correct (despite an unconstitutional warrant, evidence was admissible due to good faith), and the s. 11(b) delay justified by exceptional circumstances related to a joint trial.

This is a motion brought by Raed Jaser, an appellant in a terrorism-related conviction appeal, seeking production of a post-sentence psychiatric report pertaining to his co-accused, Chiheb Esseghaier.

Jaser argues the report is necessary to support a fresh evidence application on appeal, contending that if Esseghaier was unfit to stand trial, it could constitute a miscarriage of justice for Jaser.

The Crown opposed the production.

The Court of Appeal, applying the Trotta and McNeil factors, found that Jaser met the prima facie entitlement for production.

Given Esseghaier's privacy interests as a non-party, the court ordered the psychiatric assessment to be produced to the panel for in camera inspection, reserving the decision on full production to the parties.

The accused, charged with four counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder arising from a vehicle attack on a Muslim family, applied for a change of venue.

The accused argued that extensive media coverage, community events, and political commentary in London, Ontario, rendered it impossible to select an impartial jury there.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that publicity was widespread and safeguards like challenges for cause were sufficient.

The court granted the application, finding that the saturation of local coverage and the community's sense of personal violation created a risk of subconscious bias that warranted moving the trial to ensure a fair and impartial jury.

The applicant challenged the constitutional validity of s. 577 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the Attorney General's power to direct an indictment without providing reasons or a preliminary hearing violates s. 7 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding that binding precedent establishes there is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing and that core prosecutorial discretion, including the decision to direct an indictment, is not subject to routine judicial review absent an abuse of process.

This decision addresses the appellant's desire to abandon his appeal, raising concerns about his current mental capacity.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario determined it has the discretion to reject a Notice of Abandonment if the appellant lacks capacity, likening the test to that for entering a guilty plea.

The court decided to proceed to a second stage of analysis to determine whether to accept the abandonment, setting a case management conference to explore the evidentiary record on capacity and offering to appoint counsel for the appellant for this limited purpose.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest.

Trial counsel had previously represented the appellant's co-accused (her former husband), who was discharged after providing a statutory declaration denying knowledge of the drugs.

Counsel then represented the appellant, despite her denial of guilt and desire to plead not guilty.

Counsel conceded that the case's outcome hinged solely on a search warrant challenge, without consulting the appellant.

When the challenge failed, counsel proceeded with a nolo contendere procedure, resulting in a finding of guilt without a guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found a clear conflict of interest, as counsel's duty to the former co-accused was adverse to the appellant's interests, rendering the verdict unreliable and a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered, with the Crown indicating no re-prosecution.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and conspiracy to possess heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The primary ground of appeal was the extraordinary delay (over four years) by the trial judge in delivering written reasons for judgment after announcing the verdicts.

The Court of Appeal found that this prolonged delay, coupled with the complexity of the case, rebutted the presumption of judicial integrity and impartiality, rendering the reasons an "after-the-fact justification." Consequently, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown brought a motion to summarily dismiss the responding parties' application for disclosure under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The responding parties sought disclosure of alleged out-of-court communications between the trial judge and an FBI handler, which were referenced in a book published by an undercover agent, to support a reasonable apprehension of bias claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's motion, finding it premature to conclude the bias claim could not succeed, and ordered the Crown to make further inquiries regarding the alleged communications.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking cocaine, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime, as well as his 20-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility, denying a change of venue, finding reasonable grounds for his arrest, and upholding the lawfulness of a strip search.

He also challenged the pre-trial custody credit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the credibility assessment, no error in the venue decision, and that the arrest and subsequent searches were lawful and Charter-compliant.

The court also deferred to the trial judge's discretionary calculation of pre-sentence credit.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code pending his re-trial on terrorism charges.

Before the terms of release were finalized, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the applicant's convictions, resulting in him serving a life sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 680 application as moot, noting that any future application for release must be brought under s. 679 for bail pending appeal.

A publication ban under s. 517 was also lifted.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order pending his retrial for terrorist-related offences.

The bail judge had dismissed his application on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The reviewing judge found the bail judge erred by misapprehending a risk assessment, failing to address the applicant's present ideology, and considering irrelevant factors regarding the proposed sureties.

Fresh evidence regarding trial delay, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the applicant's rehabilitation was admitted.

The application was allowed, and the applicant was released on strict bail conditions including house arrest, electronic monitoring, and four sureties.

Seven appellants appealed their convictions for offences relating to a conspiracy to import and traffic in cocaine, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing their applications for a stay of proceedings based on breach of their Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The appellants contended that the 30-month presumptive ceiling under the Jordan framework should not apply because the Crown preferred an indictment, thereby creating a one-stage proceeding subject to an 18-month ceiling.

They also argued that delay in preferring the indictment constituted "wasted" time and that systemic or institutional delay was not adequately considered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the 30-month ceiling applied to cases tried in superior court regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry occurred, that the Crown's delay in preferring the indictment was justified and did not constitute wasted time, and that the case's particular complexity justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of 486 grams of heroin for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, and her four-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the test for wilful blindness and that the evidence supported his findings.

The Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the appellant's difficult background involving serious violence, her rehabilitative potential, and her community involvement.

The Court also found that the trial judge erroneously relied on unrelated criminal conduct as an aggravating factor.

The custodial portion of the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after returning to Canada from Panama with two suitcases containing 1.5 kilograms of cocaine in secret compartments.

She claimed she was unaware of the drugs.

The Court of Appeal allowed her appeal on the basis that the trial judge admitted inadmissible expert evidence regarding courier knowledge without proper jury instructions, and ordered a new trial.

The court found that expert testimony suggesting couriers know they are carrying drugs constituted impermissible anecdotal evidence under R. v. Sekhon that invited the jury to reason from generalized conclusions about other cases to the appellant's specific state of mind.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of oxycodone for the purposes of trafficking and possession of cocaine, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted the appeal from the trafficking conviction and substituted a conviction for simple possession of oxycodone.

The appeal from the cocaine possession conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and a sentence of time served was substituted in place of the original sentence.