Lisa Dianne Mathews

The Crown appealed an acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a police search of a hotel bedroom was not a justified safety search and in excluding the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the officers had predetermined to conduct the search before arriving, which supported the trial judge's conclusion that there was no reasonable apprehension of imminent harm.

The Court found no basis to interfere with the exclusion of evidence, as the trial judge did not find the search was conducted in good faith.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that upheld his conviction.

The appellant argued that the unusual fact situation required the court to grant leave regarding the law of entrapment.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding the law of entrapment well settled and its application to the facts uncontroversial.

The applicant corporation sought the return of $144,050 in cash seized by police during a drug and money laundering investigation targeting its former director.

The applicant argued it was the lawful owner of the funds, which it claimed were a business float, and that the funds were not required for the pending criminal proceedings.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that it was the lawful owner of the funds, and that the funds were required as evidence for the upcoming preliminary inquiry and trial.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction and sentence arising from an incident where he retained half of a quantity of marijuana that had been turned over to him while on duty during an internal police investigation.

He argued that the police investigation constituted entrapment and amounted to impermissible random virtue testing under the principles set out in R v Barnes.

The court held that the police had reasonable suspicion based on prior information suggesting chronic marijuana use by the appellant and that the reverse sting operation was a legitimate investigative step.

The court concluded there was no entrapment or abuse of process and upheld both the conviction and sentence, emphasizing the breach of trust inherent in the conduct of a serving police officer.

The accused brought an application to exclude evidence of drugs found during a vehicle search, arguing his arrest was arbitrary and the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The police had intercepted communications and conducted surveillance indicating the accused was transporting drugs.

The court found the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused based on this evidence.

The subsequent search of the vehicle was a valid search incident to arrest, and as a passenger, the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused brought a motion to sever multiple drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking counts so that each would be tried separately before a jury.

The defence argued that the accused intended to testify on some counts but not others and that a joint trial would undermine the right to remain silent by exposing the accused to cross‑examination on all counts.

Applying the interests of justice framework from R. v. Last, the court considered both the accused’s fair trial rights and society’s interest in efficient proceedings.

The court concluded that trying the possession counts together with the earlier trafficking counts could create unfairness if the accused chose to testify on some counts but not others.

Counts 3 and 4 were severed from counts 1 and 2, while counts 1 and 2 remained joined for trial.

Sentencing decision following guilty pleas to multiple counts of trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The offender supplied large kilogram quantities of methamphetamine to an undercover police officer and was found with additional kilograms during the execution of search warrants.

The court rejected the defence claim that the offending was driven by a serious opioid addiction, finding instead that the offender was an experienced and sophisticated wholesaler motivated by profit.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for large-scale drug trafficking at a high level of the supply chain, the court imposed a global sentence of 12 years' imprisonment along with firearms prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture.

The appellant sought to appeal a forfeiture order regarding Hell's Angels paraphernalia seized from his residence.

During his sentencing, the appellant disavowed any interest in the property, claiming it belonged to the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Corporation.

He chose not to participate in the subsequent forfeiture proceedings.

After the Corporation's appeal of the forfeiture order was dismissed as abandoned, the appellant attempted to appeal the order himself.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it would be an abuse of process to allow the appellant to challenge an order made in proceedings he deliberately chose to ignore.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to grant a stay of proceedings based on the Crown's failure to disclose telewarrant documents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a stay is a remedy of last resort and should only be granted where there is no other adequate remedy or irreparable prejudice.

The court found that any prejudice could have been remedied by an adjournment, a mistrial, or allowing the withdrawal of admissions.

The stay was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a directed verdict of acquittal entered by the trial judge in a drug trafficking case.

The trial judge had ruled that the testimony of the alleged purchaser was essential to support a conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding ample basis in the police officer's testimony to infer a drug transaction occurred, and held that the trial judge erred in law.

The acquittal was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was stopped for stunt driving and his vehicle was impounded under the Highway Traffic Act.

During an inventory search of the vehicle, police opened a bag and found cocaine and marijuana.

The appellant appealed his drug convictions, arguing the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights because inventory searches should be limited to itemizing visible property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that police are entitled to search and itemize the contents of bags and containers during an inventory search to properly safeguard the property.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a youth charged with drug possession for the purpose of trafficking.

Police officers conducted a random, warrantless search of a high school using a sniffer dog, which reacted to the youth's unattended backpack in the gymnasium.

The police searched the backpack and found marijuana and psilocybin.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the dog sniff and subsequent physical search violated the youth's section 8 Charter rights, as students have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their backpacks and the search was not authorized by law or conducted reasonably.

The court affirmed the exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant appealed the custodial sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to give serious consideration to a conditional sentence, instead simply indicating a preference for a custodial sentence.

The appeal was allowed, and a 30-day conditional sentence was substituted.

The respondent, a registered owner of semi-automatic firearms, sought to acquire a fully automatic Thompson submachine gun from another collector.

The Registrar of Firearms refused to issue a registration certificate, but a summary conviction appeal court judge allowed the respondent's appeal, finding he was grandfathered under s. 12(5) of the Firearms Act.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that s. 12(2) is the exclusive grandfathering provision for fully automatic firearms, and s. 12(5) cannot be used by owners of semi-automatic weapons to acquire fully automatic ones, consistent with the Act's public safety purpose.