Philip R. Campbell

The appellants, Orville Campbell and Stanton David, appealed their convictions for first-degree murder.

They argued the verdict was unreasonable due to insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation and alleged errors in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal found the first-degree murder verdict unreasonable, concluding that the evidence did not establish planning and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly given the rapid sequence of events.

The court substituted the convictions with second-degree murder.

It dismissed all grounds for a new trial on second-degree murder, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions regarding post-offence conduct, the Vetrovec warning for a key witness, pathology evidence, or the use of the deceased's criminal record.

This is an appeal from convictions for breach of trust against an Ontario Provincial Police officer, Cst.

Kara Darnley, related to two incidents: the "witness record incident" and the "drug investigation file incidents." The Crown alleged Cst.

Darnley abused her position out of loyalty to her fiancé.

The trial judge convicted her of breach of trust for both incidents but acquitted her of obstruction of justice for the witness record incident.

Cst.

Darnley appealed, citing errors in jury directions on reasonable doubt and the "public good" element of breach of trust, inconsistent verdicts, and misapplication of the entrapment defence.

The Court of Appeal found significant errors in the reasonable doubt instruction and that the verdicts for the witness record incident were inconsistent.

It also found errors in the entrapment analysis, specifically regarding the "average person" test and the elevation of moral standards for police officers.

The appeal was allowed, with an acquittal substituted for the witness record breach of trust conviction and a new trial ordered for the drug investigation file breach of trust conviction.

Two appellants were convicted of murder arising from a shooting in Toronto allegedly motivated by street gang rivalries.

The appellants appealed their convictions on four grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting expert opinion evidence on street gangs from a Toronto Police Service detective; (2) the trial judge erred in admitting handwritten rap lyrics seized from an apartment; (3) the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification evidence; and (4) the trial judge's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and the sentence appeal, finding that while the trial judge committed an error in principle regarding expert evidence bias analysis, the evidence was properly admitted.

The court also found the jury instructions on eyewitness identification were adequate and fair, and that the trial judge's conduct, though at times harsh, did not demonstrate bias when viewed contextually.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder in the fatal shooting of a victim inside a bar.

The critical evidence was security camera footage showing two men in a stairwell moments before the shooting.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant was one of the men and was holding a gun.

The trial judge opined in his jury charge that the dark object appeared to be a gun, despite the Crown's earlier concession that the object was not clearly identifiable as a gun.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's opinion compromised the appellant's right to a fair trial by improperly intervening on a critical factual issue and emboldening the Crown to withdraw its concession.

The court also addressed issues regarding identification evidence and improper Crown speculation about a disabled security monitor.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

A 15-year-old appellant was convicted of first degree murder under sections 229(c) and 231(4)(a) of the Criminal Code after a police officer was killed during a traffic stop.

The officer attempted to remove the appellant from a stolen vehicle, became trapped as the vehicle accelerated, and was ejected and killed when the vehicle became airborne.

The appellant claimed he did not intentionally accelerate the vehicle and that pedal misapplication occurred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider the appellant's age and level of maturity when assessing whether he knew his dangerous driving was likely to cause death.

The court also found errors regarding the Crown's closing address and the exclusion of a prior consistent statement.

The respondent was convicted of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a loaded firearm.

Following conviction, the respondent brought a motion to stay proceedings claiming a breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to post-verdict delay.

The trial judge granted the stay, applying the Jordan presumptive ceiling to the entire period from charge to sentencing.

The Crown appealed, arguing that post-verdict delay should be assessed separately and without presumptive ceilings.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, establishing that while Jordan principles apply to post-verdict delay, a separate five-month presumptive ceiling applies to post-verdict proceedings, distinct from the pre-verdict ceilings.

The court found that the post-verdict delay, after deducting time attributable to an exceptional circumstance (a Part XXIV dangerous offender application), fell below the five-month ceiling and therefore did not constitute a breach of section 11(b).

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching but acquitted of sexual assault, all charges arising from the same facts and evidence.

The appellant appealed on the ground that the verdicts were inconsistent and therefore unreasonable.

The Crown cross-appealed the acquittal, arguing that confusing jury instructions explained the inconsistency.

A five-judge panel was convened to resolve conflicting authorities regarding the role of jury instructions in inconsistent verdict analysis.

The majority held that the Supreme Court's guidance in R. v. F. (J.) provides authoritative direction: if the Crown wishes to respond to an inconsistent verdict argument by asserting that an acquittal resulted from legal error in instructions, it must appeal the acquittal.

The majority found the instructions legally correct and declined to order a retrial, instead entering acquittals on the conviction counts.

The dissent would have allowed both appeals and ordered a new trial on all counts, finding the charge confusing when viewed as a whole.

Seven appellants appealed their convictions for offences relating to a conspiracy to import and traffic in cocaine, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing their applications for a stay of proceedings based on breach of their Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The appellants contended that the 30-month presumptive ceiling under the Jordan framework should not apply because the Crown preferred an indictment, thereby creating a one-stage proceeding subject to an 18-month ceiling.

They also argued that delay in preferring the indictment constituted "wasted" time and that systemic or institutional delay was not adequately considered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the 30-month ceiling applied to cases tried in superior court regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry occurred, that the Crown's delay in preferring the indictment was justified and did not constitute wasted time, and that the case's particular complexity justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a fatal stabbing outside an Ottawa nightclub.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the conviction was unreasonable, focusing on whether the evidence supported the finding of planning and deliberation required for first degree murder.

The court found that while the appellant's guilt of murder was established, the evidence did not support the conclusion that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The court substituted a conviction for second degree murder, finding that the attack appeared impulsive rather than the product of a calculated scheme.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following a jury trial.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant had knowledge of 100 kg of cocaine secreted in his truck at a border crossing.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that his section 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when he made an incriminating statement to CBSA agents; (2) that the trial judge erred in leaving willful blindness with the jury; and (3) that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof in her re-charge on possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

Appeal from conviction for drug-related offences and breach of recognizance.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of evidence seized during a search warrant execution at his residence.

The trial judge dismissed the s. 8 Charter motion based on a redacted information to obtain (ITO).

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in concluding the redacted ITO contained sufficient grounds to support the search warrant.

The court determined that the confidential informant information was insufficiently reliable, with weak credibility assessment, inadequate corroboration, and non-compelling information regarding whether the firearm would be at the searched location.

The court also found the ITO contained misleading language suggesting the target lived at the residence when he did not.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and acquittals were entered on all counts.

The appellants sought leave to appeal their first-degree murder convictions and sought to introduce fresh evidence in the form of a recantation by key Crown witness Ronnie Khananisho.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to admit the fresh evidence and confirmed the prior panel's dismissal of the appellants' appeals from conviction.

The court found that while the recantation was admissible and the due diligence requirement was satisfied, the evidence failed the cogency test.

The recantation suffered from serious credibility issues, including implausible origins involving contact with the incarcerated appellant's former girlfriend, and could not reasonably be expected to have affected the trial verdict given that the central witnesses were Jorge Restrepo and Jorge Acosta, whose testimony was corroborated by powerful independent evidence including cellphone records and medical evidence.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and simple assault (included offence on choking charge) and acquitted of threatening death following an altercation with his wife.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury there was no evidence the pot of spaghetti sauce fell from the stove rather than being poured by the appellant, and (2) that the trial judge erred in allowing Officer Henderson to testify about the appearance of neck injuries as fingerprints.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated sexual assault in the death of a 29-year-old woman found naked in a wooded park in Guelph.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on DNA evidence linking the appellant to the deceased, forensic entomology evidence establishing time of death, and toxicology evidence showing cocaine in the deceased's blood.

The trial judge admitted evidence of a subsequent assault by the appellant on another sex worker (the "Barrie incident") to establish motive and rebut innocent association.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: admissibility of the Barrie incident evidence, unreasonableness of the verdict on causation and fault elements, and adequacy of jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Barrie incident evidence was wrongfully admitted and that the jury instructions on the fault element in murder were deficient.

The appellant was convicted at a second trial of four counts of sexual exploitation involving two teenaged girls from the Netherlands who stayed at his family home in 1997 and 2001.

The appellant's first convictions were overturned on appeal and a new trial was ordered.

At the second trial, the trial judge admitted evidence concerning a "mouse incident" that had resulted in an acquittal at the first trial, to challenge the credibility of one complainant.

The trial judge found both complainants credible and rejected the appellant's categorical denials.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and reasoning.

The applicants, sought for extradition, applied for disclosure of U.S. customs and Canadian police notes, Information to Obtain (ITOs) for search warrants and production orders, and communications between prosecutors.

They alleged breaches of Charter rights (ss. 8 and 9) due to warrantless searches and non-compliance with seizure reporting, and abuse of process (s. 7) regarding the timing of Canadian charge withdrawals.

The court found an air of reality to the s. 8 claims regarding the initial warrantless border search of electronic devices and the failure to comply with s. 489.1 of the Criminal Code, ordering disclosure of the notes and ITOs.

However, the s. 9 argument regarding arrest and the s. 7 abuse of process claim lacked an air of reality, and disclosure of prosecutorial communications was denied.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for driving a taxi from which a youth shot and killed the deceased.

The Crown's case relied on evidence from two witnesses: the front-seat passenger who testified that the appellant knew of the plan to kill the deceased, and the shooter himself who testified that the appellant had no knowledge of his plan.

The trial judge made numerous interventions during the shooter's testimony, expressing disparaging views about his credibility and reliability.

The trial judge also gave a Vetrovec instruction regarding the shooter's evidence, permitted re-examination of the passenger on prior consistent statements, and instructed the jury on the standard of proof.

The appellant appealed on five grounds.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in law by impermissibly using the complainant's text messages for the truth of their contents and to corroborate her testimony, and by failing to consider plausible innocent explanations for the appellant's text messages.

The appellate court found these were errors of law, concluding that without the impermissible evidence, there was insufficient proof of absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

Application for release from custody pending a new trial ordered by the Court of Appeal.

The applicant was convicted of second degree murder in connection with the death of a young man following an assault in an Ottawa bar on New Year's Eve 2005.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial based on fresh expert evidence regarding the mechanism of death.

The applicant had previously been released pending appeal but breached his recognizance by contacting a Crown witness.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court granted the application, finding that the applicant had demonstrated his detention was not necessary for public protection or to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, despite the serious nature of the charge and the prior breach.

The appellant challenged an order for a new trial after exclusion of a co-accused’s prior inconsistent Agreed Statement of Facts tendered for its truth in a murder prosecution.

The majority held threshold reliability was not established because available safeguards did not adequately permit testing of truth and accuracy, particularly given curtailed cross-examination following assertions of solicitor-client privilege.

The Court emphasized deference to trial-level reliability determinations absent error in principle and rejected a request for a new trial based on how the prosecution conducted the voir dire.

It concluded the statement’s surrounding circumstances did not provide sufficient substantive reliability where the declarant had incentives to shift blame during plea negotiations.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored, with dissenting reasons favouring a new trial.