Mindy Caterina

The appellant challenged a second degree murder conviction arising from a targeted fatal stabbing proved primarily by circumstantial identification evidence, including surveillance video, shoe DNA evidence, clothing evidence, vehicle evidence, and recognition evidence from a recanting witness.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did misapprehend the defence position by stating that all parties agreed the appellant was not the driver of the van, but found the misapprehension immaterial because the conviction rested on affirmative circumstantial evidence identifying the appellant as the stabber.

The court rejected arguments based on Villaroman, insufficient reasons, and unreasonable verdict doctrine, holding that the proposed innocent inferences were speculative and that the reasons, read functionally in context, clearly rejected the blood-transference theory.

The court also upheld the limited reliance placed on the recanting witness's recognition evidence after proper Vetrovec and Hudson analysis.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made material misapprehensions of evidence regarding the complainant's reason for visiting the appellant's house and the appellant's post-incident text messages.

These misapprehensions fatally flawed the trial judge's credibility assessment of the appellant.

Consequently, the court quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial, making it unnecessary to address the sentence appeal.

The appellant challenged his convictions for firearm and drug trafficking offences, and his 10-year sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in determining the scope of a s. 10(b) Charter breach (right to counsel).

The appellant contended that the delay in facilitating his lawyer call began earlier, at the point of arrest by Toronto Police Service (TPS), rather than only upon arrival at the Durham Regional Police Service (DRPS) station.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the initial delay by TPS was justified due to ongoing public and officer safety concerns and evidence preservation tasks.

The court concluded that the s. 10(b) breach only commenced at the DRPS station, as found by the trial judge, and dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The appellant, who had previously been found not criminally responsible for a prior offence, pleaded guilty to serious assaults committed while in a psychiatric facility.

He was subsequently designated a dangerous offender.

He appealed the sentencing judge's refusal to strike his guilty pleas, arguing he did not understand the potential for an indeterminate sentence and that the judge misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the pleas were informed and that the delayed release of the motion judge's reasons did not render them an after-the-fact justification.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual assault and distributing intimate images, receiving a 12-month consecutive sentence.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence and by misapplying sentencing principles, including the consideration of public safety, drug addiction, and restraint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the sentencing judge's emphasis on denunciation and general deterrence, and finding no error in principle or demonstrably unfit sentence.

The court reiterated the high deference owed to sentencing decisions.

The applicant sought judicial review of a reconsideration decision by the respondent police service, which refused to remove non-conviction information from his Vulnerable Sector Check.

The information related to withdrawn and stayed charges involving allegations of criminal harassment, sexual assault, and sexual interference where the alleged victims included children.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the police service's interpretation of 'alleged victim' and 'pattern of predation' under the Police Records Checks Reform Act was reasonable and consistent with the legislation's purpose of protecting children and vulnerable persons.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of William Whatcott on a charge of willfully promoting hatred against gay men, stemming from the distribution of flyers at the 2016 Toronto Pride Parade.

The trial judge had acquitted Whatcott, finding the flyers did not constitute hate speech and excluding expert evidence on anti-gay discrimination tropes and evidence of prior discreditable conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in excluding the expert evidence, which was necessary to understand how the flyers perpetuated negative stereotypes and promoted hatred in a broader social and historical context.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Pheonix Haist, appealed her convictions for gun-related offences and refusal to provide a breath sample.

She argued that her s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated due to delays in being informed of the right and in facilitating access to counsel.

She also contended that her convictions for firearm possession were unreasonable, alleging misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the delays in advising and facilitating counsel were justified by the immediacy requirements of breath demands and officer safety concerns.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of circumstantial evidence regarding firearm possession, affirming that the inference of possession was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and breach of probation.

He argued the trial judge erred in failing to find breaches of his ss. 9 and 10(a) Charter rights during a motor vehicle stop and in failing to exclude the gun and drugs under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal found a s. 10(a) breach occurred when police delayed informing the appellant he was being investigated for a firearm, but concluded under a fresh s. 24(2) analysis that the evidence should not be excluded.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking methamphetamine and appealed, arguing the trial judge misapprehended photographic evidence concerning her knowledge of the bag's contents.

The Court of Appeal found that there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's finding that the appellant knew what was in the bag she passed.

The trial judge properly considered and rejected the defence's submission that the appellant passed the bag unwittingly, and correctly applied the law governing circumstantial evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, A.A., appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing that the trial judge did not make a finding that the complainant's life was endangered and that the evidence did not support such a finding.

The conviction stemmed from an incident where A.A. sprinkled ignitable fluid on the complainant's hair while holding a lit torch.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the actus reus of aggravated assault, specifically "endangerment of life" was met.

The court found there was a "realistic possibility" that the complainant's hair would ignite, even if the appellant's intent was merely to scare.

The court affirmed that the mens rea for aggravated assault was also established, as the risk of bodily harm from the dangerous conduct was objectively foreseeable.

The appellant, Peter Sagos, appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and extortion, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The charges arose from harassing and threatening emails sent to his former lawyer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish the factual basis for his ineffective assistance claims, largely due to the absence of an affidavit from himself or trial counsel.

The court affirmed that trial counsel is a compellable witness in such motions and that the defence strategy pursued at trial was reasonable given the circumstances.

The appellant, J.L., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and breach of probation, alleging errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment, including undue reliance on demeanour, incorrect use of the absence of exaggeration, and misapprehension of material evidence.

He also sought leave to appeal his global sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility determinations were entitled to significant deference and that no reversible errors were made regarding demeanour, absence of exaggeration, or misapprehension of evidence.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by imposing a sentence exceeding the Crown's recommendation without first alerting the parties and providing an opportunity for submissions.

The sentence was reduced from three years and three months to three years.

The applicant sought judicial review of a police service's decision to disclose non-conviction information on a vulnerable sector check.

The applicant argued the reconsideration process was procedurally unfair because the police did not disclose the underlying information relied upon to make the decision, preventing the applicant from knowing the case to meet.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that procedural fairness required the police to provide access to the relevant information before the applicant submitted written submissions for the reconsideration.

The court quashed the decision and remitted the matter for a new reconsideration by a different decision-maker.

The appellants, David Kaczmarek and Terrell Sullivan, appealed their convictions for sexual assault and Mr. Sullivan also appealed his sentence.

The trial judge had found the complainant lacked the capacity to consent due to extreme intoxication and did not agree to the sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of incapacity, rejecting arguments that the judge erred in the order of findings, equated lack of memory with incapacity, or reversed the burden of proof.

Mr. Kaczmarek's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging his counsel prevented him from testifying, was also dismissed, as the court found counsel's advice was sound and the decision not to testify was ultimately Mr. Kaczmarek's.

Mr. Sullivan's sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court affirming that continuing sexual activity after consent is withdrawn is not less morally blameworthy than engaging in sexual activity with someone who never consented or lacked capacity.

The appellants, Zhang Jian Fan and Jian Ling, appealed their convictions and sentences for large-scale cannabis production offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

They asserted a defence of honest but mistaken belief that their operation was properly licensed.

The trial judge rejected their credibility and found their mistake was one of law, not fact.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellants' belief was not credible and, alternatively, that their mistake was one of law regarding the scope and application of the licences, not a mistake of fact about the existence of a licence.

The Court also upheld the sentences, finding them proportionate, while setting aside victim surcharges.

The appellant, Rejean Perron, appealed the imposition of a ten-year long-term supervision order following convictions for sexual assault, forcible confinement, and use of an imitation firearm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the sentencing judge not explicitly detailing why a ten-year order was imposed over a shorter term, the record and the psychiatrist's report, which indicated a high risk of recidivism and an undiagnosed behavioural pattern, justified the maximum period of supervision.

The court also noted the possibility of future reduction or termination of the order.

C.C. appealed his 6-year global sentence for human trafficking, assault, and child pornography, arguing for a reduction based on harsh pre-trial bail conditions (Downes credit) and fresh evidence of rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised discretion regarding bail conditions and that the fresh evidence, while commendable, did not warrant a sentence reduction given the gravity of the offences.

The appellant, convicted of firearms offences and breach of recognizance following a shooting incident, appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the admission or assessment of witness evidence, that the verdict was reasonable given the strong circumstantial evidence, and that the trial judge properly rejected the self-defence argument.

The court granted leave to appeal the sentence but ultimately dismissed the sentence appeal, concluding that the eight-year custodial sentence was fit, balancing mitigating factors with the appellant's prior firearms offence and the dangerous nature of discharging a weapon in a populated area.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in a controlled substance, trafficking in methamphetamine, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He appealed both his convictions and sentence.

On conviction, he argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 10(b) Charter application, claiming police failed to ensure he understood his right to counsel and delayed access to duty counsel.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's finding that the appellant understood his rights and declined to consider the delay argument raised for the first time on appeal.

On sentence, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly considered irrelevant aggravating factors, specifically his "higher involvement" in the drug hierarchy and discussions about fentanyl and firearms.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the evidence supported the appellant's higher role and that discussions of other serious criminal activities were relevant aggravating factors, even if the transfers did not materialize due to arrest.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and while leave to appeal sentence was granted and fresh evidence admitted, the sentence appeal was also dismissed.