Sharon C. Wilmot

The applicant sought extensive disclosure from the Crown and Peel Regional Police (PRP) under Stinchcombe and O'Connor, and a sealing order for application materials.

The disclosure requests stemmed from suspicions of targeting and police misconduct related to a vehicle stop and subsequent arrest for firearms and drug offences.

The court denied most disclosure requests where the information did not exist (e.g., historical CPIC snapshots, specific informant recruitment policies) or where likely relevance was not met.

However, the court ordered the production of officer notes and "will say" statements regarding an off-camera interview where the applicant was asked to become a confidential informant, and specific notes of an officer related to a BOLO broadcast.

The sealing order request was denied as the applicant failed to meet the Dagenais/Mentuck test for restricting the open court principle.

The applicant sought judicial review of a police service's decision to disclose non-conviction information on a vulnerable sector check.

The applicant argued the reconsideration process was procedurally unfair because the police did not disclose the underlying information relied upon to make the decision, preventing the applicant from knowing the case to meet.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that procedural fairness required the police to provide access to the relevant information before the applicant submitted written submissions for the reconsideration.

The court quashed the decision and remitted the matter for a new reconsideration by a different decision-maker.

The Crown and Peel Regional Police applied for access to a video exhibit previously ordered sealed in a sexual assault and sexual interference prosecution.

The video, likely child pornography, was in defence counsel's possession and had been sealed by a prior court order.

The applicants sought access for investigation and potential use in the prosecution.

The court, relying on R. v. Murray and Rule 5.1-2A of the Law Society of Ontario’s Rules of Professional Conduct, held that physical evidence documenting a crime, even if it contains both inculpatory and exculpatory elements, must be disclosed to authorities.

The application for access to the sealed exhibit was granted.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking, brought an application for the disclosure of police disciplinary records relating to two officers involved in the investigation.

The court held that the disciplinary file of an officer who would not be called as a Crown witness was not first party disclosure and did not meet the 'likely relevant' threshold for third party records.

For the undercover officer who would testify, the court ordered the police to ascertain whether specific additional disciplinary records existed, but otherwise dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to change a final custody order that had granted him sole custody of his two sons and required them to attend a reunification program.

The younger son had repeatedly run away and refused to live with the appellant or attend the program.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the son's extreme resistance constituted a material change in circumstances and that it was no longer in his best interests to enforce the custody order.

The court also dismissed the son's cross-appeal seeking a declaration that he had withdrawn from parental control, finding the motion judge's order that no person had custody or access rights over him was sufficient.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Independent Police Review Director and the Chief of Police classifying an unjustified strip search by a police officer as misconduct 'not of a serious nature' under the Police Services Act.

The applicant argued that an unjustified strip search must always be classified as serious misconduct and that the failure to hold a disciplinary hearing breached procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Director and Chief have statutory discretion to assess the seriousness of misconduct based on the specific circumstances.

The court found the decisions were reasonable given the facts, including that the search was conducted privately, without touching, and in accordance with policy, and that no hearing was required once the misconduct was reasonably deemed not serious.

The police service applied for an order under the Youth Criminal Justice Act to disclose a young person's police records for use in a police disciplinary hearing against an officer.

The subject officer also sought access to the records.

The court held that both the police service and the officer must apply for access under sections 119(1)(s) and 123 of the Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding that neither applicant established a valid interest in the records, as the records had no nexus to the alleged misconduct and were not relevant to the young person's credibility or character.

Furthermore, granting access would undermine the privacy protections and principles of diminished moral culpability under the Act.

The Toronto Police Service and a police officer sought access to youth records of a young person (L.D.) who was a witness and complainant in a police disciplinary hearing.

The officer was alleged to have assaulted L.D. while in police custody.

The court considered whether access to L.D.'s youth records was permitted under sections 119(1)(s) and 123 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court held that the applicants failed to establish a valid or valid and substantial interest in the records, and that permitting access would undermine the proper administration of justice under both the YCJA and the Police Services Act.

The application was dismissed.

The appellants sought $207,612.83 in partial indemnity costs for the appeal against the respondent Dr. Librach, who proposed $101,571.06.

The Court of Appeal fixed the appellants' partial indemnity costs against Dr. Librach at $100,000 inclusive of taxes, plus disbursements, noting that even the respondent's proposed figure was on the high end.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical negligence action relating to a birth injury that resulted in cerebral palsy.

The trial judge had dismissed the action against the attending obstetrician, nurse, and hospital.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal with respect to the obstetrician, finding that the trial judge made inconsistent findings regarding the interpretability of fetal heart rate monitor outputs and erred in concluding that the bradycardia would have occurred regardless of the application of a vacuum extractor.

A new trial was ordered for the claim against the obstetrician.

The appeal regarding the nurse and hospital was dismissed.