Christopher Murphy

The accused, charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, sought to exclude a DVD video from evidence at trial.

The DVD, which likely constituted child pornography, had been in the exclusive possession of the defence but was ordered turned over to the Crown pursuant to the ethical obligations of defence counsel regarding physical evidence of a crime.

The accused argued that allowing the Crown to use the DVD would violate his right against self-incrimination under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the requirement to turn over the evidence was based on professional ethical obligations to maintain the integrity of the judicial system, not to assist in convicting the accused, and its use by the Crown would not render the trial unfair.

The Crown and Peel Regional Police applied for access to a video exhibit previously ordered sealed in a sexual assault and sexual interference prosecution.

The video, likely child pornography, was in defence counsel's possession and had been sealed by a prior court order.

The applicants sought access for investigation and potential use in the prosecution.

The court, relying on R. v. Murray and Rule 5.1-2A of the Law Society of Ontario’s Rules of Professional Conduct, held that physical evidence documenting a crime, even if it contains both inculpatory and exculpatory elements, must be disclosed to authorities.

The application for access to the sealed exhibit was granted.

The accused, a 23-year-old first offender, was convicted by a jury of criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm after a high-speed motor vehicle collision that killed his best friend and injured another passenger.

The court balanced the principles of general deterrence and denunciation with the accused's youth, remorse, and rehabilitative prospects.

The accused was sentenced to two years less a day in custody, followed by three years of probation and 240 hours of community service.

The court also imposed a 10-year driving prohibition, finding that the recent Criminal Code amendments did not remove the power to impose such a ban for criminal negligence causing death, as dangerous driving is an included offence.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after striking and killing a pedestrian with his taxi.

He claimed he did not see the victim and collided due to momentary inattention.

The Crown alleged intentional conduct motivated by road rage.

The trial judge left liability for manslaughter based on unlawful acts of assault and dangerous driving with the jury.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on how to apply the W. (D.) framework to the dangerous driving element.

The court held that while the classic W. (D.) instruction was inapplicable due to the modified objective nature of dangerous driving, the accused's evidence still had exculpatory potential and could raise reasonable doubt on whether the Crown proved the elements of dangerous driving.

The court also expressed concerns about the trial judge's conduct and handling of the mistrial application, though found no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The accused was convicted of two counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm after speeding through a red light and colliding with two vehicles, injuring both drivers.

The court considered the accused's difficult upbringing, lengthy criminal record, and current 64-month sentence for unrelated offences.

Applying the totality principle, the court imposed a 12-month custodial sentence to run concurrently with his existing sentence, along with a 12-month driving prohibition.

The accused, Michael Lights, was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm and criminal negligence causing bodily harm following a collision.

The defense argued that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Lights was the driver.

The court found the evidence overwhelming that Lights was the driver, based on witness testimony, identification via health card, and consistent descriptions.

The court then applied the legal principles for dangerous driving and criminal negligence, finding that Lights' conduct—speeding through a red light with non-functional lights, low brake pads, and bald tires on wet roads—constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent driver and demonstrated wanton disregard for the safety of others.

Lights was found guilty on all four counts.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant for his residence and vehicle, alleging that the Information to Obtain contained misleading statements, omissions, and errors that invalidated the authorization.

The court reviewed the ITO, cross‑examination of the affiant officer, and applicable principles governing review of prior authorizations.

Although the court found numerous inaccuracies and overstatements in the ITO, it concluded they resulted from carelessness rather than a deliberate attempt to mislead the issuing justice.

After excising erroneous statements and considering permissible amplification, the remaining information still established reasonable and probable grounds linking the accused to drug trafficking and connecting the residence to evidence of those offences.

The court held the search warrant was properly issued and no breach of s. 8 of the Charter occurred.