Kerry Lea Benzakein

The applicant was charged with possessing psilocybin for the purpose of trafficking contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

He filed a Notice of Constitutional Question challenging the constitutionality of section 5 of the CDSA as it relates to psilocybin, alleging violations of section 2(b) (freedom of thought) and section 7 (liberty and security of the person) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant argued that the prohibition on trafficking infringes the rights of others to access psilocybin for its thought-related benefits.

The court found that section 5(2) of the CDSA does not infringe either section 2(b) or section 7 of the Charter.

The court rejected the applicant's broad interpretation of freedom of thought and found that psilocybin, as an unpredictable and scientifically nascent substance, does not constitute a protected tool of thought under the Charter.

The appellant, Rashawn Salmon, appealed his convictions for various drug and firearms offences, arguing that the reviewing judge erred in dismissing his pre-trial Charter motion.

Specifically, he challenged the lawfulness of search warrants for his condo unit and vehicle, alleging s. 8 breaches regarding CCTV footage and the sufficiency of grounds for the warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the reviewing judge's conclusions that the police obtained information from authorized persons, that there were reasonable grounds for the search warrants, and that the vehicle seizure was lawful.

The court reiterated that a piecemeal approach to warrant review is inappropriate and that property management can consent to police access to common areas.

The appellant was convicted of multiple drug trafficking and firearm offences and sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment.

He appealed both his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the application judge's ruling on pole camera surveillance or the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence, reducing the total incarceration period from 18 to 15 years and quashing the delayed parole order.

The court found the trial judge erred by failing to apply the principle of restraint for a first-time offender.

The fine in lieu of forfeiture was upheld.

The appellant, convicted of five counts of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking, one count of simple possession, and two counts of breach of probation, appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The primary ground of appeal challenged the trial judge's dismissal of a pre-trial Charter application, arguing that his warrantless arrest and subsequent search violated his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The appellant also contended that the trial judge erred in concluding that seized fentanyl and fentanyl/cocaine mixture were for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's finding of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on the totality of circumstances, including confidential informant information and police surveillance.

The court also upheld the trafficking convictions, finding the evidence overwhelming despite a minor error by the trial judge regarding a concession.

The applicant, Elijah Hall, pleaded guilty to three counts of selling fentanyl and cocaine.

He sought a stay of these charges based on entrapment, arguing that the initial drug transaction was initiated by an undercover police officer without reasonable suspicion.

The Crown conceded the lack of reasonable suspicion for the first transaction but argued that this did not taint subsequent transactions.

The court, applying the principles of entrapment, found that the lack of reasonable suspicion at the outset did taint the subsequent transactions, distinguishing the case from R. v. Williams where firearm charges were not stayed.

The court followed R. v. Gambin, concluding that the subsequent transactions were "fruit poisoned by the tree of the first transaction." The application for a stay was allowed, and the three counts were stayed.

The applicant, Eze Moses Ojukwu, brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence (heroin found in a knapsack) under sections 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defence argued the search was unlawful as it was not truly incidental to the arrest and reflected a systemic failure by the Toronto Police Service.

The Crown contended the search was lawful for safety and evidence discovery purposes, or alternatively, that the evidence should be admitted under s. 24(2).

The court found the search was a lawful search incident to arrest based on safety concerns, given the high-risk domestic violence context and the accused's breach of release terms.

Even if there was a s. 8 breach, the court found the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) due to the minor nature of the breach, the moderate impact on the accused's privacy, and society's strong interest in adjudicating serious drug trafficking charges on their merits.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The applicant, Christopher Janisse, sought bail pending appeal of his convictions for multiple drug trafficking offences and possession of proceeds of crime, for which he received a 16-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the three-part test under section 679(3) of the Criminal Code: whether the appeal is not frivolous, whether the applicant will surrender, and whether detention is necessary in the public interest (balancing enforceability and reviewability).

While the Crown conceded the first two factors, the court found that despite the grounds of appeal not being frivolous and involving alleged police misconduct, the seriousness of the offences, the length of the sentence, and the applicant's concessions on certain counts weighed heavily in favour of enforceability.

The application for bail pending appeal was denied.

The appellants, Zhang Jian Fan and Jian Ling, appealed their convictions and sentences for large-scale cannabis production offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

They asserted a defence of honest but mistaken belief that their operation was properly licensed.

The trial judge rejected their credibility and found their mistake was one of law, not fact.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellants' belief was not credible and, alternatively, that their mistake was one of law regarding the scope and application of the licences, not a mistake of fact about the existence of a licence.

The Court also upheld the sentences, finding them proportionate, while setting aside victim surcharges.

The appellant, Crystal Joanne Antoine, appealed her conviction and sentence after pleading guilty to multiple charges, including possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge had imposed a 9-month custodial sentence without addressing Gladue principles, as he was unaware of her Indigenous background.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that the sentence should be reduced due to the failure to apply Gladue principles.

The appellant abandoned her conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal sentence and reduced it to six months, dismissing the conviction appeal as abandoned.

The defendant, Ho Ting Char, was charged with conspiracy, unlawful production of methamphetamine, and unlawful production of ketamine.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial video surveillance evidence of the defendant's non-verbal conduct at various locations associated with clandestine drug laboratories.

The court found the evidence, while suspicious, did not unequivocally prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew he was participating in drug production or was part of a conspiracy, as innocent explanations for his conduct could not be excluded.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted on all counts.

The appellant was convicted of possessing MDMA for the purpose of trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 9 were violated due to unlawful continued detention and search.

The trial judge found the initial detention and pat-down lawful, but the search of the appellant's knapsack unlawful, admitting the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant's continued detention was lawful, emphasizing the totality of circumstances and the reasonable suspicion held by police in a dangerous situation.

Consequently, the appeal against conviction was dismissed, though a mandatory victim fine surcharge was quashed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her certiorari application seeking to quash the order committing her to trial on drug-related charges.

The appellant argued that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error due to the absence of evidence, particularly regarding timing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the committal, finding that there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer knowledge and control of contraband found in locked rooms, including circumstantial evidence such as sole ownership of the house, items in plain view, mail addressed to the appellant, and intercepted communications with her co-accused spouse.

The court held that the lack of precise timing evidence did not render the inferences speculative.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in property obtained by crime and possession of property obtained by crime after police discovered $1,136,555 in cash in his vehicle.

The primary issue at trial was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant knew the funds were proceeds of crime.

The appellant testified he believed the money was "Shoah Gelt" (money belonging to Jewish people in Europe or Asia seeking to move funds to safety).

The trial judge rejected this testimony and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: improper application of the W.(D.) test, insufficient reasons for conviction, and a grossly disproportionate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The defendants, David Brown and Daimian Johnson, pleaded guilty to cocaine trafficking offences.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the substantial quantities of cocaine involved and their high-level involvement in the drug trade, and mitigating factors such as their guilty pleas, personal circumstances, restrictive bail conditions, and the anonymous surrender of firearms.

For Johnson, the court also considered his testimony at another trial.

The Crown proposed sentences of five years for Brown and seven years for Johnson.

The court imposed sentences of four years and seven months for Brown and six years and five months for Johnson, granting modest additional credit for restrictive bail conditions and the surrender of firearms, and limited credit for Johnson's testimony, which was found to be of little assistance to the prosecution.

Ancillary orders for DNA samples and firearm prohibitions were also imposed.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of ketamine for the purpose of trafficking arising from Project Ice Castle (York Region charges), production of ketamine arising from Project Apollo (Toronto charges), and failure to comply with recognizance.

The accused was arrested in April 2015 in possession of 60 kilograms of ketamine and subsequently engaged in ketamine production at three clandestine drug laboratories in Toronto while on bail awaiting trial.

The court imposed a global sentence of 15 years and 6 months imprisonment, consisting of 7 years and 6 months for possession for trafficking, 7 years and 6 months for production (consecutive), and 6 months for failure to comply.

The court credited 447 days of pre-trial custody at enhanced rates for lockdown periods and strict bail conditions.

The defendant, Leon Bookal, was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime, stemming from a search warrant executed at his residence.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to prove constructive possession, while the defendant claimed the cocaine belonged to a friend who was staying at his condominium and had access to his locker.

The court found the police officers' note-taking inadequate and their independent recollections unreliable.

Despite some inconsistencies in the defendant's testimony, the court found his evidence compelling and was left with a reasonable doubt regarding his knowledge of the cocaine and the origin of the cash.

Consequently, the defendant was found not guilty on both counts.

The defendant brought an application to exclude evidence (crack cocaine) found in his condominium, arguing a section 8 Charter breach due to an unlawful strip search conducted at the police station subsequent to his arrest.

The court found a section 8 breach occurred due to the blatant lack of record-keeping regarding the reasons for and the manner in which the strip search was conducted, despite finding reasonable and probable grounds for the search itself and general compliance with most *Golden* guidelines.

However, the court dismissed the application to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding no temporal, contextual, or causal connection between the strip search breach and the evidence, which was obtained hours earlier under a valid search warrant.

The accused was charged with drug-related offences following a police search warrant executed at his residence.

The Crown sought to rely on the "step six" process from R. v. Garafoli to have the court consider redacted portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO) that were excised to protect the identity of a confidential informant.

The defence opposed this request, arguing that the Crown's summary of the redacted material did not provide sufficient information to mount a proper challenge to the warrant's validity.

The court conducted a detailed analysis of whether the summary adequately disclosed the nature of the redacted information under the three Debot criteria: credibility of the informant, corroboration, and compellability.

The court found that the step six process could be applied on a partial basis, allowing the Crown to rely on the unredacted ITO for certain paragraphs where the summary provided sufficient detail, while restricting the Crown to the redacted version for other paragraphs where the summary was inadequate.