Angela Lepsa

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit of 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath samples, statements, and observations, alleging violations of her Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the police failed to make a formal breath demand as required by section 320.28(1) of the Criminal Code, delayed implementation of the right to counsel beyond the earliest reasonable opportunity, and that a breath technician undermined the accused's confidence in duty counsel.

Under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the breath test results, statements regarding alcohol consumption, and observations made at the police station, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused, Vahid Pashazahiri, brought an application to exclude evidence (fentanyl, morphine, and cash) seized during his arrest, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 8 (unreasonable search), 9 (arbitrary detention), and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, rendering the subsequent search unlawful.

Additionally, the officer delayed advising the accused of his right to counsel, demonstrating a fundamental misunderstanding of the "without delay" standard.

Applying the Grant framework, the court determined that the seriousness of the state's Charter-infringing conduct and its significant impact on the accused's liberty and privacy interests outweighed society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits, despite the reliability and importance of the evidence.

Consequently, the application to exclude the evidence was granted.

Malachi Brown was found guilty by a jury of assault with a weapon and using an imitation firearm while committing an assault with a weapon.

The court addressed the Kienapple rule, determining it did not prevent multiple convictions for these offences due to Parliament's intent to displace it for s. 85 of the Criminal Code.

Considering aggravating factors (use of imitation firearm, victim's age, breach of trust) and mitigating factors (first offender, youth, family support, anti-Black racism social context), the court sentenced Brown to a total of eighteen months imprisonment, to be served as a conditional sentence in the community, followed by two years of probation.

A ten-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order were also imposed.

The applicant, Elijah Hall, pleaded guilty to three counts of selling fentanyl and cocaine.

He sought a stay of these charges based on entrapment, arguing that the initial drug transaction was initiated by an undercover police officer without reasonable suspicion.

The Crown conceded the lack of reasonable suspicion for the first transaction but argued that this did not taint subsequent transactions.

The court, applying the principles of entrapment, found that the lack of reasonable suspicion at the outset did taint the subsequent transactions, distinguishing the case from R. v. Williams where firearm charges were not stayed.

The court followed R. v. Gambin, concluding that the subsequent transactions were "fruit poisoned by the tree of the first transaction." The application for a stay was allowed, and the three counts were stayed.

The offender, an 18-year-old first-time offender, was convicted of arson after participating in the deliberate burning of a stolen pickup truck using gasoline in a dense residential complex.

The Crown sought a net sentence of nine months' custody, while the defence sought time served or a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for serious arson offences, declining a conditional sentence.

The offender was sentenced to seven months' net custody followed by two years of probation.