Julia Kushnir

In a first-degree murder trial, both the Crown and defence brought pre-trial evidentiary motions.

The court ruled on the admissibility and format of a Crown video chronology, directing modifications to ensure neutrality, including replacing the word 'shooting' with 'shots fired' and amending slide descriptions.

The court also agreed to call a key witness, a taxi driver whose vehicle recorded the incident, allowing both sides to cross-examine him due to reliability and communication concerns.

Finally, the court dismissed a defence application to introduce evidence of the deceased's disposition for getting into arguments, finding it lacked probative value and risked prejudice.

The applicant, convicted of sexual interference against a child aged 12 to 14 and sentenced to 4.5 years' imprisonment, sought bail pending appeal.

The applicant advanced three grounds of appeal: an allegedly improper corrective jury instruction regarding the defence theory, inconsistent verdicts on two counts, and error in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay based on delay.

The motion judge found all three grounds to be weak or without merit.

Applying the Oland framework, the court held that the seriousness of the offence and the weakness of the grounds of appeal elevated the enforceability concern over the reviewability concern.

Bail was denied.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking offences, brought pre-trial motions alleging violations of their s. 8 Charter rights.

One accused challenged the warrantless obtaining of his Airbnb booking information and the subsequent warrantless entry into the unit where drugs were found.

The court held there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the booking information due to Airbnb's privacy policy, and that exigent circumstances justified both the information request and the entry to secure the drugs.

The other accused challenged a tracking warrant, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) was insufficient and misleading.

The court found the ITO provided ample basis for the warrant and was not misleading.

The court further held that even if there were Charter breaches, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The motions were dismissed.

The applicant, J.P., sought a stay of criminal proceedings due to an alleged infringement of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

This was a retrial after a previous stay was overturned on appeal.

The court found that the constitutional clock reset to zero upon remittance from the Court of Appeal, and the 30-month Jordan ceiling applied.

Despite the net delay being below the ceiling, the court conducted a contextual analysis, finding that the Crown's inconsistent positions and failures regarding disclosure of the applicant's cellphone caused significant and unreasonable delay, necessitating the defence to bring additional applications.

The court concluded that the defence took meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, while the Crown did not, leading to the delay markedly exceeding what was reasonable.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The appellant appealed a conviction for invitation to sexual touching involving a young child, arguing that the trial judge made improper credibility findings, shifted the burden of proof, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Crown's case relied largely on a video-recorded statement given by the complainant as a child, which was admitted under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code and adopted at trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, including discrepancies and defence testimony, and repeatedly reminded himself of the Crown’s burden of proof.

Although some factual inconsistencies were not expressly resolved, the trial judge considered them within the reasonable doubt analysis.

The appellate court concluded that the verdict was reasonably supported by the evidence and disclosed no reversible error.

The appellant, Kevin Hanse, appealed his convictions for two firearm offences (attempting to obtain possession of a firearm and transferring ammunition) and his sentence.

The Crown's case relied heavily on wiretap evidence, with the defence challenging the admissibility of expert and lay witness testimony regarding code words for firearms and marijuana.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh post-sentencing evidence concerning a workplace injury and argued the trial judge erred in assessing aggravating factors and imposing a consecutive sentence for a marijuana trafficking offence to which he had pleaded guilty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, upholding the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and finding no error in the sentencing principles or the fitness of the sentence.

The applicant, Christopher Janisse, sought bail pending appeal of his convictions for multiple drug trafficking offences and possession of proceeds of crime, for which he received a 16-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the three-part test under section 679(3) of the Criminal Code: whether the appeal is not frivolous, whether the applicant will surrender, and whether detention is necessary in the public interest (balancing enforceability and reviewability).

While the Crown conceded the first two factors, the court found that despite the grounds of appeal not being frivolous and involving alleged police misconduct, the seriousness of the offences, the length of the sentence, and the applicant's concessions on certain counts weighed heavily in favour of enforceability.

The application for bail pending appeal was denied.

The offender was found guilty of multiple drug trafficking offences, including possession of 21 kilograms of cocaine and two kilograms of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court rejected the offender's argument that he believed the fentanyl was cocaine, finding he was operating a high-level commercial enterprise.

Weighing the severe aggravating factors of the quantity and nature of the drugs against mitigating factors including restrictive bail conditions and pandemic-related pre-trial custody, the court imposed a global sentence of 16 years, reduced to 14 years and 9.5 months after credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused, having been convicted of drug trafficking offences, applied to reopen his trial prior to sentencing to adduce fresh evidence.

The fresh evidence related to findings in a separate proceeding that a police officer had deliberately misled another officer to obtain search warrants.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the evidence could have been adduced at trial with due diligence.

The court concluded that the application was an attempt to reverse a tactical decision made by defence counsel at trial, who had chosen to challenge a different warrant rather than pursue the missing video evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for multiple violent offences and his designation as a dangerous offender, which resulted in an indeterminate sentence.

The primary focus of the appeal was the dangerous offender designation under s. 753(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code, which allows for designation based on the brutal nature of a single offence compelling a conclusion of future unrestrained behaviour.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's decision, finding no error in the assessment and weighing of conflicting expert psychiatric evidence regarding the appellant's future risk of violent reoffence.

The court affirmed that the sentencing judge was entitled to prefer the Crown's expert's opinion, which considered clinical factors in addition to actuarial tests, and that the evidence supported the conclusion that the appellant constituted a threat to public safety requiring an indeterminate sentence.

The conviction appeal was also dismissed.

The accused, Christopher Janisse, faced an eight-count indictment for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The trial proceeded on a written statement of facts.

Janisse conceded guilt on two counts of possession of cocaine for trafficking and one count of possession of proceeds of crime.

The court found him not guilty of two counts of trafficking cocaine, determining that the circumstantial evidence, while suspicious, did not meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found Janisse guilty of a third trafficking count and two counts of possession of fentanyl and crystal methamphetamine for trafficking, concluding that the totality of circumstantial evidence established his knowledge and control of a drug stash house and the large quantities of drugs found.

The final judgment was guilty on counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8, and not guilty on counts 4 and 5.

The defendant, Thanh Hai Lu, was convicted of multiple commercial-level drug trafficking offences involving cocaine, fentanyl, fentanyl/heroin, MDMA, and ketamine.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the dangerous nature and large quantities of drugs, the commercial scope of the operation, and the defendant's subjective knowledge of trafficking fentanyl.

Mitigating factors included his lack of criminal record, strong family support, rehabilitative potential, and expressed remorse.

The court also considered the principle of parity with a co-accused and credit for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.

A global sentence of 9.5 years' incarceration was imposed, reduced by pre-trial credit.

The accused was arrested for murder and a search incident to arrest revealed controlled substances.

The murder charges were later withdrawn, but the drug charges proceeded.

The accused brought a Charter motion to exclude the drug evidence, arguing his s. 8 rights were violated by an unlawful arrest and his s. 10(b) rights were violated by a delay in facilitating access to counsel.

The court found the arrest was lawful, but the police seriously breached the accused's right to counsel by inexplicably delaying his access to a lawyer for almost three hours.

Given the seriousness of the breach and misleading testimony by a police officer, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking following an undercover police investigation.

The accused delivered cocaine and fentanyl to an undercover officer on four occasions after deals were brokered by a co-conspirator.

The court admitted the co-conspirator's text messages under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found the accused guilty on all trafficking counts, concluding he had knowledge of the illicit nature of the substances.

The court also found the accused guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking regarding drugs found in an apartment, finding constructive possession proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused, charged with drug offences following a search incident to an arrest for an unrelated murder, brought a motion to compel disclosure of redacted documents from the ongoing murder investigation.

The defence sought the unredacted documents to challenge the lawfulness of the murder arrest under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Crown asserted investigative privilege over the redacted portions.

The court applied the Richards test and the Barnes four-prong approach, concluding that while the information was relevant, it was unlikely to affect the outcome of the Charter hearing or prevent the accused from making full answer and defence.

The court held that the public interest in protecting the ongoing murder investigation outweighed the accused's marginal interest in disclosure, and dismissed the motion.

The applicant, Kevin Tran, convicted of drug trafficking and firearms offences, sought bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed, arguing detention was necessary in the public interest under s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would surrender.

Despite the seriousness of the offences, the applicant's lack of criminal history, adherence to previous bail conditions, and strict proposed release terms, along with the co-accused's prior release on similar terms, led the court to conclude that detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The application for bail pending appeal was granted.