Bobby Russon

The accused was charged with knowingly participating in or contributing to the activities of a terrorist group (Atomwaffen Division/National Socialist Order) for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity, contrary to section 83.18(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proved that the accused completed an application to join the terrorist organization, pledging loyalty and offering his skills as a mechanic and military training.

The court found that the accused knew AWD/NSO was a terrorist organization, participated in its activities by offering his skills, and did so for the purpose of enhancing the terrorist group's ability to carry out terrorist activity.

The accused was found guilty.

This decision concerns a motion for a directed verdict in a terrorism prosecution under section 83.18(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, Seth Bertrand, was alleged to have participated in or contributed to the activities of the Atomwaffen Division (AWD), a listed terrorist group, for the purpose of enhancing its ability to facilitate or carry out terrorist activity.

The court found that there was some evidence on each essential element of the offence, including the accused’s application to join AWD, his statements, and his actions, such that a properly instructed jury could convict.

The motion for a directed verdict was dismissed.

The applicants, charged with gang sexual assault and other offences, brought a constitutional challenge to the common law principle that a person cannot consent to the intentional infliction of bodily harm during sexual acts, including BDSM.

They argued this principle, particularly as affirmed in R. v. Zhao, violated their Charter rights to freedom of expression (s. 2(b)), liberty and security of the person (s. 7), and equality (s. 15).

The court dismissed the application, finding that violence is not a protected form of expression, that the right to liberty does not extend to inflicting bodily harm, and that BDSM is not an analogous ground for discrimination under s. 15.

The court upheld the common law principle as constitutional and justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter.

The applicant, J.P., sought a stay of criminal proceedings due to an alleged infringement of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

This was a retrial after a previous stay was overturned on appeal.

The court found that the constitutional clock reset to zero upon remittance from the Court of Appeal, and the 30-month Jordan ceiling applied.

Despite the net delay being below the ceiling, the court conducted a contextual analysis, finding that the Crown's inconsistent positions and failures regarding disclosure of the applicant's cellphone caused significant and unreasonable delay, necessitating the defence to bring additional applications.

The court concluded that the defence took meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, while the Crown did not, leading to the delay markedly exceeding what was reasonable.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The applicant, Sheldon Baylis, brought a sub-facial challenge to the validity of a search warrant, arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained omissions and misleading information.

The court reviewed the ITO, making several amplifications (additions of material facts) and excisions (removal of erroneous or misleading information).

Despite finding serious improprieties in the police officer's disclosure, including deliberate non-disclosure and misleading statements, the court determined that the amplified and excised ITO still provided reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant's issuance.

The court also considered its residual discretion to quash the warrant due to police misconduct but declined to do so, emphasizing the high threshold required for such an action, noting that some omissions actually benefited the applicant by weakening the grounds.

The application to quash the warrant was dismissed, and the warrant's validity was confirmed.

The accused was sentenced on two indictments for multiple Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) and Criminal Code offences, including possession for the purpose of trafficking in heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine, as well as firearms offences, proceeds of crime, and breaches of prohibition orders and recognizance.

The court considered aggravating factors such as a lengthy criminal record, quantities of drugs, and commission of offences while on bail.

Mitigating factors included a guilty plea for the second indictment and an apology.

The court applied the totality principle to arrive at a global sentence of 12 years, reduced by pre-sentence custody and a one-year credit for the harsher conditions of incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The appellant, Ronald Contreras, appealed a sentence imposed for breach of probation.

The sentencing judge departed from a joint submission by adding a 12-month probation order with an absolute abstinence condition for alcohol and illegal substances.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's failure to defer to the joint submission, inadequate consideration of Gladue principles, insufficient opportunity for counsel to make submissions, and inadequate reasons for sentence.

The Superior Court found multiple errors in principle, including a lack of understanding of Gladue principles and the high threshold for rejecting joint submissions.

The appeal was allowed, and the probation order was deleted.