David W. Schermbrucker

The accused was charged with knowingly participating in or contributing to the activities of a terrorist group (Atomwaffen Division/National Socialist Order) for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity, contrary to section 83.18(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proved that the accused completed an application to join the terrorist organization, pledging loyalty and offering his skills as a mechanic and military training.

The court found that the accused knew AWD/NSO was a terrorist organization, participated in its activities by offering his skills, and did so for the purpose of enhancing the terrorist group's ability to carry out terrorist activity.

The accused was found guilty.

This decision concerns a motion for a directed verdict in a terrorism prosecution under section 83.18(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, Seth Bertrand, was alleged to have participated in or contributed to the activities of the Atomwaffen Division (AWD), a listed terrorist group, for the purpose of enhancing its ability to facilitate or carry out terrorist activity.

The court found that there was some evidence on each essential element of the offence, including the accused’s application to join AWD, his statements, and his actions, such that a properly instructed jury could convict.

The motion for a directed verdict was dismissed.

Two appellants pleaded guilty to wholesale fentanyl trafficking and received sentences of 7 and 11 years respectively at trial.

The Crown appealed and the Alberta Court of Appeal set a 9-year starting point for wholesale fentanyl trafficking, increasing the sentences to 10 and 14 years.

The majority upheld the starting-point methodology as a permissible form of appellate sentencing guidance, finding it compatible with existing sentencing principles and the deferential appellate standard of review.

The majority also found both original trial sentences demonstrably unfit given the gravity of wholesale fentanyl trafficking, and declined to disturb the Court of Appeal's increased sentences.

The dissent would have allowed the appeals, finding neither original sentence demonstrably unfit and that the Court of Appeal improperly reweighed mitigating factors.

This criminal appeal considered whether a roadside detention in a police cruiser and a related pat-down search violated Charter protections against arbitrary detention and unreasonable search.

A majority found the pat-down search unconstitutional because securing the accused in the cruiser was not reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

The majority nevertheless admitted the cocaine evidence under section 24(2) based on good-faith conduct and evolving detention-law context.

The conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed with dissenting reasons favouring exclusion and acquittal.