Amanda Webb

The decision addresses an application by Tenzin Palden to exclude evidence of cocaine seized during his arrest, on the basis of alleged violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court finds that while there was no breach of sections 8 or 9, and no breach of section 7 regarding body-worn cameras, there was a breach of section 10(b) due to delay in access to counsel.

However, the evidence is not excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the breach was not sufficiently serious to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

This is a mandatory 90-day detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The court addresses the onus at such reviews, distinguishing between cases where an initial bail hearing was held (no onus on either party) and where none was held (onus reverts to Crown/accused as per s. 515).

The court also clarifies the appropriate procedures and scope of s. 525 reviews, emphasizing they are not de novo bail hearings and that the Palmer/St-Cloud due diligence and relevance criteria for new evidence still apply.

The applicant sought release based on a new surety plan, but the court found it did not constitute a material change in circumstances and dismissed the application, finding continued detention justified.

The offender was found guilty of multiple drug trafficking offences, including possession of 21 kilograms of cocaine and two kilograms of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court rejected the offender's argument that he believed the fentanyl was cocaine, finding he was operating a high-level commercial enterprise.

Weighing the severe aggravating factors of the quantity and nature of the drugs against mitigating factors including restrictive bail conditions and pandemic-related pre-trial custody, the court imposed a global sentence of 16 years, reduced to 14 years and 9.5 months after credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused, having been convicted of drug trafficking offences, applied to reopen his trial prior to sentencing to adduce fresh evidence.

The fresh evidence related to findings in a separate proceeding that a police officer had deliberately misled another officer to obtain search warrants.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the evidence could have been adduced at trial with due diligence.

The court concluded that the application was an attempt to reverse a tactical decision made by defence counsel at trial, who had chosen to challenge a different warrant rather than pursue the missing video evidence.

The applicants, charged with drug and gun offences following a police investigation, challenged the search warrants that led to their charges under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

They argued that the police failed to preserve relevant CCTV footage and that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that a police officer deliberately misled the affiant and the issuing justice, and intentionally failed to seize relevant CCTV video, violating s. 7.

The court also found that the search warrants lacked reasonable and probable grounds, violating s. 8.

Applying the Grant test under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the police misconduct was egregious and subverted the search warrant process, warranting the exclusion of the seized evidence.

The appellant, Kester Ellis, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal raised two main issues: whether cell phone location tracking data, obtained under a facially invalid warrant (a s. 8 Charter breach), should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and whether the Crown's opening statement contained inadmissible and prejudicial investigative hearsay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence under s. 24(2) due to the unintentional nature of the warrant error, minimal privacy impact, and societal interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court also found the Crown's opening statement to be permissible narrative evidence, not improper hearsay.

The applicant, who was not a suspect in a drug trafficking investigation, had her apartment searched after police observed a suspect entering and leaving the building.

The police obtained a search warrant for the applicant's apartment, where they found a large quantity of drugs.

The applicant brought a motion to quash the search warrant and exclude the evidence under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable grounds to believe the suspect had taken drugs into the applicant's apartment, rendering the search unreasonable under s. 8.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the serious breach of the applicant's privacy rights warranted the exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The accused, Christopher Janisse, faced an eight-count indictment for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The trial proceeded on a written statement of facts.

Janisse conceded guilt on two counts of possession of cocaine for trafficking and one count of possession of proceeds of crime.

The court found him not guilty of two counts of trafficking cocaine, determining that the circumstantial evidence, while suspicious, did not meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found Janisse guilty of a third trafficking count and two counts of possession of fentanyl and crystal methamphetamine for trafficking, concluding that the totality of circumstantial evidence established his knowledge and control of a drug stash house and the large quantities of drugs found.

The final judgment was guilty on counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8, and not guilty on counts 4 and 5.

The accused was charged with trafficking fentanyl and possession of proceeds of crime.

During the trial, the accused brought a s. 8 Charter motion seeking to exclude drugs, money, and cell phones seized incident to arrest, arguing that a subsequent warrantless search of a co-accused's cell phone at the police station violated his rights.

The accused also brought a mistrial application alleging the trial judge improperly intervened during witness examination.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding the interventions were merely to clarify evidence.

Assuming a technical s. 8 breach occurred when police used the co-accused's phone to call the accused's phone, the court applied the Grant framework and concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2), as the breach was minor, had little impact on privacy interests, and the evidence was reliable and essential to the prosecution.

During a jury trial for drug and proceeds of crime offences, the accused testified that the $605 found on him upon arrest was from cashing a welfare cheque.

The Crown sought to cross-examine him and call reply evidence based on social assistance records indicating he did not receive payments by cheque.

The court dismissed the accused's section 8 Charter application, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the manner and timing of social assistance payments obtained by police under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The court also permitted the Crown to call reply evidence, as the accused's testimony was new, unforeseeable, and relevant to an essential issue.

The accused, charged with possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, brought a Garofoli application to exclude evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at her residence.

She argued her s. 8 Charter rights were violated because the Information to Obtain (ITO) relied on confidential informant information that was not credible, compelling, or corroborated.

Applying the Debot factors, the court found that while corroboration was limited, the highly compelling and credible nature of the information from two confidential sources provided sufficient grounds for the authorizing justice to issue the warrant.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with multiple drug trafficking offences, brought an application to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that a tracking warrant was improperly issued.

The tracking warrant was based on information from a confidential informant.

Applying the Debot framework, the court found the informant's information was compelling, highly credible, and materially corroborated by police surveillance of counter-surveillance techniques.

The court concluded there were reasonable grounds to suspect the accused was trafficking drugs and that the tracking warrant was validly issued.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The appellants, Sebastian Zamora and Nicholas Poku, appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice that quashed their discharge at a preliminary inquiry and committed them for trial on drug trafficking and importing charges.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the reviewing judge's decision, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by improperly weighing evidence and drawing inferences, which is the role of the trier of fact.

The court declined to address the issue of when the actus reus of the offence of importing is complete, deeming it an inappropriate forum for such clarification.

The offender was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking after 6.79 grams of a fentanyl/heroin mix was found on his person.

The Crown sought a sentence of 4.5 years, while the defence sought time served of 3.5 years.

The court considered the offender's difficult background, schizophrenia, and status as an addict trafficker, alongside the highly dangerous nature of fentanyl.

The court imposed a sentence of 3.5 years (credited as time served) followed by 2 years of probation with strict conditions to address his mental health and addiction issues.

Lalendra Desilva was sentenced for possession of various drugs for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the large quantity and variety of drugs, the commercial nature of the operation, and bail non-compliance.

Mitigating factors included the offender's age, lack of prior criminal record, strong support, education, employment history, and genuine remorse.

Enhanced credit for harsh pre-trial custody conditions was also applied.

The court imposed a global sentence of 3½ years' imprisonment, aligning with the defence's request, along with ancillary orders.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Over a three-year period, the accused developed a serious cocaine addiction that led him to sell cocaine to an undercover officer on four separate occasions, totalling approximately 30 grams, with additional cocaine found in his residence.

The accused successfully completed a residential addictions treatment program prior to sentencing and demonstrated genuine rehabilitation.

The court imposed a sentence of 90 days incarceration to be served intermittently, along with one year of probation, finding that while incarceration was necessary, the accused's exceptional rehabilitative efforts and demonstrated sobriety warranted a departure from the standard sentencing range for cocaine trafficking.