R. v. Palden, 2026 ONSC 452

CITATION: R. v. Palden, 2026 ONSC 452

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-90000314-0000

DATE: 20260218

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

TENZIN PALDEN

Amanda Webb, for the Crown

Michael Little, for Mr. Palden

HEARD: October 20, 2025 and January 7, 2026

R.F. GOLDSTEIN J.

Background

1On August 21, 2023, Cameron Longmore was under surveillance by the Toronto Police. It was part of a large drug investigation. The surveillance was part of a large project. Mr. Longmore was known to the police and was a target of the investigation. He had been observed by the police on multiple occasions. The observations were consistent with drug trafficking. On that day Mr. Longmore met with Tenzin Palden at Kennedy Commons Plaza in Scarborough. Mr. Palden was unknown to the police and was not a target of the investigation. Police observed Mr. Longmore driving a Jeep. Mr. Palden was driving a Toyota Rav4. They parked next to each other in a rear laneway. Mr. Longmore placed a bin in Mr. Palden’s vehicle. The bin contained 30 individually-wrapped bricks of cocaine. The police arrested both men and searched the vehicles.

2The bin in Mr. Palden’s car contained 34.766 kilograms of cocaine. The cocaine’s purity was between 93% and 100%. The cocaine’s value was as follows:

• If sold at the kilogram level: $938,682 to $1,147,278.

• If sold at the ounce level: $2,110,792.86 to $2,483,285.71.

• If sold at the gram level: $3,128,940 to $4,171,920.

3Mr. Palden was charged with possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking. He brought an application to exclude the evidence from his trial. That application was dismissed. Other than an application under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, he had no defence on the merits of the case. On October 20, 2025, he was arraigned for the purposes of an uncontested trial. He pleaded not guilty. The trial was conducted by way of an agreed statement of facts, which Mr. Palden did not contest. I found him guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

4The Crown and defence are not that far apart in terms of the range of sentence. The Crown’s position is that the proper range of sentence for an amount of cocaine of this magnitude is 8-12 years in custody. The Crown’s view is that there is no evidence that Mr. Palden was anything other than a low-level courier; as well, his personal circumstances are sympathetic. Accordingly, Crown counsel, Ms. Webb, argues that Mr. Palden should receive a sentence of 8 years, which is at the lowest end of the range.

5Mr. Little, for Mr. Palden, does not disagree with the range as set out by Crown counsel but argues that under these very particular circumstances, Mr. Palden should receive a sentence in the range of 6-7 years.

Circumstances of Mr. Palden

6Mr. Palden is 27 years old. He is in a serious relationship but has no children. His family are from Tibet. Like many Tibetans, his family found themselves as refugees in India. Mr. Palden was born in India in 1998. He moved to Canada with his family in 2012 when he was 14 years old. Although his upbringing was not lavish, as Mr. Little put it, he grew up in an intact, loving, supportive, and pro-social family. He has two sisters. One is an early childhood education teacher; the other is a student at Toronto Metropolitan University. Mr. Palden himself is an apprentice steamfitter and a member of the local steamfitter’s union. He was working at the time of his arrest towards becoming a qualified journeyman steamfitter. He is a first offender. Prior to this arrest he was unknown to the police. Mr. Palden is very connected to the Tibetan community here in Toronto, as demonstrated by letters filed by the defence.

Impact on the Community

7I can do no better than to quote, at length, the comments and quotes of Justice Code in R. v. Graham, 2018 ONSC 6817 at paras. 44-45, about the horrendous effects of cocaine trafficking in the community:

In terms of the range of sentence for this separate offence, cocaine is a hard drug because it is addictive and because it causes significant direct and indirect damage to users, to their families, and to the safety and security of society. As a very experienced trial judge, Bassel J., put it in R. v. Amour [2004] O.J. No. 1537 (O.C.J.),

This was a lifestyle or life conduct choice or course of action, for profit. I agree with the submission of Mr. Devlin that the cocaine offence is not a victimless crime. One only has to walk through the Old City Hall here to see three courts dedicated to drug offences in the main, involving the possession and sale of cocaine. The devastating health effects on cocaine drug users, the terribly addictive aspect of this drug, the disastrous effects on their families, and the ruination of their lives, all reflect very real victims, which is an aggravating factor. In addition, the terrible addiction and need for money to feed the addiction is a significant underlying cause of many crimes that are prosecuted in the courts, including thefts, robberies, break-and-enters, soliciting for the purpose of prostitution, assaults, with a whole other category of victims. A very tragic but graphic illustration of the misery flowing from this drug is seen daily with numerous addicts pleading guilty and receiving sentences of incarceration for street-level transactions of small amounts of cocaine.

Also see: Pushpanathan v. Canada, 1998 778 (SCC), [1998] 160 DLR (4th) 193 at 235-7 (S.C.C.).

An additional feature of cocaine trafficking that is well-known in the courts, and that increases the gravity of the offence, is that it is associated with violence. That is because it is an unlawful but lucrative business and so it spawns collateral violent crime, either to protect territory, to protect and enforce unlawful transactions, or simply to steal an unlawful product or its unlawful proceeds. As Doherty J.A. put it in R. v. Hamilton, supra at 161:

The use and sale of cocaine kills and harms both directly and indirectly. The direct adverse health effects on those who use the drug are enormous and disastrous. Cocaine sale and use is closely and strongly associated with violent crime. Cocaine importation begets a multiplicity of violent acts. Viewed in isolation from the conduct which inevitably follows the importation of cocaine, the act itself is not a violent one in the strict sense. It cannot, however, be dissociated from its inevitable consequences. Unlike the trial judge, I characterize cocaine importation [and possession for the purpose of trafficking, in this case] as both a violent and serious offence…

8The Graham case dealt with about three ounces of cocaine. This case, in contrast, involves over thirty kilograms of cocaine. The harmful effects described by Code J., Bassel J., and Doherty J.A. are obviously multiplied.

Mitigating and Aggravating Factors

9The key aggravating factor in this case is the very large quantity of cocaine. There are, however, mitigating factors. It is mitigating that Mr. Palden has led a pro-social life to this point. He is a first offender. He has the support of his family and his community, as set out in the letters filed on his behalf. He has worked and taken courses and been as pro-social as it is possible to be while on bail. It is mitigating that he chose to not contest the Crown’s case and saved court and prosecutorial resources.

10That said, it is not as mitigating as a guilty plea. By not contesting the trial, Mr. Palden leaves open his right to appeal the Charter rulings. That is, of course, his right to do so. In no way is it aggravating that he chose to proceed in this way. But a guilty plea is an expression of remorse. An offender who pleads guilty takes responsibility for the offence and communicates their remorse to the community. Mr. Palden did not do that. He is obviously not to be punished for failing to do that – as I said, it is his right to proceed in this way – but he does not get the full mitigation that would ordinarily go with a guilty plea.

Principles of Sentencing and Sentence Imposed

11The fundamental principle of sentencing is that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. In cases involving the trafficking of large amounts of Schedule I drugs, the most important sentencing principles are general and specific deterrence and denunciation: R. v. Graham, at para. 46. Rehabilitation of course plays a role, but in a case of this nature it plays a secondary role to denunciation and deterrence. Of course, the balance is always different depending on the offender and the offence. It is an individualized process. Rehabilitation may be emphasized more in some cases than others, but deterrence and denunciation still play important roles in these types of cases, especially a case involving such large amounts of a schedule I drug.

12Bearing these principles in mind, Ms. Webb, for the Crown, argued that a sentence of 8 years was appropriate for Mr. Palden. She emphasized that the range of sentence for an offence of this nature is 8-12 years. She took a position at the bottom end of the range. She explained that she took into account the fact that there were many mitigating factors, including Mr. Palden’s pro-social history, his lack of police involvement, his status as a first offender, his support from his family and his community, and his decision not to contest the Crown’s case. Ms. Webb, who took a very fair position, also conceded that the Crown could not prove that Mr. Palden was anything other than a relatively low-level courier. I agree. The evidence does not point to any greater involvement by Mr. Palden.

13In support of her position, Ms. Webb points to a number of cases. I will mention some of them:

• R. v. Sandu, 2016 ONSC 7946: The four accused were convicted after trial in relation to what McCombs J., the sentencing judge, called a “carefully orchestrated major criminal operation that led to the seizure of 33 kilograms of cocaine” on one day and 10 kilograms of cocaine on another day. All the offenders were first offenders who had led previously pro-social lives, for the most part. Iqbal was 43 years old. He had a family. McCombs J. described him as the directing mind although there were others involved. He sentenced Iqubal to twelve years in relation to the full 43 kilograms. Sandhu was 40 years old at the time of sentencing. He also had a family. McCombs J. found that he worked under Iqbal but was a fully committed member of the drug conspiracy. McCombs J. sentenced him to 11 years in relation to the full 43 kilograms. Alexiou also had a family. He was a courier in relation to the 33 kilograms of cocaine. McCombs J. sentenced him to 10 years. Sharma, another family man, was convicted in relation to 10 kilograms of cocaine. He was the least culpable of the four. McCombs J. sentenced him to 6 years.

• R. v. Graham, supra: The offender was convicted after a jury trial of possession of a handgun, possession of three ounces of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime. He was convicted at a judge-alone trial of breaching various probation and weapons prohibition orders. He had an atrocious criminal record. These offences included his second offences for possession of a firearm and possession of a Schedule I drug for the purposes of trafficking. The record also included a conviction for attempted murder. Code J. found him to be a mid-level trafficker. He noted, after adopting the analysis in other cases, that kilogram level trafficking frequently attracts sentences of ten years or more. He ultimately sentenced Graham to two years, consecutive to the gun offence. He would have sentenced Graham to three years but for the totality principle.

• R. v. Brissett, 2019 ONCA 11: The Court of Appeal upheld a 10-year sentence. The offender possessed 15 kilograms for the purpose of trafficking. He had a related record, although it was dated.

14In R. v. Graham, Code J. adopted the analysis of the range of sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking set out in the decision of Greene J. in the Ontario Court of Justice in R. v. McGill, 2016 ONCJ 138, [2016] O.J. No. 1346 at para 54:

The Court of Appeal has, in effect, created graduated weight or amount-based categories of cocaine trafficking and sentencing ranges for each of these categories. It is undoubtedly true, as recently said by K.L. Campbell J. in R. v. Barraeiras, 2015 ONSC 7196 at para. 39, that, “[l]engthy penitentiary terms of imprisonment are regularly imposed upon offenders that [sic] possess substantial amount of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking”. Indeed, the Court of Appeal has several times expressed the view that five to eight years is the “proper range” for adult offenders found in possession of approximately a half-kilogram (slightly more than a pound) of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking: R. v. Bajada (2003), 2003 15687 (ON CA), 173 C.C.C. (3d) 255; R. v. Bryan, 2011 ONCA 273, [2011] O.J. No. 1581 (C.A.); and R. v. Haye, supra; affd. [2014] O.J. No. 6575 (C.A.). Higher amounts are not infrequently dealt with by way of penitentiary sentences of greater than ten years: see, for example, the detailed survey of the approach taken by the Court of Appeal to multi-kilo cases, especially where aggravated by the element of importation, in R. v. Duncan et al, 2016 ONSC 1319, at paras. 25-37. As regards cases involving much more moderate amounts of the drug, R. v. Woolcock, [2002] O.J. No. 4927 (C.A.) is generally recognized as fixing the sentencing envelope for constructive possession of an ounce or less of cocaine at “6 months to 2 years less a day”. Intermediate amounts (as is the immediate case) tend to attract sentences in an intermediate range of two to four or five years.

15I adopt this analysis.

16Mr. Little argues that Mr. Palden should receive a sentence in the range of 6-7 years. He relies on all the same mitigating factors, including the fact that Mr. Palden was only a low-level courier. He does not disagree that the range is 8-12 years for someone in Mr. Palden’s position but argues that he should receive a sentence below the range. In addition to Sandhu, relied on by both Crown and defence, Mr. Little relies on two other cases:

• R. v. Mok, [2017] O.J. No. 3758: Mok pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. The police observed individuals who imported cocaine. The individuals left a duffel bag at Mok’s house. The police executed a search warrant and found ten kilograms of cocaine in the duffel bag. There was a joint submission for five years. Mr. Mok had a limited criminal record there were many mitigating factors. McMahon J. imposed the joint submission less pre-sentence custody and Downes credit. McMahon J. gave him some credit for restrictive bail conditions.

• R. v. Jablonski, [2018] O.J. No. 6950: The offender pleaded guilty to one count of possession of cocaine for the purpose and one count of trafficking cocaine. Facts relating to trafficking carfentanyl were read in and treated as an aggravating factor. The accused had trafficked a sample of carfentanyl to a police agent. He also trafficked one kilogram of cocaine and had possession of 14 kilograms of cocaine. The trial judge described him as “not the kingpin” of the very sophisticated drug operation but found that he played a major role and was in a position of trust. He was 47 years old. He had a somewhat dated criminal record that included two drug possession offences and a possession for the purpose offence. LeDressay J. of the Ontario Court of Justice imposed a global sentence of eight years.

17In the Sandhu case, the two lower-level players, Alexiou and Sharma, received sentences of ten and six years each. Mr. Little argued that Mr. Palden was situated similarly to Sharma, thus justifying the six-year sentence. In my view, however, Mr. Palden is somewhere between Sharma and Alexiou, who received ten years as a courier of 33 kilograms of cocaine. Alexiou, however, appears to have had more involvement in that drug operation than Mr. Palden had in this drug operation. Mr. Mok is in a slightly different position in that he pleaded guilty (unlike Mr. Palden) and was subject to a joint submission.

18After reviewing the cases, I agree with Crown counsel that the range of sentence for a low-level cocaine courier is from eight to twelve years when kilogram or more amounts of cocaine are trafficked or possessed for the purpose of trafficking. But where does Mr. Palden fit into that?

19I turn first to the nature of the drug. Although it has been overtaken by the plague of fentanyl in our country, cocaine is a dangerous drug. It ruins lives through addiction and fuels violence. I will not repeat Justice Code’s quote about cocaine.

20The next issue is the role of couriers. In that regard, I adopt the comments of McCombs J. in Sandhu at para. 39 about the role of couriers:

Mr. Alexiou very clearly had a significant role to play in the receipt and delivery of the 33 kilograms of cocaine. It may be that he was acting as a mere courier, but his conduct carries a very high degree of moral blameworthiness. The evidence supports the conclusion that he was chosen for that role because he was considered to be someone who could be trusted with drugs of very high value that were to be transported to the condominium unit. He flew in from Montreal that very morning, likely for the sole purpose of ensuring that the drugs were delivered to the chosen location. He was entrusted with exclusive possession of a very large quantity of cocaine valued at about $1.5 million at the wholesale level, and he was also entrusted with an access card and key to the condominium unit.

21Although Mr. Palden, unlike Alexiou, did not have a key to a condo used to store cocaine, and did not fly in from another jurisdiction, it is an obvious inference that he was also chosen for his role because he could be entrusted with over 30 kilograms of cocaine.

22As I suggest to counsel during submissions, it is a real mystery how Mr. Palden came to be involved with a significant and organized drug conspiracy, even at a very level. He comes from a pro-social family and community. He was working as an apprentice steamfitter, an excellent trade with many opportunities. He was making good money. This is a very unusual situation. That said, these are not exceptional mitigating circumstances that take the case out of the range. These circumstances simply go to Mr. Palden’s prospects for rehabilitation, which, and I agree with Mr. Little on this point, are very good.

23That said, I agree with Crown counsel that 8 years is the proper sentence. I agree that all of the mitigating factors apply, including the fact that Mr. Palden has taken great advantage of all the opportunities afforded him while on bail. It takes into account restrictive bail conditions, which are a mitigating factor although it must be said that those conditions were gradually loosened. The one factor that in my view does not take it below the range, as argued by the defence, is the fact that Mr. Palden did not plead guilty. He had an uncontested trial and has preserved his appeal rights. Of course, as I have said, preserving appeal rights is not an aggravating factor. Indeed, it is mitigating that he did not contest the Crown’s facts and saved court and prosecutorial resources. The mitigation that would go with a guilty plea and the remorse that entails does not, however, apply to him in these circumstances. Again, it is not punishment for failing to plead guilty. Again, no accused person, or anyone for that matter, is to be punished for exercising their constitutional and legal rights. It is simply a mitigating factor that is lacking. In my view, that is why this otherwise excellent candidate for rehabilitation does not fall below the range.

24Mr. Palden is sentenced to 8 years in custody or 2920 days with credit for 11 days in custody. He will have 2909 days left to serve. He will also be subject to a s. 109 order for ten years, and a DNA order.

R.F. Goldstein J.

Released: February 18, 2026

CITATION: R. v. Palden, 2026 ONSC 452