R. v. Longmore, 2026 ONSC 3202
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
CAMRON LONGMORE
Amanda Webb and Elisa Mastrorillo, for the Crown
Ravin Pillay, for Camron Longmore
HEARD: September 5, 2025; May 19, 2026
R.F. GOLDSTEIN J.
1. Overview
1In August 2023 the police conducted observations of Camron Longmore. He was seen driving three different vehicles registered to other people: a grey Chevrolet Tahoe; a white GMC van, and a grey Jeep Cherokee.
2On August 3, 2023, at 1:51 pm, the police observed Lucho Loder at Kennedy Commons Shopping Plaza. Mr. Longmore and Shane Smith-Thomas drove up in separate vehicles and parked on either side of Mr. Loder’s vehicle. They moved heavily weighted bags and a black bin with a yellow lid from Loder’s vehicle into Mr. Longmore’s vehicle. Mr. Longmore and Smith-Thomas drove away. The police observed them move duffle and hockey bags between their vehicles. Later that afternoon Loder met up with Mr. Longmore and Smith-Thomas. Mr. Longmore got a large black suitcase from Loder and placed it in his car.
3On August 20, 2023, at 11:17 am, police were again conducting surveillance. Police observed Loder drive from 9 Caseley Way in Toronto to an address in Woodbridge. He parked next to a white GMC van driven by Mr. Longmore. They stood together and had some kind of interaction. Smith-Thomas also briefly attended. He brought some food to Mr. Longmore. A short time later Bryan Sherritt parked next to Mr. Longmore. Mr. Longmore got a black bin with a yellow lid out of the back of the GMC van. He gave it to Sherritt. Sherritt placed it in his vehicle and then drove away.
4The next day, August 21, 2023, the police again conducted surveillance. Loder met Mr. Longmore at 11 Progress Avenue. Mr. Longmore was now driving a Jeep Cherokee. They transferred three black bins with yellow lids from Loder’s vehicle to Mr. Longmore’s Jeep Cherokee. Each bin contained multiple kilograms of cocaine.
5Mr. Longmore drove to Kennedy Commons shopping area where he met with Sherritt. He transferred a bin containing 36.71 kilograms of cocaine to Sherritt. Sherritt was subsequently arrested. The bin was later seized from an address associated to Sherritt.
6Mr. Longmore then parked in the rear laneway of a Metro store. He then met with Tenzin Palden. Mr. Longmore transferred a bin containing 34.76 kilograms of cocaine to Palden. Palden was subsequently arrested, and the bin was seized.
7The police then attempted to arrest Mr. Longmore. He tried to flee. He rammed three police cars before the police arrested him. The police searched the Jeep Cherokee. They found a third black bin with a yellow top. It contained 26.35 kilograms of cocaine. They also found a black garbage bag containing 5.81 kilograms of cocaine, and a green Dollarama bag containing 2.2 kilograms of cocaine. The total amount of cocaine seized from the Jeep Cherokee was over 34 kilograms. According to the Agreed Statement of Facts, the value of 34 kilograms of cocaine at that time was as follows:
Sold at the kilogram level: $927,000 to $1.1 million.
Sold at the ounce level: $2.0 million to $2.4 million.
Sold at the gram level: $3.1 million to $4.1 million.
8The total amount of cocaine trafficked by Mr. Longmore that day was 71 kilograms. According to the Agreed Statement of Facts, the value 71 kilograms of cocaine at that time was as follows:
Sold at the kilogram level: $1.9 million to $2.3 million.
Sold at the ounce level: $4.3 million to $5.1 million.
Sold at the gram level: $6.4 million to $8.5 million.
9Test samples of the cocaine revealed that it was between 93% and 100% pure.
10Mr. Longmore brought an application to exclude the evidence under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Justice Bawden dismissed the application on July 31, 2025. On September 5, 2025, Mr. Longmore was tried before me. He pleaded not guilty to two counts of trafficking cocaine and one count of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. The trial proceeded based on admissions pursuant to s. 655 of the Criminal Code. Mr. Longmore did not contest the Crown’s case or call any evidence. I found him guilty of all counts. He now comes before the court for sentencing.
2. Circumstances Of The Offender
11I have had the benefit of an Enhanced Pre-Sentence Report for Mr. Longmore. He is a very young man, still. He was 20 at the time of the offence and is now 23. His parents were very young when he was born – his mother was 19 and his father was only 17. His father could not cope, apparently, and has not been an important influence in his life. His mother, Tanese Longmore, managed to complete school despite having more children as a single mother. She was, fortunately, able to lean on her family and become a personal support worker. Mr. Longmore was raised in the home of his maternal grandparents in Ajax along with his maternal uncle, half-siblings, and, from the age of 10, his stepfather. He has a good relationship with all of them, according to the EPSR. His relationship was rocky with his stepfather at the beginning, but it is better now. Mr. Camron’s needs were met as he grew up, and the EPSR writer described his mother as “strict but supportive”. He also had a good relationship with his paternal grandmother. He spent time with her over the years and remains close with her.
12Mr. Longmore attended multiple elementary schools and experienced bullying, but things improved somewhat in high school until the Covid-19 pandemic. He went to Notre Dame Catholic Secondary School and appears to have done reasonably well. Things seem to have fallen apart during the pandemic, as they did for so many in high school. Nonetheless, he did graduate from high school in 2022. He has taken some online courses geared towards becoming an electrician but not completed them. He has worked at some jobs, including accompanying his uncle Alton to plumbing job sites.
13Mr. Longmore indicated to the social worker writing the EPSR that he experienced anti-black racism from correctional officers at the Toronto East Detention Centre. He did not, for understandable reasons, describe the TEDC in flattering terms. His time there was apparently miserable, something that is, unfortunately, all too easy to believe. In terms of substance abuse, Mr. Camron’s family members have worried about his marijuana use but he does not seem to have a major substance abuse problem.
3. Impact on The Community
14Large-scale drug trafficking is incredibly harmful to the community. Although other drugs have perhaps displaced cocaine as the worst of the worst, cocaine is still highly dangerous. It destroys lives. Addiction is the cause of petty crime, vandalism, or worse. High-level commercial trafficking – which is what Mr. Longmore was doing – relies on the spreading of misery and violence to be profitable. No doubt that is why Parliament has chosen to make life imprisonment the maximum penalty for trafficking a schedule I substance or possession of a schedule I substance for the purpose of trafficking. I do not need to repeat what has been said in many cases about the trafficking of hard drugs – it is scourge, and as I said, it destroys lives and communities.
4. Positions of the Crown and Defense And Cases In Support
15The Crown’s position is that Mr. Longmore should be sentenced to 12 years in custody, less Summers credit: R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26; Criminal Code, s. 719(3.1). Ms. Webb, for the Crown argues, that this is at the lower end of the range for such a significant amount of cocaine.
16Ms. Webb has referred to R. v. Palden, 2026 ONSC 442. Like Mr. Longmore, Palden had an uncontested trial before me. Mr. Longmore trafficked 34.76 kilograms of cocaine to him. Mr. Palden was older and working in a good trade, but unlike Mr. Longmore he was unknown to the police before the arrest. I sentenced Palden to 8 years in the penitentiary.
17In that decision I also summarized several of the cases that Ms. Webb relies on in this case. I will simply repeat my summary of some of them at paras. 13 to 15 of Palden:
13In support of her position, Ms. Webb points to several cases. I will mention some of them:
R. v. Sandu, 2016 ONSC 7946: The four accused were convicted after trial in relation to what McCombs J., the sentencing judge, called a “carefully orchestrated major criminal operation that led to the seizure of 33 kilograms of cocaine” on one day and 10 kilograms of cocaine on another day. All the offenders were first offenders who had led previously pro-social lives, for the most part. Iqbal was 43 years old. He had a family. McCombs J. described him as the directing mind although there were others involved. He sentenced Iqubal to twelve years in relation to the full 43 kilograms. Sandhu was 40 years old at the time of sentencing. He also had a family. McCombs J. found that he worked under Iqbal but was a fully committed member of the drug conspiracy. McCombs J. sentenced him to 11 years in relation to the full 43 kilograms. Alexiou also had a family. He was a courier in relation to the 33 kilograms of cocaine. McCombs J. sentenced him to 10 years. Sharma, another family man, was convicted in relation to 10 kilograms of cocaine. He was the least culpable of the four. McCombs J. sentenced him to 6 years.
R. v. Graham, 2018 ONSC 6817: The offender was convicted after a jury trial of possession of a handgun, possession of three ounces of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime. He was convicted at a judge-alone trial of breaching various probation and weapons prohibition orders. He had an atrocious criminal record. These offences included his second offences for possession of a firearm and possession of a Schedule I drug for the purposes of trafficking. The record also included a conviction for attempted murder. Code J. found him to be a mid-level trafficker. He noted, after adopting the analysis in other cases, that kilogram level trafficking frequently attracts sentences of ten years or more. He ultimately sentenced Graham to two years, consecutive to the gun offence. He would have sentenced Graham to three years but for the totality principle.
R. v. Brissett, 2019 ONCA 11: The Court of Appeal upheld a 10-year sentence. The offender possessed 15 kilograms for the purpose of trafficking. He had a related record, although it was dated.
14In R. v. Graham, Code J. adopted the analysis of the range of sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking set out in the decision of Greene J. in the Ontario Court of Justice in R. v. McGill, 2016 ONCJ 138, [2016] O.J. No. 1346 at para 54:
- The Court of Appeal has, in effect, created graduated weight or amount-based categories of cocaine trafficking and sentencing ranges for each of these categories. It is undoubtedly true, as recently said by K.L. Campbell J. in R. v. Barraeiras, 2015 ONSC 7196 at para. 39, that, “[l]engthy penitentiary terms of imprisonment are regularly imposed upon offenders that [sic] possess substantial amount of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking”. Indeed, the Court of Appeal has several times expressed the view that five to eight years is the “proper range” for adult offenders found in possession of approximately a half-kilogram (slightly more than a pound) of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking: R. v. Bajada (2003), 2003 CanLII 15687 (ON CA), 173 C.C.C. (3d) 255 (C.A.); R. v. Bryan, 2011 ONCA 273, [2011] O.J. No. 1581 (C.A.); and R. v. Haye, supra; affd. [2014] O.J. No. 6575 (C.A.). Higher amounts are not infrequently dealt with by way of penitentiary sentences of greater than ten years: see, for example, the detailed survey of the approach taken by the Court of Appeal to multi-kilo cases, especially where aggravated by the element of importation, in R. v. Duncan et al, 2016 ONSC 1319, at paras. 25-37. As regards cases involving much more moderate amounts of the drug, R. v. Woolcock, [2002] O.J. No. 4927 (C.A.) is generally recognized as fixing the sentencing envelope for constructive possession of an ounce or less of cocaine at “6 months to 2 years less a day”. Intermediate amounts (as is the immediate case) tend to attract sentences in an intermediate range of two to four or five years.
15I adopt this analysis.
18Ms. Webb relies on other cases, but I agree with her that there is support in the case-law that 12 years is within the range of sentence for criminal activity involving significant amounts of cocaine.
19The defence position is that Mr. Longmore should be sentenced to 8 years, less Summers credit. Mr. Pillay argues that Mr. Longmore should receive Duncan as well as Summers Credit, for time spent on house arrest: R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754. He relies on several cases, but it is only necessary to mention a few:
R. v. Frost, 2011 ONSC 6448. Frost was a key player in a conspiracy to import over 1300 kilograms of cocaine into Canada by boat. The boat was intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard, and the cocaine was found on board. Frost was 59 years old and was a first offender. Thorburn J. (as she then was) sentenced him to 16 ½ years.
R. v. Macias and Popovich, 2025 ONSC 5456. Macias and Popovich pleaded guilty to one count of possession of 20 kilos of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking. Popovich also pleaded guilty to trafficking the 20 kilos; guilty to possession for the purposes of trafficking of 151 kilos of cocaine and 297 kilos of methamphetamine at one address; and guilty to possession of possession of an additional 197 kilograms of methamphetamine. They both pleaded guilty after Boucher J. dismissed their applications under the Charter. Both were first offenders with significant mitigating factors. Justice Boucher sentenced Macias to 6.5 years on the possession of the 20 kilograms of methamphetamine. She sentenced Popovitch to a 13-year global sentence.
R. v. Purvis, 2026 ONCA 187. Purvis pleaded guilty to importing and possession for the purpose of trafficking in relation to an importing scheme involving approximately 1.5 metric tonnes (or 1500 kilograms) of cocaine. He was at the lowest position in the hierarchy. He had suffered adversity, including an intellectual disability and cognitive challenges. The Court of Appeal reduced his sentence from 16.5 years to 12 years.
R. v. Tello, 2018 ONSC 2259. Tello was found guilty after a trial of conspiring to import 1000 kilograms of cocaine; trafficking one kilogram of cocaine on one occasion and two kilograms on another; and possession of proceeds of crime. He abandoned the conspiracy to import when he became suspicious of the undercover officer. K. Campbell J. found that Tello was a high-ranking controlling partner in the conspiracy at the top of the drug trafficking hierarchy. He sentenced Tello to a 15-year global sentence. See also: R. v. Ursino and Dracea, 2018 ONSC 1171.
20From these cases, I infer that criminal activity involving very significant amounts of cocaine can attract sentences of between 10 and 20 years. The range is wide because the amounts, positions in the drug hierarchy, and expressions of remorse vary widely.
5. Mitigating and Aggravating Factors
21There are mitigating and aggravating factors in this case. The main aggravating factor is the enormous amount of cocaine involved: over 100 kilograms. It is an aggravating factor that Mr. Longmore appears to have been entrenched in high-level drug trafficking for commercial gain. It is also aggravating that in trying to escape when placed under arrest, he drove dangerously and crashed into three police cars.
22There are mitigating factors, of course. Mr. Longmore continues to enjoy the support of his family. He did not plead guilty, so he cannot point to the mitigating factor of remorse. He did save the state the resources to prosecute and try him, and there is certainly mitigation in that. That mitigation, however, is limited. The case against him was overwhelming. He was caught red-handed.1 The lack of a guilty plea is not, of course, an aggravating factor.
6. Principles Of Sentencing, Sentence Imposed, And Ancillary Orders
23The main principles of sentencing involving large-scale cocaine trafficking are general deterrence, specific deterrence, and denunciation. As Code J. stated in Graham at para. 46:
Another important feature of drug trafficking offences is that they are rationally premeditated commercial crimes driven by the profit motive. Because of the significant harms and violence associated with cocaine trafficking, and because it is a planned and premeditated commercial crime, the courts have repeatedly stressed that denunciation and deterrence are the most important sentencing principles in these cases.
24Large scale cocaine trafficking (and importation) is a commercial venture that requires planning and sophistication. People trafficking at the multi-kilo level understand that it is a high-risk, high-reward activity. They make rational decisions about the trade-off between risk and reward. For them, it is a business a decision to traffic cocaine: R. v. H.(C.N.) (2002), 2002 CanLII 7751 (ON CA), 170 C.C.C. (3d) 253 at para. 46; R. v. Hamilton (2004) 2004 CanLII 5549 (ON CA), 186 C.C.C. (3d) 129 at paras. 103-105; Graham at para. 46. The commercial trafficker at that level is not doing it because they are trapped in a cycle of poverty and addiction, as perhaps a street-level trafficker might. Such addicted people need help, which is why rehabilitation plays a larger role. People trafficking at a high commercial level usually don’t need help; they need to be convinced that the rational business decision is to find some other line of work.
25Rehabilitation is obviously a principle of sentencing as well, although, as I have said, it plays a lesser role when such large amounts at the commercial level are involved. Mr. Longmore is very young. He has family support. He did take some steps towards rehabilitation. That said, a person’s recent criminal conduct, especially while on bail for a current offence, says something about their rehabilitative potential. Mr. Longmore has the burden to prove rehabilitative factors on a balance of probabilities. The lack of rehabilitative potential, of course, is not an aggravating factor. But it is still something that can be considered: Graham at para. 31. Given his youth, the support from his family and the potential of gainful employment, I find that Mr. Longmore has realistic if limited potential for rehabilitation. Hopefully he will use his time in the penitentiary to reflect, achieve the basic skills he got started on while on bail, and mature.
26There is also the principle of restraint that must be considered. A young first offender must be sentenced in such a way as to avoid a crushing sentence that would undermine their rehabilitative potential: Purvis at para. 35. In this case, I must consider that Mr. Longmore is exactly the sort of person that Tulloch C.J.O. had in mind in Purvis: a young, first offender facing a significant penitentiary sentence.
27Finding the appropriate balance in any sentencing decision is difficult. It requires the sentencing judge to balance all the factors, giving the appropriate weight to each factor. Consideration of one set of factors – those dealing with general deterrence in large-scale cocaine trafficking cases – will point in the direction of a significant sentence in accordance with the principles of deterrence and denunciation. Other factors – restraint, rehabilitation, and any collateral consequences – will point in the direction of a less significant sentence where the offender is still very young and has some rehabilitative potential.
28Two other issues require consideration: moral blameworthiness and Mr. Longmore’s place in the drug hierarchy.
29When considering Mr. Longmore’s moral blameworthiness, I have difficulty with the notion that social factors connected to anti-Black racism played a role in this particular offence. There must be some connection – it need not be a causal connection – between systemic racism and the circumstances that give rise to or explain the criminal conduct. Without that connection, mitigation of sentence is simply a discount based on the colour of a person’s skin, which all agree is wrong: R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680 at para. 97. Social context evidence may help explain some aspects of an offence. For example, in Morris, the Court of Appeal found that “it was open to the trial judge to find that the evidence of anti-Black racism was connected to, or played a role in, Mr. Morris's strong fear for his personal safety in the community”: Morris at paras. 98-99.
30In this case, there is no doubt that Mr. Longmore faced struggles growing up. His father was not present in his life. He described one very negative encounter with the police, giving rise to understandable fear and suspicion, but he does not report that he was subjected to constant harassment. Although the family was obviously not rich, Mr. Longmore’s basic needs were provided for. He lived in a multi-generational family unit and always had members of his family around. I accept that Mr. Longmore was probably subjected to some anti-black racism, but this case lacks the connections between anti-black racism and the criminogenic factors that played a role as understood in Morris.
31The main link between Mr. Longmore and this crime appears to have been his paternal uncle, Smith-Thomas. Smith-Thomas apparently introduced him to criminality and showed him quick ways to earn money. Smith-Thomas was present for drug-dealing like behaviour on two occasions. Everyone interviewed agrees that Smith-Thomas was a bad influence, and members of the family told him to stay away. However, he lived with his paternal uncle, Alton Longmore, as well as his grandparents, stepfather, and siblings. In other words, in his mother’s home he was surrounded by people who may not have been rich but were leading pro-social lives. Mr. Longmore apparently spent time going to work sites with his uncle Alton. Mr. Longmore, perhaps immaturely, apparently decided that his uncle Alton, who made an honest living in a skilled trade as a plumber, was not as good a role model as his drug-dealing other uncle. However immature or bad that choice was, there is no evidence that systemic racism had anything to do with it. Mr. Longmore’s moral blameworthiness is relatively high, given his place in the drug hierarchy and the enormous amounts of cocaine trafficked; it is, however, attenuated by his relative youth.
32I turn to the question of Mr. Longmore’s role. I find that Mr. Longmore was in the middle of the drug hierarchy, although probably a little closer to the bottom than to the top. Mr. Longmore was actively conducting activities consistent with drug trafficking. While it is true that his uncle was present during the first two days of the surveillance, on the third occasion he was working alone. There is no evidence that he was the driving force or one of the driving forces behind the criminal enterprise; or that he was giving orders to those lower down in the hierarchy. There is no evidence that he was living an ostentatious lifestyle. I infer that he was too young and inexperienced to be the driving force or directing mind of the enterprise. He was, however, trusted enough to distribute an enormous quantity of cocaine worth millions of dollars. He started the day with an enormous quantity of cocaine and distributed different amounts to others. I conclude that those others were lower than him in the hierarchy. He may not have been a directing mind, but he was also not a mere courier.
33When I balance all the factors, I find that a global sentence of 10 ½ years is called for. It is not as high as the 12-year sentence called for by the Crown. Justified though a 12-year sentence might be, it would be crushing for a young man like Mr. Longmore. In terms of parity, Mr. Longmore was at a higher level than Palden, who received an 8-year sentence. The sentence must reflect the key principles of deterrence in large-scale commercial cocaine trafficking. A double-digit sentence is called for with such a large amount of cocaine trafficked by someone in the middle of the hierarchy. The sentence will be 10 ½ years concurrent on all counts.
34Mr. Longmore was arrested on August 21, 2023, and released on August 28. He thus spent 7 days in custody. He was on a house arrest bail from August 28, 2023, until July 2, 2025, when he was arrested for failing to comply with his bail. He remained in custody from July 2, 2025, until March 12, 2026, a total of 253 days in custody. He pleaded guilty to fail to comply with a recognizance and obstruct justice. He was sentenced to 14 days in custody, or time served. He was then released and has resumed his old house arrest bail. He has been on that bail from March 13, 2026, until today, June 15, 2026.
35Thus, Mr. Longmore is credited with 239 of the 253 days in custody, as well as the 7 days he served before getting bail. That is 246 days, or credited at 1.5:1, 369 days – just over one year. He will be credited with that time.
36Mr. Longmore also spent about 22 months on bail before being arrested. As noted, since his release from custody, he has spent approximately 3 more months on bail.
37Mr. Pillay argues that I should credit Mr. Longmore with 6 months of Downes credit given that he did spend almost two years on house arrest before being failing to comply, and another three months since: R. v. Downes (2006), 2006 CanLII 3957 (ON CA), 79 O.R. (3d) 321, 205 C.C.C. (3d) 488 (C.A.). As well, he does not have proper records and on that basis is not seeking Duncan credit. I have some trouble giving Mr. Longmore credit for time spent on house arrest given that he breached. I do not have much information about the breach – how serious it was, for example, but it appears based on the guilty plea that he was not convicted of other serious criminality. I am reluctant to exercise my discretion to grant Downes credit under those circumstances, but Crown counsel does not oppose the 18 months of pre-sentence credit, which undoubtedly represents some combination of Downes and Duncan credit. I have no doubt that Mr. Longmore would receive Duncan credit of some kind. Under the circumstances, Mr. Pillay’s request for 18 months of credit is not unreasonable. When I take pre-sentence custody into consideration, I agree that Mr. Longmore should receive credit for 18 months on each count concurrent.
38Thus, Mr. Longmore will have 9 years left to serve, concurrent on each count.
39There will also be a s. 109 order for ten years and a DNA order.
R.F. Goldstein J.
Released: June 15, 2026
COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-90000315-0000
DATE: 20260615
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
CAMRON LONGMORE
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
R.F. Goldstein J.