Graham Zoppi

The defendant, Vimalan Ravindran, faced charges of operating a conveyance with over 80 mg of alcohol.

The defence brought a Charter application, arguing that a six-minute delay in making an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand by the police officer, P.C. Yellapah, breached the defendant's rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The delay was attributed to the officer's need to confirm the defendant's identity (as he lacked a valid driver's license) and to await backup for officer safety, given the late hour, highway location, and presence of two occupants in the vehicle.

The court found that these circumstances constituted "unusual circumstances" as per Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, justifying a flexible interpretation of the "forthwith" requirement for ASD demands.

Consequently, no Charter breaches were found, the breath samples were admissible, and a conviction was registered.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Over a three-year period, the accused developed a serious cocaine addiction that led him to sell cocaine to an undercover officer on four separate occasions, totalling approximately 30 grams, with additional cocaine found in his residence.

The accused successfully completed a residential addictions treatment program prior to sentencing and demonstrated genuine rehabilitation.

The court imposed a sentence of 90 days incarceration to be served intermittently, along with one year of probation, finding that while incarceration was necessary, the accused's exceptional rehabilitative efforts and demonstrated sobriety warranted a departure from the standard sentencing range for cocaine trafficking.

The defendant brought a motion to stay charges of impaired driving and "over 80" pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the charge to the anticipated end of trial was 19 months and 25 days.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, which sets an 18-month presumptive ceiling for constitutionally tolerable delay.

After calculating defence delay at 2 months and 21 days, the net delay was 17 months and 4 days, falling below the presumptive ceiling.

However, the court found that the defence met the onus of demonstrating that the delay markedly exceeded the reasonable time requirements for a simple impaired driving case, considering the substantial state delay and the court's earlier admonitions that went unheeded.

The motion was allowed and the charges were stayed.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit two accused for trial on charges of attempted murder, aggravated assault, careless use of firearm, weapons dangerous, and unauthorized possession of firearm arising from a shooting incident outside a nightclub in Scarborough.

The accused challenged the sufficiency of identification evidence.

The court found that while identification evidence was frail and contained material inconsistencies, it was sufficient to warrant committal for trial on the low threshold applicable at the preliminary inquiry stage.

The court distinguished between cases of weak identification, which may still warrant committal, and cases where identification is so contradictory as to not constitute identification at all.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

Approximately 25 months elapsed between arrest and the second trial date.

The defence brought a motion to stay proceedings alleging a violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown failed to provide disclosure of a booking video despite repeated requests over many months.

The court found the delay constitutionally intolerable and granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over .08 following a R.I.D.E. stop on November 28, 2009.

The Crown relied on observations by the arresting officer, a roadside screening device test result showing a fail, and breathalyzer test results.

The defence challenged the grounds for both the approved screening device demand and the breathalyzer demand, as well as whether the tests were administered as soon as practicable.

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds for both demands and that the tests were administered promptly.

However, the court found insufficient evidence of impairment based on the officer's observations alone, without expert evidence linking the breathalyzer readings to impairment at the time of driving.

The accused was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of over .08.