Jesse Razaqpur

The accused brought Garofoli applications challenging the validity of search warrants executed during a joint police investigation into drug trafficking.

The court dismissed the application regarding the residential units, finding the Information to Obtain (ITO) established reasonable and probable grounds based on a pattern of suspected drug transactions.

However, the court found the search of two outbuildings located beyond the fence-line of a mixed residential and commercial property violated section 8 of the Charter, as the ITO lacked sufficient specificity to authorize their search.

Applying the Grant framework under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court concluded the evidence, which included firearms and significant quantities of fentanyl and methamphetamine, should not be excluded, as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Patrick Gordon pleaded guilty to possession of psilocybin for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought a conditional sentence of imprisonment (CSO), while Gordon sought a conditional discharge.

The court reviewed sentencing principles, including proportionality, individualization, and parity, and analyzed comparator cases involving psilocybin dispensaries.

The court found that a conditional discharge was in Gordon's best interests and not contrary to the public interest, considering his lack of criminal record, remorse, and the circumstances of the offence.

The offender pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, firearms offences, and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The murder involved a targeted public shooting with two firearms, resulting in one death and injuries to two others.

The court considered the offender's youth, guilty plea, and social context evidence of anti-Black racism, but found the aggravating factors, including elements of planning and deliberation, required a significant period of parole ineligibility.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 16 years, and a concurrent 13-year sentence for the firearms and drug offences.

Chris Vagenos pleaded guilty to five offences, including possession of psilocybin for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and breach of an undertaking.

The offences stemmed from his employment at a store selling magic mushrooms, and he breached his undertaking by returning to work there shortly after his initial arrest.

The Crown sought a conditional sentence, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court granted a conditional discharge with a 30-month probation order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a DNA order, emphasizing rehabilitation and finding the discharge not contrary to the public interest despite the breach of undertaking.

Matthew Ferguson pleaded guilty to possession of psilocybin for trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought a 15-month custodial sentence, while the defence requested a conditional discharge.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the large quantity of psilocybin, the retail storefront operation, and the offender's managerial role and financial motivation.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, remorse, pro-social life, community involvement, and family support.

The court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence with house arrest for the first six months, 100 hours of community service, a DNA order, and a 10-year/life weapons prohibition.

Aladin Abdelgadir pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl and MDA for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court considered the significant quantity of fentanyl (over 2 kg), the accused's awareness of the opioid crisis and the dangers of fentanyl, his motivation by profit, and his related criminal record, including being on parole at the time of the offence.

Mitigating factors included his guilty plea, intelligence, and social context evidence related to systemic racism and a troubled upbringing.

The court emphasized general and specific deterrence due to the grave harm caused by fentanyl trafficking.

A global sentence of 13 years was imposed.

Michael Dalia was convicted of drug offences, including possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a 16-year sentence for fentanyl-related counts, while the defence requested a global sentence of 10 years, arguing Dalia was a mid-level trafficker with significant mitigating factors, including harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, the offender's criminal record, and the impact of fentanyl trafficking, applying principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The court also applied a "Duncan credit" for the unduly harsh conditions of Dalia's pre-sentence custody.

Ultimately, a 13-year sentence for the fentanyl count was imposed, reduced to 10 years after the Duncan credit, with concurrent sentences for other counts.

The applicant, Patrick Benson, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on secondary grounds following a bail hearing.

He argued for a de novo hearing based on an alleged error by the Justice of the Peace and a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic and an outbreak at the detention centre, coupled with his health issues.

The court found a material change in circumstances, warranting a de novo hearing.

However, after reviewing the proposed release plan, the applicant's extensive criminal record (including violent offences, breaches of court orders, and failures to appear), and the Crown's evidence regarding institutional COVID-19 protocols, the court dismissed the bail review application.

Detention was ordered on both primary (flight risk) and secondary (public safety) grounds, finding the proposed plan insufficient to mitigate the substantial risk posed by the applicant.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on charges including possession of methamphetamine for trafficking and probation breaches.

The court considered a new surety and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic as material changes in circumstances, allowing for a de novo review.

Despite the applicant's extensive criminal record and the seriousness of the charges, the court granted judicial interim release.

It found that the proposed release plan, combined with the heightened health risks of incarceration during the pandemic, sufficiently addressed the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention, particularly for a non-violent offender.

The accused was found guilty of seven counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking in various controlled substances (fentanyl, heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, GHB, hydromorphone, and cannabis), two counts of possession of proceeds of crime, one count of careless storage of a firearm, and one count of possession of a loaded prohibited weapon.

The accused operated a drug trafficking enterprise in concert with a co-accused from a hair salon and later from a residential address.

The court imposed a sentence of 7 years and 6 months imprisonment, with consideration given to Gladue factors relating to the accused's Métis heritage, childhood trauma, and rehabilitation efforts, while maintaining that denunciation and deterrence remained paramount given the serious nature of the offences involving fentanyl and heroin trafficking combined with firearms possession.

The accused was convicted of seven counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking in various controlled substances (fentanyl, heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, GHB, hydromorphone, and cannabis), one count of possession of proceeds of crime under $5,000, one count of careless storage of a firearm, one count of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and four counts of breach of firearms prohibition orders.

The court imposed a global sentence of 9 years imprisonment, including a 1-year consecutive term for the prohibition breaches, with time served credited on a 1.5:1 basis.

The sentencing emphasized the serious dangers of fentanyl and heroin trafficking, the toxic combination of drugs and firearms, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The accused was charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

Police arrested the accused based on information from a confidential informant and conducted a warrantless search of his vehicle, seizing 27.96 grams of fentanyl.

The accused challenged the validity of the arrest and the search, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 8 and 9.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused, that the arrest was arbitrary, and that the resulting search was unlawful.

The court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the state misconduct and the impact on the accused's Charter-protected rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was tried on two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual touching involving two complainants who were children at the time of the alleged events.

The trial judge accepted the complainants as credible and sympathetic witnesses, but held that credibility alone did not satisfy the criminal burden of proof.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found a reasonable doubt on the essential elements of intention and sexual purpose because the evidence did not establish that the accused was awake or conscious during the touching incidents.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pretrial application to exclude his formal statement to police, alleging it was involuntary and obtained in violation of his rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the statement was voluntary, as the police interrogation techniques did not overbear the applicant's will.

However, the court found that the police breached ss. 10(a) and 10(b) by failing to inform the applicant of the deceased's name or specific details of the murder charge, which prevented him from meaningfully instructing counsel.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that admitting the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the evidence.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the accused requested that the partial defence of provocation be left with the jury.

The accused testified that the victim made threatening comments before the accused killed him.

The trial judge refused the request, finding no air of reality to the objective element of the defence.

The court held that the victim's comments, made while bound and confined by the accused, would not cause an ordinary person to lose the power of self-control.

The applicant, Jesse Bonello, charged with robbery and related offences, sought disclosure of police occurrence reports relating to the principal Crown witnesses, Tyrone Saunders and Lauren Smith, under *Stinchcombe* and, alternatively, via an *O'Connor* application.

The Crown argued the records were not in its possession and thus not subject to *Stinchcombe* disclosure.

The court found that the occurrence reports were not "fruits of the investigation" and therefore not subject to *Stinchcombe* disclosure.

Applying the *O'Connor* principles, the court determined that the applicant met the "likely relevance" threshold for Tyrone Saunders' records due to his extensive criminal record and expected credibility issues, ordering a review of those sealed documents.

However, the application for Lauren Smith's records was dismissed as a "fishing expedition" due to the absence of a criminal record or case-specific evidence demonstrating likely relevance.

The Crown brought an application for a ruling on the admissibility of post-offence conduct evidence against three accused in a first-degree murder trial.

The court deferred the decision on the admissibility of vehicle cleaning evidence, finding it premature to balance probative value against prejudicial effect until further trial evidence was presented.

However, the court granted the admission of evidence regarding alleged witness intimidation by one accused, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect, subject to proper jury instructions and prior identification evidence.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of cell phone evidence and the use of a PowerPoint presentation summarizing call detail records at a first-degree murder trial.

The court permitted non-expert telecommunications company representatives to testify about the "general rule" regarding cell phone location in relation to towers, acknowledging exceptions.

The court also allowed the use of a PowerPoint presentation as demonstrative evidence, provided it was amended to be neutral, fact-based, and accurate, with consistent formatting and scale for maps, and subject to limiting instructions to the jury.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit thermal-imaging video evidence, lay opinion evidence from a surveillance technician interpreting heat signatures, and demonstration evidence.

The defence objected to the lay opinion and demonstration evidence, and requested the full unedited video.

The court reserved decision on the lay opinion evidence pending further qualification of the witness, disallowed the demonstration evidence due to its high prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value, and permitted the Crown to present an edited version of the thermal-imaging video, finding the timestamp sufficient to convey time gaps.

The accused, indicted for first-degree murder, applied for an order requiring the Crown to produce criminal records and police occurrence reports for all Crown witnesses.

The Crown agreed to provide criminal records but opposed the production of occurrence reports, arguing they were not first-party disclosure and that the third-party disclosure procedure had not been followed.

The court found that occurrence reports from the investigating police service (NRPS) for nine specific Crown witnesses fell within the Crown's first-party disclosure obligation under *Stinchcombe* and *McNeil*, as credibility was a live issue and the reports related directly to the investigation.

However, the court declined to order disclosure from other police services, deeming them third parties, and dismissed the third-party disclosure application due to procedural non-compliance under *O'Connor*.