Maryse Nassar

The accused, K.G., was charged with three counts of sexual assault against his former common-law partner, M.H. The allegations included non-consensual vaginal intercourse while M.H. was in a medication-induced sleep, forced fellatio, forced anal penetration during consensual intercourse, and non-consensual sexual touching after separation.

The Crown sought to admit similar fact evidence.

The court dismissed the similar fact application, finding insufficient similarity between the alleged incidents.

The judge found significant credibility and reliability concerns with the complainant's evidence, including bias, dramatic shifts in demeanor, inconsistencies, and the impact of medication on her memory.

While the accused's denials were not entirely accepted, they could not be entirely rejected, leaving a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, K.G. was acquitted on all three counts.

The Crown brought a bail review application under s. 521 of the Criminal Code, seeking to vacate a release order and have a bail hearing de novo for the respondent, Brandon Van Allen.

The Crown argued that the Justice of the Peace erred in law by failing to address submissions regarding the surety's contradictory evidence and gaps in the supervision plan (secondary grounds), and by unduly focusing on triable issues and the respondent's non-participation in an altercation when assessing public confidence (tertiary grounds).

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the Justice of the Peace properly applied the test for release, assessed the surety's credibility, and was entitled to deference in her determinations, concluding that no error in law occurred.

This is a Crown appeal from the respondent's acquittals on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of various controlled substances, as well as possession of property obtained by crime.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, and the appeal grounds related to the trial judge's assessment of this evidence.

The appellant argued the trial judge considered the circumstantial evidence in a piecemeal fashion rather than cumulatively.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly instructed herself on the law regarding circumstantial evidence and applied it properly, considering the evidence as a whole and identifying limitations without assessing individual pieces in isolation against the reasonable doubt standard.

The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that no legal error was committed by the trial judge.

The court also clarified that misapprehension of evidence is a question of mixed fact and law, not appealable by the Crown on a question of law alone, and affirmed the trial judge's correct application of law regarding constructive and joint possession.

The offender was convicted by a jury of importing 4.6 kilograms of opium into Canada, concealed inside an air compressor shipped from Iran.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the defence sought three to three and a half years, citing the offender's status as a first-time offender and the recent cancer diagnosis of his wife as a collateral consequence.

The court found insufficient evidence to reduce the sentence based on collateral consequences and sentenced the offender to four years and six months imprisonment, along with a ten-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The court sentenced the accused after jury convictions for trafficking in crack cocaine, possession of crack cocaine for the purposes of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime arising from an undercover street-level drug buy.

The sentencing analysis balanced denunciation and deterrence for crack trafficking against strong rehabilitation evidence, including addiction, parental responsibilities, compliance with Narcotics Anonymous, and a positive pre-sentence report, while also noting relapse and prior addiction-related convictions.

A custodial sentence was found necessary, but the court imposed a relatively modest term in light of the connection between addiction and the offences.

The accused received six months' imprisonment less time served, followed by 18 months' probation with treatment and community service conditions.

A mandatory weapons prohibition was imposed, but the requested DNA order and victim fine surcharge were declined.

The accused, a 34-year-old first offender with serious health issues including HIV and Hepatitis C, was found guilty by a jury of possession of cocaine, and possession of ketamine and MDMA for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a 12-month custodial sentence, while the accused sought a 9-month conditional sentence.

The court considered the accused's strict compliance with house arrest bail conditions for nearly three years as a significant mitigating factor.

The court imposed a 16-month conditional sentence to be served in the community, followed by two years of probation, finding this would satisfy the principles of denunciation and deterrence while promoting rehabilitation.

On a mid-trial application for severance following an adjournment caused by co-accused counsel's conflict, the court considered whether delay to the moving accused justified separate trials.

Applying the governing severance principles under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code and the balancing approach in Last, the court held that the strong public interest in a joint trial remained predominant.

The charges arose from the same hotel-room seizure, the possession issues overlapped substantially, and severance risked inconsistent verdicts and impaired truth-seeking.

The application was dismissed, without prejudice to any future s. 11(b) Charter argument.

The accused applied to quash a telewarrant authorizing the search of his apartment in a drug trafficking investigation and sought exclusion of the seized drugs and related paraphernalia.

The court held that the telewarrant was invalid because the ITO contained no statement of the circumstances making it impracticable for the affiant to appear personally before a justice, as required by s. 487.1 of the Criminal Code and s. 11(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

However, the court found the ITO, as amplified, established reasonable grounds to search, and the police acted in good faith despite drafting errors and omissions regarding the confidential informant.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court held the evidence was admissible notwithstanding the s. 8 breach.

The accused were charged with possession of cannabis marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime following execution of a search warrant.

Both accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of their section 11(b) Charter rights (right to trial within a reasonable time).

The total delay from commencement of proceedings to trial was 19 months and 22 days.

The court found that approximately 16 months of delay was attributable to state conduct, including Crown delays in vetting the Information to Obtain and significant institutional delays in scheduling.

The court found that the delay exceeded the 8-10 month guideline for provincial court trials and that the accused suffered some prejudice from the extended delay.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused was convicted of possession of approximately 45 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at a restaurant and located drugs behind the counter.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of two years while the defence requested a conditional sentence.

The court considered the seriousness of trafficking offences, the quantity of drugs, and the accused’s prior criminal record as aggravating factors, while also weighing mitigating circumstances including family support, stable employment, and prolonged compliance with strict bail conditions.

Applying the principles of denunciation and deterrence alongside rehabilitation under s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code, the court concluded that a strict conditional sentence would adequately address the purposes of sentencing.

The accused was sentenced to two years less a day to be served in the community under strict house arrest followed by probation.

The accused was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police approached his parked vehicle for a wellness check.

After determining there were no health or safety concerns, the police demanded the accused's driver's licence, ran checks, and subsequently arrested and searched him and the vehicle, finding crack cocaine.

The accused brought an application to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, alleging violations of his section 8 and 9 rights.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the detention was arbitrary and the subsequent searches were unlawful, characterizing the police conduct as a flagrant and deliberate disregard for Charter rights.

The application was granted and the crack cocaine was excluded from evidence.

The accused appeared for sentencing after a jury conviction for trafficking a small quantity of crack cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime arising from an undercover police “opportunity drug buy.” The Crown sought a custodial sentence of eight months, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

Applying the principles of sentencing under ss. 718–718.2 and 742.1 of the Criminal Code, the court considered the offender’s youth, absence of prior record, stable employment history, and the very small quantity of drugs involved.

Although trafficking in crack cocaine is a serious aggravating factor, the court found minimal risk of reoffending and concluded that community supervision would not endanger the safety of the community.

A conditional sentence was imposed to balance denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.

The applicants, jointly charged with trafficking in cocaine, brought applications to stay the charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to trial was approximately 28 months.

The court applied the Morin framework and found that the institutional delay of 15 months was within acceptable limits, considering the inherent time requirements of a joint trial and the actions of the accused.

The court also found minimal prejudice to the applicants.

The applications for a stay were dismissed.

During a jury trial for cocaine trafficking, the Crown invoked investigation privilege to prevent disclosure of the surveillance location from which a police officer observed the accused during an undercover drug transaction.

The court reviewed the principles governing investigative technique and observation post privilege, balancing the public interest in protecting police methods and cooperating third parties against the accused’s right to make full answer and defence.

The judge permitted extensive cross‑examination regarding the officer’s ability to observe but prohibited questions that would reveal the precise surveillance location or whether the officer was inside or outside a building.

The jury was instructed that the privilege limited defence cross‑examination and that this limitation could affect the weight given to the officer’s testimony.

The jury ultimately acquitted one accused and convicted the other.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application seeking to modify the standard racial bias challenge-for-cause question used during jury selection under the Parks framework.

The moving party proposed a multiple-choice question intended to better detect conscious and unconscious racial bias among prospective jurors.

The court reviewed prior decisions considering the proposed approach, including cases approving and rejecting the use of multiple-choice questions.

Finding no evidentiary basis to conclude the proposed question was more effective than the established Parks question, the court exercised its discretion to maintain the standard formulation.

The jury panel was directed to be asked the traditional Parks question during jury selection.