G. Walker Q.C.

The Crown brought an application for a ruling on the admissibility of post-offence conduct evidence against three accused in a first-degree murder trial.

The court deferred the decision on the admissibility of vehicle cleaning evidence, finding it premature to balance probative value against prejudicial effect until further trial evidence was presented.

However, the court granted the admission of evidence regarding alleged witness intimidation by one accused, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect, subject to proper jury instructions and prior identification evidence.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit thermal-imaging video evidence, lay opinion evidence from a surveillance technician interpreting heat signatures, and demonstration evidence.

The defence objected to the lay opinion and demonstration evidence, and requested the full unedited video.

The court reserved decision on the lay opinion evidence pending further qualification of the witness, disallowed the demonstration evidence due to its high prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value, and permitted the Crown to present an edited version of the thermal-imaging video, finding the timestamp sufficient to convey time gaps.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of cell phone evidence and the use of a PowerPoint presentation summarizing call detail records at a first-degree murder trial.

The court permitted non-expert telecommunications company representatives to testify about the "general rule" regarding cell phone location in relation to towers, acknowledging exceptions.

The court also allowed the use of a PowerPoint presentation as demonstrative evidence, provided it was amended to be neutral, fact-based, and accurate, with consistent formatting and scale for maps, and subject to limiting instructions to the jury.

The accused brought pre-trial applications alleging breaches of their rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, seeking the exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The police arrested the accused without a warrant based on confidential informant tips and surveillance, finding cocaine and cash.

A subsequent search warrant for the accused's residence yielded more cocaine and cash.

The court found the arrest and warrantless search were based on reasonable grounds and did not violate the Charter.

While there was a technical breach of section 8 due to the late filing of a report to a justice regarding the search warrant, the court held that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) as the police acted in good faith and society's interest in adjudicating the serious charges on their merits outweighed the impact of the breach.