Michael Peterson

The accused was charged with multiple counts of arson and public mischief following a fire that destroyed his truck and damaged adjacent vehicles and a building.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including surveillance videos and the testimony of the accused's former fiancée.

The court found the accused guilty of arson seriously threatening another's property and arson for a fraudulent purpose, concluding he intentionally set fire to his own insured truck.

However, the accused was acquitted of the remaining arson charges because the Crown failed to prove the ownership of the other damaged vehicles.

The appellant, K.C., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, having abandoned his sentence appeal.

The incident involved conflicting accounts of a sexual encounter.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony, finding it contradicted by text messages, and accepted the complainant's evidence as logical, consistent, and supported by other evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error or material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, affirming the high degree of deference owed to credibility findings on appeal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Terrence Rivard, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and a 6-year sentence.

The trial judge had acquitted him of assault with a weapon but convicted him of aggravated assault on Daniel Shaver, rejecting his self-defence claim regarding Shaver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and factual findings, supported by independent evidence, were sound.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, noting the appellant's significant criminal record and the severe impact on the victim.

The appellant, R.C., appealed convictions for sexual assault, touching for a sexual purpose, and invitation to sexual touching.

The complainant, who was 15 at the time of trial, testified about incidents that occurred when she was between four and seven years old.

The trial judge accepted the complainant's evidence as credible and reliable.

On appeal, R.C. argued that the trial judge improperly assessed the reliability of the complainant's uncorroborated evidence and erred in dealing with recovered memories.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully considered and resolved reliability issues, and did not err or reverse the onus of proof regarding recovered memories.

The trial judge's findings on reliability were entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered on April 23, 2015 and sentence imposed on August 4, 2015 by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred by failing to provide reasonable assistance to the appellant in respect of Charter views.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking and the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in law by improperly using confidential informant information contained in the Information to Obtain (ITO) to support the trafficking finding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The Crown brought an application for a ruling on the admissibility of post-offence conduct evidence against three accused in a first-degree murder trial.

The court deferred the decision on the admissibility of vehicle cleaning evidence, finding it premature to balance probative value against prejudicial effect until further trial evidence was presented.

However, the court granted the admission of evidence regarding alleged witness intimidation by one accused, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect, subject to proper jury instructions and prior identification evidence.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit thermal-imaging video evidence, lay opinion evidence from a surveillance technician interpreting heat signatures, and demonstration evidence.

The defence objected to the lay opinion and demonstration evidence, and requested the full unedited video.

The court reserved decision on the lay opinion evidence pending further qualification of the witness, disallowed the demonstration evidence due to its high prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value, and permitted the Crown to present an edited version of the thermal-imaging video, finding the timestamp sufficient to convey time gaps.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of cell phone evidence and the use of a PowerPoint presentation summarizing call detail records at a first-degree murder trial.

The court permitted non-expert telecommunications company representatives to testify about the "general rule" regarding cell phone location in relation to towers, acknowledging exceptions.

The court also allowed the use of a PowerPoint presentation as demonstrative evidence, provided it was amended to be neutral, fact-based, and accurate, with consistent formatting and scale for maps, and subject to limiting instructions to the jury.

The accused, indicted for first-degree murder, applied for an order requiring the Crown to produce criminal records and police occurrence reports for all Crown witnesses.

The Crown agreed to provide criminal records but opposed the production of occurrence reports, arguing they were not first-party disclosure and that the third-party disclosure procedure had not been followed.

The court found that occurrence reports from the investigating police service (NRPS) for nine specific Crown witnesses fell within the Crown's first-party disclosure obligation under *Stinchcombe* and *McNeil*, as credibility was a live issue and the reports related directly to the investigation.

However, the court declined to order disclosure from other police services, deeming them third parties, and dismissed the third-party disclosure application due to procedural non-compliance under *O'Connor*.

Four accused were convicted of intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to a residential property on August 22, 2010, knowing or being reckless as to whether the property was inhabited.

The victim's residence was firebombed with Molotov cocktails in what was characterized as a crime for hire based on false allegations that the victim was a pedophile.

The offenders caused approximately $10,000 in damage.

One accused also faced charges of disguising his face with intent to commit an indictable offence and breaching probation.

Another accused faced an additional charge of attempting to obstruct justice.

The court imposed penitentiary sentences ranging from two to four and one-half years, with the lead offender receiving the longest sentence.

The court emphasized the seriousness of arson, particularly when targeting an occupied residence, and applied principles of denunciation and deterrence.