Chelsey Lapointe

During a criminal trial involving multiple accused, the Crown brought a Khelawon application to admit the out-of-court statements of two deceased witnesses for the truth of their contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found that the unsworn, audio-recorded telephone statement of a former neighbour lacked both procedural and substantive reliability and was inadmissible.

However, the court admitted the video-recorded statement of a deceased complainant, finding sufficient procedural safeguards and substantive reliability corroborated by other witnesses to overcome hearsay dangers.

During a trial for sexual offences, the defence sought to cross-examine a complainant on alleged prior inconsistent statements recorded in notes made by Family and Children's Services workers, pursuant to s. 11 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Crown objected, arguing the notes were not verbatim statements.

The court ruled that the notes, being summaries written in the third person and not verified by the complainant, lacked the necessary reliability to be characterized as prior inconsistent statements under the Act.

The defence was permitted to cross-examine on the content of the interviews but could not use the notes as formal prior statements.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of lay opinion evidence from a registered nurse and capacity assessor regarding the complainant's capacity to manage her personal care.

The accused opposed the admission, arguing it was irrelevant and potentially prejudicial.

The court applied the principles from Graat and ruled the evidence admissible, finding it relevant to the complainant's condition and helpful to the jury, subject to appropriate limiting instructions.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of proposed demonstrative aids, specifically aerial maps of Port Colborne with embedded photographs and property descriptors, for a lengthy trial involving multiple accused and sexual offences.

The accused objected to the necessity of the maps, the accuracy of Google Street View photos, and the prejudicial nature of certain descriptors.

The court allowed the use of the aerial maps with municipal addresses and commercial names, but excluded the embedded photographs and non-neutral descriptors to avoid clutter and potential prejudice.

The applicant accused brought a third party records application.

Following a decision releasing records to the Crown and the applicant, the court issued an addendum ordering that the records may also be released to counsel for the co-accused on the same terms.

The Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence in a sexual assault trial where the complainant allegedly lacked the capacity to consent due to intellectual disabilities.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence from another witness alleging the accused provided her with drugs before engaging in non-consensual sex.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the dissimilarities between the two scenarios outweighed the similarities, and the prejudicial effect of the evidence significantly outweighed its probative value.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a Step One application under section 278 of the Criminal Code seeking the production of police occurrence reports relating to the complainant and 14 other proposed Crown witnesses.

The court found that the reports concerning the complainant were likely relevant to the key issue of her capacity to consent, given her developmental delay, and ordered their production to the court for review.

However, the application for reports relating to the other 14 witnesses was dismissed as the accused failed to establish an evidentiary foundation beyond mere speculation that the reports would contain information useful for impeachment.

The accused brought a Charter s. 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that he was not tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, which sets presumptive ceilings of 18 months for Provincial Court and 30 months for Superior Court.

After calculating the overall delay of 40 months and 2 weeks from the charge date to the anticipated completion of trial and sentencing, the court deducted 19 months of defence delay and 7 months of exceptional circumstances (death of accused's father and illness of defence counsel).

The remaining delay of 14 months and 1 week fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and dismissed the application.

Following conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference with a minor, the court imposed a sentence of 60 days imprisonment followed by three years probation.

The offender, a 52-year-old man, had provided alcohol to two 15-year-old girls employed to perform household work.

While intoxicated, the offender touched the victim's breasts and genitals without consent.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles for offences involving abuse of minors, while considering the offender's lack of remorse, absence of prior imprisonment, and serious physical injuries as relevant factors.

Three young persons were sentenced following guilty pleas to sexual assault and sexual touching of a young person.

The offences involved repeated sexual assaults of a younger foster sibling over a 15-month period in a foster home.

The court found this to be an exceptional case meeting the custody threshold under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court imposed custodial sentences ranging from 15 to 21 months, with varying periods of open or closed custody followed by community supervision and probation, along with conditions including no contact with the victim, weapons prohibitions, and DNA orders.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown sought to rely on the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged whether the Crown had proven two prerequisites: that the samples were taken as soon as practicable, and that the first sample was taken within two hours of the offence.

The court found the samples were taken as soon as practicable but held that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the first sample was taken within the two-hour requirement due to insufficient evidence regarding the consistency of timepieces used.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

Following a trial, the accused conceded sufficient evidence existed for conviction but argued the charges should be stayed pursuant to section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the basis that his right to be free from arbitrary detention had been infringed.

The court found no arbitrary detention occurred and convicted the accused on both charges.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a demand to provide a sample of breath into an approved screening device.

The Crown proceeded summarily and the accused pleaded not guilty.

The court found two fatal defects in the Crown's case: first, the demand made by the constable was not a valid demand under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code because the officer already had reasonable grounds to believe the accused had committed an impaired driving offence under section 253, making the screening device test an unnecessary intermediate step; and second, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed the necessary mens rea, as the officer could not articulate why the breath samples were unsuitable.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while disqualified from doing so.

The accused brought a motion to stay the charge pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the total delay was approximately 22 months, the delay was primarily attributable to the accused's own actions, including multiple requests for adjournments, his attempts to obtain legal counsel, and his frivolous Charter challenge based on "Freeman on the Land" ideology.

The court found that the accused had not established on a balance of probabilities that his Charter rights had been violated.

The accused was charged with assault to resist arrest following a police interaction in a parking lot.

The Crown alleged the accused failed to produce identification during a traffic stop for failing to signal a right-hand turn, and subsequently resisted arrest.

The accused raised jurisdictional arguments based on "freeman on the land" theories.

The court dismissed the charge on the basis that the underlying traffic stop was unlawful.

The Crown failed to establish that the operation of any other vehicle might have been affected by the alleged failure to signal, which is a material element of the offence under section 142 of the Highway Traffic Act.

Without a lawful basis for the stop, there was no lawful demand for identification, and therefore no lawful arrest.

Resistance to an unlawful arrest is not unlawful.

The accused was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proved all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused argued that he should be acquitted based on the defence of officially induced error, claiming that a police officer misinformed him about the consequences of refusing the breath demand.

The court rejected this defence, finding that the accused failed to establish the prerequisites for the excuse and that his evidence was unreliable and internally inconsistent.

The court convicted the accused.