Edward Kiernan

This motion to change a divorce order addressed child support and special expenses.

The respondent (payor) sought a retroactive reduction in child support due to decreased income and a change in special expense contributions.

The applicant (recipient) sought a retroactive increase in child support and contributions to various special expenses.

The court found a material change in circumstances for child support, imputing income to the payor for one year of underemployment, and retroactively adjusted support from January 1, 2019.

The payor's request to change life insurance was dismissed.

For special expenses, the court largely upheld the original order's requirement for consultation and agreement, finding the payor liable for childcare and school uniforms where consultation occurred or was unreasonably withheld, but denying other claims where the recipient failed to consult.

This high-conflict family law case involved two motions concerning the parenting arrangements for a child.

The respondent father sought a temporary order for primary residence due to alleged parental alienation by the applicant mother.

The applicant mother sought dismissal of the father's motion and an updated Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) report.

A critical material change in circumstances arose: the mother was in a relationship with a man recently convicted of child pornography possession and subject to a s.161 Criminal Code prohibition order.

The court found this constituted a compelling and exceptional material change, creating actual or potential harm to the child.

Consequently, the court granted the father's motion for temporary primary residence and sole decision-making responsibility, while allowing the mother unsupervised parenting time under strict conditions, including the prohibition of the convicted individual's presence during her parenting time.

The OCL was also requested to engage further services.

The Children's Aid Society brought a protection application regarding two children.

The older child disclosed sexual abuse by the mother's new partner, and the mother failed to protect the child, eventually resuming her relationship with the abuser.

The children were placed in the temporary care of their paternal grandparents.

At trial, the court found the children in need of protection.

The father sought custody but had moved to a new city with a partner who had seven children recovering from severe trauma, and the older child refused contact with him.

The court granted a final custody order to the paternal grandparents under section 102 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, finding it in the children's best interests, and ordered a structured access schedule for the parents.

The respondent mother brought a motion to change a final order to allow her to relocate with the children to the Niagara region to attend college.

The applicant father opposed the move and brought a cross-motion for sole custody and primary residency.

The court found a material change in circumstances regarding the mother's employment and financial situation, and held that the move was in the children's best interests.

The mother's motion to relocate was granted, the father's cross-motion for custody was dismissed, and the father's access schedule was varied to provide him with additional time to accommodate the move.

This decision addresses costs following an eight-day trial in a family law matter.

The court found divided success, noting that neither party's pre-trial offers to settle fully aligned with the final judgment.

The applicant was largely unsuccessful on the matrimonial home valuation date, while the respondent conceded the separation date late and failed to pay spousal support.

Both parties were found to have behaved unreasonably on certain issues, contributing to the necessity of a trial.

Considering the mixed outcomes and the conduct of the parties, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The court determined costs following two motions regarding custody and access.

Although the applicant succeeded in setting aside a previous temporary order, he did not succeed in his main goal of returning to 50/50 residence, and the respondent was overall successful.

The court awarded the respondent costs of $2,500 plus HST, finding the amount very reasonable compared to her actual legal fees.

The parties separated after a 21-year marriage.

The primary issue was the equalization of the matrimonial home, which the respondent had inherited from her grandparents.

The applicant claimed a 50% ownership interest based on an alleged agreement and unjust enrichment, and sought an unequal division of net family property under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act due to significant post-separation increases in the property's value.

The court found the respondent was the sole owner but the applicant was entitled to an equalization payment based on the valuation date value.

The court declined to apply s. 5(6), finding the threshold of unconscionability was not met.

The court also awarded the applicant occupation rent for a mobile home on the property, retroactive spousal support, and ordered him to pay child support for one child.

The applicant father brought a motion to set aside a temporary order that granted sole custody of the parties' child to the respondent mother, seeking to reinstate a prior shared parenting arrangement.

The respondent mother brought a cross-motion for a permanent order of sole custody.

Due to high conflict between the parents, the court interviewed the 12-year-old child, who expressed a preference to live with his mother and have discretionary weekend visits with his father.

Finding that joint custody was inappropriate given the parents' inability to communicate, the court dismissed the father's motion and granted sole custody to the mother, with specified parenting time for the father in accordance with the child's wishes.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that the child was in need of protection and an order for sole custody to the mother with supervised access to the father.

The court found the child in need of protection under section 74(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Child, Youth, and Family Services Act due to risks of physical harm arising from the paternal grandparents' long-term opioid addiction and recent cocaine use, the paternal uncle's drug issues, and the father's lack of insight into these risks and his own anger management difficulties.

The court granted sole custody to the mother and ordered weekly supervised access for the father at a third-party facility, emphasizing that unsupervised access would only be considered if the father addressed his living situation and anger management issues.

The initial finding that the child was also in need of protection under section 74(2)(h) was later corrected and removed.

The court addressed the calculation of spousal support following the respondent's sale of a farm property, which resulted in a significant, non-recurring capital gain.

The central issue was whether and to what extent this capital gain should be included in the respondent's income for spousal support purposes, particularly after the cessation of previously imputed farming income.

The court considered the Child Support Guidelines' provisions for non-recurring amounts and the need for fairness in light of both parties' circumstances.

The appellant mother appealed a trial decision making two of her children Crown wards without access and granting custody of her third child, who has Down syndrome, to the biological father without access to the mother.

The mother argued the trial judge erred in assessing evidence, including child hearsay and medical evidence, and in denying her access.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, credibility findings, or determination that access was not in the children's best interests given the mother's history of physical discipline, lack of insight, and failure to address the children's needs.

This is a child protection trial under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act involving three children.

The Children's Aid Society sought findings of protection and Crown Wardship for all three children.

The court found that the mother inflicted physical harm on the children through hitting them with a stick and other harsh discipline, causing complex trauma and emotional harm.

The court made findings of protection for all three children.

For the two older children, the court ordered Crown Wardship with no access to the mother.

For the youngest child, the court placed him in the custody of his father with no access to the mother, finding that the father was providing appropriate care and that the child was thriving in his care.

A mid-trial motion by the respondent mother to amend her pleadings to include a claim for placement of the subject child with the maternal great aunt was denied.

The child had been in the care of the Children's Aid Society since 2013 following removal due to domestic violence and substance abuse concerns.

The mother had not previously advanced the kinship care plan despite multiple opportunities to do so, including at trial management conference and when filing amended pleadings.

The court found that granting the amendment would require a substantial adjournment, necessitate reopening the Society's case, and result in significant delay prejudicial to the child's need for permanency.

The court emphasized the importance of procedural efficiency and the child's best interests in child protection proceedings.

Three young persons were sentenced following guilty pleas to sexual assault and sexual touching of a young person.

The offences involved repeated sexual assaults of a younger foster sibling over a 15-month period in a foster home.

The court found this to be an exceptional case meeting the custody threshold under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court imposed custodial sentences ranging from 15 to 21 months, with varying periods of open or closed custody followed by community supervision and probation, along with conditions including no contact with the victim, weapons prohibitions, and DNA orders.

A young person pleaded guilty to sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown applied for a serious violent offence (SVO) designation under section 42(9) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court applied a two-phase test: first, determining whether the offence caused serious bodily harm and whether the young person caused that harm; second, exercising discretion to determine whether an SVO designation was necessary to hold the offender accountable.

While the court found the threshold test satisfied, it declined to make the SVO designation, finding that such designation was not necessary to achieve the purposes of youth sentencing in all the circumstances.