CAS of Haldimand & Norfolk v. J.-L.J et al, 2021 ONSC 5465

COURT FILE NO.: FC-19-FO-25

DATE: 2021-08-10

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

CAS of Haldimand & Norfolk

Applicant

– and –

J.-L.J and C.M.

Six Nations of the Grand River

Respondents

Ms. L. Edwards, for the Applicant

Ms. A. Macdonald for the Respondent mother,

Mr. E. Kiernan for the Respondent father,

Mr. M. Elchami for the Respondent Band

HEARD: February 8, 9, 10 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 22, 25, March 23, 24, 25, 2021

JUDGMENT

THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE L. BALE

the parties

[1] The parties to this action are as follows:

a. the Applicant, Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand & Norfolk;

b. the Respondent mother, J.-L.J.;

c. the Respondent father, C.M.; and

d. the Respondent Band, Six Nations of the Grand River.

[2] The subject child is J., born […], 2014. J. is currently six years of age and is residing in the care of D.J., the maternal grandmother, pursuant to the Temporary Order of the Honourable Mme. Justice A. Hilliard dated March 8, 2019.

OVERVIEW OF POSITIONS

[3] All parties agree that J. is in need of protection pursuant to s. 2(b)(ii) of the Child Youth and Family Services Act, S.O. 2017, CHAPTER 14, Sch.1. That is, J. is at risk of physical harm as a result of J.-L.J.’s pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting him. A finding will be made to this effect, on consent.

The Society

[4] The Society seeks placement of J. in the care of C.M. pursuant to the terms of a six-month supervision order. The Society seeks further terms permitting J.-L.J. to have access to J. on alternate weekends, supervised by D.J.

[5] The Society’s position is grounded in the concern that, after 3 ½ years of Society involvement, J.-L.J.’s abuse of alcohol and prescription drugs has continued to impact her judgment and her ability to care for J. The Society has concerns regarding J.-L.J.’s ability to secure and sustain long-term stability, and with D.J.’s commitment to cooperating with the Society and C.M., including sharing information and following directions as required. The Society has had no child protection concerns regarding C.M. during the period of their involvement.

[6] The operative Application filed by the Society is the Child Protection Application as amended on August 28, 2020, which seeks placement of J. in the care of C.M. pursuant to a six-month supervision order.

Respondent Father

[7] C.M.’s position at trial is as per his Amended Answer Plan of Care dated December 10, 2019. He shares the Society’s concerns as they pertain to the caregiving of J.-L.J. C.M. seeks an Order placing J. in his care and custody pursuant to s. 102 of the CYFSA. This custody order would effect a variation of the custody and access terms of the Final Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Sherwood, dated September 22, 2016, reversing the primary residence of the child. In the alternative, C.M. argues that J. should be placed in his care pursuant to a six-month supervision order.

[8] C.M. asserts that he is supportive of an ongoing relationship between J. and his mother and his maternal family, and supportive of the child’s ongoing connection with his indigenous heritage and community. C.M. has agreed to an order for designated contact between J. and the Six Nations of the Grand River Band.

Six Nations

[9] The Six Nations of the Grand River is supportive of the Society’s request for a placement of the child with C.M. pursuant to the terms of a six-month supervision order. The Band has requested, and all parties have agreed, to specified terms of designated contact between the child and Band representatives, which supports the child’s continued exposure to his heritage through community elders and cultural events.

[10] The Band does not support the return of the child to J.-L.J.’s care.

Respondent Mother

[11] J.-L.J. seeks the placement of J. in the care of D.J., pursuant to a six-month supervision order, with prescribed terms of access by J.-L.J.

[12] J.-L.J. asserts that the child was under the care and charge of D.J. at the time of commencement of the Society’s request for court intervention, and as such, the least disruptive alternative for J. is to be returned into the home of D.J. She asserts that it is in the best interests of J. not to be removed from this environment.

The Child

[13] The child J. is six years of age. He is a First Nations, Inuk or Métis person, and a member of the Six Nations of the Grand River Band. Identification findings to this effect were made by the Honourable Mme. Justice Breithaupt-Smith on January 8, 2020.

BACKGROUND

[14] J.-L.J. and C.M. cohabited from approximately April 2013 to February 2015.

[15] J. was born on […], 2014.

[16] The Respondent parents were residing on the property of the maternal grandparents at the time of separation. J. was an infant at the time.

[17] Following separation:

a. C.M. resided briefly with a friend, and then moved in with his parents (paternal grandmother and paternal step-grandfather) in Kitchener, Ontario. C.M. continues to reside there to date;

b. J.-L.J.’s residence has been as follows:

(i) She generally resided on the property of the maternal grandparents until approximately August 2017, however:

a. She temporarily stayed with the paternal grandparents and C.M. for approximately 4-6 weeks in the summer of 2015;

b. For less than one month, she resided in a women’s shelter because she was ‘not seeing eye to eye’ with the maternal grandparents.

(ii) J.-L.J. secured her own residence from August of 2017 until February-April 2019. She dvises that she moved back in with the maternal grandparents in approximately February 2019, but also maintained her apartment for a short period of time following this move.

[18] C.M. is employed on a full-time basis as a short-haul semi-truck operator. J.-L.J. is not employed. Neither parent is in a romantic relationship at present, and neither parent has any children other than J.

[19] J. is now six years of age and is residing in the care of D.J. J.-L.J.’s time with J. is supervised by D.J. and other members of the maternal family.

[20] C.M. spends time with J. on alternate weekends on an unsupervised basis. Access exchanges take place at 6:00 p.m. on Fridays and Sundays with the parties meeting in Paris, Ontario (a mid-point between their residences). D.J. typically transports J. to and from parenting exchanges without J.-L.J.

Litigation History

[21] Following the separation of the parents in 2015, J. remained in the primary care of J.-L.J.

[22] On September 22, 2016 a Final Order was made by the Honourable Mr. Justice K. Sherwood, as a result of Final Minutes of Settlement filed by the parties. The Final Order provided, inter alia, for:

1. Joint custody of J.;

2. J.’s primary residence with J.-L.J.; and

3. Access to C.M. on alternating weekends and prescribed holidays.

[23] In August of 2017 J.-L.J. began working with the Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk on a voluntary basis arising from concerns related to issues of alcohol and community conflict. J.-L.J. was arrested for a criminal offence on August 28, 2017.

[24] On September 1, 2017 as a result of a Contempt Motion brought by J.-L.J., C.M. was ordered to return J. into the primary care of J.-L.J. by the Honourable Mr. Justice Sherwood.

[25] On June 11, 2018 a Safety Plan was entered into by J.-L.J., D.J., and the Society as a result of concern’s pertaining to J.-L.J.’s alcohol abuse and prescription drug misuse. The Safety plan provided that:

a. J. would be placed voluntarily with D.J.; and

b. J.-L.J.’s time with J. would be supervised.

[26] On July 5, 2018 C.M. commenced a Motion to Change the Final Order of Justice Sherwood.

[27] On July 11, 2018 as a result of another Contempt Motion brought by J.-L.J., C.M. was ordered into the care of D.J. by the Honourable Mr. Justice Martin, as per the safety plan in place.

[28] On March 8, 2019 the Society commenced a Protection Application, seeking placement of J. with C.M. pursuant to a six-month Supervision Order, with access to J.-L.J. in the Society’s discretion. The Society also brought a ‘place of safety’ motion requesting placement of J. with C.M. on that date. The Honourable Mme. Justice A. Hilliard denied the Society’s request to place J. in the care of C.M. and ordered that J. be placed in the temporary care and custody of D.J. under terms of supervision. The terms of supervision required, amongst other things, that:

a. J.-L.J. maintain regular communication and attend scheduled appointments with the Society;

b. J.-L.J. and D.J. advise the Society forthwith as to any involvement with the police as between the police and J.-L.J., the child, or any other person having access or contact with the child;

c. D.J. will ensure that no person under the influence of alcohol or illicit drugs be permitted around the child;

d. J.-L.J. demonstrate a safe and sober lifestyle free from abuse of alcohol or illicit drugs;

e. J.-L.J. notify the Society forthwith of incidents of being intoxicated by alcohol or non-medically-prescribed drugs, regardless of the presence of any children during the state of intoxication;

f. J.-L.J., to the best of her ability, participate in supports and treatments as recommended by the Society, including but not limited to individual counselling, supporting mothering, addictions counselling and inpatient rehab; and

g. D.J. comply with the Society’s directions regarding the J.-L.J.’s access to the child, and to contact the Society directly for clarification should any uncertainty arise.

[29] C.M.’s access to J. was ordered to be in the discretion of the Society as to location, duration, and frequency (at minimum on alternating weekends).

[30] On November 26, 2019 the Society amended its Protection Application to seek placement of J. with D.J., subject to a six-month Supervision Order.

[31] Statutory findings were made by the Honourable Mme. Justice J. Breithaupt Smith on January 8, 2020, on consent, confirming that J. is a First Nations, Inuk or Métis person, a member of the Six Nations of the Grand River Band and community, and that he was “removed from the residence of D.J.” at her specified address.

[32] On September 3, 2020 the Society again amended its Protection Application to again seek placement of J. with C.M., subject to a six-month Supervision Order.

[33] J.-L.J. and C.M. have filed Answer(s) and Plan(s) of Care and are represented parties in this action. D.J. has not presented a Plan of Care and has declined to participate in these proceedings despite that J. has been in her continuous care for more than six months.

[34] Representation for J. by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (“OCL”) was ordered by the court on March 8, 2019. On September 4, 2019 J.’s representation by the OCL was terminated by the court, on the consent of all parties.

[35] This matter was scheduled for trial on four previous trial sittings: January 13, 2020, April 6, 2020, May 25, 2020, November 23, 2020. Ultimately this trial was called to trial on February 8, 2021. J.-L.J.’s preliminary motion at trial for the renewed appointment of the OCL, and an adjournment of the trial was dismissed.

EVIDENCE OF THE SOCIETY

Child Protection Worker: Emily Walraven

[36] Ms. Walraven is a child protection worker with the Society. She was the family services worker on this matter from April 25, 2018 to March 19, 2019.

[37] At the commencement of Ms. Walraven’s carriage of this file, J.-L.J. had been working voluntarily with the Society for approximately eight months. She was residing in her own residence with J., and C.M. was having access to J. on alternating weekends. The Society’s concerns pertained primarily to alcohol abuse, community conflict, and lack of follow-through with supports.

[38] Throughout her involvement with this family, multiple anonymous telephone calls and multiple calls from community members reporting concerns about J.-L.J. were brought to the attention of Ms. Walraven.

A. Alcohol Issues

[39] In April 2018 J.-L.J. reported to Ms. Walraven that she had attended one appointment with Community Addiction and Mental Health Services but did not believe she had a drinking problem. In May she again denied all concerns regarding alcohol to Ms. Walraven and advised that she does not drink and “does not have a problem with alcohol”.

[40] On May 29, 2018, as a result of information received from the Norfolk OPP, Ms. Walraven attended at J.-L.J.’s home, unannounced. During that meeting J.-L.J. disclosed:

a. She had been drinking over the weekend while J. was with C.M. for an access visit;

b. On the Friday she invited a male party home to drink with her and became intoxicated; and

c. She knew she was unable to care for J. on Sunday evening, so she asked D.J. for assistance.

[41] On June 11, 2018 another event was brought to the attention of the Society by Norfolk OPP. Ms. Walraven thereafter discussed concerns about J.-L.J. with D.J. and J.-L.J., at which time J.-L.J. reported that she had been drinking large amounts of alcohol regularly, was mis-using her prescription for Lorazepam and mixing her prescription drugs with alcohol. J.-L.J. acknowledged not being able to take care of J. at the time, and agreed to voluntarily place J. with D.J. pursuant to a safety plan. C.M. was not involved in this safety planning.

[42] On July 12, 2018, during an interview with J.-L.J., she reported to Ms. Walraven that:

a. She was arrested the previous week, twice, for public intoxication;

b. That she has not had a drink in 9 days;

c. That she would complete a drug screen test; and

d. She will be starting rehab in three weeks.

[43] On August 16, 2018 Ms. Walraven met with J.-L.J. and a representative of Six Nations. J.-L.J. reported that she is 43 days clean and sober and enrolled in a detox and rehab program.

[44] As a result of concerns arising in October 2018, Ms. Walraven requested that J.-L.J. complete a drug screen test on October 23, 2018. Two days later J.-L.J. advised that she had requested the drug screen through her family doctor.

[45] On November 15, 2018 Ms. Walraven attended at J.-L.J.’s home for an unscheduled visit. Ms. Walraven observed J.-L.J.’s hands and body to be shaking out of control and the home to be unkept (i.e. garbage piled up, dishes and old food throughout the home, floors and counters needing cleaning).

[46] Under cross examination by counsel for C.M., Ms. Walraven agreed that she did not observe any significant progress with her alcohol issues during the period of involvement.

B. Supervision of Mother’s Time with J.

[47] When J. was voluntarily placed with D.J., on June 11, 2018, J.-L.J. and D.J. agreed to a condition requiring J.-L.J.’s time with J. to be completely supervised. They both acknowledged this expectation.

[48] Between June and October of 2018 J.-L.J. provided Ms. Walraven with urine drug screen results which did not raise any concerns regarding substance abuse.

[49] On September 13, 2018, after confirming that J.-L.J. was attending programming and counselling through the Six Nations, the restrictions on J.-L.J.s time with J. were relaxed by the Society such that she was permitted to have two unsupervised hours with J. per day.

[50] On September 18, 2018 Ms. Walraven became concerned by conflicting/ambiguous information received from J.-L.J. and D.J. as to who was providing care for J. on the two days per week that he was not enrolled in day care. It appeared to Ms. Walraven that J.-L.J. and D.J. were not complying with the Society’s directive regarding supervision of access. Specifically, she believed that J.-L.J. was having full-day unsupervised time without approval. As a result, a clear schedule was implemented, permitting J.-L.J. daily and defined unsupervised time with J. between 3:30 p.m. and 6:30 p.m., so that there would be no basis for confusion.

[51] On October 23, 2018, as a result of a wellness check at J.-L.J.’s home by the Norfolk OPP (at the request of the Society), J.-L.J.’s unsupervised time with J. was placed on hold. This was communicated to J-L.J. and D.J. At this time, it was suggested, and J.-L.J. agreed to consider moving into the home of D.J.

[52] The need for all of J.-L.J.’s time with J. to be supervised was repeated monthly to J.-L.J. and D.J. during this period. On February 15, 2019 it was specifically communicated to J.-L.J. and D.J., at an in-person meeting that J.-L.J. is not permitted to drop off and pick up J. from school. No period of unsupervised time was permitted.

[53] On March 4, 2019 Ms. Walraven received concerning information from C.M. and J.’s school regarding pick-ups and drop offs. Further, C.M. advised Ms. Walraven that he observed J.-L.J. to transport J. alone to access visits and that J.-L.J. had advised him that the supervised access restriction no longer applied. As a result of the concerns raised, and after consultation with her supervisor, Ms. Walraven and another worker parked outside J.’s school at bell time and observed J.-L.J. to be leaving the school parking lot alone with J. in D.J.’s vehicle.

[54] Following this event the decision was made by the Society to commence a Protection Application.

[55] Ms. Walraven maintained throughout her evidence that any changes in Society-directed terms of supervision between J.-L.J. and J. were always clearly communicated to both J.-L.J. and D.J. in advance of implementation.

C. Counselling and Services

[56] Prior to Ms. Walraven’s involvement, the Society had referred J.-L.J. to women’s services for counselling and to become connected with services. J.-L.J had not pursued these services by the time Ms. Walraven became the assigned worker. Ms. Walraven, during her involvement, also referred J-L.J. to services pertaining to supportive mother and child development and parenting skills. It is unclear as to what extent, if at all, J.-L.J. engaged in these services. J. was also referred for speech pathology, however it became evident later that this intervention was not needed.

[57] In May 2018 J.-L.J. advised Ms. Walraven that she did not attend her first appointment with Women’s Services counselling as scheduled.

[58] On June 11, 2018, upon J.’s voluntary placement with D.J., J.-L.J. agreed to attend (1) a rehabilitation program through Six Nations, and (2) Haldimand Norfolk Women’s Services for counselling support.

[59] On June 27, 2018 J.-L.J. advised that she had lost a spot at a treatment home, but had attended an intake counselling session. J.-L.J. questioned the Society’s concerns about her alcohol and drug use.

[60] Shortly thereafter the Six Nations Band also became involved with J.-L.J., offering counselling and attending with D.J. and J.-L.J. at multiple meetings with the Society.

[61] On January 7, 2019 J.-L.J. acknowledged to Ms. Walraven that she had not connected with any other recommended supports.

[62] In February 2019 D.J. and Ms. Walraven suggested that J.-L.J. might benefit from inpatient rehabilitation. J.-L.J. declined.

[63] Ms. Walraven testified that throughout her involvement with the file, she was only aware of J.-L.J. in engaging rehab and counselling services with Six Nations, and of one (intake) session with Norfolk Women’s Service. J.-L.J. did not engage in any other recommended services.

D. Communications with Society

[64] Ms. Walraven advised the court of periods of time during her involvement wherein J.-L.J. was non-responsive to Society communications. For example:

a. Ms. Walraven was unable to contact J.-L.J. between August 24, 2018 and September 9, 2018 (J.-L.J. did not answer the door nor respond to telephone calls.

b. J.-L.J. was not home for a scheduled appointment on September 10, 2018.

c. From December 11, 2018 to January 7, 2019 J.-L.J. was non-responsive to Ms. Walraven’s efforts to contact her: she did not answer the door, answer the telephone, respond to letters or text messages, or return voice mail messages.

[65] Ms. Walraven described multiple incidents wherein the veracity of the information provided to her by J.-L.J. was suspect. For example:

a. On September 17, 2018 the Society received information from the Norfolk OPP regarding incidents involving J.-L.J. on September 6, 2018 and September 8, 2018. In a meeting the following day J.-L.J. denied any police involvement on September 6, 2018 and September 8, 2018. A subsequent review of police incidents later proved J.-L.J.’s representations to be false.

b. J.-L.J. and D.J. provided inconsistent information regarding the J.-L.J.’s unsupervised time with J. in September 2018.

c. J.-L.J. made repeated representations to Ms. Walraven throughout her involvement that she had completed drug urine analysis tests as requested. This information proved false.

d. In November 2018 J.-L.J. advised Ms. Walraven that she was spending days in her own home, and nights at her mother’s home. This information was not confirmed by D.J.

e. The information provided by J.-L.J. as to potential romantic relationships and/or other individuals spending time her home was often questionable. J.-L.J. was reluctant to provide details regarding others in her home, and provided information to Ms. Walraven which appeared to conflict with police reports filed. Ms. Walraven became particularly concerned with reports of her spending time with (and potentially residing with) C.T., an individual well known to the Society and to police for his criminal activities and involvement in the drug culture.[^1] This relationship was brought to the attention of the Society in October 2018, and to Ms. Walraven’s understanding, continued into 2019 as confirmed by domestic incidents reported in police records.

f. Upon receipt of police incident reports regarding J.-L.J. in February 2019, it became clear to Ms. Walraven that J.-L.J. was not being forthcoming to her regarding her police contacts (e.g. incidents of violence, alcohol, conflict, a third-party overdose in her home, etc.). On February 15, 2019 Ms. Walraven reviewed J.-L.J.’s police occurrence reports with J.-L.J. and D.J. J.-L.J. denied all police incidents which reported her as intoxicated – asserting that the police were lying. Under cross examination Ms. Walraven agreed that J. was not present for these incidents of police involvement.

g. Both J.-L.J. and D.J. denied a domestic incident between them as reported in July 2017, stating that it never happened.

E. Observations of J. and Respondent Mother J.-L.J./Maternal Grandmother D.J.

[66] Ms. Walraven observed J. to be more reserved or shy in the presence of J.-L.J. and D.J.; more ‘snuggled’ up with them, and less smiley and engaged in conversation.

[67] No concerns were noted with respect to D.J.’s care of J.: her home was noted to be a stable and loving environment.

F. Observations of J. and C.M.

[68] Ms. Walraven noted no concerns related to C.M. during the time of her involvement.

[69] She observed one visit between C.M. and J. on March 4, 2019, noting J. to be very happy, ‘chatty’, and ‘bouncy’ on that occasion. J. was enthusiastic about showing Ms. Walraven his bedroom, his toys, his cat, dog, backyard pool, and his dinosaurs. She noted positive and loving interactions between J. and his paternal grandparents – observing him to reach for the paternal grandfather’s hand during the visit.

G. J.’s Schooling

[70] J.-L.J. and D.J. decided to wait until January 2019 to enroll J. in full-time school (as a result of his late birthday). He was enrolled in a private daycare three days per week in September 2018.

[71] In January 2019 J. was enrolled in school within the catchment of J.-L.J.’s home.

[72] Ms. Walraven took no issue with these decisions.

H. Voluntary Services

[73] Ms. Walraven explained to the court a voluntary service plan is the ‘umbrella’ for a safety plan: they are reviewed every six months. There was no signed written agreement between the Society, J.-L.J. and D.J. with respect to their safety plan.

[74] Ms. Walraven testified that in June 2018 she was supportive of J.-L.J.’s plan to place J. in the home of D.J., indicating that the Society is generally supportive of voluntary family plans that do not require court intervention.

[75] Ms. Walraven explained that on June 11, 2018, when the safety plan was made, she was aware that C.M. had regular access with J. She advised the court that she attempted to contact C.M. on June 12, 2018 by telephone but was unsuccessful. It was not until June 15, 2018 that she was able to explain the change to J.’s residence: he was reportedly upset as he would have preferred to have J. placed with him. Ms. Walraven testified that C.M. also subsequently reported J.-L.J. being arrested for intoxication, and allegations of the child being left alone unsupervised. Ms. Walraven also learned that C.M. had shared the details of the safety plan with J.-L.J.’s neighbours – he was warned against doing so.

[76] Ms. Walraven explained that at the time the safety plan was developed she believed that J.-L.J. was going to go to treatment, better herself, and work towards having J. returned to her care full time.

I. Protection Application

[77] Ms. Walraven explained that at the time of the commencement of the Protection Application, J.-L.J. was residing in the D.J.’s home with J. and the maternal grandparents. J.-L.J. was permitted to provide care to J. under the supervision of D.J.

[78] Ms. Walraven testified that when it became clear that J.-L.J. was spending unsupervised time with J. on March 4, 2019 (i.e. confirmed by Ms. Walraven’s observation of J. alone in a vehicle with J.-L.J.), the parties were very clearly no longer following the voluntary plan and intervention became necessary.

[79] A joint decision was made by the Society (i.e. workers, supervisors, etc.) that J. would be removed from the care of J.-L.J. and D.J. Ms. Walraven attended at their home and discussed the events of the day with them. Ms. Walraven was of the opinion that, if this was an isolated incident necessitated by a medical appointment, as asserted by J.-L.J. and D.J., alternate arrangements should have been canvassed with the Society. C.M. travelled to Simcoe to retrieve J. at the Society’s request. Ms. Walraven thereafter attended at C.M.’s home to complete the designated place of safety checklist. She advised that child welfare background checks on C.M. and the paternal grandparents had been completed twice previously (once by a separate agency).

[80] On March 9, 2018 a place of safety hearing was conducted before Justice A. Hilliard. The Respondent parents were served with the Society’s materials at court that same day. J.-L.J. was represented by counsel, and C.M. was assisted by duty counsel. A Band representative was also present. Ms. Walraven did not recall specifics of the place of safety hearing, but a copy of the oral reasons for judgment, and endorsement of Justice Hilliard were filed with the court. In essence the court found that (1) there was risk of harm to J. in being in the care of J.-L.J. while intoxicated by drugs or alcohol or both, but that it appeared to the court that J.-L.J. removed herself from J.’s presence when engaging in these activities and associating with other individuals involved in this sub-culture; and (2) J. could be adequately protected in the home of D.J., under terms of supervision.

Child Protection Worker: Brittany Munro

[81] Ms. Munro assumed case management responsibilities for this family on July 18, 2019 and continues to have carriage to date.

A. Alcohol Issues

[82] During the initial stages of Ms. Munro’s involvement with this family, J.-L.J. appeared to make substantial gains towards stability and sobriety. On November 26, 2019 the Society formally amended its Child Protection Application to seek placement of J. with the D.J. At that time Ms. Munro noted that:

“The Society has no current child protection concerns related to C.M., and although he presents as motivated and passionate about being a caregiver to his son, the Society has an obligation to assess and return the child to the parent from which he was removed from; in this case, J.-L.J. Although J.-L.J. has a significant history primarily related to her alcohol use, she has made significant gains. She presents as sober and focused and has gained stability while living in her parents’ home. The Society does worry about J.-L.J’s ability to function and cope when she returns to living independently, given this is when she struggled significantly in the past. When J.-L.J. was abusing alcohol historically, she had frequent run-ins with the OPP due to intoxication, conflict, etc. The Society has not received any reports of police incidents since February 8, 2019. With that being said, the Society has only recently removed supervision of J.-L.J.’s access and would like to assess this transition for a greater period, in addition to her continued services. Given the significance of J.-L.J.’s history of alcohol abuse, the Society worries about J.-L.J.’s risk of relapse and how this could impact J. The Society would like to see J.-L.J. demonstrate a further period of sobriety and stability to ensure she is ready to resume her role as primary caregiver”.

[83] On January 2020 J.-L.J. advised Ms. Munro that she continued to meet with her addictions counsellor, Mr. Miller, but was not involved in additional programming.

[84] In April 2020 the Society received a report from an unrelated third party regarding a physical altercation involving J.-L.J. and associations with individuals known to the society for illicit drug use and criminal activity. As a result of this information, Ms. Munro, the kin worker, the Band representative, J.-L.J., and D.J. engaged in a virtual (facetime) video meeting on April 24, 2020. During that meeting J.-L.J. confirmed the accuracy of the information received by the Society, but denied drinking or using drugs herself. J.-L.J. was cautioned about associating with such individuals due to her own substance abuse vulnerabilities. J.-L.J. was further cautioned regarding following COVID-19 health and safety guidelines. J.-L.J.’s unsupervised access was permitted to continue, however D.J. was requested to be more cognizant of J.-L.J.’s comings and goings and of assessing her presentation upon return from seeing friends.

[85] On May 27, 2020 Ms. Munro and J.-L.J. had a length telephone conversation wherein:

a. Ms. Munro noted J.-L.J. to be crying, and her voice was hoarse.

b. J.-L.J. disclosed that:

i. She had been assaulted by a female on May 22, 2020 and had a black eye;

ii. She was associating with the female who she had previously been punched by;

iii. She was staying at her boyfriend’s home;

iv. She had not returned to her mother’s home because she didn’t want J. to see her with a black eye;

v. Her car had been stolen and left downtown (people were sleeping in it downtown), and these same people also stole her money. Her parents assisted her in having her car towed;

vi. She was associating with individuals known to have substance abuse issues and criminal involvement;

vii. She initially denied using drugs or alcohol but then confessed that she did have “one slip”;

viii. An altercation took place with one of her associates at the hospital, at which time her ‘friend’ broke her key off in the ignition of her car. The police attended and J.-L.J. was given a breathalyzer test. She registered an alert and was given a three day license suspension.

ix. She denied any other alcohol use and indicated that she was going to ‘come to clean’ to her mother, her addictions counsellor, and the Band representative.

[86] J.-L.J. was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle on June 28, 2020.

[87] On August 4, 2020 J.-L.J. met with J.-L.J. and discussed her recent relapse and alcohol-related driving charge. J.-L.J. was emotional and remorseful in discussing her circumstances.

[88] On August 25, 2020 Ms. Munro observed J.-L.J, to not look well. She was presenting as confrontational and paranoid and she looked unkempt and tired. Her dialogue was not completely sensible, and her sentences would often trail off or go off on tangents. Ms. Munro believed J.-L.J. to be under the influence of mood-altering substances, but this was denied by J.-L.J. On this date, J.-L.J. and D.J. were advised that the Society would again be amending its Protection Application to seek placement of J. with C.M.

[89] The Society again amended its Protection Application on August 28, 2020, seeking placement of J. with C.M. D.J. was served with the Amended Application, as kin, on September 3, 2020.

[90] On November 9, 2020 Ms. Munro attended at the home for a scheduled visit. On arrival an unknown and disheveled male was standing on the driveway in front of the home. The man was known to J.-L.J., but unknown to D.J. (who arrived almost simultaneously with the worker). J.-L.J, identified him as ‘a friend’. During this meeting Ms. Munro again observed J.-L.J.’s presentation to decline: her speech became tangential, she didn’t finish her sentences, her voice went up and down, and she excused herself from the meeting several times. Again, Ms. Munro became concerned that J.-L.J. may be under the influence of something. J. arrived home from school during this meeting.

[91] On December 15, 2020 C.M. provided Ms. Munro with Facebook photographs which appear to depict J.-L.J. at a gathering involving alcohol and another individual known to the Society for substance-abuse issues.

[92] On December 29, 2020 J.-L.J. spoke with Ms. Munro on the telephone. During this conversation J.-L.J. denied that she had a problem with alcohol and did not understand why others felt she did.

B. Drug Screening

[93] The Society received urinalysis results for J.-L.J. for the period of May 17, 2019 through October 31, 2019.

[94] In April 2020 J.-L.J. advised Ms. Munro that her last urine screen was completed in February 2020. On April 24, 2020 Ms. Munro requested J.-L.J. to provide a urine drug screen. On May 5, 2020 Ms. Munro followed up with J.-L.J. regarding the requested drug test. J.-L.J. advised Ms. Munro that she completed one the week prior. This information proved to be false. On May 20, 2020 Ms. Munro again requested J.-L.J. take a drug test on that date. J.-L.J. responded that she had been doing one test per week. This information also proved false. On June 9, 2020 J.-L.J. was asked and agreed to complete a drug test. Again, no drug test result was received. On June 26, 2020 J.-L.J. again advised Ms. Munro that she was taking drug tests and could not understand why there were no results. She was urged to follow up directly with the lab. On November 9, 2020 J.-L.J. advised that she believed her last urine screen had been conducted prior to COVID-19. J.-L.J. did not explain her previous contradictions. Ms. Munro requested that J.-L.J. complete a urine screen on December 10, 2020 as she was observed to fall asleep during a court attendance the previous day. J.-L.J. responded “no problem”, but later admitted that she did not follow through with this request. She assured Ms. Munro that she would complete a test in the near future. As at the date of her evidence at trial Ms. Munro had not received any drug test results as requested during this time period.

C. Supervision of Time

[95] At the time Ms. Munro assumed carriage of this file, J.-L.J. was residing with the maternal grandparents, and all of her time was to be supervised by D.J., maternal grandfather, or her brother.

[96] On August 22, 2019 J.-L.J. was advised that, effective September 3, 2019, her access would be expanded such that she could care for J. on an unsupervised basis for one hour prior to the school day and one hour following the school day, including permission to transport J. to and from school.

[97] No concerns were noted by J.’s school with respect to his attendance or behaviour in the fall of 2019. No concerns were raised with respect to the presentation of J.-L.J. or her are of J.

[98] On November 20, 2019, given progress made by J.-L.J. in relation to stability and sobriety, J.-L.J.’s access was expanded such that she could have unsupervised time with J. for up to eight hours per day, with the stipulation that there was to be no unsupervised access overnight.

[99] On May 27, 2020 J.-L.J. and D.J. were advised by Ms. Munro that J.-L.J.’s unsupervised time with J. was suspended.

[100] On July 9, 2020 D.J. was advised that J.-L.J. was not permitted to operate a motor vehicle in J.’s presence.

[101] A safety plan was created which permitted J.-L.J. to care for J. on September 8, 9, and 11 of 2020 while D.J. was at work. The plan included the presence of the maternal great-grandmother on the property, D.J.’s presence in the home over the lunch hour, check-ins throughout the day by the maternal grandfather and uncle, and unannounced drop-ins by Society workers. While Ms. Munro noted that no protection concerns arose over these three days, such an arrangement would not constitute a viable and sustainable long-term parenting plan.

D. Counselling and Services

[102] In July 2019 J.-L.J. advises Ms. Munro that she was attending various programs through Six Nations Health Services, including outpatient treatment and addictions counselling. She advised that she was not attending parenting support services as she did not feel they were needed.

[103] In October 2019 Ms. Munro confirmed with J.-L.J.’s physician that she was medication compliant and no new concerns were reported.

[104] In November 2019 Ms. Munro confirmed with J.-L.J.’s counsellor that she was attending bi-weekly counselling sessions.

[105] On August 25, 2020, Ms. Munro discussed increasing supports, services and treatment options with J.-L.J. (e.g. RAM, CMHS and other services through Six Nations). J.-L.J. was not open to this suggestion and indicated that she did not feel this was necessary. J.-L.J. was encouraged to attend in-patient programming at Holmes House. J.-L.J. “scoffed” at the Society workers and said she did not want to but would do whatever the Society made her do, suggesting that she didn’t need help. Ms. Munro’s impression generally was that J.-L.J. was minimizing the Society’s concerns and was resistant to further services.

[106] On December 9, 2020 Ms. Munro again discussed services and programs with J.-L.J. and recommended connection with additional supports (e.g. RAAM – Rapid Access Addiction Medicine, and Clinic and Community Addictions and Mental Health Services). J.-L.J. advised that she continues to meet with Mr. Miller twice per week, and said she would ‘make some calls’ before the next meeting. Further discussion of these services occurred on December 30, 2020 and J.-L.J. appeared more willing to consider these options.

[107] Under cross-examination by J.-L.J.’s counsel Ms. Munro acknowledged that, except as referenced within the Society’s Plan(s) of Care, recommended services and treatments were not communicated in written form (e.g. letter, email, text, etc.). Ms. Munro testified that these suggested referrals were made during in-person discussions.

E. Communications with Society

[108] Ms. Munro explained that she generally scheduled meetings with J.-L.J. once per month. J.-L.J. would typically have between one to three weeks notice of these meetings. Ms. Munro advised that J.-L.J. was generally respectful and child-focused during these meetings and was noted to speak positively about J. and would comment about his progress in school, engagement in extra-curricular activities, etc.

a. Absences

[109] On May 19, 2020 J.-L.J. cancelled the scheduled monthly visit with Ms. Munro. She did not initially respond to Ms. Munro’s request to reschedule. J.-L.J. then cancelled the rescheduled meeting arranged for May 27, 2020.

[110] On May 27, 2020, during a telephone call between J.-L.J. and D.J., when asked how long J.-L.J. had been gone from the home D.J. advised that J.-L.J. had left the home on May 18, 2020 and had not returned. She had not seen J. during this period. J.-L.J. returned to the home on May 29, 2020.

[111] J.-L.J. did not attend a regularly scheduled meeting on June 23, 2020. D.J. advised that J.-L.J. left the home on June 18, 2020 and did not return. J.-L.J. did not respond to Ms. Munro’s repeated requests for contact. Eventually, J.-L.J. contact Ms. Munro on June 26, 2020.

[112] On July 17, 2020 J.-L.J. failed to attend a scheduled visit with Ms. Munro. D.J. advised that J.-L.J. had been absent from the home for a period of about three weeks.

[113] On August 25, 2020 D.J. contacted Ms. Munro to cancel another regularly scheduled meeting because the whereabouts of J.-L.J. were unknown. On that occasion D.J. advised that J.-L.J. had been absent from the home since August 14, 2020. Shortly thereafter J.-L.J. arrived home and the meeting proceeded as scheduled.

[114] On December 14, 2020 J.-L.J. was not home for a scheduled meeting with the Society and the Band representative. Her whereabouts were unknown D.J. J.-L.J. did not respond to Ms. Munro’s attempts to reach her until December 29, 2020.

[115] Ms. Munro noted that the Society’s ability to work with a parent is negatively impacted by absence from scheduled meetings.

b. Veracity of Information

[116] On May 20, 2020 J.-L.J. would not advise Ms. Munro where she was.

[117] On May 27, 2020 J.-L.J. advised Ms. Munro that she was dating someone, and was staying at his home, but refused to share the identify of the individual or disclose where she was.

[118] On June 26, 2020 J.-L.J. denied any reason for Society concern. Two days later she was charged with the criminal offence of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of over 80. Neither J.-L.J. nor D.J. advised the Society of this information - it was brought to their attention by her counsel at a court appearance on July 9, 2020.

[119] On August 25, 2020, contrary to the information received from D.J., J.-L.J. denied being absent from the home for several weeks.

[120] On November 9, 2020 J.-L.J. identified a dishevelled man on her property on arrival of the Society to a scheduled meeting only as ‘a friend’ without further elaboration.

[121] On January 5, 2021 J.-L.J. did admit to being in a relationship but was reluctant to provide details because the relationship was “still very new”. Ms. Munro is under the impression that this relationship was between J.-L.J. and I.E.

[122] In general, Ms. Munro testified that the Society continues to have significant concerns regarding the people J.-L.J. chooses to associate with due to their known criminal activity, illicit drug use, patterns of conflict and mental health issues. Ms. Munro does not believe that J.-L.J. is transparent with the Society regarding these associations including the nature of their relationships and the frequency and duration of their interactions.

[123] Further, Ms. Munro is also concerned that D.J. is not providing relevant and timely information to the Society regarding her knowledge of J.-L.J.’s activities. Ms. Munro believes that, at times, D.J. is not fully aware of the extent of J.-L.J.’s interactions, and at other times D.J. is aware but withholding information from the Society. Ms. Munro acknowledges that D.J. is in a difficult position as caregiver to J. and support person for J.-L.J.

F. Observations of J. with J.-L.J. and D.J.

[124] Ms. Munro has observed that the home of the maternal grandparents, where J. resides, is clean and child-friendly. She has observed J. to be comfortable and affectionate with J.-L.J., and J.-L.J. to be patient, responsive and appropriate in her interactions with J. Similar observations were made between J. and D.J.

[125] In September 2019 J. was enrolled in the public school in the catchment area of D.J.’s home.

[126] Ms. Munro’s information as to how much time J.-L.J. is currently spending in the home of D.J. is limited.

G. Observations of J. with C.M. and Paternal Grandparents

[127] Ms. Munro also observed the home of C.M./paternal grandparents and noted it to be clean and child-friendly as well. J. was observed to be comfortable and at ease in this home and in the presence of C.M. and paternal grandparents. To Ms. Munro’s knowledge C.M. has never missed an access visit with J. and has often requested additional time with him.

[128] Ms. Munro investigated a concern raised by J.-L.J. regarding a historic domestic incident between the paternal grandparents from 2001 and concluded that there were no protection concerns for J. arising from same.

H. Interviews with J.

[129] Ms. Munro observed that J. is not overly interested in engaging in issue-specific dialogue with workers when in the care of either parent: he often ignores efforts to discuss certain subject-areas, leading the dialogue with his own (unrelated) topics. This was not noted as atypical for children of J.’s age.

I. Parenting Challenges

[130] Ms. Munro testified to parenting challenges that arose during her carriage of the file. Specifically:

a. The parties struggled to agree with J.’s extracurricular activities – specifically, dispute arose over weekend involvement in hockey: when C.M. expressed his refusal to transport J. back and forth between Kitchener and Simcoe during his weekends, J.-L.J. advised him that she would not be sending J. for his regular access visits. Ms. Munro intervened to remind J.-L.J. that she must comply with the court-ordered terms of access. C.M. has suggested enrollment at a centre mid-way between the parties’ residences, however this has not occurred.

b. Arrangements to have J.-L.J. and C.M. share J.’s March Break of 2020 equally between the two households were objected to by D.J. Later, the plans were objected to due to J.’s hockey schedule, and later still (when hockey was cancelled due to COVID-19) J.-L.J. objected due to COVID-19.

c. On March 27, 2020 J.-L.J., despite previous direction by Ms. Munro, withheld J. from C.M. on his scheduled time due to COVID-19. Ms. Munro stepped into assist in arrange make-up time for this missed visit.

d. At the direction of the society J. spent three one-week periods of extended access in the care of C.M. and paternal grandparents during the summer of 2019. Both C.M. and D.J. were resistant to this direction.

e. During the summer of 2020 the Society implemented a week on/week off access arrangement. Again, J.-L.J. and D.J. were resistant to this arrangement, despite J.-L.J.’s relapse and periods of extended absences from the home.

[131] To Ms. Munro’s observation, the conflict is typically instigated by the maternal family (i.e. J.-L.J. and/or D.J.) more so than by C.M.

J. Cultural Issues

[132] Ms. Munro provided evidence that, although it has taken time and dialogue, C.M. has become open to learning more about J.’s Indigenous culture and how he can support this aspect of J.’s identity if J. is placed in his care.

[133] On September 1, 2020 Ms. Munro and the Band representative met with C.M. and the paternal grandparents in their home. During that meeting C.M. and the paternal grandmother shared information about community supports they were looking into that could assist them in supporting J.’s identity. The Band representative provided insight into these programs and offered the family additional services by way of an assigned worker to meet with them and educate them on indigenous culture.

[134] In November 2020 and D.J. referred to C.M. and the Society as being racist, and were critical of the Band representative for supporting placement with C.M. rather than ‘having their backs’. However, to Ms. Munro’s observation, since her involvement began in July 2019, she has never observed C.M. to act or speak inappropriately about J.’s culture. In her discussions with C.M. she has observed him as being present and open and respectful about J.’s culture and appears motivated to educate himself for the benefit of J.

K. Police Involvement and Community Complaints

[135] Ms. Munro confirmed that the Society has not requested updated criminal occurrence report records for J.-L.J. since February 2019. Ms. Munro is unaware of any current police involvements, but specified that incidents might not be brought to the attention of the society if it did not involve a child: for example, the police did not report J.-L.J.’s 2020 impaired driving charge to the Society. Ms. Munro also confirmed that she is unaware of other recent school or community complaints to the Society involving J.-L.J.

L. Mother’s Associations

[136] Through cross-examination by counsel for C.M. criminal court dockets were introduced which demonstrated that J.-L.J’s acquaintance, C.T., continues to have a number of serious criminal charges before the courts, and J.-L.J.’s alcohol-related driving offence has not been resolved. The Society has not provided J.-L.J. with a formal list of individuals she should not be associating with, but Ms. Munro testified that she has had several discussions with J.-L.J. about choosing her acquaintances more carefully. In particular the Society has had concerns with J.-L.J.’s relationships with C.T., L.M, and I.E. due to their own criminal activity and substance issues. Ms. Munro does not believe that J.-L.J. has taken these cautions to heart.

M. Society’s Plan of Care

[137] In cross examination by J.-L.J.’s counsel Ms. Munro testified that throughout her involvement she has operated from the view that the Society must make effort to ‘service’ J.-L.J. and attempt reintegration of J. into her care. She acknowledged that, at times, J.-L.J. was J.’s primary caregiver under D.J.’s roof, and that at other times D.J. has provided the majority of J.’s care.

[138] Counsel for J.-L.J. drew the court’s attention to the ‘blank space’ at paragraph 12 of the Society’s Plan(s) of Care wherein no one is noted to have explained the plan of care document on the parties. In re-examination Ms. Munro noted that all parties were represented by counsel at the time and although she did not sit down to formally review the court documents with J.-L.J. she has regular conversation with her about the subject-matter when J.-L.J. was engaging with the Society.

Child Protection Worker: Carrie Lavigne

[139] Ms. Lavigne has been the kinship worker assigned to the maternal grandparents and J. since June 15, 2018. She explained that the typical role of a kinship worker is to work with the family and friends of a child that cannot be cared for by a parent. She has met with the D.J. and J. approximately once per month over the course of the past 2 ½ years.

A. Voluntary Services Agreement

[140] Ms. Lavigne’s involvement began pursuant to a voluntary services agreement with this family in June 2018. Routine child welfare and criminal records histories and home safety checks were completed, and the Kinship Service Assessment was approved in September 2018. The maternal grandparents were aware of J.-L.J.’s problematic use of alcohol and appeared committed to ensuring J.’s safety in their care. During the initial arrangement of the voluntary services agreement Ms. Lavigne did not reach out to C.M. – this was not her role.

[141] Ms. Lavigne testified that the initial rationale behind the voluntary services agreement was to allow J.-L.J. an opportunity to improve her parenting. D.J. understood that the placement of J. was done with the intention of returning him to J.-L.J.’s care when she was stable. The Voluntary Services arrangement was not reduced to writing.

B. Relationship with and Observations of D.J.

[142] In June 2019 D.J. stated to Ms. Lavigne that “I have never trusted you since day one and you ruined my life.” She indicated she would be contacting the Ombudsman regarding Ms. Lavigne.

[143] Ms. Lavigne has concerns that D.J. has not consistently kept the Society advised of information where it would be expected. For example, she does not reach out to the Society to report J.-L.J.’s absences from the home. New information regarding J.-L.J. tends only to emerge in response to direct inquiries or questions posed by Society workers, or J.-L.J.’s absences as noted at scheduled meetings.

[144] Ms. Lavigne testified that on June 23, 2020 D.J. was specifically requested to keep Society workers apprised of J.-L.J.’s progress, however this has not occurred.[^2] Ms. Lavigne only learned about J.-L.J.’s extended periods of absence from D.J.’s home through Ms. Munro. Ms. Lavigne explained that D.J. often claims not to know what J.-L.J. is up to.

[145] Ms. Lavigne testified that from June 2020 to November 2020, on five separate occasions she requested that D.J. consider being added as a party to this proceeding and consider presenting a plan of care for J. D.J. advised she would think about it, but never followed up. In more recent meetings D.J. stated that she is ‘not worried about J. going anywhere: J. has been returned to her twice to date’. Ms. Lavigne is sympathetic to the difficult position of D.J.: caught between wanting to support J.-L.J. while at the same time prioritizing J.’s needs.

[146] Ms. Lavigne testified that, while at times J.-L.J. was J.’s main caregiver in the home of D.J. (i.e. during periods of stability), at present D.J. appears to be providing the majority of J.’s care. In January 2021 D.J. advised Ms. Lavigne that J.-L.J. is again residing in D.J.’s home, but leaves the residence to ‘visit’ friends, noting that J.-L.J. is “37 years of age and she doesn’t keep tabs on her”.

[147] Ms. Lavigne is not confident that D.J. would bring relevant concerns about the stability and well-being of J.-L.J. to the Society’s attention on a go-forward basis.

C. Relationship with and Observations of J.-L.J.

[148] J.-L.J. advised Ms. Lavigne that she moved in with D.J. and with J. in February 2019, but retained her apartment until April 2019.

[149] On May 8, 2019 J.-L.J. reported to Ms. Lavigne that she had maintained sobriety since February 2019. Ms. Lavigne observed J.-L.J. to be presenting well. During this period of involvement Ms. Lavigne observed J.-L.J. to be “child focused and strongly attached to J.” There is no evidence that early interactions between J.-L.J. and Ms. Lavigne were anything but positive.

[150] More recently however, from approximately April 2020 to present J.-L.J. has not engaged or has not presented as well when observed. For example, J.-L.J. had no contact with Ms. Lavigne from May to August 25, 2020, at which time J.-L.J. re-emerged at a meeting and appeared unwell (i.e. she was not neat and tidy as she previously presented and her thoughts were disorganized and difficult to follow). On September 9, 2020 Ms. Lavigne was called upon to do an unscheduled check-in on J.-L.J. while caring for J. J.-L.J. was observed to be coherent but tired. J. was on the couch on his tablet and refused to be engaged.

D. Observations of Relationship Between Maternal Grandmother and Respondent Father

[151] On June 14, 2019 the maternal family noted to Ms. Lavigne that they believed C.M. was not respectful of their culture. Ms. Lavigne acknowledged this perspective though she did not witness this herself.

[152] On June 20, 2019 Ms. Lavigne received a call from D.J. who was concerned that C.M. may “yell and scream” at J., reporting that this had occurred six months prior. She also noted that J. returns home from visits tired. Ms. Lavigne did not support any changes to the access regime as a result of these concerns.

[153] On July 12, 2019 D.J. reported that C.M. was “reckless”, because a year prior they had learned he ‘flipped a quad’ vehicle and wanted this information kept from the maternal grandparents. On this date J.’s voice could be heard in the background and D.J. was warned about sharing her opinion of C.M. in the presence of the child.

[154] On August 6, 2019 D.J. expressed concern regarding extended (summer vacation) access between C.M. and J. She specified that the transition was hard for J. and that he had returned home with multiple bug bites.

[155] On August 15, 2019 D.J. called Ms. Lavigne and advised that she believed C.M. had blocked her number and that access periods of seven days were too long. She did not share and specific child protection concerns.

[156] On August 27, 2019 D.J. shared that J. did not want to attend his last visit with C.M. because C.M. yells at him.

[157] D.J. has shared with Ms. Lavigne that she does not believe that C.M. will follow COVID-19 health and safety precautions. She has also advised that J. comes home ‘not telling the truth’ suggesting that C.M. is encouraging J. to lie.

[158] Ms. Lavigne testified that D.J. was not pleased that a Christmas vacation schedule was arranged between the Society, J.-L.J., and C.M. without her approval. She felt that a week in the care of C.M. was too long and wanted to have J. in her home from December 24th to December 26th, and on J.-L.J.’s birthday and to correspond with the schedules of her other grandchildren.

[159] Ms. Lavigne has repeatedly stressed that D.J. should try to resolve parenting issues directly with C.M. She agreed that D.J. generally complies with Society direction if they are required to intervene in these issues.

E. Observations of and Interviews with the Child

[160] To Ms. Lavigne’s observation J. presents as a happy and content young boy. It is evident to Ms. Lavigne that the kinship caregivers and J.-L.J. love J. and that he in turn loves them back. They are patient and loving caregivers, and are highly involved in his care.

[161] Ms. Lavigne advised that J. has been difficult to interview due to his age and lack of interest in meeting alone. In earlier years there were times when J. growled at Society workers. Ms. Lavigne believes that J. does pick up on tension in the home during difficult meetings with the Society. Ms. Lavigne has attempted multiple interview techniques with J. (e.g. incorporating play and art) however it has been challenging to engage in a ‘solid interview’. He is easily distracted and guides the direction of the interview elsewhere: whether intentional or simply due to his age and character is unknown. On occasion, Ms. Lavigne’s attempted interviews of J. have been interrupted by D.J. or J.-L.J. but again it is unknown whether this disruption has been intentional. Sometimes J. is observed to look in their direction and not answer a question.

[162] In 2019 D.J. and J.-L.J. indicated that they were not supportive of Ms. Lavigne interviewing J. at school. They expressed a preference to have Ms. Lavigne continue to make effort to interview J. at home. Out of respect for this view, J. has not been interviewed by the Society in the community. Ms. Lavigne testified that she has also been respectful of J.-L.J.’s and D.J.’s preference to have J. interviewed in the presence of a Band member.

[163] During some of the meetings with Ms. Lavigne J. has made interesting statements:

a. March 13, 2020: J. stated that he did “not have a mom” and said “he gets mad at me when I get stuck”. He would not answer a question regarding whether any adults in his life get mad;

b. August 25, 2020: D.J. said to J. “who will take are of all the outdoor work if you move to Kitchener?”, to which J. pointed at D.J. and replied “you”;

c. On December 16, 2020: J. was asked whether he wished to spend equal time with his parents over the Christmas holidays to which he replied “no” but would not elaborate.

d. On January 13, 2021 J. was interviewed privately at the request of D.J. She advised Ms. Lavigne that J. was upset after his Christmas access with C.M. and did not want to return because C.M. had yelled and screamed at him. Ms. Lavigne interviewed J. who stated that his dad yelled at him because he wanted mustard and ketchup on his hamburger. J. did not show any signs of distress during this interview.

[164] Ms. Lavigne observed J. to be more receptive to being interviewed at the home of C.M., where she was able to interview J. privately without interruption in March 2020. On that occasion she also observed that J. appeared comfortable and happy in C.M.’s home as well.

[165] Ms. Lavigne has been unable to get a strong sense of J.’s views and preferences. She notes for the court that J. has not disclosed any concerns related to any caregivers or family members.

Overall Assessment of the Evidence of Society Workers

[166] Overall, I found the evidence of Ms. Walraven, Ms. Munroe and Ms. Lavigne to be focused on material matters, organized and straightforward in presentation. The evidence of each witness was internally consistent, and also consistent with the evidence of their coworkers. In my view, Ms. Walraven, Ms. Munroe, and Ms. Lavigne displayed a balanced and even-handed approach in their dealings with this family, treating all family members with professional levels of courtesy, respect, and empathy. The workers all appeared to remain open-minded in their assessment of the best interests of J., adopting a fluid and child-centered approach to the conduct of this litigation.

[167] The accuracy of the recall of these Society witnesses was generally unchallenged by any party on material issues.

Dr. William Wynveen

[168] Dr. Wynveen provided viva voce evidence to the court in this matter. He has been practising as a General Practitioner (Family Physician) in the Simcoe area for over 40 years. Dr. Wynveen has been J.-L.J.’s family physician since she was six months’ of age. He has also been J.’s physician since birth.

Mother’s Abuse of Alcohol

[169] The first recorded concerns within J.-L.J.’s medical records relating to alcohol usage date back to May 2011, primarily relating to problematic binge-drinking patterns of alcohol abuse. Since that time Dr. Wynveen advised the court that J.-L.J. has had three inpatient (hospitalizations) resulting from alcohol over use. Specifically:

a. J.-L.J. was hospitalized from January 5, 2013 to January 9, 2013. On this occasion she experienced loss of consciousness and a possible seizure.

b. J.-L.J. was again hospitalized from August 3, 2013 to August 7, 2013; and

c. J.-L.J. was again hospitalized from June 17, 2017 to June 20, 2017.

[170] Dr. Wynveen explained that treatment during these events would have included medication to prevent serious withdrawal symptoms, hydration, vitamins, etc., followed by supportive treatment including referrals to CAMH for ongoing treatment and counselling for alcohol abuse. In 2013 J.-L.J. was prescribed an Antabuse-type medication (i.e. medication which intentionally caused unpleasant physical reactions to the consumption of alcohol). This medication has not recently been prescribed to J.-L.J., but would not interfere with her current medications if attempted again.

[171] Dr. Wynveen testified that over the years, several of J.-L.J.’s medical visits have focused on her addiction-related issues. They have had many discussions regarding her difficulties with binge drinking and life stressors. He has in past recommended a residential rehabilitation program for J.-L.J., and believes that she attempted same for a period of time in October 2016.

[172] Dr. Wynveen testified that he had no record of hospitalization of J.-L.J. in or around June of 2018 for seizure-like symptoms. He testified that during a medical appointment on June 14, 2018 and opined that any such symptoms would most likely be related to alcohol withdrawal rather than any changes to her medication. He observed J.-L.J. on that occasion to be ‘quite shaky’. He made a referral to Holmes House (a local detoxification management centre), but by July 19, 2018 J.-L.J. was reporting doing well, indicating attendance at Alcoholic Anonymous and counselling, so she did not attend.

[173] Dr. Wynveen testified that during an appointment with J.-L.J. on December 17, 2020 she discussed having fallen asleep during an important meeting, and having been accused of being impaired. On that visit J.-L.J.’s blood pressure was noted as being high, but he had no other concerns. Dr. Wynveen explained that passing out is not a common symptom of high blood pressure - more so a symptom of low blood pressure. He did acknowledge that is possible for a person with high blood pressure to develop low blood pressure if their medication is too strong or if they become dehydrated. Dr. Wynveen explained that alcohol is metabolized in the body too quickly for there to be a routine test to measure alcohol consumption.

Prescription and Non-Prescription Drug Use

[174] Dr. Wynveen explained that he currently prescribes medication for J.-L.J. relating to hypertension/high blood pressure and depression. She has been on anti-depressants for many years. Dr. Wynveen advised that he takes special precaution in prescribing medication to her as a result of his knowledge of her issues with alcohol and the danger that combining some medications with alcohol may pose. For example, because alcohol is an anti-depressant, it can blunt the effects of the intended effect of anti-depressant prescription medications.

[175] It is the opinion of Dr. Wynveen that J.-L.J. is overall compliant with her medications. He notes that there may have been times that she went off her anti-depressants because she was feeling well but has now realized that this does not result in a positive outcome for her.

[176] Dr. Wynveen recalled only one time where J.-L.J. requested an early renewal of her prescription: she stated that her medication was stolen on that occasion.

[177] Dr. Wynveen explained that blending opiates with J.-L.J.’s prescription medications, and blending opiates with alcohol can be dangerous: including respiratory depression and cardiac arrest, and even death in the case of significant overdose.

Urine Drug Screens

[178] Dr. Wynveen explained that he has received drug screen test results pertaining to J.-L.J. as requisitioned through his office. He explained that if he were the doctor who had requisitioned a drug screen, he would expect to get a copy of the results. He further explained that he often provides multiple requisitions at the same time, and renews such requisitions without issue if needed (i.e. providing a form of standing order for drug screen tests). He believes this to be the case for J.-L.J. Dr. Wynveen testified that the COVID-19 health pandemic has not had any impact upon the communication of test results to his office. He would normally receive the results the same day or the following morning. His office has remained open throughout the pandemic.

[179] The most current drug screen received at Dr. Wynveen’s office was received on January 22, 2021 (the sample having been taken same day). That test result showed the presence of her prescribed medications, as expected, but also the presence of Opioids, which would not be explained by any current prescription. Dr. Wynveen explained that the positive results for an opioid indicate the presence of Codeine or Morphine in J.-L.J.’s system.

[180] Previous to January 22, 2021, the most recent drug screen test result received from the office of Dr. Wynveen was from December 2019, more than one year prior. He confirmed that he did not receive a drug screen test result in October 2018.

[181] In 2019 Dr. Wynveen received positive drugs screen test results (i.e. opioids) regarding J.-L.J. on February 20, 2019, March 1, 2019, May 17, 2019, July 25, 2019, and September 3, 2019, but also received negative drug screen results on January 15, 2019, April 2, 2019, June 10, 2019, September 3, 2019, and October 31, 2019. The drug screens also confirmed the presence of J.-L.J.’s prescribed medications, as expected.

[182] Dr. Wynveen confirmed that Tylenol 1 contains Codeine and is available over the counter without prescription and is also commonly available as a street drug (more so than Morphine). He explained that the presence of Codeine can be innocent, but it can also be not innocent. Overall, with respect to J.-L.J., Dr. Wynveen was not of the opinion that it resulted from illicit drug use – he noted that in his experience people with narcotic addictions request prescriptions for same, and J.-L.J. has not made such requests.

J.

[183] Dr. Wynveen testified that when he was younger J. was prone to ear infections but that he now does not see him as frequently. J.’s last two medical appointments were in January and August 2020. He has no known special diagnoses or special needs.

[184] The accuracy and recall of Dr. Wynveen’s evidence was not challenged on any material issue by any party.

Mr. Barry Miller

[185] Mr. Miller is an addictions counsellor employed by the Six Nations Mental Health and Addictions Service. He has worked with J.-L.J. since March 20, 2019. He noted that she previously worked with another addictions counsellor through Six Nations before joining his caseload.

[186] The evidence of Mr. Miller was somewhat unclear as to the dates, frequency, duration and method of contact with J.-L.J. Until March 2020 (the beginning of the COVID-19 health crisis), Mr. Miller testified that he and J.-L.J. had regular in-person counselling sessions on a weekly or bi-weekly basis. He testified that counselling services have been impacted by the COVID-19 health pandemic in a negative way. Since that time counselling services between Mr. Miller and J.-L.J. have generally taken the form of text messages and the occasional phone call.

[187] Mr. Miller testified to periods of contact with J.-L.J. that were consistent in nature, and other periods of time wherein contact was more sporadic. The court was left with the impression that the nature of the counselling sessions has been a somewhat unstructured, ‘open door’ and ‘touching base as needed’ type of arrangement. Mr. Miller did not appear to keep specific detailed written records of counselling provided to J.-L.J., but did recall touching base with the Children’s Aid Society from time to time regarding her involvement.

[188] Over the course of their counselling relationship J.-L.J. has shared information with Mr. Miller regarding her struggles with alcohol abuse, including her periods of relapse. He was aware that one such relapse occurred in August 2020, but not of any earlier relapses earlier in the summer.

[189] Mr. Miller confirmed that, in addition to individual counselling sessions with him, J.-L.J.:

a. Completed a six-week relapse prevention program, “Stay the Course”, on August 30, 2019 (which included group sessions one time per week);

b. Completed a ten-week day treatment program, “New Path”, in September 2019 (which included group sessions two times per week); and

c. Attended the first week of a grief recovery program in the summer of 2019, but this program was cancelled by the service provider.

[190] Mr. Miller connected J.-L.J. to and facilitated those programs. Since the onset of the COVID-19 health pandemic there has been little to no group programming. He agreed that the COVID-19 health pandemic as been a particularly challenging time for people with addictions.

[191] Mr. Miller did acknowledge some measure of concern with J.-L.J’s associations, and reminded her to make good choices regarding people, places and things to avoid. He described her pattern of alcohol abuse as period binge-drinking and escape abuse: not an everyday occurrence, and with varying lengths of time between episodes.

[192] Mr. Miller indicated that at the end of 2020 or in early 2021 J.-L.J. made plans for an increased level of contact with him. Mr. Miller indicated that ideally, he would prefer a weekly appointment with J.-L.J., and agreed that perhaps a stay in a residential treatment facility would be of benefit. However, J.-L.J. has not requested to be connected with any other programs or services at this time.

Police Occurrence Report Records of J.-L.J.

[193] Society worker, Ms. Walraven, requisitioned the police incident records pertaining to J.-L.J. in February 2019 due to concerns that she was not being truthful about her police involvement and with others in the community. Ms. Walraven’s review of the records both raised new concerns and confirmed existing concerns about J.-L.J/’s alcohol and prescription drug misuse and the choices she was making. A pattern of harmful behaviours was noted, and it became clear to Ms. Walraven that J.-L.J. was being untruthful in their discussions. Ms. Walraven also noted that the records revealed a very significant and long-standing issue with alcohol.

[194] With the consent of all parties, Ontario Provincial Police occurrence report records pertaining to J.-L.J., current to February 8, 2019, were filed as an Exhibit in this proceeding. The relevant records were reviewed through the viva voce testimony of Society Worker Ms. Walraven and are summarized as follows:

a. On September 3, 2006 J.-L.J. was issued an alert on a roadside screening device, and she was issued a 12 hour license suspension.

b. On March 28, 2012 J.-L.J. was arrested and charged with impaired driving after police were called to a motor vehicle accident.

c. On May 19, 2012 J.-L.J. was charged with public intoxication and held in custody overnight.

d. On January 11, 2016 police attended a single motor vehicle roll-over. J.-L.J. was the driver and J. was a passenger in the vehicle.

e. On July 26, 2017 police responded to a call from wherein she alleged that J.-L.J. had an argument with D.J., and D.J. became physical. The police observed the parties to be calm on arrival and no action was taken.

f. On August 28, 2017 police responded to a call regarding an alleged neighbour dispute. J.-L.J. was observed by police to be intoxicated on arrival. She was arrested to prevent a breach of the peace and was later released unconditionally.

g. On June 9, 2018 police responded to a call placed by J.-L.J. regarding inquiries about a previous investigation. Police observed J.-L.J. to be in an intoxicated state. The call was deemed to be non-emergency in in nature.

h. On July 2, 2018 police responded to a call wherein J.-L.J. was observed to be heavily intoxicated in a public place. She was arrested for public intoxication and later released when sober.

i. On July 4, 2018 J.-L.J. was warned by police in relation to an uninvited attendance at a private residence. Hours later the police were called to return to the residence at which time J.-L.J. was charged with trespassing and returned to the home of D.J.

j. On July 3, 2018 J.-L.J. called police to report a lost cellphone. J.-L.J. advised police that she was heavily intoxicated when she lost it – no further action was taken.

k. August 25, 2018 police responded to a call made by J.-L.J. regarding a neighbour complaint of loud music and a large gathering. On arrival police observed no gathering whatsoever and the call was deemed to be unfounded.

l. On October 3, 2018 police responded to a call made by J.-L.J. regarding the theft of $25.00. She advised police that she had been drinking and was unsure how she lost the money.

m. On October 15, 2018 police were dispatched to J.-L.J.’s residence at her request regarding an argument. A male party was arrested to prevent a breach of the police and was removed from the scene.

n. On December 28, 2018 J.-L.J. was observed to be a passenger in a car pulled over by police during a Highway Traffic Act stop. Police observed to appear J.-L.J.to be intoxicated and were unable to wake her. Emergency services were called and EMS staff were able to wake her. She declined further medical aid.

o. On January 2, 2019 J.-L.J. called police to report that she was hit on the head with a laptop and threatened. The incident was being reported after the fact and J.-L.J. was observed by police to be intoxicated. She advised police that she was only requesting that they know this information and did not request further action.

[195] The police occurrence report records have not been updated since February 2019.

EVIDENCE OF C.M.

Respondent Father: C.M.

A. History of Relationship with J.-L.J.

[196] C.M. testified that his relationship J.-L.J. was approximately two years in duration. He never observed J.-L.J. to use illegal drugs during their relationship, however C.M. has always been aware of J.-L.J.’s struggles with alcohol. For example, he was aware that J.-L.J. had been previously hospitalized for alcohol abuse issues and described that during their early relationship she was frequently impaired. They argued about her alcohol intake and about money: C.M. was working and J.-L.J. was not. They had brief periods of separation. C.M. recalled an occasion wherein a neighbour brought J.-L.J. home after finding her downtown unable to walk. However, C.M. described that during her pregnancy J.-L.J. committed to her sobriety and turned a new leaf: she was healthy, responsible, and taking good care of herself. He could tell that it was not easy, and she struggled, but she made good choices throughout this period. Their relationship improved and together they moved into the home of the maternal grandparents. They resided together in that home for approximately 6 months.

[197] J.-L.J. and C.M. separated in early 2015 when J. was only a few months old. C.M. explained that at the time she was not displaying obvious signs of alcohol abuse but in hindsight may have been demonstrating warning signs of falling back into a negative cycle: for example, suggesting activities and circumstances where having a drink might seem appropriate.

[198] C.M. believes that following separation J.-L.J. remained at the home of the maternal grandparents. In the summer of 2015 J.-L.J. and J. stayed with C.M. and paternal grandparents for a period of time following a dispute between J.-L.J. and D.J. During this period C.M. became concerned that J.-L.J. may be drinking again and believed she was not being truthful about her daily activities.

[199] C.M. became aware that J.-L.J. resided in a women’s shelter in Simcoe for a period of time: he picked up J. for access from this location. J.-L.J. thereafter advised C.M. that she was asked to leave the shelter because she brought alcohol into the shelter.

B. Children’s Law Reform Act Consent Order

[200] A family court action was commenced following separation and on September 22, 2016 C.M. and J.L.J. formally resolved that action on consent. C.M. testified that at the time he had residual concerns about J.-L.J.’s historic alcohol issues, but had observed J.-L.J. to make impressive lifestyle changes during her pregnancy that he hoped were permanent. In September 2016, at the time of this consent order, J.-L.J. continued to reside in the home of the maternal grandparents. C.M. was working on a full-time basis and the Order of Justice Sherwood required payment of $300.00 per month in child support to J.-L.J. on J.’s behalf.[^3]

[201] C.M. explained that pursuant to their agreement the parties have shared transportation between their respective residences. They reside approximately 80-90km apart, and the travel time between their homes is between on hour to one hour and twenty minutes. As per their agreement they meet in Paris, Ontario for access exchanges. This arrangement continues to date except that now it is primarily D.J. that provides J.’s transportation for J.-L.J.

[202] C.M. recalled that approximately one year after the settlement of their family court action, on August 28, 2017 police were called to the home of J.-L.J. regarding a neighbour dispute (she and J. were no longer residing with the maternal grandparents by this time). J.-L.J. was noted by police to be intoxicated and she was arrested to prevent a breach of the peace. C.M. described attending at J.-L.J.’s home on that day. He observed J.-L.J. to be visibly intoxicated (as evidenced by her speech and balance) and J. was alone in her care. C.M. observed her home to be dirty, with garbage scattered throughout. J.-L.J. and C.M. got into an argument at which time C.M. took J. to the park. Upon his return to J.-L.J.’s home with the child there were several police officers in front of the house and J.-L.J. was in handcuffs on the front porch. J.-L.J. requested that C.M. take J. home with him, as she did not want J. to see her in this state.

[203] C.M. did not voluntarily release J. back into the care of J.-L.J. upon her release from custody. On September 1, 2017 J.-L.J. brought a contempt motion and Justice Sherwood ordered C.M. to return the child into J.-L.J.’s care. C.M. complied with this order.

C. Involvement of the Children’s Aid Society

[204] In the summer of 2018, C.M. received a voice mail from child protection worker Ms. Walraven informing him of concerns regarding J.-L.J.’s well-being and advising him that J. would be placed in D.J.’s care for a short while. After receipt of this information, on July 5, 2018 C.M. commenced a Motion to Change the September 22, 2016 Final Order of Justice Sherwood, seeking custody and primary residence of J.

[205] After filing this Motion to Change C.M. did not return J. into the care of J.-L.J. at the end of his scheduled access weekend. J.-L.J. immediately commenced another contempt motion, and on July 11, 2018 the court ordered C.M. to return J. into the care of D.J. as per the Safety Plan.[^4] Again C.M. complied with the court order.

[206] C.M. testified that it was only this date in court, July 11, 2018, that he was provided with a copy of the voluntary safety plan entered into between the Society, J.-L.J., and D.J. He did not have any input, nor did he consent to this voluntary arrangement.

[207] In early 2019 J.-L.J. (incorrectly) advised C.M. that there were no longer any restrictions on her time with J. In March 2019, approximately one week prior to the Society’s formal court Application, C.M. directly observed J.-L.J. to be caring for J. in the home of D.J. with no other person present.

[208] C.M. has reported concerns and information about J.-L.J. to the Society as it has come to his attention during their involvement. He denies ever making false reports or providing excessive or unwarranted information to the society. For example, C.M. highlights that it was only as a result of his report to the Society that J. mentioned that J.-L.J. was not home, the Society learned of the extended absences of J.-L.J. from D.J.’s home in the summer of 2020.

[209] C.M. testified that in March 2019 he was served with the Society’s place of safety hearing materials on the day of the hearing. He was assisted by duty counsel. He did not have any opportunity to file his own materials. He was ‘confused by the outcome, but not defeated’. C.M. has complied fully with the court Order made on that day.

D. Father’s Current Circumstances

[210] C.M. explained that he has resided with his mother and stepfather (the paternal grandparents) in Kitchener, Ontario since 2015. His mother is a retired administrator and his stepfather is employed as a factory supervisor working afternoon shifts. Neither he nor the paternal grandparents have criminal records.

[211] C.M. is 36 years old and is employed on a full-time basis. His mother is home during the day and is willing and able to assist with J. before and after school if necessary. C.M. arranges his schedule so that he does not work on weekends that J. is in his care, and indicates that he has some flexibility as to the start and end times of his day. The furthest he travels with his work is to the other side of Toronto. He never works at night.

[212] J. is C.M.’s only child. C.M. does not have addiction issues and does not drink alcohol. He acknowledges recreational use of marijuana.

[213] In cross-examination C.M. acknowledged that subsequent to the parties’ break-up in 2015 he was hospitalized due to anxiety, depression and suicidal ideation. He has had no subsequent mental health issues.

E. Concerns re: Respondent Mother J.-L.J.

[214] C.M. provided positive and complimentary evidence of J.-L.J.’s behaviour during pregnancy and early parenting of J. He acknowledged that J. loves his mother and when she is demonstrating periods of stability, she is a good and caring mother. However, he asserts that J.-L.J.’s addiction issues have posed the greatest challenge to her parenting.

[215] C.M. explained to the court that, from the outset of these child protection proceedings, he has communicated concerns to the Society about J.-L.J.’s serious problem with alcohol, pills, and dangerous associations and behaviours. He acknowledges that J.-L.J. can demonstrate stability for periods of time, but eventually she declines into circumstances of serious alcohol abuse and cannot care for J. C.M. believes that J. is hurt by J.-L.J.’s periods of extended absence from his life that are caused by her relapses. He asserts that it is D.J. currently providing the day to day care of J. rather than J.-L.J., and as a joint-custodial parent he has always objected to this arrangement.

[216] Most currently C.M. has provided printouts from the Facebook page of J.-L.J., and a Facebook page of I.E. (both dated February 2, 2021). J.-L.J.’s Facebook page indicates that she is in a relationship, but does not specify with whom. I.E.’s Facebook page indicates that he is in a relationship with J.-L.J. and includes photographs of them together posted in February 1, 2021. C.M. has also attached an article from the local newspaper reporting on a sentencing hearing regarding guilty pleas entered by I.E. in February 2020. C.M. is of the view that J.-L.J. is not currently in a stable place.

[217] C.M. advises that it has been a long time since he has had any contact with J.-L.J. She is not present for 99% of the parenting exchanges. C.M. and D.J. provide all transportation to and from the exchange location in Paris, Ontario.

[218] J.-L.J. and C.M. sometimes text one another, but rarely speak on the telephone. C.M. is willing to utilize a communication app with J.-L.J. and D.J. moving forward if they are agreeable.

F. Father’s Relationship with Maternal Grandmother D.J.

[219] C.M. described a very positive relationship with D.J. up until the time period of J.-L.J.’s pregnancy. However, he testified that by the time J. was born, their relationship had deteriorated – there was no major episode or event, C.M. just perceived a decline in her tolerance of his presence. D.J. was no longer kind and supportive to him in her previous manner. C.M. could not provide an explanation for this shift, he simply felt as though he were being alienated from the rest of the family.

[220] C.M. described that at the time of his separation from J.-L.J., an incident occurred involving police intervention between C.M. and D.J. Specifically, there was dispute over ownership of a vehicle driven by J.-L.J. The end result was that C.M. transferred ownership of the vehicle to J.-L.J. at D.J.’s request.

[221] C.M. does not believe that D.J. drinks, and does not believe that she permits J.-L.J. to drink in her home.

G. Plan of Care

[222] C.M.’s reviewed his plan of care for J. with the court.

(a) Primary Residence

[223] C.M. intends to continue to reside in the home of the paternal grandparents. His parenting time with J. has consistently taken place in this home for more than five years. J. is familiar with and comfortable in this environment.

(b) Education

[224] C.M. plans to enrol J. in the local public school in his catchment area in September 2021 if J. is placed in his care. This school is approximately a half a kilometer from his home. He will supply J. with a laptop or tablet as needed. He has been in contact with the school in anticipation of J.’s potential enrollment.

[225] In cross-examination C.M. acknowledged that to date J. has not brought homework with him to C.M.’s home, and that C.M. did not log on to the e-learning portal during the period of J.’s remote learning. Further, he has never attended a parent-teacher interview, although it appears he has had telephone contact with school officials from time to time. C.M. was not consulted with respect to J.’s school enrollment but advised that J.-L.J. usually shared J.’s report cards with him: on only one occasion he had to request an electronic copy directly from the school.

(c) Medical Care

[226] If placed in his care, J. would become a patient of C.M.’s family doctor. C.M. has confirmed that J. would be accepted as a patient. In cross-examination C.M. agreed that he has not had involvement with Dr. Wynveen, and advised that if medical care for J. has been required while in his care, C.M. has taken J. to walk-in clinics in the Kitchener area. This has occurred approximately 4-5 times over the past five years, mostly in relation to earaches. He is aware that all of J.’s vaccinations are currently up to date. C.M. is unaware of the name of J.’s current dentist.

(d) Contact with Respondent Mother and Maternal Family

[227] C.M. is supportive of maintaining a relationship between J. and the maternal family. He suggests that the current schedule would simply be ‘flipped’ such that J. reside in his primary care, and spend time with the maternal family on alternating weekends, and on alternate weeks during the summer.

[228] C.M. testified that he is familiar with J.-L.J.’s addiction issues and requests the opportunity to assess her presentation at access exchanges prior to releasing J. into the care of the maternal family on these weekends. He wants J.-L.J. to enjoy a successful recovery.

(e) Culture

[229] C.M. has always been aware of J.-L.J.’s Six Nations identity but indicates that it was not highlighted in their relationship. They did not take part in any cultural activities together save and except a summer pow-wow that C.M. attended with J.-L.J. and her family. He was not aware of any other indigenous community involvement, however, did note that they attended on the reserve to go shopping.

[230] During cross-examination by the Band C.M. reiterated his commitment to continued contact between J. and the Six Nations of the Grand River and openness to learning more about J.’s cultural identity, with or without assistance of the Society. He hopes that the Band representative will continue to provide him with guidance following completion of this litigation. C.M. denies any allegation of racism towards J.-L.J.’s family or her culture. He was disappointed not to be consulted in the process of applying for J.’s native status, but maintains that he is willing to promote J.’s involvement in cultural events and activities and will actively assist J. in gaining knowledge about his Six Nations heritage.

(f) Father’s Relationship with J.

[231] C.M. testified that he and J. spend a great deal of their time doing outdoor activities together, frequently exploring nature and riding dirt-bikes together. They attend parks, playgrounds, indoor arcades, etc., and C.M. arranges playdays with children of J.’s age. He has always exercised all of the time with J. that has been made available to him and believes that he and J. share a strong bond and easy communication with one another. He acknowledges that parenting is a continuous learning process and he is always open to ways to be a better parent to J.

H. Credibility

[232] C.M. presented as an impressive witness in this proceeding. He attended court each day, on time, and he appeared to pay careful attention to the evidence and argument provided. C.M.’s evidence was presented in a calm and thoughtful manner. He listened carefully to the questions posed, and made reasonable concessions and considered alternate theories presented to him where appropriate to do so. C.M. demonstrated compassion and empathy in addressing J.-L.J.’s struggles. He commented upon the other actors in this proceeding with due respect and dignity. C.M. acknowledged areas of weaknesses, and identified areas where he can improve as a parent. C.M. demonstrated meaningful insight into the need to learn and employ different parenting techniques and to continuously evolve to meet the changing needs of J. I did not note any major inconsistencies in his evidence, and no significant areas of weakness were highlighted in his testimony. Overall, I found C.M. to be a highly credible and trustworthy witness.

EVIDENCE OF SIX NATIONS OF THE GRAND RIVER

Band Representative: Karin Hill

[233] Ms. Hill is the Band Representative for Six Nations of the Grand River with carriage of this file. During her involvement with this family Ms. Hill had occasion to observe J. in both of his homes and described his evident comfort and familiarity in each.

[234] Ms. Hill explained that her role as Band Representative in child protection proceedings continues until a file is closed – typically upon reunification with either parent. However, this does not mean that she is prevented from continuing to provide services. If ordered or requested on a voluntary basis the Band could continue to provide support, resources, and services. In short, families do not require formal court processes to access information and services.

[235] The evidence of Ms. Hill was generally not challenged or controverted by any other party.

EVIDENCE OF J.-L.J.

Respondent Mother: J.-L.J

[236] J.-L.J. is 35 years of age and has held indigenous status since birth. She is a member of the Upper Mohawk band, Turtle Clan. J. is her only child. She is not currently employed and is residing on the property of the maternal family.

A. Relationship with Father

[237] The evidence of J.-L.J. with respect to her past relationship with C.M. was largely consistent with his evidence. However, J.-L.J. further recalls that, following separation:

a. Between the spring and summer of 2015 C.M. exercised little parenting time with J. The parenting schedule was not fixed – she would often travel to Kitchener and offer for C.M. to care for J. while she shopped or went to a hockey game. C.M. would always agree;

b. C.M.’s mental health was vulnerable around the time of separation – he was depressed and hospitalized for 72 hours after he sent concerning photographs depicting suicidal ideation to J.-L.J. J.-L.J. reported this concern to the paternal grandmother and C.M. received treatment;

c. J.-L.J. and C.M. initially did not speak much, but would communicate about J.;

d. J.-L.J. did not formally reside with C.M. and the paternal grandparents in the summer of 2015, but rather that she spent time there for extended periods over the summer to facilitate time between J. and his father. She would often return to her parents’ home on weekends, but there was no set schedule in place;

e. She resided briefly in a women’s shelter because she ‘needed to get away’ from her parents for a while. She could not recall why; and

f. In September 2016 the long-standing parenting schedule, incorporated into the Final Order of Justice Sherwood dated September 22, 2016, commenced.

B. Relationship with Paternal Grandparents

[238] J.-L.J. did not raise any issue with the paternal grandparents. She asserts that they always got along well; she acknowledged that the paternal grandmother is “great.” They were all invited to and attended birthday parties for J. subsequent to the parties’ separation. They no longer communicate, however there is no real reason for this other than the litigation itself.

C. Mother’s Relationship with J.

[239] J.-L.J. explained that she was J.’s primary caregiver when he was born. C.M. supported her, would sit up with her, assist with diaper changing and bathing, but he did not take any parental leave. J.-L.J. remained at home with the child.

[240] J.-L.J. described J. in a loving and complimentary manner. She was able to provide detailed descriptions of his personal qualities, interests, activities, relationships, daily schedule, etc. She asserts that she is never intoxicated in J.’s presence. She hopes that J. will remain in the home of D.J. and that she may continue to reside on the same property.

D. Relationship with the Maternal Family

[241] J.-L.J. testified that D.J. has been actively involved in J.’s care since his birth. J.-L.J., C.M. and J. resided on the same property as the maternal grandparents, their homes approximately 100 feet apart. If C.M. was not home, J.-L.J. and J. would frequently spend time at the grandparents’ home.

[242] In cross-examination J.-L.J. agreed that in the summer of 2015 a dispute arose between herself and D.J., wherein at her request C.M. picked up J. and J.-L.J. from the home of the paternal grandparents. J.-L.J.’s evidence was non-committal as to whether or not this incident involved physical aggression.

[243] J.-L.J. generally continued to reside on the property of the maternal family until approximately August 2017. J.-L.J. testified that in July 2017 J.-L.J. and D.J. got into a dispute that resulted in her calling the police. J.-L.J. advised that she ‘must have overreacted.’ It was during this period of time that J.-L.J. briefly moved into a women’s shelter. Shortly thereafter J.-L.J. secured her own accommodations.

[244] Upon moving into her own accommodations, D.J. continued to be actively involved in J.’s care – they continued to see each other almost daily.

[245] J.-L.J. testified in her examination in chief that she is open with D.J., shares information with her regularly including “where I am and who I’m with.” However, later in cross-examination, J.-L.J. acknowledged that there are aspects of her life that she does not want her parents to know about, and she does not share with them.

E. Alcohol Issues

[246] J.-L.J. testified that she has been hospitalized for alcohol-related issues on two or three occasions between 2013 and 2017.

[247] J.-L.J. acknowledged that in 2012 she was convicted of impaired driving. She received a large fine, a one year license suspension, and had a breathalyzer device installed in her car.

[248] J.-L.J. testified that in August or September 2017 C.M. came to her home to see her new accommodations. She asserts that C.M. brought alcohol with him and that she was not drunk when he arrived. She does not specifically recall why the police were called, but did acknowledge having issues with the downstairs neighbours. J.-L.J. requested that C.M. take J. back to Kitchener as the situation with the neighbours and the police escalated. She was forced to bring a contempt motion when C.M. would not subsequently return J. into her care after release from custody.

[249] J.-L.J. was not able to recall the specifics of many of the police interventions recorded in the police occurrence report records filed with the court. She provided very little dispute or response to the concerns and allegations raised by the Society or C.M. in her evidence-in-chief.

F. Voluntary Safety Plan

[250] J.-L.J. explained that the property she resided in after moving from her family property in 2017 was not ideal – it was busy, low income housing, with her residing right in the middle of a bundle of close-proximity houses. She described the situation as ‘unhealthy.’ She agreed that J. should reside with D.J. effective June 11, 2018. J.-L.J. testified that she too stayed at D.J.’s home “as much as possible”, but her evidence as to how long she continued to maintain her own housing thereafter was quite vague vague.

G. Supervision/Progression of Mother’s Parenting Time

[251] J.-L.J.’s evidence as to the progression of her parenting time with J. was admittedly uncertain. J.-L.J. inadvertently admitted to driving J. to his bus stop in the mornings (when raining) despite the Society’s directive that she not operate a motor vehicle with J. in it, and acknowledged one occasion of picking up J. from school in March 2019. She advised that D.J. was aware of these actions. J.-L.J. otherwise did not directly respond to the Society’s allegations regarding non-compliance with terms of supervision.

H. Drug Use and Drug Testing

[252] J.-L.J. testified that any drug screening results that were positive for opioids were as a result of Tylenol 1 used for migraines, and stress-induced neck and back pain. She acknowledged that mixing these drugs with alcohol could be harmful. She testified that she has never experimented with crystal methamphetamine, fentanyl or other such drugs.

[253] J.-L.J.’s evidence regarding provision of drug test results to the Society was not compelling. She provided a variety of answers, including that she thought she provided drug tests, but maybe didn’t, and may didn’t think it was important because she doesn’t do drugs. J.-L.J. provided no explanation for clearly misleading the Society on this issue.

I. Substance Abuse and Treatment

[254] J.-L.J. agreed that she has struggled with alcohol abuse issues for approximately ten years.

[255] In May 2020 her license was suspended for three days as a result of an alcohol-related incident. A criminal charge was laid against her in June 2020 relating to drinking and driving and this charge remains outstanding before the court. J.-L.J. agreed that, if convicted, she faces possible jail time as a result of this being a second offence.

[256] Initially in cross-examination J.-L.J. acknowledged drinking at Christmas time in 2020. She then changed her position and stated that she has not drank since the fall of 2020. This information was contrary to information previously provided in her trial Affidavit. Also during cross-examination, it became evident to the court that J.-L.J.’s previous representations of sobriety to the Society ran counter to police incident reports noting J.-L.J.’s intoxicated state. In general, J.-L.J.’s evidence regarding her past and present alcohol consumption was confused, contradictory, and simply not believable. Whether intentional or not, J.-L.J.’s information regarding her alcohol consumption to the Society and to the court cannot be relied upon as credible.

[257] J.-L.J. appeared to reluctantly agree to her counsel’s suggestion that in-patient substance abuse treatment could be beneficial. Her tone and body language while discussing this subject gave the impression of a very non-committal and disingenuous response. She also testified that she would be willing to consider a further prescription for ‘Antabuse’ if ordered.

J. Ongoing Involvement with the Band

[258] With some measure of reluctance, J.-L.J. also agreed that she would continue to work with the Band if so ordered. She noted that she does not have a strong relationship with her current assigned band representative, and feels unsupported by the band.

K. Criminal acquaintances

[259] J.-L.J. did not address the society’s concerns as to her associations with others engaged in a risky lifestyle in detail in her examination in chief.

[260] However, in cross-examination, J.-L.J. acknowledged:

a. receiving a black eye from an acquaintance in May 2020;

b. attending a party which involved others drinking in contravention of Covid-19 health protocols;

c. awareness of the criminal record of her acquaintance C.T., his involvement in the drug culture, and his anger-regulation issues. Her evidence was non-committal as to the nature of her past relationship with C.T., their living arrangements, and events which resulted in a non-contact order between them and her attendance at a bail hearing on his behalf. She asserts that they are now only ‘acquaintances’, not friends;

d. awareness of the criminal and drug issues relating to her friend L.M., in particular her use of crystal meth, but asserted they are no longer friends;

e. that she was in a romantic relationship with I.E. until February 2021;

f. involvement in such incidents as (a) a dispute with a ‘junkie’, (b) being punched in the ear, and (c) being hit over the head with a laptop while in an intoxicated state, and being warned about association with such individuals by authorities;

g. that she may not have been truthful with the Society in disclosing the details of her relationships;

[261] Despite each such admission, there was little acknowledgement of wrong-doing or insight into the risk that such behaviours and associations posed in the context of J.-L.J.’s own vulnerabilities.

L. Information and Communication with the Society

[262] J.-L.J. provided extremely limited response and explanation to the concerns raised by the Society, particularly with respect to her (a) failure to communicate with the Society, (b) her unknown whereabouts and absences from her home, and (c) other dangerous activities.

[263] In cross-examination J.-L.J. claimed very limited recall as to the nature of her discussions with the Society, and the length and nature of the periods of her absence from the home of D.J. In general, J.-L.J.’s evidence as to the nature of her activities and living arrangements from the spring of 2020 to present were elusive and difficult to follow.

[264] When queried, J.-L.J. offered no real opinion as to the impact of her lifestyle and absence from the home upon J. during this time period.

M. March 2019 Child Protection Proceedings

[265] In cross examination J.-L.J. agreed that in March 2020 she picked up J. from school, contrary to the directives of the Society. She acknowledged that she may have misrepresented the restrictions on her time with J. to C.M. She was non-committal as to whether or not C.M. had observed her to be caring for J. unsupervised during this time period.

N. Services

[266] In cross examination J.-L.J. acknowledged that the Society suggested referrals for speech programming for J., women’s services for counselling, Six Nations programming and individual counselling. She enjoys her counselling with Mr. Miller and intends to continue. Counselling with Mr. Miller at the time of J.-L.J.’s testimony was limited to telephone calls and texting due to Covid-19 restrictions.

O. Parenting Exchanges

[267] J.-L.J. acknowledged that she rarely attends parenting exchanges, leaving this function primarily to C.M. and maternal grandmother. In cross-examination she acknowledged that there was no real reason why she does not attend, and that would not be an imposition upon her to start.

P. Credibility

[268] J.-L.J. struggled to provide reliable evidence in this proceeding. She was not forthcoming in her examination in chief: not directly explaining or responding to most of the major concerns raised by the other parties. With persistence, more detail was elicited under cross-examination, however even in cross J.-L.J. tended to be vague or elusive in her responses, and struggled to recall (or claimed not to recall) relevant details of significant events. She generally only made admissions where it was obvious that she was ‘caught’; for example, where criminal charges were laid, or her licence was suspended, or when she could not hide an obvious black eye.

[269] J.-L.J. did not necessarily deny many of the incidents/topics of concern, instead she tended to deflect the questions posed and default to a general position that if she did not expose J. to these events, her problems should not be relevant to the Society or the court. The court was left with the impression that J.-L.J. does not voluntarily share what is in her view, private information, employing a ‘catch me if you can’ approach with the Society and with counsel. While this court is extremely sympathetic to J.-L.J.’s struggle with alcoholism, her reluctance to provide a fulsome and accurate portrayal of her circumstances, whether by reason of shame, fear, or other cause, made her an unreliable witness. Unless specifically stated, in areas of conflict between the evidence of J.-L.J. and the witnesses of the other parties, I prefer the evidence of the other witnesses.

Maternal Grandmother: D.J.

[270] D.J. is 63 years of age and is employed on a full-time basis during the school year in close proximity to her home.

[271] She and her husband own and reside on a large property of bush and trail. J. is currently residing with them. She does not drink alcohol and does not permit others to drink in her home.

[272] There is a second home on D.J.’s property, separated by a few acres, in which J.-L.J. and other members of the extended maternal family reside. On alternate weekends J.’s cousins (age 13 and 3) also reside on the property with the maternal uncle.

[273] D.J. is indigenous. Her family has never resided on Six Nations.

A. Relationship with J.

[274] D.J. was present for the birth of J. She has been a regular presence in his life since that time. D.J. provided the court with detailed information as to J.’s likes, dislikes, hobbies, activities, and daily routine. It is obvious that D.J. is actively involved in J.’s life in a positive way.

B. Relationship with Respondent father

[275] It was clear from the outset of D.J.’s evidence that she is not fond of C.M. She described him as an uninvolved father, unmotivated to work or go to school, and accused him of regularly being stoned when J. was a baby. D.J. is of the opinion that C.M. has made false allegations to the Society and the police that D.J. and J.-L.J. are not complying with the supervision restrictions on J.-L.J.’s parenting time. D.J. reports that C.M. “yells”, and that she does not believe that J. wants more time with him. D.J. reports little to no communication between herself and C.M., although she is not opposed to same.

[276] D.J. testified that, in her opinion, C.M. is no more responsible than J.-L.J. and that neither of them is equipped to parent J.

C. Relationship with Respondent mother

[277] At the time of J.’s birth J.-L.J. and C.M. resided in the separate home on the maternal property. After the parents separated J.-L.J. and J. moved into her old bedroom in D.J.’s home. She would see them every day after work and assisted mother with the provision of care to J.

[278] D.J. does not have specific recall as to the event between J.-L.J. and herself which resulted in police intervention in July 2017. She cannot recall the basis of the dispute, but surmised that there might have been ‘a shove’ and advised that it was not a big deal. D.J. asserted that there was no real reason for J.-L.J. and J. to move out of her home, stating simply that J.-L.J. wanted her own space. In her view there was no trigger or event which acted as a catalyst to this move.

[279] D.J. asserts that she continued to see J.-L.J. and J. almost daily while they lived independently. She was unable to explain police records which detailed very substandard levels of housekeeping (i.e. alcohol bottles, strewn garbage, unkept dishes, etc.) in J.-L.J.’s home during this time period.

[280] D.J. recalls that J.-L.J. moved back on to the property in the early spring of 2019.

[281] Despite the evidence of J.-L.J. and D.J. that they share a close and open relationship, in cross examination D.J.:

a. Acknowledged that she was unaware of J.-L.J.’s August 2017 arrest until advised of this event by the Society. Of note, D.J. offered a strong an unsolicited criticism of C.M. and J.-L.J.’s neighbours in relation to this incident. She could not identify any wrongdoing or responsibility on the part of her daughter;

b. Advised that she had no knowledge of C.T. or his relationship with J.-L.J. and was unaware that she was spending time with L.M. She was not aware that J.-L.J. was in a relationship with I.E. or with anyone else. She does not view these relationships as ‘any of her business’;

c. Acknowledged that she was unaware of J.-L.J.’s previous conviction for impaired driving until advised by the Society;

d. Testified that she was unaware of J.-L.J.’s hospitalizations for alcohol abuse;

e. Acknowledged that J.-L.J. does not tell or advise her of her involvements with the police and was unaware that J.-L.J. had been punched in the ear, hit over the head with a laptop, etc.;

f. Explained that she does not find it abnormal that her thirty-plus year-old daughter does not share these details of her life, and in part she believes J.-L.J. is protecting her from the hurt of some of this information;

g. Admitted that she was unaware that J.-L.J. was again drinking in 2020 until advised by the Society;

h. Admitted that, generally, she only heard about J.-L.J.’s negative behaviours from the Society;

i. Advised that she had no knowledge of the identity of J.-L.J.’s friend, observed on D.J.’s property by herself and the Society in November 2020, adding that she ‘doesn’t know what goes on when she’s not there’.

[282] D.J. advised the court that she believes J.-L.J. when she advises her of her sobriety.

D. Safety Plan

[283] In June 2018 D.J. recalled attending at the home of J.-L.J. She was doing laundry in the basement when the police attended at the home. It appears that J.-L.J. had called the police, but when they arrived she was intoxicated, sleeping, and couldn’t be woken. D.J.’s account of the state of the home was vastly different than the condition depicted in police records. At the advice of police, D.J. attended at the access exchange to retrieve J. from C.M. that day and took J. to her home. The following day D.J. met with Emily Walraven and agreed to take J. temporarily while J.-L.J. got some help.

[284] In response to a query as to what D.J. understood the Society’s concerns to be at that time, D.J. responded that she thinks an assault took place, and that J.-L.J. was drinking more, but J.-L.J. never told her.

E. Respondent mother’s issues with alcohol

[285] D.J. opined that J.-L.J.’s issues with alcohol abuse commenced when she moved into her own home in the summer of 2017. She testified that she was unaware of any issues with alcohol prior to that time.

[286] D.J. advised that she knew J.-L.J. was drinking, but that it was never when J. was there, seemingly on the weekends that J. was with C.M. D.J. barely saw J.-L.J. on those weekends. She acknowledged that maybe J.-L.J.’s drinking was getting out of hand in 2018. She seemed depressed and was having trouble with her neighbours.

[287] D.J. asserts that she has never observed J.-L.J. to drink in the presence of J. To her knowledge J.-L.J. does not drink on the maternal property. In cross examination D.J. acknowledged that in June 2018, when police attended at J.-L.J.’s home and she was unresponsive, J. was scheduled to return into J.-L.J.’s care that day.

[288] D.J. has “no idea” as to when J.-L.J. may have last consumed alcohol.

F. Drug use

[289] D.J. only observes J.-L.J. to take prescription drugs. She keeps her medication zipped up in her purse. D.J noted that also advised that J.-L.J. ‘took a sleeping pill at night and Tylenol 1’s with Codeine, because she always had a headache’.

G. Relationship with Society

[290] Overall D.J. reports a positive relationship with Society workers. She notes that early in their relationship she requested the intervention of the Band because she did not feel her family was being treated fairly. Later, D.J. questioned the rationale of the Society in expanding upon C.M.’s time with J.

H. Supervision of J.-L.J.’s time with J.

[291] D.J. recalled that initially J.-L.J.’s parenting time was fully supervised, primarily by either D.J. or the paternal grandfather or uncle. In September 2018 D.J. had to return to work. She recalls that J. started day care and that J.-L.J. was permitted two hours of unsupervised access, which occurred primarily before and after school.

[292] D.J. asserts that she has always complied with the Society’s directives regarding the supervision of J.-L.J.’s time with J.

[293] In January 2019 D.J. requested that J.-L.J. be permitted transport J. to and from school. The Society did not agree with this request. In her testimony the D.J. opined that this restriction was unreasonable. D.J. admitted that in March 2019 she permitted J.-L.J. to pick up J. from school when she had a medical appointment. D.J. was extremely reluctant to acknowledge any element of wrongdoing in relation to that event.

[294] D.J. disputed J.-L.J.’s evidence that she has permitted to drive J. to the bus stop in the mornings. She later changed her evidence to concede that it may have happened on one occasion, but that this should not be a problem because it is unlikely that “there would be booze in the mailbox”.

[295] She was unaware of C.M.’s report of witnessing J.-L.J.’s unsupervised parenting of J. in March 2019, expressing the opinion that the maternal uncle or great-grandmother or great aunt would likely have been home. D.J. advised that she does not instruct her other family members to “go over and watch” J.-L.J. – they are just aware of this requirement.

[296] D.J. acknowledges that in April 2020 she was requested to keep a closer eye on J.-L.J.’s activities. However, in court she advised that she only concerned herself with J.-L.J.’s actions when she was around J. – the balance of the time was no business of hers. As a result, she did not report J.-L.J.’s absences from the home to the Society as requested. D.J. further acknowledged that she did not report her assistance in having J.-L.J.’s vehicle towed home in May 2020 to the Society.

[297] D.J.’s recall in court regarding J.-L.J.’s periods of her absence from home at this time varied significantly from information previously shared with the Society, and with information provided by J.-L.J. D.J. advised that she did not ask J.-L.J. what she was up to during these absences, but would confirm with her that she was “safe”.

[298] Under cross-examination by the Band, D.J. bluntly stated that she is only concerned with the time J.-L.J. spends with J., - it is not her role to “babysit a 37-year old”.

I. Covid-19 concerns

[299] D.J. believed that C.M.’s time with J. should have been limited due to the health pandemic. She testified that she was concerned about C.M.’s exposure of J. to the Covid-19 virus, but not J.-L.J.’s potential exposure. D.J.’s inability to see the irony of her differing assessments of risk was concerning.

J. J.’s views and preferences

[300] D.J. does not believe that J. is impacted by J.-L.J.’s absences from the home. He simply accepts that she is with friends. She opines that J. does not seem to want more time with his father – he is worried about missing out on things at her home. D.J. does not reassure him that he is not missing out, instead advising that he needs to spend time with his dad.

K. Permanency

[301] D.J. acknowledged that the safety plan which placed J. in her care was originally anticipated to remain in place for approximately six weeks and has continuously been extended since that time. D.J. continues to believe that the arrangement will remain in place until J.-L.J. achieves sobriety and is able to return to her primary parenting role. She acknowledges that to date it has not been safe for J. to be returned to J.-L.J.’s care.

[302] She opines that J.-L.J. needs some time to heal. She wants her to ‘find her way, and then become a mother again’. She is willing to continue to care for J. for as long as is necessary for J.-L.J. to achieve this result.

L. Relationship with the Band

[303] D.J. initially reported a positive and helpful relationship with the Band. More recently, subsequent to the Band confirming its support to place J. with C.M., D.J. asserts that her worker is lazy, uninvolved, unaware, nonchalant, and likely operating out of a desire for revenge (resulting from a complaint made against her). D.J. shares none of the Band’s optimism that C.M. will continue to work with the Band to support J.’s connection with his indigenous identity. However, D.J. is willing to herself expose J. to a minimum of one cultural event per month.

M. Credibility

[304] D.J. is in a difficult position. She loves her daughter and her grandson very much. However, I find that D.J.’s loyalty to her daughter has limited her ability to assess information and testify in an impartial manner. During D.J.’s evidence, she was reluctant to offer or acknowledge any facts which cast her daughter in a negative light. She frequently claimed unawareness of, or could not recall details of important events.

[305] During D.J.’s evidence, I also made the following specific observations:

(a) D.J. was combative with counsel on issues that could have been easily conceded (for example, not acknowledging J.-L.J.’s role in her arrest for public intoxication, instead deflecting all blame onto C.M.);

(b) D.J. was defensive or sarcastic when challenged on her own role as supervisor (for example, stating that she does not record the details of her daughter’s life in a diary, that she wouldn’t expect there to be ‘booze’ in her mailbox, and that it’s not her job to babysit a 37 year old);

(c) On some occasions D.J. claimed little knowledge on any aspect of J.-L.J.’s life, however on other occasions it appeared that D.J. had been coached, or provided with very specific details of the evidence of other witnesses before her (for example voluntarily offering up the ingredients of J.-L.J.’s non-prescription medications to counter any suggestion of illicit drug use);

(d) I did not believe D.J.’s evidence with respect to her observations of the events of June 11, 2018. Her recount at trial was very different than the concerns she expressed to the Society at the time. I specifically do not believe her testimony regarding the physical state of J.-L.J.’s home at the time, by contrast to the observations made by police contained within the incident reports filed;

(e) During a detailed review of D.J.’s past statements to the Children’s Aid Society workers, D.J. would only acknowledge statements made that could be construed as positive regarding J.-L.J.;

(f) D.J.’s assertions that police and Society workers engaged in falsification of records was simply not compelling.

[306] Unfortunately, I cannot accept that D.J. was a candid and forthcoming witness. She is not impartial. I do not believe that she was completely truthful in her evidence, and I find that she deliberately withheld important information from the Society and from the court. Where the evidence of D.J. differs from the evidence of the Society workers or C.M. on material issues, I prefer the evidence of the other witnesses.

THE LAW

[307] All parties agree that J. is a child in need of protection pursuant to s. 74(2)(b)(ii) of the Child Youth and Family Services Act. That is, there is risk that J. is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of him or resulting from that person’s pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child.

[308] At the outset, it is important to establish ‘who’ had charge of the child.

a. “Charge” of the Child re: Protection Finding

[309] There can be little doubt that at the root of all child protection concerns raised in this trial are the alcohol dependency issues of J.-L.J. The Society has no concerns about the child in the care of C.M. Nor does the Society raise concerns about the child in the care of D.J. per se, but rather with D.J.’s ability and willingness to supervise and monitor J.-L.J.’s parenting time with the child in accordance with Society directives. The child protection finding in this case is as a result of the risks inherent in J.-L.J. having J. in her charge.

b. “Charge” of the Child Before Intervention

[310] The issue of who had charge of J. prior to the Society’s child protection intervention is an important threshold issue in this proceeding. Sections 101(3), 101(4), and 101(8) of the CYFSA all specifically require the court to consider the ongoing placement of the child with “the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under this Part”. These provisions require that the court:

a. Shall not remove the child from the care of this person unless there are less disruptive alternatives to the child;

b. Shall return the child to (or order that the child remain with) this person if an order is not necessary to protect the child in the future; and

c. Shall only consider alternative placements if it is necessary to remove the child from the care of this person.

[311] It is important to clarify that the Safety Plan entered into between J.-L.J., D.J. and the Society on June 11, 2018 does not qualify as ‘intervention’ of the Society under Part V of the CYFSA. Society intervention under this part was not triggered until March 8, 2019 when the Society commenced a Protection Application, seeking placement of J. with C.M. pursuant to a six-month Supervision Order.

[312] The collection of caselaw provided by counsel in this proceeding supports the view that one or more persons might fit this description of having charge of the child before intervention under this part:

a. “Charge” has connotation of authority and responsibility. “Charge” of a child suggests some established relationship, not something transient or temporary: Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v. M.(J.), 2008 ONCJ 782 at para 15.

b. There is no exclusivity inherent in the words “had charge”. More than one person may have charge of a child at any particular time, just as more than one person can have custody or care and control: Algoma at para. 16

c. Charge is not synonymous with custody, nor is it synonymous with possession. It is necessary to examine closely all the facts in order to determine who had the ongoing care, custody and responsible possession of the child: see for example Children’s Aid Society of Brant v. L.B.-A., 2020 ONCJ 562, Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. H.C. and C.C., 2003 CanLII 38754 (ONSC), C.A.S. v. J.M., 2021 ONSC 1716, Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. S.D., C.M., G.D. and W.D., 2008 CanLII 49155 (ONSC)

[313] Counsel for J.-L.J. relies upon Children’s Aid Society of Brant v. A.A., 2020 ONCJ 535 and counsel for C.M. relies upon Children’s Aid Society of Brant v. L.B.-A., 2020 ONCJ 535 for both the factual similarities and results. Both of these recent cases involved analysis of the charge of the child immediately before Society intervention in the context of temporary care hearings and both have some factual similarities to the case before this court.

[314] Having considered the relevant legislation, caselaw provided, and particular facts before me, I am of the view that there is support for the assertion that each of J.-L.J., C.M., and D.J. had some measure of charge of J., in varying degrees, at the time of child protection intervention in March 2019. However, in my view, a priority or strength of charge can be established on the facts of this case as follows:

1. J.-L.J.: I do not hesitate in concluding that J.-L.J. had the strongest degree of charge over J. in March 2019. I specifically find that:

a. J.-L.J. has historically been the child’s primary caregiver;

b. The Final Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Sherwood dated September 22, 2016 ordered that J.’s primary residence with J.-L.J.;

c. J.-L.J. shared a court-ordered legal designation of joint custody over J. with C.M.;

d. In March 2019 J.-L.J. and J. were both residing primarily in the home of D.J. J.-L.J. In her own trial Affidavit claims to have been “providing all of J.’s day to day care” within D.J.’s home at the time;

e. Although post June 2018 D.J. was generally supervising J.-L.J.’s time with J., J.-L.J. was actively involved in the day-to-day care of J. when she was present;

f. It was J.-L.J. who arranged the safety plan regarding J.’s residency at the home of D.J. in June 2018. The Society was supportive of this plan, as they are generally supportive of voluntary family plans that do not require court intervention. However, J.-L.J. had the authority to revoke this arrangement at any time - with the awareness that such a revocation would likely trigger a formal child protection intervention by the Society.

2. C.M.: C.M. also had a measure of charge over J. immediately prior to Society intervention. I specifically find that:

a. C.M. shared legal joint custody of J. with J.-L.J. pursuant to a valid and existing Final Order of the court;

b. C.M. was exercising regular and long-standing parenting time with J.;

c. C.M. was not consulted about J.-L.J.’s voluntary placement of the child with D.J. When C.M. learned of this arrangement, he took all reasonable steps possible to remedy the situation through proper legal channels. C.M. did not consent nor acquiesce to J.’s placement in the home of D.J.

3. D.J.: I conclude that D.J. also had some measure of charge over J. at the time of Society intervention. Specifically:

a. J. had been residing in her home for a period of nine months, as per the safety plan;

b. D.J. was also responsible for meeting J.’s day to day needs during this nine-month period, especially during J.-L.J.’s absences; and

c. D.J. was responsible for supervising J.-L.J.’s parenting time with the child.

[315] However, on the facts of this case, I cannot accept that the unilateral change of J.’s court-ordered primary residence from the home of J.-L.J. into to the home of D.J., made as an interim safety measure and under protest by a joint-custodial and involved parent, should be viewed as giving D.J. a priority of charge over the child. The temporary physical placement of the child into the home of D.J. between June 2018 and March 2019, should not be conflated with authority over the child, and did not extinguish J.’s natural parents’ legal and actual charge over his care and custody.

[316] I conclude that the person who most clearly had charge of J. immediately before the Society’s intervention in March 2019 was J.-L.J. While I accept that C.M. and D.J. also had lesser shared responsibilities for the charge of the child, a logical reading of s. 101 of the CYFSA would support the view that, if safe to do so, J. should be returned to the care of J.-L.J.

[317] I do not accept that there should be any presumption that J. should remain in the home of D.J. in priority over either J.-L.J. or C.M., under s. 101. To interpret the meaning of “charge” in this manner would create a legislative advantage that could serve to discourage parents in need of assistance from considering temporary respite and working voluntarily with child protection agencies during times of crisis. Such disincentive to seek out assistance when needed would clearly run counter to many stated purposes of the CYFSA (e.g. to give support to the autonomy and integrity of the family unit wherever possible on the basis of mutual consent, and focus on preventative and early intervention services) and would be contrary to the best interests of children in general.

Placement Options for J.

[318] The parties agree that J. is in need of protection. Court intervention is necessary to protect him in the future. No party in this proceeding asserts that J. can safely be returned into the care of J.-L.J., with or without terms of supervision, at this time. I agree with this assessment. It is necessary to remove J. from the care of J.-L.J. There are no terms of supervision which could adequately protect J. from the risk of harm in J.-L.J.’s care.

[319] An analysis of the available options for J.’s placement is therefore required under s. 101 and s. 102 of the CYFSA, the relevant portions of which are reproduced as follows:

Order where child in need of protection

101 (1) Where the court finds that a child is in need of protection and is satisfied that intervention through a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future, the court shall make one of the following orders or an order under section 102, in the child’s best interests:

Supervision order

1. That the child be placed in the care and custody of a parent or another person, subject to the supervision of the society, for a specified period of at least three months and not more than 12 months.

Interim society care

2. That the child be placed in interim society care and custody for a specified period not exceeding 12 months.

Extended society care

3. That the child be placed in extended society care until the order is terminated under section 116 or expires under section 123.

Consecutive orders of interim society care and supervision

4. That the child be placed in interim society care and custody under paragraph 2 for a specified period and then be returned to a parent or another person under paragraph 1, for a period or periods not exceeding a total of 12 months.

Court to inquire

(2) In determining which order to make under subsection (1) or section 102, the court shall ask the parties what efforts the society or another person or entity has made to assist the child before intervention under this Part.

Less disruptive alternatives preferred

(3) The court shall not make an order removing the child from the care of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under this Part unless the court is satisfied that alternatives that are less disruptive to the child, including non-residential care and the assistance referred to in subsection (2), would be inadequate to protect the child.

Community placement to be considered

(4) Where the court decides that it is necessary to remove the child from the care of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under this Part, the court shall, before making an order under paragraph 2 or 3 of subsection (1), consider whether it is possible to place the child with a relative, neighbour or other member of the child’s community or extended family under paragraph 1 of subsection (1) with the consent of the relative or other person.

First Nations, Inuk or Métis child

(5) Where the child referred to in subsection (4) is a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child, unless there is a substantial reason for placing the child elsewhere, the court shall place the child with a member of the child’s extended family if it is possible or, if it is not possible,

(a) in the case of a First Nations child, another First Nations family;

(b) in the case of an Inuk child, another Inuit family; or

(c) in the case of a Métis child, another Métis family.

…

Terms and conditions of supervision order

(7) If the court makes a supervision order under paragraph 1 of subsection (1), the court may impose,

(a) reasonable terms and conditions relating to the child’s care and supervision;

(b) reasonable terms and conditions on,

(i) the child’s parent,

(ii) the person who will have care and custody of the child under the order,

(iii) the child, and

(iv) any other person, other than a foster parent, who is putting forward or would participate in a plan for the care and custody of or access to the child; and

(c) reasonable terms and conditions on the society that will supervise the placement, but shall not require the society to provide financial assistance or purchase any goods or services.

Order for child to remain or return to person who had charge before intervention

(8) Where the court finds that a child is in need of protection but is not satisfied that a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future, the court shall order that the child remain with or be returned to the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under this Part.

Custody order

102 (1) Subject to subsection (6), if a court finds that an order under this section instead of an order under subsection 101 (1) would be in a child’s best interests, the court may make an order granting custody of the child to one or more persons, other than a foster parent of the child, with the consent of the person or persons.

Deemed to be order under s. 28 Children’s Law Reform Act

(2) An order made under subsection (1) and any access order under section 104 that is made at the same time as the order under subsection (1) is deemed to be a parenting order or contact order, as the case may be, made under section 28 of the Children’s Law Reform Act and the court,

(a) may make any order under subsection (1) that the court may make under section 28 of that Act; and

(b) may give any directions that it may give under section 34 of that Act.

Proposed Plans of each Party

[320] The Society, J.-L.J., C.M., and the Band are all named parties in this action. All filed Answers and participated in this trial.

[321] D.J. was entitled to and received notice of this proceeding and was entitled to participate as per her caregiver role to the child under s. 79(3) of the CYFSA. However, D.J.’s position was clear: she does not see herself as a parent to J.: she is a grandparent. She continues to hope that her daughter will rise above her personal challenges and return to her role as primary caregiver. In keeping with this view, despite being served with the Society’s child protection materials, and being invited to participate in these proceedings as a party, D.J. declined to file an Answer and present a Plan of Care for J.

[322] The placement options put forward for consideration for J. are therefore as follows:

a. That J. be placed in the care of C.M., subject to society supervision, for a period of six months, as requested by the Society and the Band (s. 101(1)1 – supervision order);

b. That J. be placed in the care of D.J., subject to society supervision for a period of six months, as requested by J.-L.J. (s. 101(1)1 – supervision order); or

c. That J. be placed in the custody of C.M., as requested by C.M. (s. 102(1) – custody order).

[323] In all scenarios, there is agreement between the parties that terms shall be imposed requiring contact between J. and the Six Nations of the Grand River Band.

Best Interests

[324] The “best interests criteria” are enumerated in s. 74.(3) of the CYFSA:

Best interests of child

[325] 74.(3) Where a person is directed in this Part to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child, the person shall,

(a) consider the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(b) in the case of a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child, consider the importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of First Nations, Inuit and Métis cultures, heritages and traditions, of preserving the child’s cultural identity and connection to community, in addition to the considerations under clauses (a) and (c); and

(c) consider any other circumstance of the case that the person considers relevant, including,

(i) the child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs,

(ii) the child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development,

(iii) the child’s race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, family diversity, disability, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression,

(iv) the child’s cultural and linguistic heritage,

(v) the importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family,

(vi) the child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community,

(vii) the importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity,

(viii) the merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or returning to a parent,

(ix) the effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case,

(x) the risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent, and

(xi) the degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.

(xi) the degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.

Assessment of Plans:

A. Placement with Maternal Grandmother v. Respondent Father

[326] Both the Society and the Band support an order placing J. in the care of C.M., pursuant to a six-month supervision order. In the alternative to a custody order in his favour, C.M. also agrees with this plan. J.-L.J. asserts that a supervision order which places J. in the primary care of D.J. is the superior option.

[327] For the reasons that follow, it is the conclusion of the court that it is in J.’s best interests to be placed in the care of C.M.

a. Views and preferences

[328] There is no strong nor reliable evidence of J. having a preference for residing with either C.M. or D.J.

[329] I accept that J. is comfortable in both of his homes and with the caregivers therein.

b. Uniqueness of FNIM culture, heritage, tradition, identity and connection to community

[330] J. is an indigenous child, connected with Six Nations. C.M. is not indigenous. J.’s connection to his indigenous culture and heritage is through the maternal side of his family only.

[331] J.-L.J. argues that this court should use utmost caution ordering a change in J.’s primary residence from an indigenous to a non-indigenous home. That J.’s shared First Nations ancestry and heritage with the maternal family militates in favour of placing the child in the care of D.J. over C.M. The Society, C.M., and the Band however argue that the consent terms requested by all parties, regarding ongoing contact between the child and the Band, are sufficient to meet the best interests of J. in this regard.

[332] In assessing this important factor within the particular needs of J., I am mindful of the commitments and objectives highlighted within the preambles of An Act respecting First nations, Inuit and Métis children, youths and families, S.C. 2019 c. 24 and the CYSA, and as specifically enumerated as a recognized purpose of the CYFSA: s. 1(2)6. Certainly, J.’s FNIM status is an extremely important feature in the particular facts of this case, however this factor does not take priority over all other enumerated considerations in assessing the best interests, protection and well-being of J.

[333] It is obvious that the maternal family is in a better position than C.M. to recognize and maintain J.’s First Nations cultures, heritages, traditions, and community connection. However, I also accept C.M.’s commitment to maintaining a strong connection between J. and his maternal family and between J. and his indigenous ancestry and culture as genuine.

c. J.’s physical, mental and emotional needs and level of development and ability of caregivers to meet same

[334] J. has no special needs or behavioural issues. All evidence presented to the court suggests that he is well-adjusted, and developmentally on track for his age. The evidence presented at trial clearly supports the conclusion that both D.J. and C.M. are equipped with the necessary skills to meet the physical needs of J. However, I am concerned that D.J. does not appear sensitive to the possibility that J. may be impacted by the lifestyle and frequent absences of his mother. She believes he is unaffected. But as J. matures, he is likely to become more alert to J.-L.J.’s alcoholism and destructive behaviour. D.J.’s reluctance to candidly articulate and confront J.-L.J.’s struggles and to acknowledge that her lifestyle has implications for J., in my view, limits her ability to provide the necessary mental and emotional support to J. I find that C.M. is in a better position to meet the future needs of J. in this regard.

d. The importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family

[335] This ‘best interests’ consideration specifically focuses the court’s attention upon the importance of a positive relationship between J. and his ‘parents’. Both of the Respondent parties clearly qualify as a parent to J. under s. 74(1) of the CYFSA. D.J. does not.

[336] The testimony of J.-L.J., C.M., and particularly D.J. at trial highlighted the salience of this issue. Specifically, the evidence of these witnesses left the court with the impression of a marked difference in the ability and willingness of J.’s proposed caregivers to understand and promote positive parental and extended family relationships in his best interests:

a. Respondent mother: I found J.-L.J. to be relatively neutral towards C.M. While she did not go out of her way to highlight the important role that J.’s father plays in his life, I also did not find her to appear motivated to disparage or undermine this relationship. She simply appeared content to have little communication with C.M. and trusted him to care for J. appropriately during his parenting time.

b. Respondent father: I found C.M. to reflect positively upon J.’s relationship with the maternal family. During his evidence he gave the impression of genuine care and concern for the health and wellbeing of J.-L.J. It would have been easy to emphasize her struggles and poor choices, however C.M. did not highlight these deficiencies. Despite his very real concerns about J.-L.J.’s addiction issues, I did not observe any hostility or ill will towards her or her extended family in his words or presentation. I accept that C.M. will continue to promote a healthy relationship between J. and J.-L.J., and an ongoing connection with her extended family. He is evidently committed to implementing a parenting plan that supports a safe and healthy relationship between J. and J.-L.J., and maximizes contact with his extended maternal family.

c. Maternal grandmother: By contrast, D.J.’s animus towards C.M. was palpable. Where opportunity presented itself to criticize the conduct or character of C.M., D.J. did not hesitate. The court was left with the impression that although D.J. tolerated C.M.’s role in J.’s life, she did not respect it. The evidence suggests that, at times, J.-L.J. and C.M. were in agreement regarding parenting plans for J. (i.e. scheduling of Christmas, summer vacation, etc.), only to have these agreements undermined by D.J. I accept the Society’s observations of D.J.’s overly critical view of C.M., and her reluctance to permit regularly scheduled or holiday or expanded parenting time between J. and his father when it was clearly appropriate to do so. D.J.’s testimony in court when questioned on issues pertaining to C.M. clearly reinforced this concern. D.J. was quick to defend her family and deflect blame onto C.M., at times resulting in positions that bordered on absurd.

[337] This court is left with the serious concern that D.J. is not willing nor able to honour and promote a strong connection between J. and his father on a long-term basis. While I am satisfied that C.M. will reinforce to J. a secure position as a member of the maternal family, regardless of J.-L.J.’s struggles, I am not confident in D.J.’s ability or desire to do the converse.

e. J.’s relationships and emotional ties to parents and relatives

[338] The court heard evidence in this trial of the benefits of J.’s exposure to his extended (maternal) family at D.J.’s home. I accept that he enjoys close contact and attachments with his mother, grandmother, grandfather, maternal great-grandmother, great-aunt, uncle, and first cousins (on alternating weekends). Likewise, C.M. resides with the paternal grandparents and J. is observed to enjoy positive connections with this side of the family as well. Any outcome in this case must recognize and promote all of these important relationships.

[339] The parties did not argue the currently unsettled area of law regarding whether a priority or preference of parenting should be granted to ‘natural parents’ over non-parents in child welfare proceedings: see for example J.D. v. DCP, et al, 2020 PECA 14, application for leave to appeal granted B.J.T. v. J.D., 2021 CanLII 52019 (SCC). However, counsel for the Band argues that s. 16(1) of An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families is directly applicable to this case. Specifically, the Act provides:

Priority

16 (1) The placement of an Indigenous child in the context of providing child and family services in relation to the child, to the extent that it is consistent with the best interests of the child, is to occur in the following order of priority:

(a) with one of the child’s parents;

(b) with another adult member of the child’s family;

(c) with an adult who belongs to the same Indigenous group, community or people as the child;

(d) with an adult who belongs to an Indigenous group, community or people other than the one to which the child belongs; or

(e) with any other adult.

[340] I have concluded that it is in J.’s best interests to be placed with C.M. I accept the Band’s argument that placement of J. with his father is consistent with the order of priority of placement prescribed by the Act.

f. Continuity of care and the possible effect of disruption

[341] The majority of J.-L.J.’s evidence focussed on the advantages and benefits of J.’s life in the home of the maternal family that should not be disrupted. She argues that the child has always resided in the primary care of the maternal family (in some combination of J.-L.J. and D.J.) and that placing the child in the care of C.M. is an unjustified experiment. In essence, J.-L.J. asserts that J.’s status quo residence in the home of D.J. should not be disrupted and should continue on a temporary basis.

(a) Status quo

[342] J. has resided in the residence of D.J. since June 2018. I do not believe that the circumstances of this initial placement should be overlooked. The June 2018 safety plan, although society-sanctioned, was made without input of C.M. – a joint custodial parent. Thereafter, the status quo arrangement continued over the verbal and formal legal objection of C.M.

[343] As a joint custodial parent, C.M.’s objections to J.’s change in residence were not given sufficient consideration. His legal right to be involved in the important decisions relating to J.’s residence ought not to have been superseded by a safety plan created and agreed to without his knowledge. This court recognizes that in times of crisis, child protection agencies are required to make urgent and sometimes superficial assessments of the least intrusive manner of ensuring safety for children. I accept that the Society workers in this case truly believed that placement of J. in the care of D.J. would be a very short term temporary measure which would allow J.-L.J. to get back on her feet with the support of her family, and then return to her primary caregiving role for J. But it is evident that this arrangement was never intended to be a permanent long-term replacement of J.’s primary residence. C.M. has at no time acquiesced to this status quo arrangement and has taken all necessary legal action through proper legal channels to assert his objection to same.

[344] There is no legal presumption which favours preservation of the current status quo residence of the child. However, the best interests of J. do require this court to consider any consequences which may flow from a change or disruption to this continued arrangement.

(b) Continuity of care

[345] It is clear to the court that J. enjoys a happy and comfortable lifestyle in the home of D.J. However, an analysis of continuity of care must consider not only the historic and current arrangement, but also the long-term permanent placement of the child.

[346] In this case, the request for placement of J. with D.J. pursuant to a six-month supervision order, is akin to another temporary placement of the child. The safety plan created in June 2018 was predicated upon the belief that J.-L.J. would sufficiently address her dependency issues and return to her role as J.’s primary caregiver. Three years have now passed, and this has not occurred. The same protection concerns present in June 2018 (i.e. at the time of the safety plan) and in March 2019 (i.e. at the time of initiation of formal child protection proceedings), continue to be present today.

[347] D.J. has opted not to participate as a party and has not presented a plan for permanent placement of J. D.J. advises that she is willing to continue to provide care for J. for ‘as long as it takes’. J.-L.J.’s requested relief therefore appears to suggest that a further supervision order would permit a sufficient extension of time for her to adequately address the court’s protection concerns and return to the role of J.’s permanent primary caregiver.

[348] In Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. Y.M., the Honourable Mr. Justice Sherr articulated:

A child’s need for permanency planning within a timeframe sensitive to that child’s needs demands that the legal process not be used as a strategy to “buy” a parent time to develop an ability to parent. In child protection proceedings, the genuineness of an issue must arise from something more than a heartfelt expression of a parent’s desire to resume care of the child. There must be an arguable notion discernible form a parent’s evidence that they face some better prospects than what existed at the time of the society’s removal of the child from their care and has developed some new ability as a parent: 2019 ONCJ 489 at para. 227. See also Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.H., 2000 CanLII 3158 (ONCJ).

[349] Similarly, the courts have repeatedly opined that ‘good intentions are not enough’ - the test is not whether a parent intends to change, but whether they have in fact changed and are now able to give the child the care that is in his or her best interests: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. P.N.S., 2016 ONCJ 164 at para. 43.

[350] J.-L.J.’s dependency issues are long-standing and, unfortunately, debilitating. Her request for J.’s permanency and long-term continuity of care for J. is contingent upon a rather speculative and unspecified formula for self-improvement – she provided little information to the court as to any intended plan for change. By contrast, the requests of the Society, C.M., and the Band to place J. in the care of C.M. are grounded in established circumstances. That is, C.M. is equipped and available today to provide long-term care and stable parenting for J. C.M. has been a constant stable presence in J.’s life. He has demonstrated a stable and patient commitment to expanded parenting of J.

[351] The prospects of C.M.’s long-term ability to provide continuity of care for the child are far superior to those of J.-L.J. on the evidence presented to this court.

g. Merits of plans of care

[352] J.-L.J.’s plan is simply that nothing should change. She appears content to spend time with J. under the supervision of D.J., when it suits her to do so, and to rely upon D.J. to meet the regular day to day needs of the child when she is not able. I do not accept that this is a meritorious plan that considers the long-term best interests of the child. D.J. has not advanced a claim to have J. placed in her long-term care. J.-L.J.’s plan does not sufficient consider the element of permanency planning for J.

[353] C.M.’s long-term plan offers more stability for J. C.M. has no known criminal history or associations, substance abuse issues, or mental health issues. He has stable employment, stable living accommodations, and a solid support network. He has carefully researched and considered the medical, educational, cultural and extra-curricular needs of the child and the availability of such services in his area. Further, C.M. has considered and prioritized the logistics of maintaining an ongoing relationship between J. and his maternal family.

[354] I am satisfied that the Plans of Care which seek placement of J. into the care of C.M. are superior to the ongoing temporary placement of the child with D.J.

h. Effect of Delay

[355] The Society has been working with this family for over three years. J.-L.J. has had ample opportunity to effect any intended change and, despite short term periods of gain, has demonstrated little long-term progress. J.’s best long-term option is to be placed in the care of his father. There is no sufficient reason to delay such a final disposition of this matter.

i. Risk of harm and degree of risk

[356] Finally, in concluding that J.’s best interests are best met by placement in the care of C.M. I have considered the risk of harm and degree of risk that J.-L.J.’s ongoing substance abuse issues and dangerous lifestyle pose to J. J.-L.J.’s behaviours, including both her own issues of substance abuse and her association with individuals with similar issues and criminal behaviour and involvement in the drug culture, is dangerous. Any exposure of J. to this lifestyle is a serious protection concern.

[357] J.-L.J. asserts that D.J.’s supervision of her parenting time, with the assistance of other members of the maternal family, minimizes this risk of harm. However, J.-L.J.’s plan requires the court to place great faith in D.J.’s ability to vigilantly monitor and supervise J.-L.J.’s parenting time with J. It is logical that the potential for J.’s exposure to J.-L.J.’s dangerous lifestyle is increased by the quantity of time he is in close proximity to J.-L.J. Supervision, in this case, is a particularly onerous task given that there is currently no real structure to the frequency and duration of J.-L.J.’s parenting time, J.-L.J. and D.J. reside on the same shared property, and J.-L.J.’s parenting time appears to occur on a rather ad hoc basis depending upon her personal circumstances.

[358] For a supervision order to be an effective instrument of risk management, the court should consider the parties’ level of cooperation, reliability, and trust, the presence or absence of clear and accurate exchange of information between the parties, and demonstrable evidence of compliance and the ability to monitor such compliance: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. L.R., 2020 ONCJ 22 at para. 620. A careful review of the evidence of J.-L.J. or D.J. causes this court concern in this regard.

[359] I find that J.-L.J. is unlikely to disclose to others an accurate and fulsome depiction of her activities and associations. She was deceitful with the Society with respect to their requests for drug testing. She did not comply with expectations and court ordered terms pertaining to meeting with the Society and communicating with the Society. She did not disclose and misrepresented incidents of involvement with the police. She was not candid about her partnerships and associations and provided inconsistent information regarding her residency. Her failure to candidly share important information extended not only to persons adverse in position (i.e. to the Society and C.M.), but also to her own support network, specifically including D.J. By observation of J.-L.J.’s testimony in court, only with a strenuous effort and a high level of persistence and attention to detail, can the layers of J.-L.J.’s story be uncovered. To compound this problem, by her own admission, D.J. is unwilling or unable to do so.

[360] I do not accept that D.J. possesses the ability or is sufficiently motivated to acknowledge and confront her daughter’s lifestyle to the level required to adequately monitor J.’s time with J.-L.J. on a regular and long-term basis. She did not report J.-L.J’s periods of absence from her home to the Society until long after the fact, when J.-L.J’s absence would likely be noted from a scheduled meeting. She did not report J.-L.J’s criminal activity to the Society in the spring/summer of 2020, despite evidence that J.-L.J’s criminal charge of impaired driving was known to her. The evidence also suggests that J.-L.J does not vigilantly monitor the presence of J.-L.J.’s questionable acquaintances on the property where J. resides. I find that it is more likely than not that (a) J.-L.J. has operated a motor vehicle with J. as a passenger on multiple occasions, and (b) has been left alone and unsupervised with J. for extended periods of time on multiple occasions with the direct knowledge of D.J. and contrary to the clear and explicit directives of the Society. I find that together they have simply disregarded terms and directive that they do not believe are warranted in the circumstances.

[361] D.J. has demonstrated to the court that she does not understand the necessity of informing herself of information that might be relevant to the degree of vigilance necessary in the supervision of J.-L.J.’s time with J. The risk of long-term harm to J. can only be counterbalanced by heightened vigilance on the part of a trustworthy supervisor. D.J. is not this person. This court is not left with the degree of confidence necessary to charge D.J. with the important task of monitoring and supervising the frequent and unstructured exposure of J. to J.-L.J. on a long-term basis.

[362] J.-L.J. and D.J. represent that J.-L.J. has never been intoxicated in the presence of J. and that he has never come to any harm while in J.-L.J.’s care, with or without the supervision of D.J. This may or may not be true, as it is unlikely that either would report such situations of risk to J. to others. For example:

(a) It became evident at trial that they had not shared with J.’s father, that J. (age 1) had been a passenger in a motor vehicle rollover collision in 2016; and

(b) In June 2018 D.J. picked up J. (age 2 ½) as usual from the access exchange without mention to C.M. that J.-L.J. was found in an unresponsive state and was unable to care for J. as scheduled that day.

[363] While I do not find that J. has come to actual physical or emotional harm in the care of J.-L.J., I cannot with confidence conclude that he has not. In my view, there is no compelling reason to expose J. to this risk of harm, when there is a safer alternative in the care of C.M. J.-L.J.’s offer to move from the home of D.J. if necessary, might reduce the day-to-day risk of harm to J., but is counterintuitive to her long-term plan to overcome her personal issues and return to a primary parenting role.

Conclusion

[364] Having extensively considered the Plans of Care of each party and the relevant best interests factors as applicable to J., I conclude that it is in the bests interests of the child to be placed in the care of C.M. This court must therefore decide whether that placement should be pursuant to a supervision order or a custody order.

B. Supervision Order or Custody Order

[365] Counsel for the Society and the Band both candidly admit that there are no child protection concerns pertaining to C.M. This concession compels the court to consider whether the involvement of the Society is still necessary if J. is placed in the care of C.M.

[366] The Society’s request for a supervision order appears to be based on the desire to monitor J.’s transition into C.M.’s care. However, no particular concerns relating to J.’s adjustment in C.M.’s home were raised during this trial. The Society has specifically observed that J. has a long-standing positive relationship with C.M. and the paternal grandparents, that C.M. has consistently exercised all of his parenting time, and that J. enjoys his time in C.M.’s home. In recent years J. has experienced summer week-about parenting time and expanded holiday parenting time with C.M. at the Society’s direction. No compelling concerns were raised with respect to J.’s adjustment to these increased periods of time. I do not accept that a transitional period of monitoring is required in order to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of J.

[367] The Band’s request for a supervision order appears to be based on the desire to permit Society oversight over the ongoing relationship between J. and the Band. It appears that the Band is requesting a supervision order simply to facilitate this ongoing relationship. However, the ongoing relationship between J. and the Band is the subject-matter of a consent agreement, which all parties agree shall be incorporated into a Final Order of this court. C.M. has demonstrated by his conduct in this action, that he is compliant with orders of the court. He is expected to and can be trusted to comply with the court order for contact with the Band.

[368] J.-L.J. asserts that the Society should remain involved to assist in the communication between the parties. In my view, this is not a high conflict family, but rather a family that engages in little exchange of information. There are lesser disruptive measures available to assist this family than a six-month period of supervision by the Society. Such communication alternatives shall also be incorporated into an order of this court.

[369] In conclusion, a supervision order is a tool of risk management not needed in the circumstances of this case. The purpose of a supervision order is to alleviate or minimize the risk of harm to a child in need of protection while in the care of a parent or other party. The court is required to consider the least disruptive course of action that is available and appropriate in the circumstances to help J. Quite simply, if there is no purported risk of harm to J. in C.M.’s care, there can be no basis for a period of supervision by a child protection agency.

[370] As such, there shall be a Final Order placing J. in the custody of C.M., pursuant to s. 102 of the CYFSA.

Parenting and Contact Order

[371] The following provisions of the Children’s Law Reform Act are applicable with respect to crafting the appropriate parenting order:

Parenting orders and contact orders

28 (1) The court to which an application is made under section 21,

(a) may by order grant,

(i) decision-making responsibility with respect to a child to one or more persons, in the case of an application under clause 21 (1) (a) or subsection 21 (2),

(ii) parenting time with respect to a child to one or more parents of the child, in the case of an application under clause 21 (1) (b), or

(iii) contact with respect to a child to one or more persons other than a parent of the child, in the case of an application under subsection 21 (3);

(b) may by order determine any aspect of the incidents of the right to decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, as the case may be, with respect to a child; and

(c) may make any additional order the court considers necessary and proper in the circumstances, including an order,

(i) limiting the duration, frequency, manner or location of contact or communication between any of the parties, or between a party and the child,

(ii) prohibiting a party or other person from engaging in specified conduct in the presence of the child or at any time when the person is responsible for the care of the child,

(iii) prohibiting a party from changing the child’s residence, school or day care facility without the consent of another party or an order of the court,

(iv) prohibiting a party from removing the child from Ontario without the consent of another party or an order of the court,

(v) requiring the delivery, to the court or to a person or body specified by the court, of the child’s passport, the child’s health card within the meaning of the Health Insurance Act or any other document relating to the child that the court may specify,

(vi) requiring a party to give information or to consent to the release of information respecting the child’s well-being, including in relation to the child’s health and education, to another party or other person specified by the court, or

(vii) requiring a party to facilitate communication by the child with another party or other person specified by the court in a manner that is appropriate for the child.

Exception

(2) If an application is made under section 21 with respect to a child who is the subject of an order made under section 102 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, the court shall treat the application as if it were an application to vary an order made under this section.

Same

(3) If an order for access to a child was made under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 at the same time as an order for custody of the child was made under section 102 of that Act, the court shall treat an application under section 21 of this Act relating to parenting time or contact with respect to the child as if it were an application to vary an order made under this section.

Allocation of decision-making responsibility

(4) The court may allocate decision-making responsibility with respect to a child, or any aspect of it, to one or more persons.

Allocation of parenting time

(5) The court may allocate parenting time with respect to a child by way of a schedule.

Parenting time, day-to-day decisions

(6) Unless the court orders otherwise, a person to whom the court allocates parenting time with respect to a child has exclusive authority during that time to make day-to-day decisions affecting the child.

…

Right to ask for and receive information

(8) Unless a court orders otherwise, a person to whom decision-making responsibility or parenting time has been granted with respect to a child under a parenting order is entitled to ask for and, subject to any applicable laws, receive information about the child’s well-being, including in relation to the child’s health and education, from,

(a) any other person to whom decision-making responsibility or parenting time has been granted with respect to the child under a parenting order; and

(b) any other person who is likely to have such information.

Decision-Making Responsibility, Parenting Time and Contact — Enforcement

Supervision of parenting orders and contact orders

34 (1) A court may give such directions as it considers appropriate for the supervision, by a person, a children’s aid society or other body, of decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact with respect to a child under a parenting order or contact order.

Consent to act

(2) A court shall not direct a person, a children’s aid society or other body to supervise the exercise of decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact under subsection (1) unless the person, society or body has consented to act as supervisor.

Parenting Plan

[372] I have already ruled that it is in J.’s best interests to reside primarily with C.M. J. will be enrolled in C.M.’s school jurisdiction as a result of this change of primary residence.

[373] I agree with C.M.’s suggestion that the existing parenting schedule, including week-about parenting time during the summer months, should simply be reversed so as to maximize J.’s time with his maternal family and to promote and maintain his existing relationships with them. The parenting schedule will be arranged such that J.-L.J. will have specified supervised parenting time with J., and D.J. will also have designated contact with the child, regardless of the circumstances of J.-L.J.

[374] I accept the father’s request to be given opportunity to observe the Respondent mother’s presentation at parenting exchanges prior to any parenting time between J.-L.J. and J. In the event that J.-L.J. presents as under the influence of alcohol or other illicit substances, it is expected that C.M. will not release J. into her care. However, the parenting terms as crafted will still permit contact between J. and D.J., in the absence of J.-L.J.

[375] The existing parenting order of Justice Sherwood, dated September 22, 2016, provides for joint custody between the Respondent parents with final decision-making authority to J.-L.J. in the event of a disagreement. However, J.-L.J.’s current circumstances, specifically in relation to her frequent unexplained absences from family life, could pose future problems in permitting the parties to reach consensus in relation to important child-related issues. It is hoped that C.M. and mother will open their lines of communication and engage in meaningful dialogue in relation to issues which impact the best interests of J., however in the event of disagreement, or non-participation by J.-L.J., it is appropriate at this time that C.M.’s position as the primary parent prevail.

[376] Information sharing will need to improve between the parties, and the maternal family. Both parties stated a willingness to utilize an online parenting app for purposes of improving their communications. D.J. will be included in this information sharing platform, so as to assist with effecting the terms of the contact order and discussing any issues arising with terms of parenting/contact.

[377] The balance of the parenting terms so ordered are rather self-explanatory.

ORDER

[378] On the basis of the above, there shall be a Final Order to go as follows:

On Consent:

1. The child J.M.J., born […], 2014, is found to be in need of protection pursuant to s. 74(2)(b)(ii) of the Child Youth and Family Services Act.

2. The child shall have contact to a designated Six Nations of the Grand River Band representative for a minimum of once per month to be agreed upon the by parties, with the intention to expose the child to his Six Nations of the Grand River heritage, or connect the child to a Six Nations of the Grand River elder, or to attend cultural events. The caregiver of the child shall have the right to be present during such contact and such contact may be conducted virtually.

3. There may be such further or other openness or contact between the child and the Six Nations of the Grand River Band as deemed appropriate by the parties.

Not on Consent

4. The child J.M.J., born […], 2014, shall be placed in the custody of C.M., pursuant to s. 102 of the Child Youth and Family Services Act.

Regular Parenting/Contact Schedule

5. The child shall reside primarily with C.M.

6. J.-L.J. shall have regular supervised parenting time, and D.J. shall have regular contact time with the child, simultaneously, as follows:

a. On alternate weekends from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. (to the extent possible this will occur on the weekends that D.J.’s other grandchildren are residing on her property);

b. On a week-about basis during the summer months; and

c. Such other or additional time to which the Respondent parents both agree.

Holiday Parenting/Contact Schedule

7. Unless otherwise agreed between the parties, the following special provisions for holiday parenting and contact time shall override the regular schedule:

a. In the event that the regular weekend parenting time/contact time of J.-L.J./D.J. falls upon a statutory holiday or professional activity day from school, the parenting time/contact time shall be extended by one full day;

b. J.-L.J./D.J. shall have parenting time/contact time with the child for one week (i.e. seven consecutive days) over the child’s school March Break in even-numbered years;

c. J.-L.J., C.M. and D.J. shall share parenting time/contact time with the child over the child’s Christmas holidays from school as follows:

a. The child shall be with J.-L.J./D.J. each year from December 24th at 10:00 a.m. until December 25th at 2:00 p.m., and with C.M. each year from December 25th at 2:00 p.m. until December 26th at 6:00 p.m.; and

b. The balance of the child’s holidays shall be divided as equally as possible between C.M. and J.-L.J./D.J.

Specific Terms re: Mother’s Parenting Time

8. J.-L.J.’s parenting time shall, at all times, be directly supervised by D.J., the maternal grandfather, the maternal great-grandmother, the maternal great-aunt, the maternal uncle or other third-party supervisor approved by C.M. in writing, in advance. All supervisors shall be informed of and shall strictly comply with the following terms of supervision of J.-L.J.’s parenting time:

a. J.-L.J. shall not for any portion of her parenting time be under the influence of alcohol or illicit non-prescription drugs;

b. J.-L.J. shall not be permitted to bring any third-party acquaintance to her scheduled parenting time with the child, unless specifically approved by C.M. in writing, in advance;

c. J.-L.J. shall not operate any motor vehicle with the child as passenger at any time;

d. The approved supervisors shall promptly inform C.M., in writing, of any suspected or attempted breach of these terms.

Parenting Exchanges

9. Parenting exchanges shall continue to occur at Tim Hortons restaurant, 1084 Rest Acres Road, Paris, Ontario, unless otherwise agreed.

10. J.-L.J. shall attend at all ‘pick-up’ parenting exchanges, and shall engage in face-to-face communication with C.M. at his request.

11. In the event that J.-L.J. does not attend at a ‘pick-up’ parenting exchange, J.-L.J.’s designated parenting time (on that occasion) shall be cancelled and:

a. D.J.’s designated contact time with the child shall proceed; except that

b. Unless agreed in advance by C.M., D.J. shall not permit any contact between J.-L.J. and the child during that period of designated contact.

Decision-Making, Communication and Information Issues

12. C.M. shall consult with J.-L.J. in relation to any major educational, medical, religious, cultural, or extracurricular decision in an effort to reach a consensus on important issues pertaining to the child.

13. C.M. will have final decision-making authority over all aspects of the child’s care in the event that the parties are unable to agree.

14. Save and except in relation to the issue of the child’s September 2021 school enrollment, C.M. shall provide a minimum of 30 days’ written notice to J.-L.J. before implementing any major changes J.’s care.

15. C.M. shall set up and manage an online platform for communications between the parties (e.g. Our family Wizard, 2Houses, etc.), and shall invite J.-L.J. and D.J. to participate.

16. Communications between J.-L.J., C.M. and D.J. on the online communication platform shall follow the following parameters:

a. The participants shall exchange important information relating to the child’s welfare, including his education and schoolwork, health and dental care, participation in cultural events, participation in extracurricular activities, etc. in a timely manner.

b. C.M. shall post the child’s scheduled events and appointments in the online calendar in advance of the event.

c. C.M. shall post and update the names and contact information for the child’s third-party care providers on the online platform.

d. All communications between the participants shall be brief, informative, child-centered, and respectful.

17. C.M. shall forthwith enroll the child in the school jurisdiction of his residence. He shall promptly advise J.-L.J. of all relevant details of this enrollment.

18. J.-L.J.’s right of supervised parenting time specifically includes a right of access to information and records pertaining to the child from all third-party care providers, including but not limited to doctors, dentists, teachers, therapists, etc. C.M.’s consent for the release of such information by third parties is not required.

19. Each party may attend at the child’s medical appointments, educational activities and interviews, and extracurricular and cultural events and activities regardless of the parenting schedule. C.M. is an approved supervisor of parenting time for purposes of J.-L.J.’s attendance at such events if requested.

Miscellaneous

20. This Order varies and replaces paragraphs 1-4 of the Final Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Sherwood dated September 22, 2016. A separate order shall issue incorporating the terms of this Order under the existing family court file no. 124/15.

21. The legal departments of the Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand & Norfolk and Six Nations of the Grand River shall be served with any Motion to Change the terms of the parenting Order.

22. In the event that any party is seeking recovery of costs in this action, cost submissions shall be served and filed as follows:

a. Any party seeking costs shall serve and file their cost submissions by September 10, 2021;

b. Any party responding to a request for costs shall serve and file their responding submissions by September 30, 2021;

c. If no request for costs is made on or before September 10, 2021 there shall be no costs payable in relation to this action;

d. Cost submissions shall not exceed five pages in length, plus Bill of Costs, relevant Offers to Settle and/or caselaw.

Released: August 10, 2021

COURT FILE NO.: FC-19-FO-25

DATE: 2021-08-10

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

CAS of Haldimand-Norfolk

Applicant

• and -

J.-L.J. and C.M.

Six Nations of the Grand River

Respondents

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Bale J.

Released: August 10, 2021

[^1]: Later in the trial a criminal court docket was introduced into evidence confirming that C.T. is currently facing a number of serious criminal charges.

[^2]: Ms. Lavigne did note one exception wherein on December 14, 2020 D.J. called Ms. Lavigne to advise that J.-L.J. had returned to the residence.

[^3]: The court is advised that these payments have continued to date and are in good standing notwithstanding J.’s kin placement with D.J. since June 2018.

[^4]: Court endorsement of Justice Martin dated July 11, 2018