Arrell J.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for stabbing his best friend 12 times in an unprovoked attack fueled by jealousy over a former domestic partner.

The Crown and defence presented a joint submission of 13 years of parole ineligibility.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding it within the appropriate range of 11-15 years, and sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 13 years, along with DNA, weapons prohibition, and no-contact orders.

Two paramedics were convicted of failing to provide the necessaries of life after misdiagnosing a fatal gunshot wound as a superficial BB gun injury and failing to transport the victim to a trauma hospital immediately.

The Crown sought a 2.5-year penitentiary sentence, arguing that uncharged offences like manslaughter should be considered aggravating factors.

The court rejected this argument, finding it fundamentally unfair since the Crown chose the specific charge.

Balancing the offenders' high moral blameworthiness for failing to follow their training against their lack of criminal records, positive community support, and the collateral consequences of their convictions, the court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence for each offender.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of prior extrinsic misconduct by the accused against his former girlfriend in a trial for second-degree murder.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to motive, animus, identity, and intent, showing the accused's jealousy after the deceased intervened in a dispute.

The court applied the Handy framework and ruled that the probative value of the prior assaults and threats outweighed their prejudicial effect, though graphic details of one assault were excluded to prevent impermissible propensity reasoning.

The application was partially granted.

The Crown brought an application to admit several ante mortem statements made by the deceased prior to his alleged murder by the accused.

The statements included a Facebook post, comments to a friend about the accused's drinking, text messages and a phone call to another friend, and utterances made during an altercation shortly before the death.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, assessing necessity and threshold reliability.

The court admitted the text messages and certain utterances made during the altercation, but excluded the Facebook post, the phone call, and a comment about the accused's medication due to lack of reliability, lack of necessity, and high prejudicial effect.

The Crown brought an application to admit three statements made by the accused to police and to admit blood-stained clothes seized without a warrant.

The accused, charged with second degree murder, argued his Charter rights were violated and the statements were involuntary.

The court found the first two statements were made when the accused was considered a witness, not a suspect, and were voluntary.

The video statement was also found voluntary, with no threats, inducements, or Charter breaches.

The warrantless seizure of the clothes was deemed reasonable due to exigent circumstances, as the clothes could have been lost or destroyed.

The statements and clothes were ruled admissible.

The moving parties sought determination of multiple pre-trial legal questions concerning whether supplier refunds or credits for cancelled educational trips had to be considered under trip contracts, the Travel Industry Act, and excess trip cancellation insurance policies, and also sought to quash a summons to examine their representative.

The court held the motions could not be resolved on a Rule 21 record because material facts remained disputed, the factual matrix was incomplete, and the proposed legal issues overlapped with unjust enrichment, trust, and unlawful means claims that would continue in any event.

The court further held that the requested examination was reasonably necessary because the responding insurers had shown the evidence sought was possibly relevant to the pending issues and the moving parties had not shown the summons was an abuse of process.

The motion to quash was dismissed and the Rule 21 motion was dismissed without prejudice.

The accused paramedics were charged with failing to provide the necessaries of life to a 19-year-old gunshot victim.

Upon arriving at the scene, the accused failed to recognize the victim had suffered a penetrating wound to the abdomen, instead concluding he was experiencing a psychiatric issue and had been shot by a BB gun.

They delayed transport, performed inappropriate lifts, and failed to take the victim to a lead trauma hospital.

The court found their actions constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of reasonably trained paramedics, endangering the victim's life.

Both accused were found guilty.

The respondent mother brought a motion to change a final order to allow her to relocate with the children to the Niagara region to attend college.

The applicant father opposed the move and brought a cross-motion for sole custody and primary residency.

The court found a material change in circumstances regarding the mother's employment and financial situation, and held that the move was in the children's best interests.

The mother's motion to relocate was granted, the father's cross-motion for custody was dismissed, and the father's access schedule was varied to provide him with additional time to accommodate the move.

The offender pleaded guilty to trafficking 2.5 kilograms of cocaine and 517 grams of fentanyl.

The Crown sought a sentence of 12 to 13 years, while the defence sought 2 years.

The court found that the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, significant rehabilitation efforts, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic constituted exceptional circumstances.

The court sentenced the offender to 4 years' incarceration, departing from the usual range of 8 to 12 years for such offences.

The moving defendant, an orthopedic surgeon, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the medical malpractice action against him, arguing the limitation period had expired.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to correct a misnomer, seeking to replace 'John Doe' with the moving defendant.

The court found that there was a genuine issue for trial regarding when the plaintiffs reasonably could have discovered the moving defendant's potential liability for delayed care.

Both the summary judgment motion and the misnomer cross-motion were dismissed, with the issues left to be determined by the trial judge.

The offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder for shooting his father and subsequently attempting to burn the body.

The Crown sought 15 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 12 years, citing the offender's guilty plea, remorse, and significant rehabilitative efforts while in custody.

The court weighed the aggravating factors, including the domestic nature of the killing and the indignities to the body, against the mitigating factors.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 13 years.

The plaintiff brought a motion in writing to transfer the action from Milton to Welland following a mortgage default and power of sale proceedings.

The defendants opposed the transfer but provided no logical reason or substantial materials.

The court noted that the majority of the parties and one of the subject properties were located in the Niagara area, and that the matter could be heard more quickly and efficiently in Welland.

The motion was granted, and the action was transferred to Welland.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder of his common-law wife in 2003, applied under the 'faint hope clause' (s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code) for a review of his parole ineligibility period.

The court applied the pre-2011 screening test, requiring the applicant to show a 'reasonable prospect of success' before a unanimous jury.

Considering the applicant's significant institutional progress, completion of programs, remorse, and reduced security classification, the court found the threshold was met and ordered a jury to be empaneled.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, uttering threats, and mischief arising from a domestic dispute in a parking lot.

The sole ground of appeal advanced was that the trial judge erred in applying the second branch of the W.D. test for assessing credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge gave fulsome and detailed reasons for her credibility findings, properly applied all three branches of the W.D. test, and her conclusions were fully supported by the record.

The defendants hired the plaintiff to construct a modular home.

A dispute arose, and the plaintiff registered a construction lien.

The defendants obtained an order vacating the lien upon posting security and subsequently brought a motion to have the security returned, arguing the lien was not perfected within the statutory timelines under the Construction Lien Act.

The court found that the contract was abandoned at the latest on December 2, 2017, and since the statement of claim was issued more than 90 days later, the lien expired.

The court ordered the return of the security to the defendants.

The plaintiff commenced a Small Claims Court action for breach of contract and later issued a Superior Court claim for defamation.

The plaintiff brought a motion to transfer the Small Claims action to the Superior Court to be consolidated, which the defendants consented to.

The parties could not agree on costs.

The defendants sought costs thrown away for work done in the Small Claims action.

The court found the work was not wasted and deferred the issue of costs to the trial judge.

The plaintiff, an insurance broker, brought an action for wrongful and constructive dismissal against his former employer.

The defendant employer argued that the plaintiff had voluntarily retired and was an independent contractor.

The court found the plaintiff's evidence to be less credible than the defendant's and a third-party witness, concluding that the plaintiff had indeed voluntarily retired as he had previously announced.

The court also determined that the plaintiff was an employee, not an independent contractor, but dismissed the action entirely based on the finding of voluntary retirement.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order striking his defence for failing to answer undertakings given at discovery.

The moving party argued there were conflicting decisions on the meaning of 'best efforts' to fulfill undertakings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the lower court's decision and no conflicting case law, as the moving party's efforts to obtain the required records fell well below the expected standard.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing its motion for summary judgment.

The motion judge had dismissed the summary judgment motion due to the voluminous record, contradictory evidence, and the need for viva voce evidence, though he made obiter comments regarding a duty of fairness.

The Divisional Court refused leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge's obiter comments did not constitute a conflicting decision under Rule 62.02(4)(a) and that there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision that the case was unsuitable for summary judgment under Rule 62.02(4)(b).

The applicant brought a motion to set aside an order that had varied a prior spousal support judgment by terminating support and eliminating arrears after an uncontested hearing.

Although the court found the applicant had been personally served with the motion to vary, it accepted her explanation that she did not attend due to confusion arising from multiple related proceedings, including enforcement proceedings through the Family Responsibility Office and a prior motion to vary requiring financial disclosure.

The court noted the applicant was self-represented, suffered from medical issues, and had been told during related proceedings that she would be re-served.

In these circumstances, the explanation for non-attendance was satisfactory under the Family Law Rules.

The order terminating support and arrears was set aside so the matter could be determined on the merits.