Russell MacCrimmon

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant, the defendant sought costs of $9,618.18.

The plaintiff, who was self-represented, responded with pseudolegal OPCA arguments rather than addressing the costs factors.

The court noted the defendant's costs were reasonable but reduced the amount slightly to be scrupulously fair.

Costs were awarded to the defendant in the amount of $7,264.00 on a partial indemnity scale.

The self-represented plaintiff sued the CEO of her employer, a federal Crown corporation, in his personal capacity over a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The defendant moved to strike the claim.

The court found that the plaintiff could not sue the CEO individually for breach of an employment contract and noted the plaintiff's reliance on Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (OPCA) concepts.

The court granted the motion, struck the statement of claim, and stayed the action, leaving the plaintiff at liberty to pursue a claim against her actual employer.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering her to pay the respondent for the installation of two heating systems in her duplex.

The appellant argued the respondent's quote was for two furnaces, not one, and alleged the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors, failed to apply the Consumer Protection Act, and denied her a fair trial as a self-represented litigant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the quote was for a single furnace was supported by evidence.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias or denial of trial fairness, noting that while the trial judge could have managed the process better, the appellant was able to present her case.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering her to pay the respondent for the installation of two heating systems in a duplex.

The appellant argued the respondent's quote was for two furnaces, while the respondent maintained it was for one and that the parties agreed to double the price for two units.

The appeal court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual finding that the quote was for a single furnace.

The court also dismissed the appellant's claims regarding trial unfairness and bias, concluding the appeal should be dismissed.

The plaintiffs, Ian and Kent Hawkins, brought a motion to remove the estate trustees (their brother Carl and brother-in-law Garry) appointed under their late father's will, alleging a conflict of interest due to ongoing litigation over the estate's primary assets.

The plaintiffs also sought to prevent the trustees from controlling access to the deceased's former solicitor's file.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the heavy onus to remove estate trustees was not met, as there was no evidence that the trustees' continuation in office would inevitably impede the proper administration of the estate.

The court also held that concerns regarding access to the solicitor's file could be adequately addressed through the ordinary rules of civil procedure, though the court ordered the action to be case managed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding damages and costs to the respondents for breach of a contract to purchase bakery equipment.

The trial judge found the appellants waived conditions in the offer to purchase by signing a lease, did not repudiate the offer, and that the individual appellant was personally liable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact or mixed fact and law.

The court also upheld the costs award, finding it was within the trial judge's discretion and not disproportionate.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action for delay.

The Court of Appeal found that although the request for dismissal should have been made on notice, the outcome would not have been different.

The appellant failed to comply with two orders designed to expedite the case and failed to adequately explain the delay.

The respondent suffered prejudice due to a certificate of pending litigation and subsequent orders.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.