Frederick Caplan

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the plaintiff's action for breach of fiduciary duty regarding mortgage investments was frivolous and vexatious.

The plaintiff, who lost his pension funds in the investments, was admittedly impecunious.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the defendants failed to establish at the first stage that the action was plainly devoid of merit or pursued for vexatious reasons.

The plaintiff, an insurance broker, brought an action for wrongful and constructive dismissal against his former employer.

The defendant employer argued that the plaintiff had voluntarily retired and was an independent contractor.

The court found the plaintiff's evidence to be less credible than the defendant's and a third-party witness, concluding that the plaintiff had indeed voluntarily retired as he had previously announced.

The court also determined that the plaintiff was an employee, not an independent contractor, but dismissed the action entirely based on the finding of voluntary retirement.

Following decisions striking the mortgagors' statement of claim, dismissing their motion to amend, and granting summary judgment against them on a mortgage, the successful mortgagees sought costs.

The mortgagors also sought costs, arguing they made a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The court found the offer did not meet Rule 49 criteria as the judgment exceeded the offer and the offer did not account for the mortgagors' separate action for damages.

Given the contractual agreement for costs of enforcement and the mortgagors' obstructive litigation tactics, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $65,000 to the New Haven parties and $7,000 to Community Trust Company.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her motion to set aside a default judgment arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by requiring the appellant to show a 'meritorious' defence rather than an 'arguable' defence.

The court held that 'meritorious' sets a higher threshold than 'arguable', and the motion judge also erred in rejecting the appellant's explanation for the default based on customary court practice rather than the evidence.

The respondent consigned a boat to a marine dealership, which sold it to the appellant for $46,000 without the respondent's authorization.

The dealership went bankrupt without remitting the proceeds.

The respondent sued the appellant for the return of the boat or its value, and was granted summary judgment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, finding that the appellant was a good faith purchaser without notice of the dealership's lack of authority.

The court held that section 2(1) of the Factors Act protected the appellant, as it does not impose a due diligence requirement on purchasers to inquire into a mercantile agent's authority.

The appellant appealed his committal for surrender to the United States on a charge of bringing into Canada property obtained by crime, conceding his committal on other charges related to a stolen truck ring.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under the new Extradition Act, the extradition judge is restricted by the Authority to Proceed and must accept the Minister's statement that the alleged conduct corresponds to the named Canadian offences.

As there was no application for judicial review of the Minister's decision, the court found no error in the committal.