Derek Anton Zuraw

The accused was charged with two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and multiple firearm-related offences following a search warrant execution at a residence in Brantford.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The accused was found in a locked bathroom near satchels containing cocaine and a handgun, and was observed wearing a similar satchel minutes before the warrant was executed.

The defence argued that the accused's connection to the residence was unclear and that the drugs and firearms could have been placed by other occupants.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Villaroman and found that while the Crown's case was superficially compelling, there remained reasonable alternative inferences consistent with innocence.

The court found that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed the drugs and firearms, and acquitted on all charges.

The applicant, Shaun Krawiec, brought a pretrial application to exclude evidence, specifically a handgun, observations of officers, and his identification, from his trial for possessing a loaded prohibited firearm.

The application was based on alleged violations of his Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(b)) during his detention, arrest, questioning, and search by police.

The Crown conceded breaches of s. 8 (unjustified pat-down search) and s. 10(b) (failure to fully inform of right to counsel).

The court found the initial encounter constituted a detention but was not arbitrary.

The second detention was also found not arbitrary.

Applying the Grant analysis under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court weighed the seriousness of the police misconduct, the impact on the accused's Charter interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court found the police conduct was not serious, the impact on the applicant's rights was not severe, and the truth-seeking function favored admission.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The offender was found guilty of multiple sexual offences and sentencing was scheduled.

The probation officer failed to complete the requested presentence report in time, citing missing contact information, incorrect documents, and holiday schedules.

The court reviewed the statutory duties under sections 720 and 721 of the Criminal Code, emphasizing the requirement to sentence as soon as practicable.

The court found the delay was due to probation workload and holidays, not complications, and adjourned the sentencing to allow completion of the report.

The accused was charged with operating a conveyance with an excessive blood alcohol concentration.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath samples based on an alleged s. 10(b) Charter breach, the voluntariness of statements made to police, and whether the Crown could prove operation of the conveyance.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding that s. 10(b) rights were suspended during the roadside investigation.

It also found the accused's statements to police voluntary, despite the officer not re-advising rights and cautions between breath samples, as the accused had already received counsel advice and understood her right to silence.

Finally, the court found the Crown proved operation beyond a reasonable doubt, relying on the presumption of operation and the accused's clear intention to drive.

The accused was found guilty.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for forcible confinement and sexual assault against his estranged wife.

He argued that the Crown failed to disclose the complainant's Sexual Assault Examination Kit (SAEK), that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, and that the trial judge erred in her credibility assessments.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the undisclosed SAEK contained evidence that could have undermined the complainant's credibility and supported the appellant's defence.

The court also found that trial counsel was ineffective in proceeding without the SAEK and that the trial judge engaged in circular reasoning when assessing credibility.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown prosecuted two accused for armed robbery of a convenience store in Brantford, Ontario on October 6, 2018.

The Crown alleged that Deakin entered the store brandishing a firearm and knife while Stewart remained outside keeping watch.

The Crown proceeded on charges of robbery simpliciter (as no firearm was recovered) and masking during the commission of an indictable offence.

Deakin's defence was identity; Stewart's defence was duress and lack of knowledge.

The court found both accused guilty on both charges based on video evidence, eyewitness identification, and analysis of the accused's conduct before, during, and after the robbery.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder of his common-law wife in 2003, applied under the 'faint hope clause' (s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code) for a review of his parole ineligibility period.

The court applied the pre-2011 screening test, requiring the applicant to show a 'reasonable prospect of success' before a unanimous jury.

Considering the applicant's significant institutional progress, completion of programs, remorse, and reduced security classification, the court found the threshold was met and ordered a jury to be empaneled.

Trial on two counts of historical indecent assault arising from allegations by two complainants involving abuse by an adult in positions of trust during scouting and hockey activities.

The court admitted count-to-count similar fact evidence, finding substantial connectedness in the surrounding circumstances, no evidence of collusion, and no material prejudice in a judge-alone trial.

Applying the distinction between credibility and reliability, the court found both complainants credible and their accounts reliable despite the age of the allegations, delayed disclosure, and the fact that parts of the incidents began while they were asleep or unconscious.

The court held the Crown proved both counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused pleaded guilty to armed robbery of a pharmacy where he stole 110 bottles and packages of narcotics, including 75 fentanyl patches, using a knife as a weapon.

The Crown and defence proposed a joint submission of two years imprisonment plus presentence custody.

The court rejected the joint submission as contrary to the public interest and imposed a sentence of five years in the penitentiary.

The accused's application to withdraw his guilty plea was dismissed.

The court found no reasonable apprehension of bias and determined that withdrawal was not justified in the interests of justice.

The appellant appealed her convictions for threatening death and assault with intent to resist arrest.

She raised several grounds of appeal, including ineffective assistance of counsel, reversal of the burden of proof, and improper admission of prejudicial evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge had improperly reversed the burden of proof by requiring the appellant to assist the court with her evidence and using disbelief of her evidence to accept the Crown's evidence.

The court also found that highly prejudicial bad character and hearsay evidence was improperly admitted at trial.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat of his Volvo truck tractor with the engine running at his residence.

The Crown conceded that the accused had rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused posed a realistic risk of danger in the particular circumstances, considering that he was already home, had been in the truck for 10-15 minutes without attempting to drive it, the truck had a sleeping compartment, and he had easier means of leaving if that were his intention.

Both charges were dismissed.

The accused brought an application for a judicial stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The information was sworn on April 25, 2012, and the application was heard on October 7, 2013, approximately 20 months later.

The court found an unacceptable delay of approximately 19 months, with significant portions attributable to the Crown and judicial officers.

The court also found moderate actual prejudice to the accused flowing from the delay.

Balancing the competing interests and applying the framework from R. v. Morin, the court granted the application and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The accused was convicted after trial of operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol causing death (two counts), operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol causing bodily harm (four counts), and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The offences arose from a motor vehicle accident on August 29, 2010, on Six Nations Territory near Brantford, Ontario, in which the accused's impaired driving resulted in the deaths of two passengers and serious injuries to three other passengers and the driver of the other vehicle.

The accused was sentenced to six years imprisonment (with five months pre-trial custody credited), with concurrent sentences on the bodily harm counts and a 15-year driving prohibition.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude a videotaped statement made to police, arguing it was involuntary and obtained in breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The court found the statement was voluntary, as there were no threats, inducements, or oppressive circumstances.

However, the court held that the police breached the accused's s. 10(b) rights by failing to provide him with an immediate opportunity to consult counsel upon arrest, despite facilities being available.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that admitting the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the accused's rights.

The statement was excluded.

The accused was charged with seven offences arising from a motor vehicle collision on August 29, 2010, on Six Nations Territory.

The charges included failing to comply with a recognizance, operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol causing bodily harm (four counts), and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol causing death (two counts).

The court found that the accused was driving at excessive speed (100-120 kph in an 80 kph zone) while significantly impaired by alcohol (blood alcohol concentration between 66-144 mg/100mL), with defective vehicle brakes and tires, in foggy night conditions.

The other driver, who was also impaired, made a left turn into the accused's path.

The court convicted the accused on all counts, finding that his impaired driving was a significant contributing cause to the deaths of two passengers and injuries to three others.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude breath sample analysis results and observations made by police officers, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The court found no arbitrary detention under section 9, no violation of the right to be informed of reasons for detention under section 10(a), and no unlawful search under section 8.

The court upheld the officer's reasonable and probable grounds for making the breath demand based on the totality of circumstances, including speeding, failure to pull over immediately, slurred speech, red glassy eyes, odour of alcohol, and the accused's unusual utterance.

The application was dismissed.