Charles O. Spettigue

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude drugs and cash seized by police at a hospital after he was treated for a gunshot wound.

The court found that hospital staff were not acting as state agents when they collected the accused's belongings during emergency treatment.

The subsequent police seizure of the items was lawful, and a minor administrative breach regarding post-seizure reporting did not warrant exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with aggravated assault, sought a Rowbotham order for state-funded counsel, arguing his right to a fair trial would be compromised without representation.

His legal aid certificate was cancelled after he received an inheritance, which he subsequently spent.

The court found that legal representation was essential given the complexity of the case and the serious charge.

However, the application was deemed premature because the applicant failed to exhaust all legal aid appeals and did not provide sufficient evidence of indigence regarding family loans.

The application was adjourned to allow the applicant to complete the legal aid appeal process and provide further financial evidence.

A.H. was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault.

This decision outlines the sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as the victim's age (16 at the time of the offence), the profound and devastating impact on the victim (depression, self-harm, fear of intimacy), the violent and serious nature of the assault involving multiple violations (kissing, touching, forced digital penetration, forced oral sex, forced vaginal intercourse), and the presence of another male during the assault.

Mitigating factors included A.H.'s youth (18 at the time of the offence), being a first-time adult offender, having a supportive family, a stable employment history, and a newfound willingness to seek therapy for past traumas.

The Crown sought 4 to 5 years in custody, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, finding it inappropriate for a violent sexual assault, and sentenced A.H. to 30 months' incarceration, moderately below the typical range for forced penetration due to his youth and first-offender status.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended documentary evidence (Uber records, Google timeline, text messages) and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal found that the Uber and Google documents were inconsequential and did not constitute a misapprehension of evidence.

While the text messages did contradict the complainant's testimony regarding the exact time of the assault, the court found this error immaterial to the overall credibility of her narrative, especially given the strong credibility findings made by the trial judge.

The appeals from conviction and sentence were dismissed.

During a criminal trial for sexual offences, the Crown sought to cross-examine the accused regarding an alleged attempt to contact a potential witness on social media.

The defence objected.

The court denied the Crown's request, finding that the proposed cross-examination would only serve to show circumstantially bad character.

The court held that the prejudicial effect of allowing the jury to infer disreputable conduct outweighed any probative value, and the evidence did not tend to prove that the sexual activity with the complainant was non-consensual.

During a sexual assault trial, the Crown brought an application to admit prior consistent statements made by the complainant to a friend via Snapchat on the night of the alleged offence.

The Crown argued the evidence was necessary to rebut the defence's allegation of recent fabrication raised during cross-examination.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defence's theory posited the motive to fabricate arose before the Snapchat conversation occurred, specifically when the complainant's mother picked her up and she feared punishment for breaking parental rules.

Consequently, the statements lacked probative value to rebut the allegation.

The Crown sought to file a letter written by the complainant as a numbered exhibit during trial.

The defence opposed this.

The court denied the Crown's request, citing a prior omnibus ruling by Justice Kurz that restricted evidence regarding certain sexual activity, and the general rule against admitting prior consistent statements as exhibits, especially when they contain information not disclosed in the witness's testimony.

The court found no unfairness to the Crown or complainant in not admitting the letter, as the complainant had an opportunity to address inconsistencies during cross-examination.

The accused, A.H., sought leave to re-open a pre-trial ruling by a case management judge (Kurz J.) that denied an. application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code regarding evidence related to a "Spin The Vape" game.

The application for leave was based on three grounds: fresh evidence (an affidavit from A.H.), the release of a new Court of Appeal decision (R. v. Choudhary), and alleged misapprehension of evidence or submissions by the case management judge.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the affidavit did not constitute fresh evidence that could not have been adduced earlier, that R. v. Choudhary did not change the existing law, and that there was no misapprehension of evidence by the case management judge.

The accused brought a constitutional challenge arguing that section 281 of the Criminal Code (abduction of a child under 14) is overly broad and creates an absolute liability offence that could criminalize innocent persons helping lost children.

The court dismissed the application, relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Chartrand.

The court held that section 281 requires mens rea, specifically the intent to deprive a parent or guardian of possession of the child, and preserves all common law and statutory defences.

The accused, charged with abduction and attempted abduction of two children, brought pre-trial motions to exclude oral and video statements made to police, as well as evidence seized from his apartment pursuant to search warrants.

The court found the statements were voluntary and not obtained in breach of the Charter.

However, the court found that a second search warrant, which authorized the seizure of items previously denied by a Justice of the Peace in a first warrant application, violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court excluded the items not authorized by the first warrant under s. 24(2).

The Crown appealed a sentence for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to allow the Crown to file a Notice of Increased Penalty and by demonstrating a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The accused cross-appealed the trial judge's refusal to award costs against the Crown.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no reasonable apprehension of bias but held that the trial judge erred in reviewing the Crown's decision to file the Notice on a reasonableness standard.

Applying the correct standard, the court found the Crown's decision was not arbitrary or an abuse of process, given the aggravating factors including a prior conviction, high blood alcohol readings, and the late guilty plea.

The Crown's sentence appeal was allowed, a 30-day intermittent jail sentence was imposed, and the accused's costs appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a sentence for impaired driving where the sentencing judge refused to allow the Crown to file a Notice of Increased Penalty for a repeat offender.

The sentencing judge had unilaterally gathered transcripts from other cases to conclude the Crown's practice was inconsistent and unreasonable.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred in principle by reviewing the reasonableness of the prosecutorial discretion and by impermissibly gathering evidence.

Applying the appellate framework, the court found no abuse of process or Charter violation in the Crown's decision to file the notice, and imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of 30 days' incarceration.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude breath sample analysis results and observations made by police officers, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The court found no arbitrary detention under section 9, no violation of the right to be informed of reasons for detention under section 10(a), and no unlawful search under section 8.

The court upheld the officer's reasonable and probable grounds for making the breath demand based on the totality of circumstances, including speeding, failure to pull over immediately, slurred speech, red glassy eyes, odour of alcohol, and the accused's unusual utterance.

The application was dismissed.