Robert S. Gee

Criminal trial on seven intimate-partner-violence counts, including multiple assaults, two choking/suffocation allegations, assault with a weapon, and uttering death threats.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court rejected the accused's blanket denials after finding them incompatible with two contemporaneous recordings and police evidence about the absence of visible injuries.

The court held that inconsistencies in the complainant's sequencing on minor details did not undermine the reliability of her core allegations, which were corroborated by objective evidence.

Findings of guilt were entered on counts one through six, while one assault count was dismissed for absence of evidence.

The accused was charged with 27 offences arising from a shooting incident on the Six Nations Reserve on May 6, 2024.

The Crown alleged the accused fired a firearm at a van fleeing his residence after a physical altercation with three women.

The Crown conceded insufficient evidence for attempted murder charges.

The court found the accused guilty of five counts of pointing a firearm, careless use of a firearm, uttering a threat, five counts of discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose, breaching probation orders, breaching a firearms prohibition order, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, and driving while prohibited.

The court acquitted on two assault charges and two firearm licensing charges, finding the weapon met the definition of firearm under section 2 of the Criminal Code but not the enhanced definition under section 84(3)(d).

The accused was charged with two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and multiple firearm-related offences following a search warrant execution at a residence in Brantford.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The accused was found in a locked bathroom near satchels containing cocaine and a handgun, and was observed wearing a similar satchel minutes before the warrant was executed.

The defence argued that the accused's connection to the residence was unclear and that the drugs and firearms could have been placed by other occupants.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Villaroman and found that while the Crown's case was superficially compelling, there remained reasonable alternative inferences consistent with innocence.

The court found that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed the drugs and firearms, and acquitted on all charges.

The accused, Luke Adam Martin, was convicted of two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking involving large quantities of fentanyl and methamphetamine, alongside guilty pleas to theft, possession of break-in instruments, and breach of probation.

The court considered the serious nature of the offences, the large quantities of drugs involved, the presence of firearms, and the accused’s prior criminal record and probation status.

The accused’s submissions to treat the drug possession as a fleeting courier incident and to exclude firearms as an aggravating factor were rejected.

The court imposed a sentence of 13 years for fentanyl trafficking and 6 years concurrent for methamphetamine trafficking, with credit for pre-sentence custody, and concurrent sentences for the other offences.

This decision addresses the issue of reasonable and probable grounds (RPG) for arrest and demand in a drug-impaired driving case.

The court found that Officer Accursi had both subjective and objectively reasonable grounds to arrest Dalton Powell based on observations corroborated by a civilian witness and body camera footage.

The accused's Charter s. 8 and s. 9 rights were found not to be violated, including an overholding claim where the accused was detained for approximately six hours after the initial arrest.

The court also found the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on officer observations, Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) testing, and urinalysis results.

The Ontario Court of Justice found Luke Adam Martin guilty of two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking methamphetamine and fentanyl found in a 2012 Ford Escape.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on evidence that Martin had control and knowledge of the drugs and firearms found in the vehicle.

The defence conceded possession and trafficking elements but argued Martin lacked knowledge of the drugs, attributing possession to a co-accused, Brandon Pfeiffer.

The court rejected this defence, finding Pfeiffer's testimony implausible and Martin's denials not credible, especially given the quantity and value of the drugs, Martin's control of the vehicle, and his wearing of latex gloves at arrest.

The court concluded Martin's guilt was the only reasonable inference.

The accused, Shabbir Dossa, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated end of trial was 24 months and 17 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown argued that portions of the delay were attributable to the defence or constituted exceptional circumstances (discrete events or case complexity).

The court found no delay attributable to the defence and no exceptional circumstances.

The primary reason for the delay was the Crown's unacceptable and unexplainable delay in providing meaningful disclosure, particularly the accident reconstructionist report and ITOs.

Consequently, the court found a breach of the accused's 11(b) right and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The accused, William Schatz, pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a 17-year-old student.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the egregious breach of trust by a teacher and the profound, long-lasting impact on the victim and her sister.

Mitigating factors included the accused's guilty plea, lack of prior criminal record, and strong community support.

The Crown sought a two-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence proposed a 6 to 12-month conditional sentence.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, emphasizing that carceral sentences are the norm for sexual offences against children, and imposed an 18-month incarceration period followed by two years of probation.

The court declined to impose a SOIRA order, finding it disproportionate given the accused's low risk of reoffending and the significant time elapsed since the offence.

The accused, J.C., brought a mid-trial application under section 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 20 months and 4 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters set by R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that some delay was attributable to the defence or exceptional circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found no waiver or attributable delay by the defence, noting Crown disclosure delays and prioritization of other matters.

The court also rejected the argument that pandemic-related backlog constituted an exceptional circumstance in this case, as the direct impacts had abated and the time to obtain trial dates was not inordinate.

The application was granted, and the charge was stayed.

The accused, Matthew Taylor, was charged with four counts of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking and one count of breach of probation.

Taylor challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and the subsequent search of a backpack, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 8 and 9.

The court found the arrest and search were lawful, primarily based on officer safety concerns, and that the seized substances were admissible.

The court also found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Taylor was in possession of the controlled substances.

The appellant, Joseph Scott Hill, appealed his conviction and sentence for destroying or harvesting prescribed trees contrary to a Haldimand County by-law.

The appeal challenged the trial Justice of the Peace's interpretation of the "own use" exception and alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant also sought a reduced fine and restitution.

The court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the "own use" interpretation and no factual basis for the ineffective assistance claim.

The court also dismissed the respondent's request for costs, deeming the appeal not to meet the high threshold for a cost award.

Raven Joseph-Soroka and Ashley Wilson were charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on police surveillance of the accused's movements and the items found in their vehicle, including fentanyl, a digital scale, numerous small baggies, and cash.

The court found that when viewed cumulatively and in light of human experience, the circumstantial evidence excluded any reasonable alternative explanations for the accused's activities, leading to convictions for both accused on both charges.

Joseph-Soroka was found to be a party to Wilson's trafficking under s. 21 of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and luring a person under 16.

The luring charge was dismissed by the Crown.

The court dismissed the invitation to sexual touching charge, finding no positive act of invitation by the accused.

However, the court found the accused guilty of sexual assault and sexual interference, accepting the complainant's testimony despite her perceived lack of detail, and rejecting the defence's argument that her testimony was unreliable based on ungrounded common-sense assumptions about how a complainant should act.

The court applied the rules against ungrounded common-sense assumptions and stereotypical inferences in assessing credibility.

The accused, Dustin Fahey, faced five criminal charges arising from domestic incidents with his former spouse, Andrea Randell, and her mother, Jeanette Randell.

The charges included threatening, unlawful confinement, criminal harassment, and assault.

The court found Mr. Fahey guilty of threatening Andrea Randell and criminally harassing her, based on credible testimony and extensive text message evidence demonstrating a pattern of manipulative and relentless communication.

However, the court dismissed the charges of unlawful confinement and assault due to insufficient or unclear evidence.

The judge rejected the accused's claim of memory loss, finding it untruthful and not a valid defence.

The accused was charged with operating a conveyance with an excessive blood alcohol concentration.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath samples based on an alleged s. 10(b) Charter breach, the voluntariness of statements made to police, and whether the Crown could prove operation of the conveyance.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding that s. 10(b) rights were suspended during the roadside investigation.

It also found the accused's statements to police voluntary, despite the officer not re-advising rights and cautions between breath samples, as the accused had already received counsel advice and understood her right to silence.

Finally, the court found the Crown proved operation beyond a reasonable doubt, relying on the presumption of operation and the accused's clear intention to drive.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused, P.F., was charged with invitation to sexual touching, sexual assault, and sexual interference involving his stepdaughter, E.G. The Crown presented evidence from the complainant, her mother, and two police officers, while the accused testified in his defence.

The court found both the complainant and the accused to be intelligent, articulate, and compelling witnesses, presenting diametrically opposed versions of events.

Due to the lack of independent corroborating evidence capable of resolving the inherent uncertainty between the two credible but conflicting accounts, the court was left in a state of reasonable doubt.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, and all charges against the accused were dismissed.

The accused, J.S., was charged with sexual assault, assault, and sexual interference involving his 13-year-old stepdaughter, E.S., on two separate occasions.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the accused, applying the principles from R. v. W.D. and cautioning against stereotypical myths in sexual assault cases.

The court found the complainant's testimony compelling and corroborated by another witness, while the accused's testimony was deemed unbelievable due to inconsistencies and his callous behavior.

The court found the accused guilty on all charges, noting that for the second incident, a conviction would be registered for one of the three charges as it was a continuing transaction.

The accused, R.M.P., was charged with one count of sexual assault against the complainant, A.M. The trial focused on whether the sexual encounter was consensual and if the accused was aware of any lack of consent.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both witnesses, applying the principles from R. v. W.D. and R. v. J.J.R.D. The defence theory that the complainant fabricated the allegation due to feeling disrespected was rejected as inconsistent with the evidence, particularly the complainant's immediate demeanour after the incident.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible and accepted her version of events, concluding that the Crown had proven the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt and found the accused guilty.

The accused, Jacob Olmstead, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was 27 months and 23 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established by R. v. Jordan.

The central issue was how to treat the delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The court found that the entire period from June 9, 2020, to March 2, 2021, was a discrete, exceptional circumstance caused by the pandemic.

After deducting this period, the remaining delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

Consequently, the court determined the delay was not unreasonable and dismissed the accused's application.

The accused, Hal Clayton, was arrested for driving with a suspended license, leading to a vehicle search that uncovered controlled substances.

Clayton brought a Charter application alleging violations of his s. 8 (unlawful search) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) rights.

The court found that the vehicle search was a pretextual search, not genuinely for a driver's license, and thus unlawful.

Additionally, the police violated the accused's right to counsel by delaying advisement of rights and by questioning him after he had requested a lawyer but before he had access to one.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court determined that the serious and cumulative nature of the Charter breaches by multiple officers outweighed society's interest in admitting the evidence.

Consequently, all evidence found during the search was excluded from the trial.