Anthony Minelli

The accused was charged with 27 offences arising from a shooting incident on the Six Nations Reserve on May 6, 2024.

The Crown alleged the accused fired a firearm at a van fleeing his residence after a physical altercation with three women.

The Crown conceded insufficient evidence for attempted murder charges.

The court found the accused guilty of five counts of pointing a firearm, careless use of a firearm, uttering a threat, five counts of discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose, breaching probation orders, breaching a firearms prohibition order, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, and driving while prohibited.

The court acquitted on two assault charges and two firearm licensing charges, finding the weapon met the definition of firearm under section 2 of the Criminal Code but not the enhanced definition under section 84(3)(d).

The applicant, Marcus Akin Connell, sought to exclude evidence (a loaded handgun) under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The evidence was obtained following police detention, search, and arrest for breach of a release order.

The Crown conceded multiple Charter breaches, including arbitrary detention (s. 9), unreasonable search and seizure of identification (s. 8), and denial of rights to counsel (s. 10(a) and 10(b)).

Applying the three-stage Grant test, the court found the police conduct to be at the serious end of the spectrum due to mistaken beliefs about their powers and obligations, and the impact on the applicant's Charter-protected interests was also high, particularly given his intoxicated state and prior experiences as a racialized male.

Despite the reliability and importance of the evidence to the Crown's case, the court concluded that admitting it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was therefore excluded.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari and mandamus to quash a provincial court judge's decision to declare a mistrial in a sexual assault case.

The mistrial was granted on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically the trial lawyer's unilateral decision not to call defence witnesses.

The Superior Court dismissed the Crown's application, holding that certiorari is available to parties in criminal proceedings only for jurisdictional errors, not for errors of law.

The court affirmed that a trial judge has the discretion and jurisdiction to declare a mistrial, even after conviction and before sentencing, and that any error in doing so would be an error of law within jurisdiction, not a jurisdictional error.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder case, the court ruled on the admissibility of the accused's statements to police, ante-mortem statements of the deceased, and character evidence.

The court found the accused's statements were voluntary and not obtained in violation of his Charter rights.

The deceased's statement 'No, it's my brother' was admitted for state of mind but not for its truth.

The court also allowed some evidence of the deceased's prior violent acts to support the accused's self-defence claim, while permitting the Crown to lead balancing evidence of the accused's disposition for violence.

The accused, J.C., was sentenced for criminal negligence causing the death of his six-month-old son.

The child sustained severe burns from a butane torch and died due to the burns and lidocaine toxicity from an ointment applied by J.C., who failed to seek medical attention for two days.

The court accepted a joint submission for an eight-year sentence, emphasizing the high moral blameworthiness, prolonged abdication of parental responsibility, and the need for denunciation and deterrence, despite mitigating factors like a guilty plea and remorse.

The court also noted the inadequate care of the other children.

The accused, P.F., was charged with invitation to sexual touching, sexual assault, and sexual interference involving his stepdaughter, E.G. The Crown presented evidence from the complainant, her mother, and two police officers, while the accused testified in his defence.

The court found both the complainant and the accused to be intelligent, articulate, and compelling witnesses, presenting diametrically opposed versions of events.

Due to the lack of independent corroborating evidence capable of resolving the inherent uncertainty between the two credible but conflicting accounts, the court was left in a state of reasonable doubt.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, and all charges against the accused were dismissed.

The accused, Jacob Olmstead, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was 27 months and 23 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established by R. v. Jordan.

The central issue was how to treat the delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The court found that the entire period from June 9, 2020, to March 2, 2021, was a discrete, exceptional circumstance caused by the pandemic.

After deducting this period, the remaining delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

Consequently, the court determined the delay was not unreasonable and dismissed the accused's application.

The accused, Jacob Olmstead, brought a pre-trial application challenging a search warrant for his residence, alleging a violation of his s. 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure, and seeking the exclusion of evidence.

The challenge was based on claims that the warrant was overbroad, the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient basis, and the affiant made material misrepresentations and omissions.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the ITO, despite being imperfectly written, provided a sufficient and reasonable basis for the warrant's issuance, and that the alleged flaws did not undermine the reasonable grounds.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, following a charge of uttering threats.

The applicant argued the detaining justice erred in law and presented new evidence, including the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on trial delays and detention conditions, and the subsequent withdrawal of a "fail to appear" charge.

The court found no errors in law by the detaining justice regarding reverse onus or public safety grounds.

While acknowledging the impact of COVID-19 and the withdrawn charge as new evidence, the court ultimately dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to present a particularized plan for release, which was crucial given his history of violence, harassment, and prior bail breaches.

The dismissal was without prejudice to a further application supported by an appropriate release plan.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and having more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

The Crown called two OPP officers as witnesses.

The defence abandoned a Charter application prior to trial.

The court dismissed the over 80 charge due to the Crown's failure to establish the target value of the alcohol standard used in the calibration check, as required under section 320.31(1)(a) of the Criminal Code following recent legislative changes.

However, the court found the accused guilty of impaired operation based on the officer observations of poor driving, slurred speech, unsteady balance, and odour of alcohol on the breath, rejecting the defence argument that a prior head injury and recent fall could account for the observations.