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The accused was convicted of drug trafficking based on circumstantial evidence proving he possessed a fanny pack of drugs found under his seat.
The accused was charged with four counts of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possession of property obtained by crime.
A fanny pack containing drugs was found under the front seat of a vehicle during a traffic stop, positioned under the accused's legs.
The accused denied knowledge of or control over the fanny pack.
The court applied the test from R. v. Villaroman, finding that while the accused's guilt was a reasonable inference based on proximity to the drugs, possession of cash, two cell phones, and suspicious travel circumstances, the court had to determine if this was the only reasonable inference.
The court rejected the accused's testimony as implausible and inconsistent, rejected the defence theory that drugs could have been left by another dealer, and rejected the theory that the drugs belonged to the driver.
The court found the only reasonable inference was that the accused possessed the drugs for trafficking purposes and convicted on all charges.
All charges dismissed and evidence excluded after the court found the police conducted an unlawful pretextual stop.
The accused was charged with possession of cannabis resin, possession for the purpose of trafficking in fentanyl and cocaine, possession of property obtained by offence, prowl by night near a dwelling house, and failing to comply with a recognizance.
Police conducted surveillance on a residence and stopped the accused as he left on a bicycle, claiming he was riding without a light and on the sidewalk in violation of the Highway Traffic Act and a municipal by-law.
The accused fled and was apprehended after an extensive police pursuit.
The court found that the stop was pretextual and unlawful, violating sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.
The court also found minor violations of section 10 rights.
All evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and all charges were dismissed.
Motion for non-suit granted and peace bond application dismissed due to lack of reasonable fear.
The Crown sought a peace bond under s. 810 of the Criminal Code against the defendant following a marital separation.
At the close of the Crown's case, the defence brought a motion for a non-suit.
The court applied the Sheppard test to determine if there was any evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could find the elements of the application met.
The court found that while there was some evidence the complainant harboured fear, there was no evidence that such fear was objectively reasonable, especially given the passage of time and lack of contact between the parties.
The motion for non-suit was granted and the application for a peace bond was dismissed.
Accused found guilty of four counts of historical sexual misconduct; remaining counts dismissed due to lack of trust relationship.
The accused faced 12 counts of historical sexual misconduct involving three complainants.
The court analyzed whether the accused were in a position of trust or authority towards the complainants under s. 153 of the Criminal Code.
The court found that the accused were not in a position of trust towards two of the complainants, resulting in the dismissal of several counts.
For the primary complainant, the court found a position of trust existed until she turned 16, but did not continue thereafter, leading to the dismissal of charges against the co-accused.
However, applying the W(D) framework, the court accepted the primary complainant's evidence regarding the principal accused and found him guilty of four counts of sexual misconduct.
The accused was convicted of arson based on the accepted testimony of his co-perpetrator.
The accused was charged with arson and break, enter and commit arson in connection with a barn fire deliberately set on April 11, 2014.
The co-perpetrator, Tim Norris, pled guilty and testified that he and the accused jointly set the fire.
The accused denied involvement and provided multiple inconsistent versions of events.
The court found the accused's testimony unreliable due to constant shifting accounts and accepted the testimony of the co-perpetrator.
The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly participated in the arson.
Conviction was entered on the break, enter and commit arson charge, with the standalone arson charge stayed at the Crown's request.