C. Good

The accused was charged with aggravated assault and break and enter following a violent altercation in downtown Brantford.

The victim, who was already blind in one eye, suffered a ruptured left eye resulting in permanent blindness after being attacked by the accused and his uncle.

The accused claimed he acted in defence of his uncle under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected this defence, finding that the victim was the one being attacked without provocation and that the accused joined in a one-sided beating of a vulnerable victim.

The break and enter charge was dismissed by Crown concession, but the accused was convicted of aggravated assault as a principal to the offence.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault, forcible confinement, and choking against his 16-year-old cousin.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of two to three years, while the defence sought a significantly shorter sentence with creative sentencing approaches including conditional sentences and intermittent sentences.

The court rejected the defence's proposed sentencing approach as violating fundamental sentencing principles and statutory requirements.

The court imposed a 12-month custodial sentence to be served concurrently on all charges, followed by two years of probation, with ancillary orders including DNA collection, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and 20-year sex offender registry requirement.

The accused was charged with four offences arising from an incident on the Six Nations Reserve: dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, failure to stop for police, possession of a stolen Chevrolet Trailblazer valued over $5,000, and failure to comply with a probation term.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved the accused was the driver of the stolen vehicle.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts based on eyewitness identification evidence from a police sergeant who had prior dealings with the accused, corroborated by circumstantial evidence including the accused's proximity to the abandoned vehicle, footprints consistent with the accused wearing only socks, and identification by a second officer.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a single-vehicle collision.

The accused denied being the driver and claimed Charter violations regarding the right to counsel and unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found the accused was the driver based on credible eyewitness evidence and physical evidence from the collision.

No Charter violations were found.

The court concluded the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol and her blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit at the time of the collision.