J. Stephenson

The accused, Laureano Bistoyong, was charged with second-degree murder in the stabbing death of his cousin, Mark Bistoyong.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter, but the Crown did not accept the plea, arguing for murder intent.

The court found that the Crown proved the requisite mens rea for murder, specifically that the accused intended to cause serious bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause death and was reckless whether the victim died or not.

The court rejected the defence of provocation, finding no air of reality to it due to a significant time lapse between the alleged provocation and the stabbing.

Laureano Bistoyong was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder, following a shooting that killed two victims.

The Crown alleged the defendant hired a contract killer to murder the victims' son, a drug dealer who worked for the defendant.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of the admitted killer, an unsavoury witness who had entered a plea deal.

The court applied the Vetrovec warning and found the witness's testimony required independent corroboration.

Concluding that the circumstantial evidence (cell phone records and GPS data) was weak and supported multiple innocent inferences, the court found the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the defendant.

Aladin Abdelgadir pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl and MDA for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court considered the significant quantity of fentanyl (over 2 kg), the accused's awareness of the opioid crisis and the dangers of fentanyl, his motivation by profit, and his related criminal record, including being on parole at the time of the offence.

Mitigating factors included his guilty plea, intelligence, and social context evidence related to systemic racism and a troubled upbringing.

The court emphasized general and specific deterrence due to the grave harm caused by fentanyl trafficking.

A global sentence of 13 years was imposed.

This is a sentencing decision following a trial where Derrick Adams was found guilty of manslaughter and trafficking fentanyl.

The court considered the appropriate sentence, balancing aggravating factors such as Adams' extensive criminal record, lack of full remorse, and the victim's young age, against limited mitigating factors including some remorse and a streamlined trial.

The judgment discusses the evolving sentencing ranges for fentanyl trafficking and related deaths, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The court also applied a "Duncan credit" to reduce the sentence due to harsh pre-trial detention conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

A global sentence of 8 years for manslaughter (concurrent 6 years for trafficking) was imposed, with credit for pre-trial custody.

The applicant brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed.

The total delay from the charge date to the anticipated end of trial was 56.5 months.

After deducting 7 months for defence-caused delay and 14 months for exceptional circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the remaining delay was 35.5 months.

As this exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts and the Crown advanced no argument on complexity, the court found the delay presumptively unreasonable.

The application was granted and the charges were stayed.

This criminal trial concerned charges of trafficking fentanyl, manslaughter, and criminal negligence causing death against the accused.

The charges arose from the overdose death of Rachel Cook.

The court analyzed circumstantial evidence, including text messages and expert testimony, to determine if the accused trafficked fentanyl to the deceased and if this act caused her death.

The court found that the only reasonable inference was that the accused trafficked fentanyl to the deceased, which caused her death.

The court also found that the accused's conduct met the mens rea requirements for manslaughter (objective foreseeability of non-trivial bodily harm) and criminal negligence causing death (marked and substantial departure from a reasonable person's conduct).

Peter Zenger was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine and morphine, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The case involved a voir dire to exclude evidence obtained from a search incident to arrest following a traffic stop for stunt driving.

The court found reasonable grounds for the stunt driving arrest but a Charter breach (s. 8) due to the officer's failure to articulate a valid purpose for the search incident to arrest.

However, applying the Grant analysis, the court admitted the evidence.

On the merits, the court accepted expert testimony and found Zenger guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking in both cocaine and morphine, rejecting his credibility.

The court had reasonable doubt regarding the proceeds of crime charge, leading to an acquittal on that count.

The applicant, Patrick Benson, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on secondary grounds following a bail hearing.

He argued for a de novo hearing based on an alleged error by the Justice of the Peace and a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic and an outbreak at the detention centre, coupled with his health issues.

The court found a material change in circumstances, warranting a de novo hearing.

However, after reviewing the proposed release plan, the applicant's extensive criminal record (including violent offences, breaches of court orders, and failures to appear), and the Crown's evidence regarding institutional COVID-19 protocols, the court dismissed the bail review application.

Detention was ordered on both primary (flight risk) and secondary (public safety) grounds, finding the proposed plan insufficient to mitigate the substantial risk posed by the applicant.

The accused was charged with Assault Causing Bodily Harm following an altercation with a pedestrian at an intersection.

The accused claimed self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code, alleging the complainant made a verbal threat while reaching into his pocket.

The court rejected the self-defence claim, finding the accused's testimony implausible and inconsistent with independent witness evidence.

The court found the assault was retaliatory aggression for the complainant kicking the accused's vehicle.

The court also found the complainant's injuries constituted bodily harm.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was convicted of seven counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking in various controlled substances (fentanyl, heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, GHB, hydromorphone, and cannabis), one count of possession of proceeds of crime under $5,000, one count of careless storage of a firearm, one count of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and four counts of breach of firearms prohibition orders.

The court imposed a global sentence of 9 years imprisonment, including a 1-year consecutive term for the prohibition breaches, with time served credited on a 1.5:1 basis.

The sentencing emphasized the serious dangers of fentanyl and heroin trafficking, the toxic combination of drugs and firearms, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The accused was charged with driving while disqualified contrary to section 259(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused was the driver of a Chrysler 300 vehicle observed on Upper Gage Avenue in Hamilton on March 23, 2018.

The accused admitted he was a disqualified driver but denied operating the vehicle, claiming his friend Richard Bound was the driver.

Two police officers testified they observed the accused driving the vehicle, while the accused and his friend testified the friend was driving.

The court found significant credibility issues with the police evidence, including inconsistencies in their testimony, evasiveness during cross-examination, and implausible explanations regarding the vehicle search and decision not to tow it.

The court acquitted the accused, finding reasonable doubt as to who was driving the vehicle.

The accused were charged with multiple offences including conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and heroin, and criminal organization offences related to a motorcycle club.

The Crown relied heavily on police surveillance and intercepted communications.

The court admitted the visual and voice identification evidence, as well as a membership list under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found two of the accused guilty of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and heroin, but acquitted the third.

The court acquitted all accused of the criminal organization charges, finding the Crown failed to prove that one of the main purposes of the motorcycle club was the facilitation of serious offences.

One accused was also found guilty of weapons and proceeds of crime offences.

The accused brought a Garofoli application to exclude evidence obtained through omnibus warrants and search warrants, alleging insufficient material before the issuing judges and breaches of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court addressed issues of standing, the excision of misleading expert opinion and irrelevant information from the Information To Obtain (ITO), and the sufficiency of confidential informant (CI) information for both predicate warrants (tracking and dialed number recorder warrants) and the main wiretap authorization.

The court found that all accused had standing, excised certain inflammatory and misleading portions of the ITO, but ultimately concluded that the predicate warrants met the lower "reasonable suspicion" standard and the wiretap authorization met the "best interests of justice" standard, supported by credible and corroborated CI information.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused brought a pretrial motion for Crown disclosure of questionnaires, debriefing notes, and handlers' notes regarding 22 confidential informants used to support wiretap authorizations.

The Crown conceded the questionnaires and debriefing notes but opposed disclosing the handlers' notes, arguing they were not relied upon by the affiant.

The court held that in the context of a Garofoli application, handlers' notes not relied upon by the affiant do not form part of the investigative file requiring disclosure.

However, the court ordered disclosure of the handlers' notes for two informants because the affiant himself was their handler.

The Crown brought a pretrial motion to admit the opinion evidence of two police officers as expert witnesses in a trial involving drug trafficking and criminal organization charges.

The first officer was proposed as an expert in drug trafficking and slang, which the court admitted fully, finding the evidence reliable and necessary.

The second officer was proposed as an expert on outlaw motorcycle gangs, specifically the Outlaws and the Black Pistons.

The court found the second officer qualified to testify on the general history and culture of outlaw motorcycle gangs, but excluded his opinion on the specific culture of the Black Pistons and the ultimate issue of whether they constituted a criminal organization, due to his limited specific experience with that group.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of cocaine and cash seized during a warrantless search following a traffic stop.

He alleged breaches of ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter after police concealed the true reason for his detention and delayed advising him of his right to counsel.

The court found no s. 8 breach because reasonable and probable grounds existed based on wiretap intelligence and surveillance.

However, deliberate breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) occurred when police misled the accused about the reason for detention and failed to promptly advise him of his right to counsel or facilitate a requested call.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant analysis, the court held the breaches were brief and had minimal practical impact, and that society’s interest in adjudication on the merits favoured admission of the reliable physical evidence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana and two counts of breach of recognizance.

The sentencing judge rejected a joint submission and imposed a sentence of six months' imprisonment in addition to 90 days of pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed the sentence and applied for bail pending appeal.

The Superior Court of Justice denied the application, finding that while the appeal was not frivolous, the argument that the sentence was manifestly unfit was not strong given the appellant's extensive criminal record.

Bail pending appeal was denied and the appeal was expedited.

The applicant sought a reference hearing under section 74 of the Firearms Act to challenge the Chief Firearms Officer's refusal to issue him a firearms licence.

The refusal was based on the applicant's membership in the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, deemed a criminal organization.

The applicant had no criminal record, no mental health issues, and no history of violence.

The court upheld the refusal, finding that membership in a criminal organization constitutes a legitimate public safety concern under section 5(1) of the Firearms Act, even absent specific enumeration in section 5(2).

The accused was charged with four offences arising from an incident on the Six Nations Reserve: dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, failure to stop for police, possession of a stolen Chevrolet Trailblazer valued over $5,000, and failure to comply with a probation term.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved the accused was the driver of the stolen vehicle.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts based on eyewitness identification evidence from a police sergeant who had prior dealings with the accused, corroborated by circumstantial evidence including the accused's proximity to the abandoned vehicle, footprints consistent with the accused wearing only socks, and identification by a second officer.

The accused was charged with eight counts including attempted break and enter, break and enter with theft, breach of probation, and possession of break-in tools.

The accused pleaded guilty to counts 2, 3, and 4 (mischief, breach of probation).

On count 1 (attempted break and enter), the court found the accused guilty based on video evidence showing him disabling and stealing a glass break sensor from a medical building, which constituted more than mere preparation.

On counts 5-8 (break and enter, theft, breach of probation, and possession of break-in tools), the court acquitted the accused due to insufficient evidence of identity and possession, noting the Crown's failure to bring a similar act application that would have permitted the court to draw inferences between the two incidents.