8 total
NCR verdict entered where drug-induced psychosis constituted a disease of the mind.
The accused was charged with second degree murder after admitting to causing the death of the victim.
The defence raised not criminally responsible (NCR) by reason of mental disorder under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.
The court found that the accused suffered from Cannabis-Induced Psychotic Disorder exacerbated by prolonged substance use, and that his internal predisposition — including a vulnerable brain, prior episodes of psychosis, and features of borderline and antisocial personality disorder — contributed causally to his mental state at the time of the offence.
Applying the holistic approach from R. v. Stone and R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun, the court found the drug-induced psychosis constituted a disease of the mind and that the continuing danger factor was satisfied.
A verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder was entered.
The offender was sentenced to 8 years in prison for manslaughter after trafficking fentanyl to a teenager who fatally overdosed.
This is a sentencing decision following a trial where Derrick Adams was found guilty of manslaughter and trafficking fentanyl.
The court considered the appropriate sentence, balancing aggravating factors such as Adams' extensive criminal record, lack of full remorse, and the victim's young age, against limited mitigating factors including some remorse and a streamlined trial.
The judgment discusses the evolving sentencing ranges for fentanyl trafficking and related deaths, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.
The court also applied a "Duncan credit" to reduce the sentence due to harsh pre-trial detention conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.
A global sentence of 8 years for manslaughter (concurrent 6 years for trafficking) was imposed, with credit for pre-trial custody.
The accused was found guilty of manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death after trafficking fentanyl that resulted in a fatal overdose.
This criminal trial concerned charges of trafficking fentanyl, manslaughter, and criminal negligence causing death against the accused.
The charges arose from the overdose death of Rachel Cook.
The court analyzed circumstantial evidence, including text messages and expert testimony, to determine if the accused trafficked fentanyl to the deceased and if this act caused her death.
The court found that the only reasonable inference was that the accused trafficked fentanyl to the deceased, which caused her death.
The court also found that the accused's conduct met the mens rea requirements for manslaughter (objective foreseeability of non-trivial bodily harm) and criminal negligence causing death (marked and substantial departure from a reasonable person's conduct).
The accused's application for third-party child welfare records was dismissed for lacking likely relevance.
The accused brought an application for disclosure of records held by The Children's Aid Society of Haldimand & Norfolk (CASHN) regarding investigations undertaken in 2018 and 2019 into allegations of sexual misconduct.
The accused argued that the records were likely relevant because the initial 2018 investigation did not result in criminal charges, whereas the 2019 investigation did, suggesting the complainant's statements differed between the two investigations.
The court applied the two-stage test under section 278.5 of the Criminal Code and found that the accused failed to establish that the records were likely relevant to an issue at trial.
The court dismissed the application.
Offender sentenced to nine months' imprisonment for sexual interference with a 12-year-old girl.
The offender was convicted of sexual interference after digitally penetrating and fondling the 12-year-old cousin of his girlfriend.
The court accepted a joint submission from counsel, sentencing the offender to nine months' imprisonment less credit for pre-sentence custody at a 1.5:1 ratio, along with ancillary orders.
The court noted the severe impact on the victim and expressed disagreement with a prior decision finding the current one-year mandatory minimum for the offence unconstitutional, though the older nine-month minimum applied in this case.
A young offender convicted of attempted murder and sexual assault was sentenced as an adult to eight years in custody, with the court applying both adult and youth sentencing principles.
A young offender, aged 17 at the time of the offences, was convicted of two counts of attempted murder and one count of sexual assault following a brutal home invasion.
The offender was sentenced as an adult pursuant to the Youth Criminal Justice Act.
The court imposed concurrent sentences of eight years for the attempted murder counts and five years for the sexual assault count, with enhanced presentence custody credit of 1.5 to 1 (36 months total).
The court balanced adult sentencing principles with youth criminal justice considerations, emphasizing rehabilitation while addressing denunciation and deterrence.
Ancillary orders included SOIRA registration, DNA order, firearms prohibition, and communication prohibition with victims.
The court granted the Crown's application to sentence a youth as an adult for serious violent offences.
A youth aged 17 years and one month committed two counts of attempted murder and one count of sexual assault against a mother and her five-year-old child in their home on February 28, 2011.
The Crown applied for an adult sentence under section 72 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.
The court found that the offences were extremely serious, involving a prolonged attack including sexual assault, repeated violent physical assaults, and a deliberate attempt to murder both victims by setting a fire.
The offender had limited cognitive abilities, borderline intellectual functioning, and a family background that fostered antisocial attitudes.
While the offender demonstrated positive behaviour and engagement in programming during pre-sentence detention, his progress was slow and his insight into the harm caused to victims was limited.
The court determined that a youth sentence would be insufficient to hold the offender accountable and that an adult sentence was necessary to provide for continued rehabilitation in a structured setting and a lengthy period of community supervision.
Bail review granted; detention order set aside due to errors in tertiary-ground analysis.
The accused applied for a review of a detention order following a bail hearing where he had been charged with possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and breach of an undertaking.
The reviewing judge considered the secondary and tertiary grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code and the standard of review for bail review under s. 520.
The court held that the justice of the peace erred in relying on the tertiary ground after already determining detention on the secondary ground and failed to apply the principle that the tertiary ground must be used sparingly.
The court also found a material change in circumstances based on strengthened surety evidence and the removal of an unsuitable proposed surety.
The accused satisfied the onus for release and was granted bail with strict conditions and substantial sureties.