Aubrey D. Hilliard

The applicant sought to validate a collection of handwritten and will-kit documents as the deceased's later will, or alternatively to undo an earlier validation order and have the estate administered on an intestacy.

The court applied the s. 21.1 substantial-compliance framework under the Succession Law Reform Act and accepted authenticity, but found the incomplete documents did not establish fixed and final testamentary intentions.

The absence of key pages, executor designation, and residue clause, together with references to an existing "copy of will" and "original will," supported the inference that the materials were ancillary directions rather than a new will.

The court also rejected the alleged revocation of the previously validated 2004 will and held that ordinary civil costs rules applied.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for criminal harassment of his former intimate partner.

He raised several grounds of appeal, including inadequate reasons, violation of his right to a fair trial regarding the abandonment of an O'Connor application while self-represented, reasonable apprehension of bias, misapprehension of evidence, improper admission of character evidence, and unreasonable verdict.

The Superior Court of Justice found no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or procedural rulings, noting the trial judge's findings were supported by the uncontroverted evidence of the complainant.

The appeal was dismissed.

Family law trial following separation of a married couple with one child.

The parties resolved most issues by consent at the outset of trial, leaving parenting time, spousal support, equalization, occupational rent, and carrying costs.

The court maintained the existing parenting schedule with the mother as primary parent, ordered periodic spousal support of $1,200 per month on compensatory and non-compensatory grounds, awarded $10,000 in net retroactive spousal support after crediting $30,000 in post-separation transfers, and determined an equalization payment of $22,434.29 owed by the applicant to the respondent.

The respondent's claim for occupational rent was dismissed, and the money taken from the respondent's mother's farm account for home renovations was found not to be a loan.

A divorce was granted.

The accused was charged with second degree murder after admitting to causing the death of the victim.

The defence raised not criminally responsible (NCR) by reason of mental disorder under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the accused suffered from Cannabis-Induced Psychotic Disorder exacerbated by prolonged substance use, and that his internal predisposition — including a vulnerable brain, prior episodes of psychosis, and features of borderline and antisocial personality disorder — contributed causally to his mental state at the time of the offence.

Applying the holistic approach from R. v. Stone and R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun, the court found the drug-induced psychosis constituted a disease of the mind and that the continuing danger factor was satisfied.

A verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder was entered.

The parties separated after a 21-year marriage.

The applicant sought an unequal division of net family property, alleging the respondent recklessly depleted insurance proceeds received after their home burned down.

The court dismissed the claim for unequal division, finding insufficient evidence of reckless depletion.

The court ordered the partition and sale of the matrimonial home, with proceeds to be divided equally after paying joint debts.

The respondent was ordered to pay retroactive child support of $13,212 out of his share of the house proceeds, and ongoing child support based on his current income.

Spousal support was set at zero due to the respondent's inability to pay.

The applicant sought an order compelling the Long Point Region Conservation Authority (LPRCA) to enforce a permit issued to his neighbours, who had constructed a retaining wall contrary to the approved grading plan.

The LPRCA had investigated the applicant's complaint but exercised its discretion to take no enforcement action, concluding the completed work conformed with the applicable legislation.

The Superior Court found that while the LPRCA has the discretionary authority to enforce its permits through stop orders or charges, it is not mandatory.

Applying the reasonableness standard of review, the Court held that the LPRCA's decision not to take enforcement steps was justified, transparent, and intelligible.

The application was dismissed.

Following a 20-year marriage, the applicant sought sole decision-making, child support, spousal support, and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The respondent, who had a history of non-compliance with court orders and had not seen the children in over a year, sought joint decision-making and shared parenting.

The court granted the applicant sole decision-making and dismissed the respondent's claim for parenting time.

The court ordered ongoing and retroactive child support based on the respondent's disability income, awarded lump sum spousal support to the applicant, and granted her exclusive possession of the matrimonial home to facilitate its sale.

The applicant father sought to retain primary care of the child following the respondent mother's relocation from Kugluktuk, Nunavut to Edmonton, Alberta without providing the required notice under the Divorce Act.

The father had retained the child beyond the agreed parenting time in response to the mother's move.

The court determined that despite the child's habitual residence being in Nunavut, Ontario had jurisdiction to hear the matter.

The court found that it was in the child's best interests to be returned to the mother's primary care in Edmonton, permitting the relocation, while granting the father extended parenting time during school breaks.

The court considered the child's Inuit heritage, connection to siblings, access to medical resources, and the mother's support system in Edmonton.

The court considered motions regarding the limitation periods applicable to a counter-application and Family Law Act claims in the estate of Murray Gibbons.

Emilia Gibbons sought to dismiss Edward Gibbons' counter-application as statute-barred, while the respondents sought to dismiss Emilia's Family Law Act claims for the same reason.

The court found the counter-application was out of time and dismissed it, but granted an extension for Emilia's Family Law Act claims, allowing them to proceed.

The court considered an application by Wayne Biggar for spousal support and unequal division of net family property following the breakdown of his marriage to Donna Stratford (nee Biggar).

After reviewing the parties’ financial circumstances, contributions, and the evidence at trial, the court granted Mr. Biggar’s claim for spousal support on a non-compensatory basis, ordering a lump sum payment of $85,000 to be paid from Ms. Stratford’s share of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.

The court dismissed Mr. Biggar’s claim for unequal division, finding that the remaining proceeds of sale should be divided equally, subject to adjustments for the spousal support award and a prior judgment against Mr. Biggar.

The court also found that, although an equalization payment was technically owed by Mr. Biggar, equitable considerations justified reducing it to zero.

The decision addresses an application by Warren Michael Cummings seeking various forms of relief against the Mayor, Councillors, Chief Administrative Officer, and the Corporation of the County of Norfolk.

The court considered requests for review of a Municipal Election Compliance Audit Committee decision, the conduct of council in passing a by-law, the appointment of an auditor or investigator, and the right of residents to challenge legal bills.

The court found that Mr. Cummings lacked standing for the relief sought, that the requests were frivolous, and summarily dismissed the application under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court sentenced Jeremy Wicker for sexual assault against his former spouse, Josephine Wicker, following a conviction after trial.

The Crown sought a two-year jail sentence and three years' probation, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court reviewed relevant case law, considered aggravating and mitigating factors, and ultimately imposed a custodial sentence with probation, declining to make a SOIRA order.

The decision discusses the impact of domestic context, lack of remorse, and the principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The court considered a motion by the Defendants to strike portions of the Plaintiffs’ amended claim or, in the alternative, for summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs’ claim for an easement for drainage.

The court found that while the Plaintiffs’ pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action, there was no genuine issue for trial regarding the easement claim.

The Plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to define the easement with adequate specificity or to show that an easement of necessity or by common intention existed at the time of severance.

The claim for an easement for drainage was summarily dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for a declaration that a judgment survived the respondents' bankruptcy, the successful respondents sought full indemnity costs.

The court declined to award costs, noting that the applicant had already lost the ability to collect a substantial debt due to the respondents' bankruptcy.

Relying on equitable principles and the 'fresh start' policy of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the court ordered each party to bear their own costs.

The respondent brought a motion seeking leave to appeal interim arbitral awards, to set aside those awards, for the arbitrator to recuse himself, and to nullify the mediation/arbitration agreement and costs awards.

The applicant brought a cross-motion to dismiss the respondent's motion and to enforce the February 2024 arbitral award.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion, finding his request for leave to appeal the 2019 award was statute-barred and that he failed to identify errors of law for the 2024 award.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias by the arbitrator, no legal incapacity for the agreement, and no basis to invalidate the costs awards.

The applicant's motion to enforce the February 2024 arbitral award was granted due to the respondent's flagrant and willful disobedience of arbitral awards and court orders.

The plaintiffs, vendors of a property, moved for summary judgment against the defendants, purchasers, for breach of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS).

The defendants failed to close the deal, citing an unfulfilled requisition regarding oil and gas leases on title.

The court found that the oil and gas leases did not go to the root of title, and therefore, the unfulfilled requisition did not provide a valid defence for the defendants' failure to close.

The court granted summary judgment on both liability and damages, finding that the plaintiffs had reasonably mitigated their losses by reselling the property.

Damages were assessed based on the difference in sale prices and other related expenses, excluding claims for personal time, mileage, and storage.

An application for dependent support under the Succession Law Reform Act was brought on behalf of a minor child against his deceased father's estate.

The deceased's will provided a nominal bequest, which the court found woefully inadequate given the father's prior support obligations and the estate's substantial value.

Applying the factors under the SLRA, including the moral duty owed to dependents, the court ordered the estate to pay $42,043 for the child's support through high school and 80% of his anticipated post-secondary education expenses.

Full indemnity costs were awarded to the applicant.

The applicant sought a declaration that debts arising from a 2016 judgment survived the respondents' discharge from bankruptcy pursuant to sections 178(1)(d) and (e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, alleging fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence in the original pleadings or judgment to support claims of fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, defalcation in a fiduciary capacity, or obtaining property by false pretenses or fraudulent misrepresentation.

The court determined the debt was a breach of contract, not fraud, and that the applicant was attempting to recharacterize the debt post-bankruptcy.

The defendants, Robert B. Woodrow and Anne Woodrow, brought a motion seeking a declaration that a default judgment debt owed by Ross E. Greb (a third party and co-shareholder/director) survived his consumer proposal discharge under section 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Woodrows argued the debt arose from fraud or misappropriation while Greb acted in a fiduciary capacity.

The court dismissed the motion, finding insufficient evidence in the original default judgment record to establish that Ross E. Greb owed a personal fiduciary duty to Robert Woodrow.

The general rule that directors owe fiduciary duties to the company, not individual shareholders, was upheld, and the "exceptional circumstances" required to deviate from this rule were not present.

The appellant, M.J., appealed his conviction on one count of sexual assault and one count of sexual interference, as well as a 15-month custodial sentence.

The appeal grounds included allegations of uneven scrutiny of evidence, material misapprehension of evidence, failure to instruct on the meaning of beyond a reasonable doubt, and an unreasonable verdict.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were owed deference, there was no material misapprehension of evidence, the standard of proof was properly applied, and the verdict was reasonable.

The court also found the imposed sentence was not demonstrably unfit, considering the aggravating factors and the need for denunciation and deterrence in sexual offense cases involving a position of trust.