CITATION: R. v. Douglas et al., 2026 ONSC 4689
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
Conrad Douglas and Nadine El-Asmar
Defendants/Applicants
Alex Reschke, for the Federal Crown
Kathyrn Doyle, for the Defendant/Applicant Conrad Douglas
Mark Evans, for the Defendant/Applicant Nadine El-Asmar
HEARD: August 10, 2026
A.D. Hilliard
Overview
[1] The Defendants have brought an Application challenging the facial validity of a warrant that authorized the search of a residence and outbuildings located at 5964 Brittania Crescent, Niagara Falls. The Defendants argue that their Charter rights under section 8 were violated and that the evidence obtained pursuant to that search should be excluded under section 24(2).
Background
[2] In February 2024, Detective Matt Sigfrid, a member of the Niagara Regional Police Service (NRPS) authored an Information to Obtain (ITO) seeking judicial authorization to search four locations: 4847 Jepson Street – upper and lower units (Jepson), 5964 Brittania Crescent – residence and outbuildings (Brittania), 4588 Bridge Street – upper unit (Bridge), and Room 31 of the OYO Motel in Niagara Falls. The ITO also sought authorization to search two motor vehicles: a BMW X5, the registered owner of which was Nadine El-Asmar, and a white Hyundai.
[3] The ITO was drafted to obtain evidence relating to the offence of possession for the purpose of trafficking. There were four (4) persons listed as the targets of the investigation: Conrad Douglas, Alexander Fraser-Maxwell, Jairmain Gordon, and Efrossini Kontaxis.
[4] Members of the NRPS 2 District Street Crime unit had obtained information from confidential sources that Mr. Douglas, Mr. Gordon and Ms. Kontaxis were selling cocaine. Three confidential sources provided information to NRPS that Mr. Douglas was trafficking cocaine. One of those confidential sources also advised police that Mr. Douglas drives a BMW SUV. Another one of those confidential sources advised that Mr. Douglas was using the whole residence at Jepson, including the upper and lower units.
[5] It is acknowledged that Ms. El-Asmar was not a target of the investigation nor is there any evidence that police suspected Ms. El-Asmar of possessing or trafficking drugs prior to the execution of the search warrant.
[6] The warrant was applied for and granted on February 8, 2024 and members of the NRPS executed the search warrant at Brittania on February 13, 2024. Inside the residence large quantities of controlled substances were located along with currency alleged to be proceeds of crime.
Analysis
Facial validity of the warrant
[7] The approach to be taken in reviewing a warrant for validity was set out by Watt J.A. in R. v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72, at paragraph 84:
The scope of warrant review is narrow. The review is not a de novo hearing of the ex parte application. The reviewing judge does not substitute his or her view for that of the issuing judge...The standard is whether there is sufficient credible and reliable evidence to permit a justice to find reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence has been committed and that evidence of that offence would be found at the specified time and place of search...Said in another way, the test is whether there was reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the warrant could -- not would -- have issued.
[8] The standard has been defined as “credibly-based probability”, something more than suspicion but less than balance of probabilities. In other words, if the issuing justice could have issued the warrant, then the application fails. The ITO must establish that there was a reason to believe that evidence of the alleged crime would be found at the places sought to be searched. The review must be conducted using a common-sense holistic approach. [see R. v. LD, [2019] O.J. NO 3122 (CJ)]
[9] There is no contest that in order to establish reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of the offences would be at the target location, there needs to be a nexus between the alleged offences, drug-trafficking in this case, and the address for which police are seeking authorization to search. The Applicants argue that the ITO does not disclose information that establishes a nexus between Mr. Douglas’ alleged drug trafficking and the Brittania residence. The Crown has elected not to invoke Step 6 of the Garofoli procedure and therefore I have only the redacted ITO to review for sufficiency.
[10] Although the information obtained by police from the confidential informants is referenced in support of the grounds to believe that items to be searched for are in the places to be searched, none of the information provided by the confidential informants relates to Brittania. There is no evidence from any source, other than Versadex, that indicates that Mr. Douglas resides at Brittania.
[11] The Crown concedes that of the twelve occasions on which police made observations of Mr. Douglas, there are only 3 that are relevant to the analysis as to whether there is sufficient evidence in the ITO to create a nexus between the alleged offences and the Britannia address: October 18, 2023, January 10, 2024 and January 29, 2024. The surveillance details from those three dates is as follows:
October 18, 2023: Mr. Douglas is observed at the Britannia address walking a dog between 12:19 and 12:21 p.m. Affiant note indicates that it is believed that Mr. Douglas is using this residence based on the observation of him walking a dog from that residence. Mr. Douglas then drives away from the Britannia address at 12:26 p.m. At 2:02 p.m. Mr. Douglas is observed walking down the driveway at the Jepson address, entering a vehicle with a bag in his hand and then exiting the vehicle moments later with the same bag in his hand that appears to be smaller. Police believe the interaction in the motor vehicle is consistent with drug trafficking. Mr. Douglas then walked to the Subway on Victoria Avenue and returns shortly thereafter to the Jepson address.
January 10, 2024: The BMW associated with Mr. Douglas is seen parked at the Britannia address at 1:33 p.m. At 1:59 p.m. Mr. Douglas is seen exiting the residence and entering the BMW alone and driving away. The next police observation of Mr. Douglas is at 2:05 p.m. when his vehicle is observed pulling into the Subway parking lot on Victoria Avenue. A 2:06 p.m. a female passenger exits the BMW from the rear passenger door. Police conclude that because the female was not seen with Mr. Douglas at Britannia that she must have entered and exited so quickly in the parking lot of Subway that police did not see her enter the BMW. Police conclude that this quick entry and exit of the female is consistent with drug trafficking. After the female exits the BMW, it is observed driving to Jepson at 2:24 p.m.
January 29, 2024: At 3:34 p.m. the BMW is observed by police parked at Britannia. Mr. Douglas is then observed to leave Britannia at 4:04 p.m., drive to Jepson and park in the side parking lot. At 4:29 p.m. Douglas is observed to leave Jepson in the BMW. He is observed parked on Ross Street in front of a residence at 4:37 p.m. and at 4:38 p.m. a male approaches the driver’s side window of the BMW, puts his hands inside the vehicle and then walks back into the residence on Ross Street. The BMW returns to Jepson at 4:47 p.m. The interaction at the driver’s side window of the motor vehicle police believed to be consistent with drug trafficking.
[12] There are no observations by the police of Mr. Douglas leaving Brittania carrying packages or bags that would be suggestive of Mr. Douglas transporting quantities of drugs stored at the residence. Police also do not observe Mr. Douglas entering into the detached garage, which is the outbuilding at Brittania sought to be search in addition to the residence. There are not even observations of Mr. Douglas at Brittania either early in the morning or late at night to corroborate the Versadex information that he is residing there.
[13] After reviewing the ITO in totality, I am satisfied that there is sufficient credible and reliable evidence to permit a justice to find reasonable and probable grounds to believe that Mr. Douglas was in possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking. The observations made by members of the NRPS set out in the ITO corroborates the information obtained from confidential sources that Mr. Douglas drives a BMW SUV and that he has access to and appears to be utilizing the residence at Jepson. The observations of NRPS officers can also form the basis for a reasonable inference that Mr. Douglas is in possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking based on what appear to be brief interactions with different individuals on multiple dates. These observations corroborate information obtained from confidential sources that Mr. Douglas is trafficking cocaine.
[14] However, that does not end the inquiry. There must also be sufficient evidence to permit the issuing justice to find that evidence of the offence would be found at the specific place to be searched. It is not enough for there to be evidence supporting an inference of trafficking and evidence that Mr. Douglas has access to a particular residence to ground an authorization to search.
[15] Detective Sigfrid sets out his grounds to believe that evidence of possession for the purpose of trafficking drugs will be found in the places to be searched starting at paragraph 141 of the ITO. In this section of the ITO, Detective Sigfrid summarizes the information received from the confidential sources and the observations made by NRPS during their surveillance of the targets, including Mr. Douglas. Nowhere in this section of the ITO does Detective Sigfrid state that he believes Mr. Douglas to be residing at Britannia or even that Mr. Douglas uses Britannia as a place to store his drugs. Brittania is only mentioned in two paragraphs that reference interactions believed to be consistent with drug trafficking: one summarizing January 10, 2024 surveillance and the other summarizing January 29, 2024 surveillance.
[16] I also note that the concluding paragraph of that section reads as follows: “I have reasonable ground (sic) to believe that the offence in paragraph one (1) has been and will be committed. I believe that Conrad DOUGLAS, Alexander FRASER-MAXWELL, Jairmain GORDON, and Efronsinni KONTAXIS are in possession of a controlled substance and am requesting a search warrant for the locations identified in paragraph two (2).” This paragraph is exactly the same, word for word, as paragraph 127, the concluding paragraph in the section with the heading “Summary of grounds to believe an offence has been or will be committed”.
[17] Although I accept that the issuing justice was entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the ITO, I think it is notable and informative that Detective Sigfrid did not state anywhere in the ITO that he believed that Britannia was the residence of Mr. Douglas. The only reference to Britannia being Mr. Douglas’ residence is in the section setting out the investigative checks that were conducted. In that section, Detective Sigfrid notes that Mr. Douglas’ address is listed at Brittania on Versadex, a police reporting and case management system.
[18] It is well established that attendance at a premise proximate to a suspected drug transaction can provide a basis for a search warrant [see R. v. Cole, 2025 O.J. NO. 416 (SCJ) and R. v. Salmon, 2024 ONCA 697, [2024] O.J. No. 4290 (CA)]. However, it is the temporal proximity between attendance at the premises and suspected drug transactions that is at issue here. Of the three occasions when police observe Mr. Douglas at Britannia on the same day as observations of behaviour consistent with drug trafficking, on only one of those days is Mr. Douglas seen going directly from Britannia to what police allege to be a drug transaction. On the two other occasions, Mr. Douglas first attends at Jepson prior to the impugned interaction.
[19] Although the assessment of reasonable grounds is not dependent on some mathematical notion of probability, parsing the facts in a mathematical assessment, [R. v. Cusick, 2019 ONCA 524] even on a more qualitative approach, the question to be answered is whether one instance of drug trafficking proximate to attendance at a residence to be searched sufficient to meet the standard of credibly-based probability. In my view, the answer to that question is no. Even when I consider the totality of the evidence provided in the ITO, including the Versadex information that Mr. Douglas’ address is Brittania and the observations by police of Mr. Douglas attending at Brittania on three occasions, I am not satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to find that there is a nexus between Mr. Douglas’ alleged drug trafficking and Brittania.
[20] The argument of the Crown that there is a reasonable inference that Brittania is Mr. Douglas’ “stash” house, as was found by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Shedden, 2022 ONCA 25 is not supported even on the broadest reading of the ITO. The facts in Shedden were entirely distinguishable from this case. In Shedden, the appellant was observed attending the residence listed in the search warrant nine times over a three-day period in which police observed the appellant engaging in suspecting drug transactions. There was a clear connection between the appellant’s attendance at the residence and the drug transactions in Shedden. In this case, Mr. Douglas’ is observed at Brittania only four (4) times over the course of four months of surveillance. In contrast, Mr. Douglas is observed at Jepson on all 12 of the days police surveilled his movements and all the interactions described as suspected drug transactions occur on the premises of or proximate to Mr. Douglas being at Jepson.
[21] Finally, I note that nowhere in the ITO does Detective Sigfrid state that he believes that Brittania is a location where Mr. Douglas likely stores the drugs he is selling. Although the caselaw is clear that conclusory statements alone are insufficient to support the issuance of a warrant, the complete absence of any statements as to the conclusions or inferences the detective has drawn from his observations and review of the evidence is telling.
[22] I therefore find that the warrant is facially deficient and therefore the search constitutes a breach of Mr. Douglas and Ms. El-Asmar’s section 8 Charter rights.
Exclusion under 24(2)
[23] Having found a breach of the Applicants Charter rights, I must go on to determine whether the evidence should be excluded under section 24(2).
[24] The Supreme Court of Canada recently reiterated the test to be applied in R. v. Fox, 2026 SCC 4:
(1) The Legal Framework Under Section 24(2) of the Charter
88 Section 24(2) of the Charter provides that when "a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner" that infringed a Charter right, "the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute".
89 The purpose of s. 24(2) of the Charter is "to maintain the good repute of the administration of justice", which "embraces maintaining the rule of law and upholding Charter rights in the justice system as a whole" (R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, at para. 67). The phrase "bring the administration of justice into disrepute" must be "understood in the long-term sense of maintaining the integrity of, and public confidence in, the justice system" (para. 68). The analysis under s. 24(2) starts from the premise that a Charter breach has already damaged the administration of justice and "seeks to ensure that evidence obtained through that breach does not do further damage to the repute of the justice system" (para. 69). The focus of s. 24(2) is societal, targeting systemic concerns rather than punishing the police or compensating the accused (para. 70).
90 The analysis under s. 24(2) proceeds in two stages. First, the court considers a threshold requirement, which asks whether the evidence was "obtained in a manner" that infringed or denied a Charter right or freedom. The threshold requirement involves a generous and purposive approach to examining the entire chain of events involving the Charter breach and the impugned evidence and asks whether they were part of the same transaction or course of conduct. The connection between the Charter breach and the impugned evidence can be temporal, contextual, or causal, or a combination of all three. Although a causal connection is not required, the connection should not be remote or tenuous. Each case must be considered on its own merits; there is no rigid rule as to what sort of connection is too remote or tenuous (see R. v. Mack, 2014 SCC 58, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 38; R. v. Tim, 2022 SCC 12, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 234, at para. 78; R. v. Beaver, 2022 SCC 54, [2022] 3 S.C.R. 718, at para. 96).
91 Second, if the threshold requirement is met, the court considers an evaluative component, which asks whether admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The evaluative component involves balancing three lines of inquiry: (1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct; (2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused; and (3) society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits (Grant, at para. 71; Beaver, at paras. 94 and 116; Tim, at para. 74). The balancing is a qualitative exercise and does not involve mathematical precision (Grant, at paras. 86 and 140; R. v. Harrison, 2009 SCC 34, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494, at para. 36; Beaver, at para. 117).
Obtained in a manner
[25] I am satisfied that the drugs seized from Britannia during the execution of the warrant that I have now found to be facially invalid were obtained in a manner that infringed the Applicant’s Charter rights under section 8. The police had no other grounds to enter Britannia. There is no evidence to suggest that the drugs would have been found by police regardless of whether the warrant was issued.
[26] Next I must then go on to the second part of the test – the evaluative component, assessing and then balancing the three lines of inquiry set out above.
Seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct
[27] My task in assessing the first factor is to situate the police conduct “on a scale of culpability with inadvertent or minor violations at one end and wilful or reckless disregard of Charter rights at the other.” [R. v. Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, [2017 S.C.J. No. 59 at para. 61] The farther down the scale the police conduct gets towards wilful, reckless, or deliberate the greater the need for the Court to disassociate itself. [R. v. Montaque, [2025] O.J. No. 4119 (SCJ) at para 114]
[28] The facts of this case are similar to those before Maxwell J. in Montaque wherein she found that “there was an unacceptable degree of carelessness and inattentiveness in the way the ITO was drafted.” [Montague, supra, at para. 117] The issues with the ITO in this case are beyond what could be described as inadvertent, technical, or minor. There was insufficient evidence to support even an inference that evidence of drug trafficking would be found at Brittania, as was the case in Montague.
[29] There were also serious drafting issues, as noted above, including a lack of any statement as to the detective’s grounds to believe that evidence of drug trafficking would be found at Brittania. The manner in which the ITO was drafted also obscured and blurred important details regarding the proximity in time between interactions determined to be consistent with drug trafficking and attendance at specific addresses. There are paragraphs in the ITO that contain references to multiple targets and/or multiple addresses that include a conclusory statement that an “interaction consistent with drug trafficking” was observed without any detail as to which target was involved or at which address the interaction was observed at or near.
[30] In addition to some obvious typos in the ITO, such as a notation that a time was 2:30 p.m. when in reading the observations of that date in full it becomes obvious that the time should have been noted at 2:03 p.m., there is at least one full paragraph that is a wholesale cut and paste from a previous section. Paragraph 127 is repeated verbatim at paragraph 167 despite the fact that those paragraphs conclude different sections of the ITO – one summarizing the grounds to believe an offence has been committed and the other grounds to believe evidence will be found in the places to be searched. I find that this is more than simply sloppy drafting or a lack of proofreading. Use of boilerplate paragraphs in an ITO is unacceptable and demonstrates a disregard for the seriousness of the intrusion that a search of a residence constitutes.
[31] I find that the Charter-infringing conduct in this case was serious and falls towards the end of the spectrum of wilful, reckless and deliberate. Although there is not enough for me to find definitively that the police conduct was wilful or deliberate, I am satisfied that it was careless and shows a reckless disregard for the importance of the sanctity of a personal residence and the serious intrusion a search warrant constitutes.
Impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused
[32] As the Supreme Court of Canada indicated in R. v. Tim, 2022 SCC 12, [2022] S.C.J. No. 12 at paragraph 90, the inquiry on the second branch “involves identifying the interests protected by the relevant Charter rights and evaluating how seriously the breaches affected those interests.” The greater the impact of the breach on the accused’s Charter rights, “the greater the risk that admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”
[33] Police entry into a private dwelling has a serious impact on the rights of an accused. It is trite to say that the expectation of privacy in one’s home is very high. Entry into and search of a private residence constitutes a serious violation of the applicants’ Charter-protected interests. The seriousness of the impact weighs heavily in favour of exclusion.
Society’s interest in adjudicating the case on its merits
[34] On the final branch of the test, I must consider the public’s interest in this case being adjudicated on the merits. The Crown points out the serious issue of drugs in the community, in the Niagara Region in particular. He also notes that the particular drugs found in this case are an important factor that militate strongly in favour of not excluding the evidence and instead allowing the prosecution to proceed on the merits. In response, the applicants argue that Society’s interest in adjudicating cases of alleged drug trafficking cannot by itself overcome the seriousness of the conduct and the serious impact of the breaches.
[35] I accept that illicit drug trafficking is a scourge on the community and one that should be resoundingly denounced. However, as counsel for Mr. Douglas submitted, there cannot be carve outs for specific offences where Society’s interest in adjudication on the merits trumps the Charter-protected rights of accused persons. It is not and cannot be the case that for certain types of offences, such as drug trafficking, no matter how egregious the police conduct evidence will never be excluded.
[36] I also recognize that the evidence the applicants are seeking to exclude is real evidence and is inherently reliable. I have considered as well that the exclusion of the evidence obtained from the search of Britannia will effectively end the prosecution of this case.
Balancing
[37] In the final stage of the analysis, I remind myself that “balancing is a qualitative exercise and does not involve mathematical precision.” [Fox, at para. 91] In assessing and weighing each line of inquiry, the exercise is an attempt to ensure that evidence obtained through Charter breaches does not cause further harm to the justice system while addressing systemic concerns relating to the impact on the long-term repute to the justice system that would result from the admission of evidence obtained through Charter breaches. [R. v. Beaver, 2022 SCC 54, [2022] SCJ No. 54 at para. 133]
[38] Having considered the seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct of the police and the seriousness of the impact on the Charter-protected rights of the Applicants, I find that Society’s interest in adjudicating this case on its merits does not outweigh the first two factors so as to tip the scale in favour of dismissing the application to exclude. I find that allowing the evidence obtained from the search of Britannia to be admitted at the trial in this matter would undermine public confidence in the justice system. If police misconduct in obtaining search warrants into a private residence can be overlooked simply by virtue of the fact that large quantities of drugs were found, there would be a serious and deleterious impact on the long-term repute of the justice system.
[39] In cases involving the investigation of drug trafficking, police must still be held to the same standard as in any other investigation, particularly when seeking to enter and search a person’s home. The protection of the sanctity and privacy of people’s residences cannot be overlooked simply because the police discovered illicit drugs.
Conclusion
[40] The warrant obtained by Detective Sigfrid was facially deficient in relation to the authorization granted to search Britannia. As a result, the search that was conducted violated the section 8 Charter rights of Mr. Douglas and Ms. El-Asmar.
[41] Having applied the legal framework under section 24(2), I have concluded that all the evidence obtained from the search of Brittania should be excluded.
A.D. Hilliard
Released: August 13, 2026
CITATION: R. v. Douglas et al., 2026 ONSC 4689
COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-166
DATE: 2026/08/13
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
Federal Crown
– and –
Conrad Douglas and Nadine El-Asmar
Defendants/ Applicant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
A.D. Hilliard
Released: August 13, 2026