Court File and Parties

Court File No.: FC-23-00000190-0000 Date: 2026-03-23

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:

Ferris Elizabeth Gladys Petheram Applicant

-- and --

Walter David Petheram Respondent

Counsel: Jonathan Krashinsky, for the Applicant Maybelline Massey, for the Respondent

Heard: January 28, 29, 30, February 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

Reasons for Judgment

The Honourable Justice A.D. Hilliard

Overview

[1] On the first day of trial, the parties came to a comprehensive agreement on decision-making, communication through Our Family Wizard (OFW), child support -- ongoing and retroactive, section 7 expenses, dividing the existing RESP, life insurance to secure child support, sale of the matrimonial home, and post-separation adjustments.

[2] The issues that remained for me to determine after trial were equalization, regular and holiday parenting time, spousal support, carrying costs for the matrimonial home pending sale, occupation rent, and costs.

Background

[3] The parties met and started dating in June 2011. They began cohabitating in September 2011 and got married on October 1, 2016.

[4] Prior to marriage, the parties lived in a house owned by Mr. Petheram -- 579 Woodside Street, Fergus, Ontario (the Woodside property). Mr. Petheram was employed full-time with Premier Equipment working out of Elmira, Ontario as an integrated solutions manager. Ms. Petheram was employed full-time with Sunstar working as a bilingual customer service representative.

[5] Their only child, Bennett, was born on August 18, 2017. Ms. Petheram went on maternity leave in August 2017 and did not return to work until September 2018.

[6] Mr. Petheram did not take a paternity leave after Bennett was born. It is not significantly contested that Ms. Petheram was primarily responsible for childcare and maintaining the household while she was on maternity leave.

[7] Immediately after her maternity leave, Ms. Petheram returned to working at Sunstar. However, that position required her to travel to Guelph for work. A month after her return to work, Ms. Petheram took a job in Fergus that allowed her to be closer to home and Bennett's daycare.

[8] In early 2020, Mr. Petheram got an offer of employment with Schuyler Farms Limited, a large farming operation in Norfolk County. He was offered the position of Chief Operating Officer. In March 2020, the parties decided to move to Simcoe, Ontario so that Mr. Petheram could take the position with Schuyler Farms.

[9] The parties found a new home in Simcoe that was located adjacent to one of the properties owned by Schuyler Farms. The house was specifically selected due to its proximity to the farm operation where Mr. Petheram would be working.

[10] Ms. Petheram quit her job in Fergus in May 2020 in anticipation of the move to Simcoe. She did not work outside of the home again until after the parties separated.

[11] The Woodside property was sold in 2020. The proceeds of sale (approximately $175,000) were deposited into a Tangerine savings account owned by Mr. Petheram.

[12] 579 Concession 13, Simcoe, Ontario (the Matrimonial Home) was purchased on June 21, 2020. Title to the Matrimonial Home was registered in the names of both parties in joint tenancy.

[13] In 2022, the parties applied to and were accepted for a reality television show called Farmhouse Facelift. The Matrimonial Home underwent significant renovations as part of participation in Farmhouse Facelift. The entire cost of the renovations was estimated at $269,479.45.

[14] Mr. Petheram arranged for the payment of the total renovation costs to the producers of Farmhouse Facelift. There is a disagreement about the conversations the parties had about how and where Mr. Petheram obtained the money to pay for the renovations. Ultimately, it came to be known that Mr. Petheram took the money from his mother's farm account that he was managing after the death of his father and not from the Tangerine account that had the proceeds of sale from the Woodside property.

[15] In August 2023, the same month the parties separated, a letter was sent by a lawyer on behalf of Mr. Petheram's mother demanding repayment of the money removed from the farm account along with the return of certain items that were allegedly removed from the farm without consent.

[16] Mr. Petheram moved out of the matrimonial home shortly after the parties separated. He then transferred $10,000 to Ms. Petheram to pay for household expenses. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Petheram withdrew an additional $20,000 from the parties' joint account.

[17] Bennett has been diagnosed with a number of health issues, including a lazy eye, ingrown toenails, and a breathing issue for which he requires a CPAP machine when he sleeps.

[18] Bennett's vision issues initially required that he wear a patch for periods of time during the day. He was then accepted into a program whereby he receives atropine eye drops to dilate his pupil. This medication is designed to eliminate the need for patching. However, the drops must be administered three times weekly -- Monday, Wednesday and Friday in the morning. Ms. Petheram is exclusively administering eye drops to Bennett. After Mr. Petheram's weekend parenting time, Ms. Petheram attends at Bennett's school on Monday mornings to administer the drops.

[19] Bennett was referred to a chiropodist for his ingrown toenails. After it was determined that treatment by way of topical creams was not effectively managing the condition, a nail evulsion procedure was recommended. Mr. Petheram did not consent to the procedure until Ms. Petheram brought a motion to dispense with his consent. The motion was ultimately resolved on consent the day of the motion.

[20] It was discovered that Bennett has sleep apnea after he underwent a sleep study and a CPAP machine was prescribed for his use. Bennett uses the machine when he sleeps and it has to transition between the homes of his parents on weekends. The parties were unable to come to an agreement as to how Bennett's CPAP machine should be exchanged. Ms. Petheram was leaving the machine at school with administrative staff and then Mr. Petheram was returning the machine by leaving it at the matrimonial home in between the screen door and the door to the house.

[21] In 2025, Ms. Petheram contacted Mr. Petheram about enrolling Bennett in hockey. Mr. Petheram refused to consent. Ms. Petheram decided to enroll Bennett anyway. For the 2025/2026 season, up to the trial, Bennett attended practices and games only during his parenting time with Ms. Petheram.

Parenting Time

Judicial Interview

[22] Ms. Petheram brought a motion at the commencement of trial seeking that I conduct a judicial interview with Bennett. Mr. Petheram was opposed to that request.

[23] I heard argument on the motion prior to the commencement of the evidence. After considering the submissions of counsel, I reserved judgment until the end of trial. I provided brief oral reasons for deferring my decision and indicated that I would accept hearsay evidence from the parties and their witnesses as to Bennett's views and preferences.

[24] After the completion of all the evidence, I heard additional submissions on whether I should conduct a judicial interview. After hearing those, I advised the parties that I would not be conducting a judicial interview and would provide my reasons for declining in my judgment on the trial.

[25] The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNHCR), Article 12, affirms the right of children capable of forming their views to express and have them be heard in a judicial proceeding affecting them. As Benotto J.A. confirmed in M.A.A. v. D.E.M.E., "[t]he right of children to participate in matters involving them is fundamental to family law proceedings. Canada has adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child, effectively guaranteeing that their views will be heard."[^1]

[26] When attempting to ascertain the views and preference of a child or children, a trial judge may interview a child under the authority of section 64(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act (CLRA). However, as the Court of Appeal noted in Uldrian v Uldrian, "ss. 24 and 64 of the Children's Law Reform Act do not impose a duty on a trial judge to interview the child. This is a matter for his discretion."[^2] Courts must determine "on a case by case basis, using a flexible approach" whether or not a judicial interview is appropriate and in the best interests of the child.[^3]

[27] It is not disputed that parenting time is possibly the most fundamental issue for which the views and preferences of children should be ascertained.[^4] However, there are other means by which evidence about a child's views and preference can be obtained other than a judicial interview. I agree with the position of my colleague, McDermot J., who wrote "[j]udicial interviews are one means by which the children's views and preference may be provided to the court."[^5]

[28] In this case, although I did not have the benefit of an Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) counsel, clinical report, or section 30 assessment, I heard evidence from the parties and their collateral witnesses about their interactions with Bennett and the things he reportedly told them. After hearing that evidence, I determined that interviewing Bennett was not appropriate because it was clear to me that Bennett is already a child caught in the middle of his parents struggle for control. I had concerns about Bennett's level of awareness of the conflict between his parents, even at his young age. I was concerned that interviewing Bennett would only serve to reinforce that his parents cannot put aside their differences and come to an agreement about what is best for him.

[29] Another factor in my decision was that the parents own evidence about Bennett's views and preferences was not particularly inconsistent. Mr. Petheram in fact conceded during his evidence that he expected that if I conducted a judicial interview that Bennett would say he wants to spend more time at his mother's residence. I am not persuaded that Mr. Petheram's evidence about what he anticipates Bennett would say during a judicial interview should support an adverse inference as argued by Ms. Petheram. Rather I find that Mr. Petheram's testimony demonstrates his understanding and recognition of Bennett's deep connection with and attachment to his mother.

[30] There was no evidence that Bennett has ever expressed a desire to tell someone, let alone a judge, what parenting schedule he would prefer. I accept that there are many children who wish to have their views heard and considered by the judge who is making decisions that affect them. However, I am of the view that there are many children, particularly those caught in between two parents who they dearly love and wish to please, that would much prefer that the decision be made for them.

[31] I accept that Bennett is a mature 8 1/2 year old. However, he is still young. His views and preference although important, are but one factor in determining what parenting schedule is in his best interests. The weight to be given to Bennett's views and preferences at his age would not be determinative and, in my view, the potential downside did not outweigh the benefits.

[32] Finally, I concluded that Bennett's views and preferences could be ascertained from the evidence I did hear. I accept that Bennett has expressed to his mother a desire to spend more time at her home. I also accept that Bennett enjoys the time he spends at his father's home. Ultimately, I find that Bennett does not wish to have the time he spends at Mr. Petheram's home increased at present.

Changing the current schedule

[33] Both parents are seeking a change to the schedule that has been in place now for twenty (20) months. Although I accept that the parenting schedule was agreed to by Mr. Petheram on a without prejudice basis, I agree with the opening remarks of Pazaratz J. in Churchill v Elliot: ""Without prejudice." In parenting orders you can only say it so many times -- and for so many months (years?) -- before it starts to lose its impact."[^6]

[34] I accept that Mr. Petheram has taken the position throughout the litigation that he should have equal parenting time with Bennett. However, I find that over time, Mr. Petheram has acquiesced to a parenting schedule whereby Ms. Petheram is the primary parent.

[35] However, the status quo that has been created by the passage of time cuts both ways. Ms. Petheram is also seeking an order that represents a change to the long-standing parenting arrangement. Her counsel's reliance of the comments on Pazaratz J. must therefore be applied equally to her request as they do to Mr. Petheram's.

[36] I accept that the parties have had issues with communication, and particularly a lack of timely response by Mr. Petheram. However, the inability to effectively communicate has been generally addressed by the consent to a final order granting Ms. Petheram sole decision-making authority.

[37] After separation, the parties agreed to communicate exclusively via the parenting app, Our Family Wizard (OFW). There was an interim order requiring the parties to respond to OFW messages within 24 hours. Despite that court order, Mr. Petheram would often not respond to Ms. Petheram's messages in the requisite time period.

[38] I am not satisfied that Mr. Petheram's failure to read and respond to OFW messages in a timely way demonstrates a lack of interest in Bennett's wellbeing. I find that Mr. Petheram was often overwhelmed by the sheer volume of communications sent by Ms. Petheram, almost all of which required a response. Mr. Petheram's aversion to conflict often resulted in him failing or refusing to respond to what he perceived to be a barrage of messages from Ms. Petheram.

[39] Although he was reluctant to concede this during his evidence, I am of the view that Mr. Petheram believes that sometimes Ms. Petheram overreacts to issues Bennett is having and that she is, at times, over-vigilant in her approach to medical treatment.

[40] The issue with Bennett's ingrown toes is one example.

[41] Ms. Petheram would have me believe that Mr. Petheram was either oblivious to or outright ignored Bennett's suffering as a result of his ingrown toenails. In support of her position, Ms. Petheram points to Mr. Petheram's responses to the proposed treatment, specifically his failure to provide consent to the toe evulsion procedure prior to a motion being brought. She also references his evidence at trial in which he still would not concede that he was wrong to not consent to the evulsion procedure sooner than he did.

[42] Certainly, Ms. Petheram's position is one explanation of Mr. Petheram's actions and his evidence at trial. However, there is also another possible explanation. Mr. Petheram has a different perspective than Ms. Petheram on the amount of pain ingrown toenails can cause given that he suffered from this same problem as a child. Mr. Petheram's personal perspective on the impact of ingrown toes is an insight that Ms. Petheram simply cannot share, having never had any personal experience with the condition.

[43] I find that Mr. Petheram is not indifferent or oblivious to Bennett's suffering. Rather, I find that Mr. Petheram had his own views of how Bennett's ingrown toenails should be treated, which was mostly informed by his own experiences as a child. Mr. Petheram's refusal to consent to the toe evulsion procedure was based on his disagreement with what he believed to be an unnecessary medical intervention, a belief which he continues to stand by. Parents can reasonably disagree on medical treatment. This particular condition was not life threatening, although I accept that it was quite painful for Bennett.

[44] Mr. Petheram's approach to Bennett's participation in hockey is another example of these two parents taking very different views on an issue.

[45] Mr. Petheram was forthcoming in his evidence insofar as he acknowledged that he did not want Bennett to be registered for hockey because he did not believe that Bennett would remain committed to playing for an entire season. On this issue, however, Mr. Petheram acknowledged that he was wrong. He conceded that Bennett enjoys playing hockey and even went to one of Bennett's games after the trial commenced.

[46] I have concluded that Mr. Petheram's refusal to take Bennett to hockey practices and games during his parenting time was Mr. Petheram taking a principled stand on an issue after having conceded on most others. I find that Mr. Petheram chose hockey as his line in the sand because it is not a medical issue. I infer from Mr. Petheram's evidence that he believes he has conceded most other unilateral decisions Ms. Petheram has made and he was not prepared to give in on hockey after having specifically said he did not agree with Bennett being registered.

[47] Just because two people have different parenting styles and approaches does not mean that one or the other of them is wrong. Two very different parents can adequately and sufficiently meet the needs of the same child. I find that is the case with these two parties. Mr. Petheram is not the lackadaisical parent that Ms. Petheram would have me believe. On the other hand, Ms. Petheram is not as overbearing and overreactive as Mr. Petheram might like me to infer.

[48] Ms. Petheram testified that Bennett has told her that Mr. Petheram and his partner argue when he is there and it makes him scared. Ms. Petheram's mother also testified that Bennett has made similar disclosures about fighting between his Dad and new partner. With respect to this allegation, I am not persuaded that the situation is a stark or as black and white as Ms. Petheram suggests.

[49] Undoubtedly Ms. Petheram's residence with Bennett is a much quieter place than Mr. Petheram's home. When Bennett is in the care of his mother, it is just the two of them. Mr. Petheram and his new partner have a daughter who is under the age of two. Mr. Petheram's new spouse, by her own evidence at trial, is boisterous in how she expresses herself. She and Mr. Petheram also testified that there are times during which her young adult children are in the home, as well as extended family who come and visit for weeks at a time.

[50] With respect to Ms. Petheram's evidence that Bennett has asked her if she and Mr. Petheram can get back together because they never argued, I am not surprised that Bennett perceives his parents as never having argued during their marriage. Mr. Petheram has demonstrated a pattern of conflict avoidance post-separation that leads me to conclude that he was similarly conflict averse during the marriage. However, I am not satisfied that the evidence of Ms. Petheram and her mother as to what Bennett has told them about his father's home leads to the inevitable conclusion that Mr. Petheram and his new partner have a highly conflictual relationship.

[51] I accept the evidence of Mr. Petheram and his partner that their home is sometimes noisy and that she can express herself in a loud and animated way. I find that their evidence is not incompatible with the perception of an 8-year-old who grew up with two parents who communicated very differently than Mr. Petheram and his current partner. I am not persuaded that the perception of Bennett as to the environment in his father's residence should result in a reduction in Mr. Petheram's parenting time.

[52] With respect to the issues raised by Ms. Petheram in her evidence about the lack of proper adult supervision in Mr. Petheram's home, I am not persuaded that Bennett is either left alone for long periods of time while in his father's home, or that Bennett is placed in a caregiving role to his baby sister. I accept the evidence of Mr. Petheram and his spouse that Bennett is not placed in a caregiving role to his sister and that he is not left for long periods of time alone in his room.

[53] Bennett's perception of being left alone at his father's residence must be considered in the context of having the undivided attention of his mother when he is in her care. I infer from Ms. Petheram's evidence that when Bennett is in her care they are constantly together and interacting with one another, unless other people are present or he is asleep. I accept that there are instances when Bennett feels alone at his father's residence because the adults are otherwise occupied or he is in his room by himself. That is not, however, a justification for a reduction in Mr. Petheram's parenting time.

[54] Overall, after having considered the evidence of both parties and their collaterals, I find that the current parenting schedule is generally working well and has created stability and predictability for Bennett. As I said to the parties at the end of the trial, I believe that they both love Bennett very much and that he loves them. I find that they are each, in their individual ways, adequately and sufficiently meeting Bennett's needs. I am not persuaded that the difference in their respective parenting styles justifies a change in the current parenting schedule.

[55] I am also not satisfied that the corollary parenting issues raised by Ms. Petheram, specifically attendance at hockey, the exchange of Bennett's CPAP machine and the administration of eye drops, require a change to the parenting schedule. For the reasons below, I have concluded that those issues can be adequately addressed by provisions in the final order.

[56] I have therefore concluded that it is in Bennett's best interests that the regular parenting schedule remain the same on a final basis.

[57] Given my conclusions about both parties being adequate and appropriate parents, I have determined that there should be an equal sharing of time during the holidays. I have set out a schedule for the parties to follow failing an agreement between them to some other shared schedule.[^7]

Corollary Issues

Hockey

[58] The parties filed an agreed statement of facts confirming that Bennett loves to play hockey and wishes to continuing participating in hockey on a regular basis. This agreement represented a shift in the position of Mr. Petheram on the issue of hockey, which was appropriate albeit made only mid-way through the trial.

[59] Unfortunately, there was no agreement filed on the issue of whether Mr. Petheram would take Bennett to his hockey games and practices during his parenting time. When I directly questioned him on this issue, Mr. Petheram said that he would follow whatever the Court's direction was about hockey during his parenting time.

[60] I find that participating in organized hockey is important for Bennett's health, overall growth, and development. Bennett participating in hockey is not an encroachment on parenting time. Both parents are equally capable of taking Bennett to hockey and helping him dress for games and practices. The time and financial commitment is not so significant as to create an insurmountable burden for either parent.

[61] Playing hockey is important enough for Bennett that he should be attending regardless of which parent is caring for him. Bennett should not be made to feel that hockey is a burden. He should not be made to feel that one of his parents do not support him in this activity that he clearly enjoys participating in.

[62] Given the parties previous inability to agree on this issue, I am persuaded that there should be provision in the final order that both parents will either take Bennett to his scheduled games and practices during their parenting time or provide the other parent the opportunity to do so.

Bennett's CPAP machine

[63] Another issue the parties were unable to agree on is the exchange of Bennett's CPAP machine -- a medically necessary device.

[64] I accept that Mr. Petheram has read the user manual for the CPAP machine and accurately reported in his testimony the variation of temperature tolerance the machine can withstand. However, I also accept as reasonable Ms. Petheram's concerns that a machine that cost the parties over $1,000 should not be exchanged in a manner that risks damaging it when there are other options available.

[65] Like many issues in this trial, the disagreement over how to exchange Bennett's CPAP machine comes down to a battle of wills. Mr. Petheram believes that Ms. Petheram is being unreasonable and is therefore unwilling to compromise his position. Although I understand the objection to using school staff to assist with transitioning the CPAP machine, Mr. Petheram's evidence that it is more convenient to drive to and drop off the machine of at the matrimonial home rather than walk around to the other side of the school and leave it with the administrative staff is not particularly reasonable or believable. However, Ms. Petheram's insistence on her way and no other way is also not reasonable in the circumstances.

[66] If the parties cannot be civil enough to personally exchange the CPAP machine, then Ms. Petheram will have to obtain a tote or container with a lid and leave it on her front porch for pick up and drop off. I agree with Mr. Petheram insofar as using school staff to exchange the machine is not appropriate albeit for a different reason.

[67] The issue is not the inconvenience to school staff, as Mr. Petheram contends, but rather the message that sends to Bennett -- Mom and Dad are unable to work together to find a way to get his CPAP machine exchanged between their homes without it having to be left at school. A CPAP machine is not a small item that is easily and discreetly handed off. It may be that Bennett does not wish for his peers to know that he has a machine that he has to use that travels with him between his two homes. Although the use of a CPAP machine is nothing that Bennett should be ashamed of or feel self-conscious about, it is not something that is ubiquitous for a child of his age.

[68] Therefore, the final order will contain a provision that requires the parties to utilize a drop box exchange system for Bennett's CPAP machine not school staff if they are unable to agree on a hand-to-hand exchange.

Bennett's eye drops

[69] Another source of conflict is which parent should be administering Bennett's medically required eye drops.

[70] I am skeptical of Ms. Petheram's evidence that Bennett advised her that the way in which his Dad administered his eye drops hurt him. All of the evidence on the issue of the eye drops leads me to conclude that Mr. Petheram never even had eye drops to administer.

[71] I accept that Ms. Petheram unilaterally imposed the arrangement whereby she attends the school to administer the eye drops on Monday mornings after Bennett's weekend with his father. Again, in my view, this is an unnecessary encroachment on Bennett's time at school which should be a place where he is undisturbed by the conflict between his parents. I find that Mr. Petheram acquiesced to the arrangement of Ms. Petheram attending the school to administer the eye drops simply to avoid further conflict.

[72] There is no evidence that Mr. Petheram is incapable of administering Bennett's eye drops during his parenting time. All of the evidence I accept leads me to conclude that Mr. Petheram has never even been given the chance to administer the eye drops. Mr. Petheram's evidence, which I accept, is that he is ready willing and able to give Bennett his eye drops during his parenting time.

[73] As with Bennett's CPAP machine, I am of the view that the administration of eye drops does not and should not be occurring at and during school hours. It is entirely unnecessary for Bennett to have to be removed from class or taken from before school interactions with friends and peers to attend the office to have his mother administer eye drops. Furthermore, Ms. Petheram's insistence on being the only parent to administer Bennett's drops sends the wrong message -- that his father is incapable of properly attending to Bennett's medical needs.

[74] I accept that Bennett expressed to his mother a preference that she be the one to administer his drops. However, it was notable that during her evidence, Ms. Petheram at no point indicated that she attempted to reassure Bennett that his father was equally as capable as she was. I find that Ms. Petheram did not genuinely try to include Mr. Petheram in administering the eye drops or help him to understand how best to administer the drops in such a way as to maximize Bennett's comfort.

[75] Part of encouraging a good relationship with the other parent involves communicating confidence in their ability to meet the child's needs. Ms. Petheram is indirectly telling Bennett that his father is unable to properly administer his eye drops by insisting on doing it herself.

[76] I am satisfied that there is a need to include a provision in the final order requiring the parties to cooperate in ensuring that Bennett's eye drops are administered by the parent in whose care he is at the time the drops are required and that the administration of eye drops at school cease.

Spousal Support

Entitlement

[77] During the trial, Mr. Petheram appropriately conceded that Ms. Petheram is entitled to spousal support. Consequently, I will only briefly explain why I agree with this concession.

[78] Ms. Petheram is entitled to spousal support on both a compensatory and non-compensatory basis.

[79] It is not significantly disputed that Ms. Petheram has been primarily responsible for caring for Bennett. She took a one-year maternity leave to care for Bennett after he was born while Mr. Petheram worked full-time. Even after her maternity leave was over, both before and after the move to Simcoe, Ms. Petheram bore the lion's share of the responsibility of ensuring that Bennett's day to day needs were met. When the parties lived in Fergus, Ms. Petheram took a job that was closer to Bennett's daycare so that she could be available to pick him up when necessary.

[80] Although I accept that Mr. Petheram participated in caring for Bennett in the evenings after he got home from work, he did not seriously dispute that his job was less flexible, insofar as he was less available to pick up Bennett after daycare or in case of an emergency. Then once the parties moved to Simcoe, although the matrimonial home was located on the farm property, Mr. Petheram's duties required him to leave early in the morning and often not return until the evening.

[81] The parties relocated from Fergus to Norfolk County so Mr. Petheram could take a job as chief operating officer of a large farm operation. I accept that the job Mr. Petheram accepted was a significant career advancement and a job of the type that he had coveted for most of his life. I find that Ms. Petheram's opportunities for career advancement were impacted by the move to Norfolk County, as she had to leave a job where she had established her work ethic and value to the company. It is also not disputed that after the move to Norfolk County Ms. Petheram did not work until after separation, which further impacted her options for career advancement.

[82] Based on the agreed statement of facts filed, the parties agreed on their respective incomes after separation. There is no dispute that Mr. Petheram's income, before he was terminated from his employment at Schuyler Farms was significantly more than Ms. Petheram's. There was no evidence led that Ms. Petheram has ever made an income that is comparable to Mr. Petheram's, even when she was employed full-time in Fergus.

Lump sum vs periodic

[83] Ms. Petheram seeks an order for periodic spousal support. Mr. Petheram's position at trial was that any spousal support awarded should be by way of a lump sum.

[84] Lump sum spousal support is the exception and should only be awarded in the clearest of cases. I am not satisfied that this is one of those exceptional cases where spousal support should be awarded as a lump sum.

[85] The Court of Appeal made it clear that lump sum spousal support awards should be the exception and not the rule for four (4) practical reasons:

First, in many instances, moneys will simply not be available to fund a lump sum support award either to take the place of, or to supplement, an award of periodic support. Instead, support will be paid from one spouse's income, the only available source for support payments, and it will be paid to finance the ongoing needs of the other spouse, which will generally be of a periodic rather than lump sum character.

Second, for married couples, the court will have determined already the amount to be paid to equalize the value of the spouses' net family properties: see s. 5, Family Law Act. In many circumstances, this payment will obviate any requirements a dependent spouse may have for transitional capital.

Third, in many cases, there will be no considerations favouring a lump sum award from the perspective of either spouse.

Fourth, in at least some cases where there are considerations favouring a lump sum award, the general exigencies of life, including the possibility that the parties' means and needs will change, will outweigh the considerations favouring a lump sum award.[^8]

[86] Although there may be sufficient funds available from the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home to fund a lump sum spousal support order, I am not persuaded that the availability of those funds is determinative. There will be a payment to Ms. Petheram out of the proceeds of sale that will obviate any needs she may have for transitional capital.

[87] The only consideration favouring a lump sum award in this case is that enunciated by Mr. Petheram in his evidence -- avoiding future litigation on the issue of spousal support and thereby reducing at least one source of potential conflict between the parties. Although I agree that a lump sum award would provide certainty in this regard, that advantage is not determinative when considering the fourth factor -- the possibility of changes in the parties' means and needs. Both parties are still relatively young. Bennett is not yet 9 years old. The likelihood of changes in both parties means and needs is significant. Furthermore, there is some uncertainty as to what Mr. Petheram's employment situation will be into the future given his recent termination.

[88] The Court of Appeal recently emphasized the importance of considering section 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act, which sets out the objectives of a spousal support order: to recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown and apportion between spouses the financial consequences arising from the care of children of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of those children.[^9] These considerations are relevant to the determination of where in the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG) range an award should be made -- low, mid or high.

[89] The strength of the compensatory claim and the needs of the recipient will inform the analysis as to where in the range an amount should fall. The mid-range is not simply a default position that the Court should reflexively award without further explanation.[^10]

[90] I find that Ms. Petheram has a strong compensatory claim given the parties move to Simcoe to accommodate Mr. Petheram's career choices and the years that Ms. Petheram was out of the workforce after the move to Simcoe. Bennett is also not yet 9 years old and requires before and after school care which has primarily been the responsibility of Ms. Petheram. She has had to make career choices with Bennett's care needs in mind as a result.

[91] However, I have also considered that Mr. Petheram has agreed to pay Child Support Guidelines table support based on his income at the job he was terminated from. Taking into account the child support Mr. Petheram has agreed to pay, the mid-range spousal support amount would result in Ms. Petheram receiving 51% of Net Disposable Income (NDI).[^11] If the high amount were awarded, Ms. Petheram would be receiving 53.5% of NDI.

[92] I have considered that Mr. Petheram now has a second child who he is financially responsible for. However, this factor must be balanced against the second income earner Mr. Petheram has in his new partner with whom he is able to share living expenses.

[93] In the circumstances, I am persuaded that an amount between the mid and high range is appropriate. I find that Ms. Petheram should be awarded 52% of NDI which results in a periodic monthly spousal support payment of $1,200.

Retroactive

[94] Mr. Petheram has not paid any spousal support since the date of separation.

[95] Ms. Petheram argued that the appropriate way to calculate retroactive spousal support is by way of a lump sum. She submitted calculations for lump sum spousal support on a retroactive basis (August 2013 to December 2025). Ms. Petheram also argued that there is no basis upon which Mr. Petheram should receive any credit against spousal support arrears as the consent submitted at the commencement of trial addresses post-separation adjustments.

[96] Mr. Petheram submits that retroactive support should be calculated on the parties' actual incomes based on the after-tax periodic amount owing at the low end of the range. He also argues that the $10,000 Ms. Petheram acknowledges receiving from him two (2) days after separation should be credited against any spousal support arrears owing, as well as the $20,000 withdrawal from the parties' joint account by Ms. Petheram after separation.

[97] The difficulty with calculating retroactive spousal support arrears on a periodic basis is two-fold: 1) I do not have any evidence as to what Ms. Petheram's income was for the year 2025 and 2) I did not receive any calculations that address what amounts would be owing on an after-tax basis using the parties' 2025 incomes.

[98] Despite the deficiencies in the evidence and the absence of calculations to support Mr. Petheram's position, I had enough information to prepare some rough calculations of my own. Based on the evidence I did receive, I have concluded that the range of retroactive spousal support owing based on a periodic calculation is likely within the range being proposed by Ms. Petheram for a lump sum amount.

[99] I am satisfied that the lump sum range proposed by Ms. Petheram, supported by spousal support calculations, is reasonable in the circumstances. I find that the appropriate amount of retroactive support to be awarded on a lump sum basis is $40,000.

[100] I am not persuaded, however, that the gratuitous transfer and withdrawal by Ms. Petheram post-separation was contemplated in the partial settlement submitted at the commencement of trial nor that Mr. Petheram should not receive any credit for those amounts against spousal support arrears. Ms. Petheram did not dispute that she received the total amount of $30,000 post-separation through a combination of a funds transfer and a withdrawal from the parties' joint account. These funds were received at a time when Ms. Petheram was not yet working and I find that the money was entirely from Mr. Petheram's income.

[101] The Consent to an Order submitted at the commencement of trial addresses child support arrears owing by Mr. Petheram and credits for one-half of the payments he made towards the mortgage, property taxes and house insurance, along with a credit for 100% of the payments he made for Ms. Petheram's car insurance. There is nothing in the settlement referring to the two amounts -- the $10,000 transfer or the $20,000 withdrawal. It would be inequitable for there to be no accounting of the $30,000 which Ms. Petheram acknowledges having received post-separation.

[102] I agree with Ms. Petheram's submission that those funds are not properly the subject of equalization as they were post-separation. However, as I have indicated, there must be some accounting of those funds. In my view, the most appropriate way to address these funds is as a set-off against retroactive spousal support owing. Therefore, the retroactive spousal support award will be reduced by $30,000, leaving a balance owing of $10,000.

Property Issues

[103] Prior to deciding whether one party owes the other an equalization payment, I must determine the date of marriage value for the Woodside Property, the value of disputed chattels, and whether the money Mr. Petheram took from his mother's farm account qualifies as a loan for which he gets a full deduction.

Value of Woodside on the Date of Marriage

[104] There was a court order requiring Mr. Petheram to obtain an appraisal of Woodside at the date of marriage. He did not comply with that order and consequently I did not have the benefit of evidence of the value of Woodside on October 1, 2016 by way of a formal appraisal.

[105] Ms. Petheram appropriately conceded that the lack of a formal appraisal does not result in Mr. Petheram being completely disentitled to a date of marriage deduction for Woodside. The issue is the evidence upon which I can determine what the value of Woodside was on October 1, 2016.

[106] Mr. Petheram has submitted documents relating to the refinancing of Woodside just one (1) year prior to the date of marriage. The documents make it clear that there was an appraisal undertaken by the bank and that the amount of money loaned by the bank was based on the appraised value. The documents further indicate that up to 100% of the appraised value can be registered against title. I find that the bank did in fact register 100% of the appraised value based on the charge amount being $335,000 and the loaned amount being $267,999.

[107] Mr. Petheram filed the Property Assessment Notice he received from the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) for the 2013 to 2016 property tax years. Based on that document, MPAC's assessment of the property value in 2015 was $302,000 and in 2016 $305,000.

[108] Mr. Petheram also submitted a report from House Sigma, a website that tracks real estate market trends and provides data on the median sale price of real estate properties based on available data. House Sigma found that there was an upward trend in the median price of houses sold in the Centre Wellington, Fergus area, with a +30% change in value. The document estimated a median price for Woodside in October 2016 of $425,000.

[109] The difficulty with the House Sigma document is that there was no evidence provided as to the inputs and presumptions used by the website to reach the conclusion as to the median price. I also did not receive any evidence as to what data the House Sigma website uses and relies on to create its estimated values. I therefore have placed no weight on the conclusion reached by House Sigma as to the estimated value of Woodside in October 2016.

[110] Despite my concerns about the overall veracity of the House Sigma document, I am satisfied that an average increase in value can be extrapolated from the data provided. There is no evidence that the housing market was flat or in decline in the year after the refinancing. Furthermore, the House Sigma data results in a modest increase in value of 2% per year.

[111] I am satisfied that there was more likely than not an increase in the market value of Woodside in the year that elapsed between refinancing and the date of marriage. I find that it is reasonable to attribute a 2% increase in the value of Woodside, resulting in a date of marriage value of $341,700.

Value of Miscellaneous Disputed Items in NFP

Tools

[112] Mr. Petheram has numerous tools and other personal property, some of which remains at the matrimonial home and some of which has been removed. Although he initially estimated their value at nil, during his evidence at trial Mr. Petheram revised his position to a value of $10,000. Ms. Petheram's position is that all of Mr. Petheram's tools and tool accessories are worth $30,000. Neither party provided any appraisals or market comparators to support their estimates.

[113] The value of personal property is not what it would cost to replace it but what each used piece of property could reasonably be sold for in its used condition. However, I accept Ms. Petheram's evidence that during the marriage Mr. Petheram spent thousands of dollars purchasing tools, tool chests, and items such as a snow blower.

[114] Despite the absence of corroborative evidence, both parties agree that the tools have some value in the range of thousands of dollars. I find that the tools likely have a re-sale value of greater than $10,000, but less than $30,000.

[115] I therefore find that the appropriate value to be attributed to the tools and equipment is $20,000.

BMO US Savings Account

[116] There is a discrepancy between the amount listed in each of the party's NFPs for the money in the BMO US savings account. Having reviewed the comparative NFP, I am satisfied that the discrepancy is due to Mr. Petheram having listed the value in US dollars and Ms. Petheram having converted US dollar amount to Canadian dollars.

[117] The appropriate value to be used is the Canadian conversion.

Joint Chequing Account value on DOM

[118] Mr. Petheram is seeking a deduction for money that was in a joint chequing account on the date of marriage. The evidence he provided in support of that amount is a bank statement dated October 19, 2016. The parties' date of marriage is October 1, 2016.

[119] Ms. Petheram argues that Mr. Petheram should not be entitled to this deduction as the evidence of what was in that bank account on October 1, 2016 was available and not produced. However, I note that Ms. Petheram does not provide any evidence that the parties received $12,000 after October 1, 2016 that would account for the money in the joint chequing account such that a deduction is not appropriate. There was no evidence that, for example, the parties received approximately $12,000 in cash as wedding gifts.

[120] I find that it is more likely than not that on the date of marriage Mr. Petheram had approximately $12,000 in the BMO chequing account given that the statement dated October 19, 2016 shows a balance of $12,114.18 and there is no evidence to the contrary.

[121] Therefore, I am satisfied that Mr. Petheram is entitled to this date of marriage deduction.

2008 Ford Fusion

[122] There is no dispute that Ms. Petheram owned a 2008 Ford Fusion on the date of marriage. Although the evidence at trial was that this vehicle was disposed of by the parties around the time that Bennett was born in 2017, I am satisfied that the vehicle had some value on the date of marriage.

[123] Having considered the evidence of Ms. Petheram that the Fusion was purchased for $12,000 in approximately 2013, I am satisfied that the proposed value of $2,000 on the date of marriage is reasonable. Mr. Petheram has provided no evidence to support his position that the Fusion was not worth anything on the date of marriage such that Ms. Petheram should not be entitled to some deduction.

2006 Grizzly Trailer

[124] Finally, with respect to the line entry for a 2006 Grizzly Trailer owned by Mr. Petheram on the date of marriage, there is no evidence that such a trailer existed after the date of marriage or that it was disposed of between the date of marriage and the date of separation. Mr. Petheram has not provided any evidence of this trailer for which he is seeking a deduction. Ms. Petheram's position is that this line item is an error and that Mr. Petheram did not own such a trailer on the date of marriage.

[125] I am satisfied that there is no evidence to support a finding that Mr. Petheram owned a 2006 Grizzly Trailer on the date of separation. Therefore, his claim for a $4,000 deduction for this item will be dismissed.

Loan from Sharon Petheram

[126] Section 4(3) of the Family Law Act (FLA) places the onus of proving a deduction or exclusion from net family property on the person claiming it. A spouse's debts and other liabilities are valid deductions from net family property as per the definition set out at section 4(1)(a) of the FLA.

[127] If the money obtained by Mr. Petheram to pay for the renovations to the matrimonial home was a loan from his mother than those monies should properly be deducted from his net family property. If, however, the money was a gift or determined to be something other than a loan, Mr. Petheram may not be entitled to the deduction he is claiming.

[128] The factors to be considered in determining whether there was a loan, were set out by the Court of Appeal in Chao v Chao:

1. whether there were any contemporaneous documents evidencing a loan;

2. whether the manner for repayment is specified;

3. whether there is security held for the loan;

4. whether there are advances to one child and not others, or advances of unequal amounts to various children;

5. whether there has been any demand for payment before the separation of the parties;

6. whether there has been any partial repayment; and

7. whether there was any expectation or likelihood of repayment.[^12]

[129] The loan documents tendered in evidence were all executed by Mr. Petheram and Mrs. Petheram after the date of separation. The first loan agreement was signed on November 20, 2023. The amended loan agreement was signed on February 7, 2025.

[130] There is nothing in the loan document regarding repayment of the principal amount of the loan, rather the loan agreement provides for interest-only payments. Even the subsequent agreement that was signed after Mr. Petheram defaulted on his interest-only payments, still does not provide for any repayment of the principal amount of the loan. There is also provision for the loan to be set-off against any amounts owing to Mr. Petheram from his mother's estate in the event of her death.

[131] There is no security held by Mrs. Petheram for the loan.

[132] I did not hear any specific evidence from Mrs. Petheram about any similar advances of money given to her other children. However, I infer from her evidence that when she learned of the money that Mr. Petheram had removed from the farm account, she had concerns about the equity of one of her children receiving a large sum of money when her other children were not receiving anything. The evidence of Mrs. Petheram regarding the monies having to be accounted for by Mr. Petheram, supports an inference that none of her other children were gifted or advanced money.

[133] Whether there was a demand for payment prior to separation is difficult to ascertain. Although the letter sent to Mr. Petheram by Courtney Boyd on behalf of Mrs. Petheram certainly could be characterized as a demand letter, the date of that letter is contemporaneous with the parties' separation. The evidence of Mrs. Petheram, which I accept, is that she and her son were in ongoing discussions throughout 2023 about how the money he withdrew would be accounted for. However, she did not testify that she ever made any specific demand for repayment until the letter sent by Ms. Boyd on August 10, 2023. I also note that the letter appears to be sent to motivate Mr. Petheram to resume his discussions and negotiations with his mother. I have also considered that Ms. Boyd's letter characterizes the funds not as a loan but rather as monies removed without authorization.

[134] Mr. Petheram acknowledged that he has not made any payments towards the balance he claims is owing to his mother. His evidence was that he made one (1) interest-only payment and he has not made any further payments.

[135] Mrs. Petheram's evidence was somewhat oblique on the issue of whether she actually expects her son to repay the funds in her lifetime. She did, however, make it clear that she would never take her son to court to enforce the loan agreement and her evidence was that she did not expect repayment any time soon given Mr. Petheram's other financial obligations.

[136] I must also consider the issue of how the money was obtained by Mr. Petheram in the first instance. The evidence of Mrs. Petheram leaves me with no doubt that the money was taken in the first instance without her knowledge and consent. The letter from Ms. Boyd confirms that as of August 2023 there had not been a meeting of the minds between Mr. Petheram and his mother as to how the issue of the money he withdrew from the farm account would be dealt with.

[137] The evidence of Mr. Petheram and his mother support a conclusion that there was an understanding between them that he would be monetarily reimbursed for the work he was performing on the family farm. Although there was no specific agreement as to how much he would receive, Mrs. Petheram conceded that she did expect to pay her son some amount of money. She was certainly not expecting him to work for free. Her evidence was that after Mr. Petheram removed the money from the farm account for his renovations, there was never an accounting of or agreement on what credit he is owed for the work he had performed.

[138] I find that the characterization of the money Mr. Petheram obtained from his mother's farm account as a "loan" is a form of revisionist history. The money Mr. Petheram removed from his mother's farm account is not a loan based on the factors set out in Chao and taking into account my finding that the money was initially obtained without Mrs. Petheram's consent.

[139] I accept that there will ultimately have to be some accounting of that money as between Mr. Petheram and his mother, but how and when that will occur is undefined at present. I find that it is more likely than not that Mr. Petheram will not pay back the money owed to his mother during her lifetime. I find it is also likely that whatever money is ultimately determined to be owed by Mr. Petheram, there will be some reconciling against the money his mother acknowledged owing him for work on the family farm, which will reduce the overall balance.

[140] If Mr. Petheram had received an inheritance from his mother and used those monies towards renovations on the matrimonial home, he would not be entitled to a deduction from his net family property. Although I accept that the money was not an inter vivos transfer, I am of the view that it is closer to an inheritance or gift than it is to a loan.

[141] Having said that, the evidence of both Mr. Petheram and his mother is that he made the first interest-only payment pursuant to the original loan agreement. I find that this interest payment should be attributed to Mr. Petheram as a liability for the purpose of assessing net family property. But for the money that was removed from his mother's farm account to pay for renovations to the matrimonial home, which benefited both of the parties, Mr. Petheram would not have had to make that payment. I therefore find that the liability to be attributed to Mr. Petheram for the purposes of determining his NFP is $21,162.36.

Equalization -- Bottom Line

[142] Taking into consideration the values I ascribed to the disputed items and adjusting the values in the parties' respective NFPs accordingly, I conclude that Ms. Petheram owed to Mr. Petheram an equalization payment in the amount of $22,434.29.

Occupational Rent

[143] The claim for occupational rent was never plead by Mr. Petheram. However, I accept that it was raised by Mr. Petheram prior to trial and, in my view, the claim should not be summarily dismissed on a procedural basis alone.

[144] Gilmore, J. helpfully set out the relevant principles to be considered when determining whether or not occupational rent should be ordered:

1. When was the demand for occupational rent made?

2. Did the non-occupying spouse suffer financial difficulty as a result of having to rent elsewhere?

3. What were the circumstances under which the non-occupying spouse left the home?

4. Who was paying for the expenses for the home?

5. Did the occupying spouse increase or decrease the selling price of the home?

6. Did the non-occupying spouse move for the sale of the home?

7. Are there other competing claims in the litigation that may offset any award of occupation rent?[^13]

[145] The issue of occupational rent was first raised at the trial management conference in this matter. There is no evidence that there was ever a formal demand made, and, as I have already noted, a claim for occupational rent was not included in Mr. Petheram's Answer.

[146] Mr. Petheram did not provide any evidence that he suffered financial difficulties as a result of having to reside outside of the matrimonial home after separation. The evidence is that Mr. Petheram moved in with his current partner. I infer from this evidence that he was thereby able to share his living expenses.

[147] The undisputed evidence of Ms. Petheram is that Mr. Petheram voluntarily left the matrimonial home shortly after the parties decided to separate. Mr. Petheram did not challenge Ms. Petheram's continued occupation of the matrimonial home. There was no motion brought by either party regarding exclusive possession.

[148] Without a court order, Mr. Petheram continued to pay for the expenses of the matrimonial home, albeit I note that he was not paying any spousal support.

[149] There is no evidence that Ms. Petheram increased or decreased the value of the matrimonial home during the period of her exclusive possession.

[150] Perhaps the most important consideration in this case is Mr. Petheram's position throughout most of the litigation, specifically his desire to purchase Ms. Petheram's interest in the matrimonial home and occupy it himself. This position was only abandoned late last year after Mr. Petheram's employment with Schuyler Farms was terminated. Although this was by no means an unreasonable position for Mr. Petheram to take, the reality is that he did not move for the sale of the matrimonial home at any point in the litigation prior to trial. I do not accept the argument that his position of wanting to buy out Ms. Petheram's interest in the matrimonial home should be viewed as him attempting to realize on his equity.

[151] Finally, I would note that although there are no specific claims that would completely offset the claim for occupational rent, Mr. Petheram did negotiate and receive post-separation adjustment credits for amounts he paid towards the mortgage and property taxes.

[152] Overall, I am not satisfied that an award of occupational rent would be equitable in these circumstances.

Carrying Costs for the Matrimonial Home

[153] Mr. Petheram has been maintaining the carrying costs for the matrimonial home since separation. However, it is agreed that Ms. Petheram will continue to reside in the matrimonial home until it is sold. She is therefore enjoying the full benefit of occupying the residence with Bennett.

[154] As Mr. Petheram will be paying spousal support going forward as a result of this judgment, I am of the view that Ms. Petheram ought to be paying for the entirety of the carrying costs of the matrimonial home until the home is sold. It would not be equitable for Mr. Petheram to continue contributing to the carrying costs of the matrimonial home and pay child and spousal support.

Conclusion

[155] Throughout the trial, both parties referred to their post-separation relationship as "high conflict". I wanted to conclude with a comment about that perception. Based on the evidence I heard over the eight days of trial, I disagree with the characterization of these parties and their post-separation interactions as "high conflict". Although I accept that they have been unable to reach an agreement on almost everything up to the eve or day of trial or a motion, I do not equate that with high conflict in the typical sense -- parents exposing their children to arguments and verbal confrontations. In my view, this is not a high conflict case, but rather a case where two parents became completely entrenched in their respective positions over the course of the litigation.

[156] However, I do not want to minimize the intransigence and inflexibility that both parents have demonstrated since separation. The inability of parents to compromise, see the other's viewpoint, and find common ground can be as dangerous and insidious as parents who fight and argue in front of their children.

[157] It is my hope that with the conclusion of the litigation, both parties will take a less adversarial approach to one another. However, court orders are made for the worst of times, not the best of times. I sincerely hope that this order will bring predictability and stability to the parties and set them on a better path towards co-parenting the wonderful child that they brought into this world together.

[158] For all of these reasons, a final order will issue as follows:

1. Bennett shall reside primarily with the Applicant mother.

2. Bennett shall have regular parenting time with the Respondent father as follows:

a) Alternate weekends from Friday afternoon until Monday morning dropping off at school, extending to the Tuesday morning dropping off at school if the Monday is a holiday not accounted for in the holiday schedule or a PA Day; and

b) Tuesdays and Thursdays after school until 7:00 p.m.

3. Failing an agreement between the parents in writing to the contrary, Bennett shall share time with his parents during the holidays as follows, which schedule shall override the regular parenting schedule:

a) March Break shall be divided equally with the parent whose regularly scheduled weekend falls on the beginning of March Break having Bennett until the Wednesday at 12 noon when he shall transition to the care of the other parent until the return to school on the following Monday;

b) Easter weekend shall be divided evenly with the Applicant having Bennett from Thursday after school until Sunday at 9:00 a.m. in even-numbered years and from Sunday at 9:00 a.m. until return to school on the following Tuesday in odd-numbered years; with the Respondent having the opposite schedule;

c) Bennett shall be with the Applicant from 10:00 a.m. on Mother's Day until return to school on the Monday;

d) Bennett shall be with the Respondent from 10:00 a.m. on Father's Day until return to school on the Monday;

e) Bennett shall be with the Applicant for the Thanksgiving weekend in odd-numbered years and with the Respondent in even-numbered years;

f) Bennett shall be with the Respondent for Halloween in odd-numbered years from after school until 7:30 p.m.

g) For Christmas Bennett shall be with the Applicant from 9:00 a.m. on Christmas Eve until 9:00 a.m. on Christmas Day and then with the Respondent from 9:00 a.m. Christmas Day until 9:00 a.m. Boxing Day in even-numbered years, which schedule shall be reversed in odd-numbered years;

h) In even-numbered years, Bennett shall be in the care of the Respondent from the Friday before the holiday break until Christmas Eve at 9:00 a.m. and in odd-numbered years, Bennett shall be in the care of the Applicant from the Friday before the holiday break until Christmas Eve at 9:00 a.m.;

i) In odd-numbered years, Bennett shall be in the care of Respondent from Boxing Day at 9:00 a.m. until New Year's Eve at 12 noon and in even-numbered years, Bennett shall be in the care of the Applicant from Boxing Day at 9:00 a.m. until New Year's Eve at 12 noon;

j) In even-numbered years, Bennett shall be in the care of the Respondent from New Year's Eve at 12 noon until the return to school the following Monday, after which the regular schedule shall resume, and in odd-numbered years, Bennett shall be in the care of the Applicant from New Year's Eve at 12 noon until the return to school the following Monday, after which the regular schedule shall resume;

k) Bennett shall spend two non-consecutive weeks (7 consecutive days beginning or ending with a parent's regularly scheduled weekend) in the care of each parent during the summer vacation. In odd-numbered years the Respondent shall have first choice of weeks, which he shall communicate to the Applicant no later than May 30. In even-numbered years, the Applicant shall have first choice of weeks, which he shall communicate to the Respondent no later than May 30;

l) All other holidays Bennett shall spend time with the parties in accordance with the regular parenting schedule.

4. Both parties shall take Bennett to all scheduled hockey games or practices during their parenting time or provide the other parent with the opportunity to do so.

5. Both parties may attend all of Bennett's extracurricular activities and school functions, including hockey practices and games regardless of in whose care Bennett is in.

6. Bennett's CPAP machine shall transition between households either by the parties meeting in person to exchange the machine personally or by the machine being placed in a container or tote placed on the porch of the matrimonial home or the Applicant mother's residence after the matrimonial home is sold, unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing. Neither party shall use school staff to assist with the exchange of the CPAP machine.

7. The parent in whose care Bennett is when he is required to have eye drops administered shall be responsible for administering the eye drops. The Applicant shall cooperate in the Respondent obtaining eye drops for use at his residence so that Bennett has eye drops at both of his parents' residences. Neither party shall administer Bennett's eye drops at school.

8. The Respondent shall pay spousal support on a compensatory and non-compensatory basis monthly in the amount of $1,200 (52% of NDI) commencing April 1, 2026.

9. The Respondent shall pay retroactive spousal support in the net lump sum amount of $10,000, which shall be set-off against the equalization payment owing by the Applicant to the Respondent.

10. The Applicant shall pay to the Respondent equalization in the amount of $22,434.29, which shall be reduced by the lump sum spousal support amount owing. The balance of the equalization payment shall be paid out of the Applicant's proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.

11. The Respondent's claim for occupational rent is hereby dismissed.

12. The Applicant shall be solely responsible for the carrying costs of the matrimonial home commencing April 1, 2026 until the sale of the property is complete.

13. A divorce is granted.

[159] If the parties are unable to agree on the issue of costs, submissions may be filed in accordance with the following timetable, failing which the issue of costs shall be deemed resolved by each party bearing their own costs:

1. The Applicant shall file her primary costs submissions, no longer than 3 pages in length, double-spaced, 12-point font, exclusive of Bill of Costs and Offer(s) to Settle, on or before March 30, 2026.

2. The Respondent shall file his costs submissions, no longer than 3 pages in length, double-spaced, 12-point font, exclusive of Bill of Costs and Offer(s) to Settle, on or before April 7, 2026.

3. Reply by the Applicant, no longer than 2 pages in length, double-spaced, 12-point font, on or before April 14, 2026.

A.D. Hilliard

Released: March 23, 2026

[^1]: [2020] O.J. No. 3240 (CA) at para 46. [^2]: 1988 CanLII 8700 (ON CA), [1988] O.J. No. 1139 (CA) [^3]: LAB v. PDMM, [2024] O.J. NO. 3517 (SCJ) at para 32. [^4]: Medjuck v Medjuck, 2019 ONCA 3254 at para 25. [^5]: C.R. v. A.H., [2024] O.J. No. 1571 (SCJ) at para 97 [^6]: [2024] O.J. No. 1412 (SCJ) at para 1. [^7]: There was no evidence lead on the issue of holiday parenting time, nor any submissions made by counsel, despite this issue being noted at the outset of trial as unresolved. [^8]: Davis v Crawford, 2011 ONCA 294 at para 71-74. [^9]: RL v MF, [2025] OJ No 3751 (CA) at para 25. [^10]: See Mason v Mason, 2016 ONCA 725 and Berger v Berger, [2016] OJ No 5983 (CA). [^11]: These numbers are based on the spousal support calculations submitted by the Applicant which were not disputed by the Respondent. [^12]: 2017 ONCA 701 at para. 54 [^13]: Toth v Grigorescu, [2016] OJ No 6622 (SCJ) at para 103.