Reasons for Judgment

Court File No.: D15747/18
Date: 2025/07/10
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:
Wayne Biggar, Applicant
– and –
Donna Stratford (nee Biggar), Respondent

Appearances:
Douglas Spiller, for the Applicant
Birkin Culp, for the Respondent

Heard: February 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 2025

Released: July 10, 2025

Justice: A.D. Hilliard

Overview

[1] This application was commenced by Mr. Wayne Biggar in 2018 seeking spousal support and unequal division of net family property. Ms. Donna Stratford (nee Biggar) filed her Answer seeking that Mr. Biggar’s claim for spousal support be dismissed and making her own claim for unequal division of net family property. After a long and somewhat tortured road, the Application finally came before me for trial in February 2025. Ms. Stratford had modified her position on the issue of property division to request that the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home be divided equally with no further equalization payment owed by either party. Mr. Biggar’s position was unchanged.

[2] At the time of trial, the matrimonial home had been sold but the proceeds of sale were still in the solicitor’s trust account, pending resolution of the property claims. No spousal support had even been paid by Ms. Stratford and no motion had been brought by Mr. Biggar for interim support.

[3] I heard evidence from both parties and their respective witnesses.[1]

[4] For the following reasons, Mr. Biggar’s claim for spousal support is granted, but his claim for unequal division is dismissed. The remaining proceeds of sale from the matrimonial home will be divided equally, subject to adjustments for the spousal support award and monies removed from trust on account of a judgment against Mr. Biggar.

Undisputed Facts

[5] Mr. Biggar was born on January 3, 1951. He was 57 years old when he started cohabiting with Ms. Stratford and had been married three (3) times previously.

[6] Ms. Stratford was born on March 3, 1955. She was 55 years old at the commencement of cohabitation and was married once before meeting Mr. Biggar.

[7] When the parties met, Mr. Biggar was a long-haul truck driver. His employment took him away from home for days at a time, driving to and from the United States. Ms. Stratford was working for the company she is currently employed with. Her job allows her to work remotely from home most days. Both parties had children from previous relationships.

[8] Each party owned their own home when they met. Mr. Biggar owned the residence that ultimately became the parties’ matrimonial home. Ms. Stratford owned a house where she was residing with her daughter and granddaughter.

[9] After moving into the matrimonial home, Ms. Stratford did not initially use any of her own money to pay the mortgage, property taxes or any of the utilities at the house. She did, however, take over ensuring that bills were paid while Mr. Biggar was away from home working.

[10] On or about November 22, 2013, Ms. Stratford received settlement funds from a personal injury claim in the amount of $53,162.14.

[11] Ms. Stratford maintained her previous home during the parties’ initial cohabitation, renting the house to her daughter. That home was sold in December 2014. The proceeds of sale were $134,391.44.

[12] The parties were married on June 27, 2014.

[13] Prior to his retirement, Mr. Biggar was involved with a company called Innotech Safety Solutions, which was incorporated in 2012. Mr. Biggar had invented a machine that could test the heat and speed of wheels. Innotech was the company that held the patent for Mr. Biggar’s invention and the directors of Innotech, of which Mr. Biggar was one, were actively working on marketing and selling the wheel testing machine.

[14] In January 2015, Mr. Biggar retired from truck driving. His Peterbilt truck was sold in April 2015 for $60,000. Mr. Biggar did not have any formal employment from the time he gave up long-haul trucking driving in January 2015 until the parties separated in May 2018. He was, however, engaged in making wood furniture, some of which was sold to third parties and some of which the parties used in the matrimonial home.

[15] Title to the matrimonial home was transferred from Mr. Biggar solely to Mr. Biggar and Ms. Stratford (then Biggar) in joint tenancy on or about May 11, 2015.

[16] In January 2016, Ms. Stratford received funds from her cousin’s estate in the amount of $28,570.05.

[17] The parties separated on a final basis in May 2018. There have been no attempts at reconciliation since that time.

[18] The matrimonial home was sold on January 31, 2019. The proceeds of sale were $374,652.10.

[19] Due to a civil judgment against Mr. Biggar, $137,034.01 from the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home was removed from the trust account of Hospodar Davies & Goold to satisfy judgment of Skarica J., dated April 13, 2021. Neither party consented to the funds being paid out of the proceeds of sale.

Position of the Parties

[20] Mr. Biggar’s position on the issues at trial are based upon his narrative that he was economically disadvantaged by the marriage, having been persuaded to retire from trucking against his will and then convinced to transfer the home he owned prior to the relationship into the names of he and Ms. Stratford as joint tenants. His evidence was that he was happy long-haul driving and his submission is that he likely would still have been long-hauling but for Ms. Stratford’s insistence that he come off the road. His position is buttressed by the evidence of his friend, Ms. Stratford’s cousin, Dwayne Stratford.

[21] Ms. Stratford’s position is that she was the fiscally responsible one in the relationship and kept the parties afloat by using her own funds to pay down Mr. Biggar’s debts. She does not agree that she was the impetus for Mr. Biggar’s retirement. To the contrary, Ms. Stratford’s evidence is that she was very clear with Mr. Biggar that the couple could not afford for him to stop long-haul trucking unless he got another job driving truck locally. Ms. Stratford’s position is that Mr. Biggar is intentionally underemployed and that she contributed equally during the relationship. She further argues that Mr. Biggar has failed to adequately provide full and frank financial disclosure and she should therefore be entitled to half of the proceeds of the matrimonial home without any deductions for an equalization payment.

Evidentiary Findings

[22] I accept that Mr. Biggar feels that his current situation is incredibly unfair. I accept that Mr. Biggar is extremely frustrated by the court process and how long it has taken to get this matter to trial. I also accept that Mr. Biggar has genuinely tried to gather together all of the information necessary to prove his case.

[23] However, during the course of Mr. Biggar’s testimony it became clear to me that he relied heavily on Ms. Stratford throughout the course of their relationship to manage his financial affairs. Mr. Biggar is an intelligent but uneducated man. I find that he has no technical savvy insofar as being able to manage his financial affairs over the internet through online banking. Although Mr. Biggar may be able to use an iPad to watch Netflix or browse the internet, I accept his evidence that he does not possess even a working knowledge of word processing or other computer skills that seem basic to most people in 2025.

[24] The banking issue is instructive of Mr. Biggar’s tech literacy. Prior to his relationship with Ms. Stratford, Mr. Biggar attended in person at his bank branch to pay bills and complete all of his financial transactions. Mr. Biggar’s evidence, uncontroverted by Ms. Stratford, is that Ms. Stratford instituted the online banking so that she could more easily pay bills on his behalf. I accept his evidence that during the relationship he did not use online banking, instead relying on Ms. Stratford to handle all of the financial affairs.

[25] Ms. Stratford’s evidence about his lack of ability to use GPS is also informative of Mr. Biggar’s level of technical competence. Ms. Stratford testified that she would often have to be on the phone with Mr. Biggar late at night directing him where to go to deliver his load because he did not use a GPS device and was unable to read his paper maps while driving in the dark.

[26] I am satisfied that Mr. Biggar does not possess adequate education, training, or technical skills to be able to accept employment as a truck driving instructor. I find that Mr. Biggar’s age and education history would be a barrier to him obtaining employment as a truck driving instructor.

[27] However, I find that Mr. Biggar’s attempts to find employment after the breakdown of the relationship were insufficient. Although I found that the evidence of Ms. Stratford’s son, Trevor McDole, appeared at times to be less than impartial, I accept Mr. McDole’s testimony that there were conversations about opportunities for Mr. Biggar to obtain employment as a local truck driver with the same company Mr. McDole works for. I accept Mr. McDole’s evidence that there was employment with his company that Mr. Biggar was qualified for and that was offered to him, but that Mr. Biggar ultimately chose not to accept. By failing to accept that offer of employment, I find that Mr. Biggar was intentionally underemployed after he stopped long-haul truck driving.

[28] I accept the evidence of Mr. Biggar’s family doctor, Dr. Ozog-Bartlett. Her evidence met all of the criteria for expert evidence, bearing out her statement that she understood her duty of impartiality as an expert witness. I accept Dr. Ozog-Bartlett’s evidence that Mr. Biggar can work so long as he does so at his own pace and with the ability to take breaks. Dr. Ozog-Bartlett was clear that Mr. Biggar has health issues that impact his daily living, and pointed out that Mr. Biggar is 74 years old and a lifelong smoker.

[29] Mr. Dwight Stratford was in my estimation the most candid of the lay witnesses I heard from during the trial. Mr. Stratford appeared from the cab of his truck up in the Northwest Territories where he was doing the ice run – transporting goods along the ice roads that exist only in the winter. Mr. Stratford clearly loves being in his truck and on the road. I accept Mr. Stratford’s evidence that from all of his conversations with Mr. Biggar he was left with the impression that Mr. Biggar would still be driving but for his relationship with Ms. Stratford. However, I note that what people say to their long-time friends may not always be a completely accurate representation of what they are actually thinking and feeling. Although I accept that Mr. Stratford accurately recounted what he was told by his long-time friend, Mr. Biggar, about the reasons he was planning to leave long-haul truck driving, that in and of itself does not demonstrate that what Mr. Biggar said to Mr. Stratford was in fact true and accurate.

[30] I accept Ms. Stratford’s evidence that she was taking care of the house and doing all of Mr. Biggar’s banking after moving in – a task which she took over from a woman Mr. Biggar was previously in a relationship with until that woman’s premature death. I find that Ms. Stratford instituted online banking services to better accommodate her schedule and to make completing the banking tasks for Mr. Biggar more efficient. Although Ms. Stratford was not contributing to the mortgage or household bills during the first part of the couple’s relationship, I accept that Ms. Stratford initially maintained her own room when she first moved in and was performing household tasks in addition to taking care of Mr. Biggar’s banking that would have justified monetary compensation had they been performed by someone not in a personal relationship with Mr. Biggar.

[31] I accept Ms. Stratford’s evidence, which was uncontradicted by Mr. Biggar, that she used money she received from her personal injury settlement, proceeds of sale from her home and money from her cousin, Leona’s estate, to pay off the following debts or expenses for Mr. Biggar:

• $19,000 Visa payment, November 29, 2013
• $3,388.38 Peterbilt payment, June 10, 2013
• $18,618.95 Visa payment, December 16, 2014
• $7,053.72 Visa payment, December 16, 2014
• $2,602.55 cell phone bills from 2013 – 2015
• $1,968.40 WestJet flight – business trip for Innotech

[32] I find that Mr. Biggar had little to no equity in his home when Ms. Stratford moved in. I accept Ms. Stratford’s evidence that Mr. Biggar had refinanced the residence in an amount more than the original purchase price shortly before their relationship began. In addition, I find that Mr. Biggar had significant credit card debt at the commencement of the relationship, totaling over $48,000.

[33] I accept the evidence of Ms. Stratford and Mr. McDole that Mr. Biggar thought that his invention / Innotech was his golden ticket. Even Mr. Stratford acknowledges having heard Mr. Biggar refer to his invention as his golden ticket. I find that his work with Innotech was at least part of the reason why Mr. Biggar did not obtain any other formal employment after he came off the road. Mr. Biggar may now see his hopes and dreams with respect to Innotech as foolish and naïve in retrospect, but I am satisfied that he made choices and conducted himself in such a manner in relation to the Innotech venture that is consistent with Mr. Biggar believing that Innotech would ultimately create a significant income source for him.

[34] I accept that Ms. Stratford believes that it would be unfair for her to have to support Mr. Biggar post-separation. I also accept that Ms. Stratford is as frustrated as Mr. Biggar with the court process and how long this matter has taken to reach its final conclusion. However, I find that there is a significant disparity between Ms. Stratford’s employment income and Mr. Biggar’s pension income now and at the date of separation. I find that Mr. Biggar enjoyed a higher standard of living when the parties were married than he does now post-separation.

Spousal Support

[35] Section 15.2 of the Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp) governs spousal support orders in relation to married spouses. The provisions of the Divorce Act apply to Mr. Biggar and Ms. Stratford as married spouses as of the date of the Application.

[36] Subsection 15.2(6) sets out the objectives of a spousal support order:

1. Recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;
2. Apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;
3. Relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and
4. In so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

Entitlement

[37] The threshold question in any spousal support determination is entitlement. The three conceptual bases for entitlement are compensatory, contractual or non-compensatory.[2]

[38] Entitlement to compensatory support is based on evidence that the recipient spouse has suffered economic disadvantage as a result of the marriage or its breakdown.[3]

[39] Mr. Biggar’s retirement at the age of 64 does not provide the basis for finding that he is entitled to spousal support on a compensatory basis. Mr. Biggar was not forced to leave the workforce due to childcare requirements. He did not move to accommodate Ms. Stratford’s career or education. Prior to Mr. Biggar’s retirement, he and Ms. Stratford both worked and earned comparable incomes. It was Ms. Stratford who was at home taking care of the house and property, responsible for paying the bills when Mr. Biggar was on the road. In assessing the parties roles during the relationship, Mr. Biggar’s role was more akin to a breadwinner, working primarily outside of the home, whereas Ms. Stratford worked from home and maintained the household throughout the relationship.

[40] Despite the testimony of Mr. Biggar and Mr. Stratford as to the alleged complaints Ms. Stratford made about being home alone when Mr. Biggar was on the road, there is nothing to suggest that Mr. Biggar was forced to retire or that his choice was not of his own free will. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Mr. Biggar had to retire due to his health.

[41] Although I accept that Mr. Biggar has experienced a drop in his standard of living post-separation, I am not satisfied that alone forms the basis for support on a compensatory basis. I find that Mr. Biggar had been living at or beyond his means when he met Ms. Stratford. He had significant credit card debt and his home was mortgaged to its full value, Mr. Biggar having just refinanced and extended his mortgage. Whenever Mr. Biggar chose to retire, having no significant savings to rely on, he would have been faced with the reality of having to sell his home in order to access the equity to supplement his government pension benefits.

[42] However, there is a clear disparity in the parties’ incomes at the date of separation and continuing to the present. Entitlement to spousal support can be non-compensatory or needs-based when there is a long relationship followed by a drop in the standard of living of the claimant and economic hardship experienced post-separation.[4]

[43] Mr. Biggar has a lower standard of living from what he enjoyed while the parties were still married and Mr. Biggar is experiencing economic hardship given the minimal income he receives from his government pension benefits. Although some of Mr. Biggar’s financial struggles are in part of his own making, I am satisfied that even when considering what employment Mr. Biggar could have obtained post-separation, there is still a significant disparity in the parties’ respective incomes.

[44] I therefore find that Mr. Biggar is entitled to spousal support on a non-compensatory basis.

Quantum and Duration

[45] Having found entitlement, I must next determine what quantum of support is owing and for what duration.

Incomes of the Parties and Imputation of Income

[46] The determination of Ms. Stratford’s income is simple: she is employed in a salaried position and her income is the Line 150 amount on her Income Tax Return.

[47] The determination of Mr. Biggar’s income is less straightforward. Mr. Biggar receives CPP and OAS benefits. Those amounts are not in dispute. What is at issue is whether or not Mr. Biggar is intentionally underemployed such that additional income should be imputed to him for the purpose of determining the amount of spousal support owing.

[48] I found as a fact that Mr. Biggar failed or refused to avail himself of employment opportunities available back in 2015 when he stopped driving long-haul. However, that was three years prior to the date of separation. After Mr. Biggar refused to accept a job driving truck locally or find any other formal employment in 2015, Ms. Stratford did not terminate the relationship or even threaten to leave the marriage if Mr. Biggar did not find a job. The marriage continued for three years following Mr. Biggar’s retirement during which time Mr. Biggar was out of the workforce entirely with, at a minimum, Ms. Stratford’s reluctant acquiescence. Furthermore, Mr. Biggar was 67 years old at the date of separation, 74 at the time of trial.

[49] I am not satisfied that income should be imputed to Mr. Biggar as Ms. Stratford submits – on the basis of full-time employment as a truck driver or driving instructor. In light of my factual findings, Mr. Biggar has no reasonable prospects of obtaining employment as a driver training instructor. Furthermore, having been out of the workforce and not having driven truck for three years, Mr. Biggar’s employment prospects in the driving industry, whether long-haul or local, were somewhat diminished at the date of separation. Mr. Biggar had also relinquished his A-Z licence after his retirement a decade ago.

[50] However, Mr. Biggar did and does have the ability to work part-time. That is supported by the evidence of Dr. Ozog-Bartlett that I have accepted. There is also evidence that Mr. Biggar did obtain employment as a janitor post-separation, albeit for a short duration due to the physical demands of the job. I find that Mr. Biggar could have found some part-time employment post-separation to supplement his pension income and failed or refused to do so after giving up his janitor position.

[51] I have also considered that Mr. Biggar purchased a brand-new truck when his old one broke down. The evidence is that Mr. Biggar is managing to make all of his truck payments post-separation despite having an annual pension income equivalent to the purchase price of the truck and not receiving any spousal support from Ms. Stratford. It is also relevant that Mr. Biggar has secured rent-free housing with his son in order to reduce his expenses. However embarrassing or deflating it may be to Mr. Biggar that he now has to rely on the generosity of his son in his retirement years, I would note that Ms. Stratford, who is still working, is also having to rely on one of her children to provide her with accommodations, albeit in Ms. Stratford’s case not rent-free.

[52] Overall, I am satisfied that some additional employment income should be imputed to Mr. Biggar over and above his CPP and OAS benefits. Taking into consideration his health and physical limitations, as well as his lack of education and training in anything other than driving truck, I find that the appropriate amount of employment income to be imputed to Mr. Biggar is as follows from the date of separation to the present:

• 2019 – $10,752
• 2020 – n/a because Mr. Biggar had actual employment income of $15,650.80
• 2021 – $11,021
• 2022 – $11,904
• 2023 – $12,710
• 2024 – $13,210
• 2025 – $13,517[5]

Divorce Act Factors

[53] Section 15.2(4) sets out the factors to be considered when the Court makes an order for spousal support:

• (a) the length of time the spouses cohabited;
• (b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and
• (c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.

[54] The combined period of cohabitation and marriage is 10 years. Both parties were in their 50s when they met and in their 60s at the date of separation.

[55] Throughout the relationship until Mr. Biggar’s retirement, both parties worked full-time. When Mr. Biggar was driving, Ms. Stratford maintained the residence, cared for the parties’ animals, which included horses, and ensured that all of the bills were paid. When Mr. Biggar was home prior to retirement, he was responsible for property maintenance. I do, however, accept Ms. Stratford’s evidence that she was capable of cutting the grass, but Mr. Biggar insisted on doing it himself and would not let her use the riding lawnmower.

[56] Post-separation and to date, there have been no orders or agreement relating to the support of either spouse.

Lump Sum vs Periodic

[57] Mr. Biggar is seeking an Order for a lump sum payment of spousal support. He cites the high conflict nature of the relationship post-separation as justification for a lump-sum payment, indicating that a “clean break” is necessary.

[58] The Court of Appeal clarified in Davis v. Crawford, 2011 ONCA 294, para 70 that although lump sum spousal support is not to be limited to only very unusual circumstances, nonetheless most spousal support orders will be periodic. The Court went on to note that when seeking lump sum payments, it is incumbent on counsel to provide not only the basis for awarding a lump sum payment and the method used to calculate such a payment, but also a range of possible outcomes.[7]

[59] Although there were serious deficiencies in the SSAG calculations provided by Mr. Biggar’s counsel, I am satisfied that this is a situation where a lump sum award of spousal support is appropriate. Both parties were in their 60s on the date of separation and in their 70s by the time of trial. Ms. Stratford continues to work only out of necessity and her retirement is both foreseeable and imminent. Whether Mr. Biggar would have chosen to continue working into his 70s is speculative. The evidence of Mr. Biggar’s doctor is that his health is such that working full-time is not possible at present. Therefore, I find that Mr. Biggar would have been facing imminent retirement post-separation even if he had not chosen to retire when he did.

[60] Lump sum spousal support is more appropriate in these circumstances because spousal support is needs-based but transitional. At the time of separation, given the ages of the parties, Ms. Stratford’s retirement was foreseeable. The fact that this Application has taken seven (7) years to be determined on a final basis further accentuates the need for finality for both parties. A periodic award would undoubtedly see the parties back before the Court in the near future when Ms. Stratford retires. Even without taking into account Ms. Stratford’s health conditions, the reality of her age is that she is entitled to retire and enjoy the fruits of her lifetime of employment. At 71, it is neither unreasonable nor inappropriate for Ms. Stratford to choose to retire, regardless of her health condition.

[61] I have also considered that a portion of Ms. Stratford’s pension is subject to equalization. Were there to be an award of periodic support, the issue of double-dipping comes into play as soon as Ms. Stratford retires, and her pension is in pay.

[62] A lump sum award also takes into consideration the equalization of net family property. I have considered that once equalization is effected, Mr. Biggar will have a sum of money to invest or use for discretionary spending, in addition to any spousal support award. Money owing to Mr. Biggar for equalization and from the sale of the matrimonial home is a financial circumstance to be considered when determining the amount of spousal support to be paid and whether the award should be in a lump sum or periodic.

[63] In assessing the lump sum support being sought by Mr. Biggar and the equalization payment he claims he is owed, I noted that the combined amount would result in Mr. Biggar leaving the marriage with more than the parties combined assets. The total amounts Mr. Biggar is proposing he is owed are more than the total equity in the matrimonial home. It would be unconscionable for Mr. Biggar to be awarded more in total support and equalization combined than he would have had without ever having met Ms. Stratford. Mr. Biggar’s proposals would also result in Ms. Stratford leaving a 10-year relationship with next to nothing, having entered that relationship with a home of her own. That too, would be an unconscionable result.

[64] Having balanced all of these factors, I find that the appropriate lump sum spousal support amount to be awarded is $85,000.

Equalization

[65] I do not accept Ms. Stratford’s argument that there should be no order as to equalization because of a lack of financial disclosure provided by Mr. Biggar. Although I accept that there have been cases in which my colleagues have declined to order equalization on the basis of a total lack of financial disclosure, this is not one of those cases.

[66] I found that Ms. Stratford was in charge of the parties’ finances from the earliest days of their relationship. Indeed, part of the impetus for their relationship and Ms. Stratford moving into Mr. Biggar’s home was for her to take care of his bills while he was driving long-haul. I also note that Ms. Stratford had a significant amount of evidence to provide as to Mr. Biggar’s financial situation throughout the relationship, including at the date of marriage and the date of separation. I am therefore satisfied that there is enough evidence of the parties’ respective financial situations both at the date of marriage and separation for me to make a determination as to equalization.

[67] There is no basis for an unequal division of net family property in this case. Ms. Stratford residing in Mr. Biggar’s home rent-free for a period of time in the early years of their relationship is balanced by her having maintained the residence, managed Mr. Biggar’s financial affairs, and paid off some of Mr. Biggar’s debts. Far from an equal division being unconscionable, as I have already indicated, the payouts proposed by Mr. Biggar would be unfair and inequitable.

[68] Mr. Biggar’s submissions about the manner in which the matrimonial home was ultimately transferred to the parties in joint tenancy are irrelevant to the determination of whether or not the parties’ net family property should be equalized. Regardless of how title to the property was held, the residence that was owned solely by Mr. Biggar when the parties met became the matrimonial home upon the parties’ marriage. Furthermore, given that Mr. Biggar had just refinanced the mortgage on his home just prior to the parties commencing their relationship, there was very little, if any, equity in the matrimonial home when the parties started living together. The equity that was built up prior to the date of marriage was during the period of time the parties were living together and when Ms. Stratford was managing Mr. Biggar’s finances.

[69] The real battleground between the parties on the issue of equalization is the value of specific items of personal property owned by Mr. Biggar both on the date of marriage and the date of separation. Where the parties have agreed on the value of chattels, I have accepted those values regardless of whether evidence confirming value was filed.

[70] Although Ms. Stratford did not file a Comparative Net Family Property Statement (CNFP) with her written closing submissions, a Net Family Property Statement (NFP) was filed as part of her trial materials. The NFP filed on behalf of Ms. Stratford is more accurate and reliable than the CNFP filed on behalf of Mr. Biggar with his closing submissions. Mr. Biggar’s CNFP for example includes credit card debt Mr. Biggar had on the date of marriage as a positive value rather than a negative one, thereby increasing rather than decreasing the value of the property owned by Mr. Biggar on the date of marriage. Ms. Stratford’s NFP also more closely accords with the financial records filed during the course of the trial. I have therefore used the NFP filed by Ms. Stratford as the starting point for determining equalization.

[71] The antique truck, Rat Rod, was appraised at $7,000, albeit by an individual who did not actually look at the physical vehicle just pictures. Despite that, I accept that the Rat Rod is worth $7,000 rather than the approximately $34,000 Ms. Stratford claims. Although I accept that Mr. Biggar put over $30,000 worth of parts and labour into building the Rat Rod, that does not mean that a purchaser would pay more than $30,000 for an antique truck. I find that $7,000 is the likely fair market value of the Rat Rod.

[72] Similarly, though I accept Ms. Stratford’s evidence that Mr. Biggar refused to sell the Case tractor for $1,000 because in his view it was worth far more, it is instructive that no one else offered to pay more. Used vehicles, such as a farm tractor, are worth only what someone is prepared to pay for them, not what value is placed on them by their owner. I find that the Case tractor is worth $1,000 as valued by Mr. Biggar.

[73] The same analysis applies to the disputed value for the two (2) John Deere riding lawn mowers. There was no evidence led as to what a similar used riding lawn mower sells for on the open market, nor did either party submit an appraisal of either tractor. I am simply unable to assess the value of these tractors, although they clearly have some value. Due to the lack of evidence led, no value will be attributed to these items.

[74] There is no appraisal of Mr. Biggar’s horse and no evidence was led as to the value of a horse. Therefore, it is not appropriate to include Mr. Biggar’s horse, at any value, in his net family property. I would also note that the evidence I heard at trial leads me to conclude that both parties had horses and yet I note that no value on Ms. Stratford’s side of the ledger for her horse.

[75] Mr. Biggar contends that his Peterbilt truck was worth $82,000 at the date of marriage. However, the evidence is that less than a year after the parties married, Mr. Biggar sold the Peterbilt for $60,000. There is no evidence before me as to the value of the Peterbilt at the date of marriage, such as an appraisal or evidence of what similar trucks were being sold for at fair market value. I find that the best indicator of the fair market value of the Peterbilt is what it sold for. I do not accept that the truck was worth over $20,000 more at the date of marriage than the date on which it was sold.

[76] The tools which were stolen from Mr. Biggar’s shop prior to the date of marriage should neither be included in Mr. Biggar’s date of marriage assets nor in his date of separation assets. The evidence at trial was that Mr. Biggar received $17,000 as an insurance payout for the stolen tools. The replacement value of those tools is not an appropriate measure of the value of those tools after they were purchased and used by Mr. Biggar. There is no proper valuation of those tools or estimate upon which the parties agree. There was also no evidence led at trial as to the fair market value of the tools. Mr. Biggar’s evidence simply was that he received money from his insurance company as a result of his claim.

[77] The value of the handcrafted bedroom set at $8,000 is not supported by any evidence. Although I accept Mr. Biggar’s evidence that he made a custom wood bedroom set for he and Ms. Stratford as part of his Cowboy Furniture venture, there was no evidence provided as to what a similar custom bedroom set sold for. Mr. Biggar did not provide an appraisal of the handmade furniture nor any evidence that he made similar furniture that sold for the price he wishes to attribute to that furniture. I accept that there is some value to the furniture as the evidence is that it is solid wood, custom hand crafted. I find that the value attributed by Ms. Stratford of $2,500 is more likely than not the fair market value for that furniture.

[78] The deduction of notional tax from the value of Ms. Stratford pensions is appropriate. Whether the pension was divided at source when in pay or paid out for the purpose of equalization, it is subject to income tax. It is appropriate for the net or after-tax value of the pension to be used rather than the gross amount. Furthermore, Ms. Stratford’s NFP provides a notional tax deduction credit to Mr. Biggar in relation to his RRSP which is a fair and balanced approach to these investments. The notional tax rate used is also only 15%, which may be lower than the tax owed by Ms. Stratford when her pension is finally in pay.

[79] In reviewing all of the documentary evidence filed, there is support for many of the assets and debts listed by both parties on their respective NFPs and financial statements. However, in reviewing Ms. Stratford’s NFP, there were some adjustments required as there were amounts indicated for bank accounts and savings for which I could not find any documentation, but no amounts noted for the value of her pension on the date of marriage or her RBC GIC. Similarly, there was an amount listed for “debts and other liabilities” on the date of marriage that did not correspond with any of the documentation provided. However, there is evidence of a line of credit Ms. Stratford had on her house on Clench Avenue, a Visa in the amount of $7,469.32 and the notional tax of 15% on her Gates pension, none of which were included in the debts on date of marriage.

[80] Although I was unable to find the proof of Mr. Biggar’s RBC Visa Classic for the valuation date, I have accepted the amount listed in Ms. Stratford’s NFP - $7,724.03. Accepting this amount provides Mr. Biggar with a credit for debt more than even he claimed. When I went back and reviewed his previous financial statements, he lists credit card debt at the date of separation as $6,000, which I took to be a round number estimate based on his recollection and having been unable to find any documentation to prove that amount.

[81] Finally, I have not included any value for Mr. Biggar’s interest in Innotech. The business valuation filed by Ms. Stratford cited a wide range of value – low being “Nil” and high being $4,459. I note that Mr. Biggar’s 1000 common shares had a “Nil” value at both the low and high end. The only value was attributable to a shareholder loan. Considering the litigation between Mr. Biggar and his former partners in the Innotech venture that result in Mr. Biggar having thousands of dollars in costs awarded against him after his claims were summarily dismissed, I find that any value attributed to Mr. Biggar’s interest in Innotech was likely based on unfounded assumptions.

[82] Having adjusted the parties’ respective net family property values based on the foregoing, I find that there is an equalization payment owed by Mr. Biggar to Ms. Stratford in the amount of $2,406.10.[8] However, given equitable considerations, including Mr. Biggar’s current financial circumstances, I find that the equalization payment owed by Mr. Biggar to Ms. Stratford should be reduced to $0.

Conclusion

[83] Mr. Biggar is entitled to spousal support on a non-compensatory basis. Given the parties’ ages and stage in life, I have found that spousal support is transitional and should be paid as a lump sum in the amount of $85,000 from Ms. Stratford’s half of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.

[84] After considering all of the financial evidence filed during the trial, I have adjusted the net family property calculation and have concluded that there is an equalization payment owed by Mr. Biggar to Ms. Stratford. However, as indicated above, for equitable reasons, I find that there should be no equalization payment made in the circumstances.

[85] In the event that the parties cannot resolve the issue of costs in light of the outcome, submissions may be filed as follows:

(a) The Applicant shall file his costs submissions, no longer than 3 pages in length, double-spaced, 12-point font, exclusive of Bill of Costs and Offer(s) to Settle on or before July 21, 2025.
(b) The Respondent shall file her costs submissions, no longer than 3 pages in length, double-spaced, 12-point font, exclusive of Bill of Costs and Offer(s) to Settle on or before July 30, 2025.
(c) Reply by the Applicant no longer than 2 pages in length, double-spaced, 12-point font, on or before August 7, 2025.

[86] Final order to go:

1. Ms. Stratford shall pay to Mr. Biggar lump sum spousal support in the amount of $85,000 which shall be paid out of her half of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home currently held in trust.
2. There will be no equalization payment owed by either party.
3. The $137,034.01 paid out of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home is attributed solely to Mr. Biggar and his half of the proceeds shall be reduced accordingly.
4. Of the money left in trust from the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home, Ms. Stratford shall receive the amount of $102,326.05 and Mr. Biggar shall receive the sum of $135,292.04.

Appendix A: Net Family Property Calculation

	Wayne Biggar	Donna Stratford
Land on V-date	$187,326.05	$187,326.05
Household items and vehicles on V-date	$16,660	$7,500
Bank accounts/RRSPs	$7,752.23	$114,918.82
Total value of Property owned on V-date	$211,738.28	$309,744.87
Total debts on V-date	$8,755.76	$23,546.11
Property on DOM	$66,534.82	$272,775.80
Debts on DOM	$41,676.09	$159,888.64
Net Property on DOM	$24,858.73	$112,887.16
Debts on V-date + DOM net property	$33,614.49	$136,433.27
Net Family Property	$178,123.79	$173,311.60

Endnotes

[1] At the end of the evidence counsel agreed that they would file written submissions rather than schedule a further appearance for oral submissions. The exchange of those written submissions was complete on April 7, 2025.

[2] Bracklow v. Bracklow, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, para 49.

[3] See Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 and Fisher v. Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11.

[4] Emmerson v. Emmerson, [2017] O.J. No. 6199 (CA), para 105.

[5] These amounts are premised on a minimum wage job 4 hours a day, 4 days per week, 48 weeks per calendar year. Minimum wage varied from 2018 to 2025 and so the minimum wage payable in each particular year was used, starting at $14 per hour in 2018 increasing to $17.60 in 2025.

[6] Davis v. Crawford, 2011 ONCA 294, para 70.

[7] Ibid at para 75.

[8] See Appendix A attached.