Michael Harris

The plaintiff sought leave to amend his Statement of Claim to add Melissa Corzo Reyes and Mark Ziegert as defendants in an action relating to a series of loans and subsequent real estate transactions.

The court granted the motion, finding that the amendments and addition of parties were appropriate and that no non-compensable prejudice would result.

The decision discusses the application of Rules 26.01 and 5.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the test for amendments, and the addition of parties, referencing relevant case law.

The defendants, Robert B. Woodrow and Anne Woodrow, brought a motion seeking a declaration that a default judgment debt owed by Ross E. Greb (a third party and co-shareholder/director) survived his consumer proposal discharge under section 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Woodrows argued the debt arose from fraud or misappropriation while Greb acted in a fiduciary capacity.

The court dismissed the motion, finding insufficient evidence in the original default judgment record to establish that Ross E. Greb owed a personal fiduciary duty to Robert Woodrow.

The general rule that directors owe fiduciary duties to the company, not individual shareholders, was upheld, and the "exceptional circumstances" required to deviate from this rule were not present.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a successful motion to annul a corporate bankruptcy.

The court found that the assignment into bankruptcy was an improper use of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, driven by self-interest to halt ongoing litigation.

While the conduct was not 'especially egregious' to warrant full indemnity costs, it justified an award of substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the successful party $55,750 in substantial indemnity costs against the party who improperly initiated the bankruptcy, comprising fees, HST, and disbursements.

No costs were awarded to or against the trustee.

This decision addresses the costs of a motion brought by the Crown to strike parts of the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The Crown successfully argued that the Construction Lien Act did not apply to the Federal Crown or First Nation lands, and the plaintiff conceded these points.

However, the plaintiff was granted leave to amend its claim to include unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, which the Crown had opposed.

The court found that the plaintiff's initial untenable pleading and failure to respond to pre-motion correspondence precipitated the motion, warranting a costs award to the Crown.

However, the award was tempered because the plaintiff's earlier settlement proposal (to strike with leave to amend) was largely the outcome, and the Crown's opposition to the amendment was unsuccessful.

The Crown's travel disbursements were disallowed due to the missed settlement opportunity.

The plaintiff construction company sued a First Nation and the federal Crown for over $3.3 million for work performed on reserve lands, seeking a sale of the lands under the Construction Lien Act.

The Crown moved to strike the claim, arguing the Act does not apply to the federal Crown or reserve lands.

The plaintiff conceded this point but sought leave to amend its claim to plead unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.

The court struck the Construction Lien Act claims but granted the plaintiff leave to amend, finding the original facts pleaded supported the alternative restitutionary claims without running afoul of the Limitations Act.

The applicant and respondent, sisters, disputed the administration of their mother's and uncle's estates.

The applicant sought reimbursement from the respondent for alleged personal payments for home repairs, executor's compensation, and an alleged gift from the uncle's estate.

The respondent sought repayment of a loan from the applicant to their mother's estate.

The court dismissed the applicant's claims regarding home repairs and executor's compensation, but ordered the respondent to reimburse Frank's estate $5,000 for unauthorized post-mortem withdrawals.

The court also ordered the applicant to repay Mary's estate $5,500.77 for the outstanding balance of a loan.

The applicant, Sheila Di Florio, sought to claim contribution from her brothers-in-law, Tony and Frank Di Florio, for a joint and several judgment debt she alleged to have satisfied on behalf of her separated spouse, Sandy Di Florio, who had declared bankruptcy.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Sheila failed to provide evidence that she personally made any payment towards the debt.

Furthermore, the court held that any right of contribution arising from payments made by or on behalf of Sandy's bankrupt estate vested solely in Sandy's trustee in bankruptcy, not in Sandy personally after his bankruptcy, and therefore could not be assigned to Sheila.

The plaintiff landlord sued the defendant tenant, a dental corporation, for breach of a commercial lease after the tenant abandoned the premises and stopped paying rent.

The tenant counterclaimed, arguing the landlord fundamentally breached the lease due to pest infestations, garbage, improper back charges, and unreasonably withholding consent to sublet.

The court found no fundamental breach, noting the tenant continued to operate for years despite the alleged issues and failed to provide sufficient information for proposed sublets.

The court also found the landlord reasonably mitigated its damages.

The landlord was awarded $86,615.97 for unpaid rent, utilities, and the cost of removing tenant improvements.

The counter-applicant brought a motion to dismiss the counter-application against certain respondents, join Ontario as a respondent, consolidate the application and counter-application, and convert the consolidated applications to an action.

The first three requests were granted on consent.

The request to convert the application to an action was contested.

The court dismissed this request, finding that the facts regarding the dedication of the disputed road as a public highway were clear and uncomplicated, and credibility was not in issue.

The successful plaintiff sought costs following judgment in an action for accounting services, requesting partial indemnity costs to the date of its Rule 49 offer to settle and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The defendant argued the offer was not a genuine settlement offer because it demanded the full amount claimed and that the case involved a substantive defence.

The court held that although an offer to settle need not contain an element of compromise, the claim was not a liquidated claim and the defendant had raised a defence of substance regarding whether it was liable as principal or agent.

Exercising its discretion under Rule 49.10(1), the court ordered otherwise and declined to award substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis throughout.