Sanam Goudarzi

The plaintiffs, shareholders and creditors in Mobilicity, a wireless telecommunications company, sued the federal government for negligence and negligent misrepresentation arising from the 2008 AWS spectrum auction.

The plaintiffs alleged that Industry Canada represented that spectrum licences acquired at auction would be transferable to incumbent carriers after a five-year moratorium, and that they relied on this representation to invest approximately $250 million in equity and $95 million in debt to capitalize Mobilicity and bid for spectrum licences.

The plaintiffs further alleged that in 2013, the government unilaterally changed the transfer framework to prohibit transfers to incumbents, and in 2014-2015 interfered with Mobilicity's sales process through threats, media manipulation, and regulatory delay.

The court found the government liable for negligence and negligent misrepresentation, holding that it owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs based on specific representations made to induce investment, and that it breached that duty through the implementation of the 2013 Transfer Framework and subsequent interference in the sales process.

The court awarded damages based on a "but for" analysis, calculating what the plaintiffs would have earned in alternative investments had they not relied on the government's representations.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether the statutory requirement that federal election Returning Officers reside in the ridings they administer violates the right to liberty under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The majority held that the right to liberty in section 7 does not extend to a free-standing right to choose one’s residence outside the context of the administration of justice, and dismissed the appeal.

The dissent would have found that the residency requirement was overbroad and infringed section 7, and would have granted the appeal.

The Attorney General of Canada sought to reconsider a mid-trial ruling on solicitor-client privilege, requesting leave to file a new affidavit to support their claim.

The plaintiffs opposed this request.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to revisit the ruling, emphasizing the importance of finality in trial proceedings and noting that the issue had been fully argued previously.

The Attorney General was directed to forthwith produce the unredacted documents as per the original ruling.

During a complex commercial trial, an evidentiary dispute arose regarding the reading in of examination for discovery transcripts under Rule 31.11.

The defendant sought to introduce additional excerpts from its own witnesses' discoveries to qualify the plaintiffs' read-ins, and also sought to read in discovery evidence of the plaintiffs' witnesses who had already testified.

The court allowed some of the qualifying read-ins that directly explained the original answers but excluded others.

The court largely dismissed the defendant's request to read in the plaintiffs' discovery evidence, finding that doing so after the witnesses had testified without putting the evidence to them in cross-examination violated the rule in Browne v. Dunn and caused trial unfairness.

During a complex commercial trial involving the auction of wireless spectrum licences, the plaintiffs challenged the defendant's assertion of solicitor-client privilege over redacted portions of nine documents.

The defendant argued the challenge required leave under Rule 48.04 as the action had been set down for trial.

The court held that a trial judge has broad discretion to order production of non-privileged documents at any time under Rule 30.04(5) without leave, but would have granted leave in the interests of justice regardless.

After inspecting the unredacted documents, the court found that while some redactions properly protected legal advice, others merely reflected policy discussions or operational decisions that referenced legal risks, which do not attract privilege.

The defendant was ordered to produce the improperly redacted portions.

The appellant, a disabled veteran and freelance journalist, commenced a defamation action in Small Claims Court against the Minister of Veterans Affairs for statements published in The Hill Times characterizing the appellant's criticism of a veterans' pension program as "mistruths" stated to suit his own agenda.

The respondents moved to dismiss the claim under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, which provides for summary dismissal of proceedings arising from expression relating to matters of public interest.

The deputy judge dismissed the claim, finding the statements related to a matter of public interest and that the appellant had not advanced credible and compelling evidence of substantial merit.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether a deputy judge of the Small Claims Court has jurisdiction to make orders under section 137.1.

The court held that deputy judges lack such jurisdiction, as the statute expressly refers to "judge" without including deputy judges, and the Legislature has demonstrated a pattern of expressly referencing deputy judges when it intends to grant them authority.

Senator Michael Duffy sued the Senate of Canada for over $7 million in damages, alleging his suspension and denial of expenses were politically motivated, unconstitutional, and violated his Charter rights, despite his acquittal on criminal charges.

The Senate moved to dismiss the action, asserting parliamentary privilege.

The court granted the Senate's motion, finding that the Senate's decisions regarding member discipline, internal affairs, proceedings, and freedom of speech were protected by parliamentary privilege and thus immune from judicial review.

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing a habeas corpus application challenging the appellant's reclassification from medium to maximum security and subsequent transfer to a penitentiary outside Ontario.

The appeal was rendered moot when the appellant was reclassified back to medium security and subsequently released on parole while the appeal was pending.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, noting that the issues sought to be raised were not properly raised before the application judge and that attempting to expand upon the legal principles established in Mission Institution v. Khela without a proper factual foundation would provide limited assistance.

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing a habeas corpus application challenging the appellant's reclassification from medium to maximum security and subsequent transfer to a penitentiary outside Ontario.

The appeal was rendered moot when the appellant was transferred back to medium security prior to the extension of time being granted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, finding that the current habeas corpus proceeding was the preferable forum to address the lawfulness of the appellant's present detention.

This decision addresses the costs of a motion brought by the Crown to strike parts of the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The Crown successfully argued that the Construction Lien Act did not apply to the Federal Crown or First Nation lands, and the plaintiff conceded these points.

However, the plaintiff was granted leave to amend its claim to include unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, which the Crown had opposed.

The court found that the plaintiff's initial untenable pleading and failure to respond to pre-motion correspondence precipitated the motion, warranting a costs award to the Crown.

However, the award was tempered because the plaintiff's earlier settlement proposal (to strike with leave to amend) was largely the outcome, and the Crown's opposition to the amendment was unsuccessful.

The Crown's travel disbursements were disallowed due to the missed settlement opportunity.