Christopher Rusko

The appellant challenged federal statutory residency requirements that caused the loss of his appointment as a returning officer after he moved outside the electoral district he administered.

The majority held that an individual's choice of residence falls within the irreducible sphere of personal autonomy protected by s. 7 of the Charter, rejected an administration-of-justice threshold, and found that the continuing vacancy rule in s. 24(4) of the Canada Elections Act was overbroad.

Because the provision automatically terminated otherwise qualified officials even where actual residence was unnecessary to achieve the objective of local knowledge and physical presence, the deprivation of liberty was contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.

The respondent failed to justify the breach under s. 1, and the majority declared s. 24(4) of no force or effect.

A dissent would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that s. 7 does not apply outside the administration of justice.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of residency requirements for election officers under the federal Elections Act, arguing they infringed his s. 7 Charter liberty interest by impacting his choice of residence and employment.

The court dismissed the application, finding that choice of residence does not rise to the profound level of personal decisions protected by the s. 7 liberty interest, which is intended for profoundly intimate and personal choices, not economic interests.