7 total
Residency rule for returning officers violated s. 7 because it was overbroad.
The appellant challenged federal statutory residency requirements that caused the loss of his appointment as a returning officer after he moved outside the electoral district he administered.
The majority held that an individual's choice of residence falls within the irreducible sphere of personal autonomy protected by s. 7 of the Charter, rejected an administration-of-justice threshold, and found that the continuing vacancy rule in s. 24(4) of the Canada Elections Act was overbroad.
Because the provision automatically terminated otherwise qualified officials even where actual residence was unnecessary to achieve the objective of local knowledge and physical presence, the deprivation of liberty was contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.
The respondent failed to justify the breach under s. 1, and the majority declared s. 24(4) of no force or effect.
A dissent would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that s. 7 does not apply outside the administration of justice.
The court held that the choice of residence is not a protected liberty interest under section 7 of the Charter.
The applicant challenged the constitutionality of residency requirements for election officers under the federal Elections Act, arguing they infringed his s. 7 Charter liberty interest by impacting his choice of residence and employment.
The court dismissed the application, finding that choice of residence does not rise to the profound level of personal decisions protected by the s. 7 liberty interest, which is intended for profoundly intimate and personal choices, not economic interests.
Judicial review granted; RAD decision unreasonable for failing to provide adequate reasons and independent analysis.
The applicants sought judicial review of a Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) decision denying their refugee protection claim.
The RAD confirmed the Refugee Protection Division's finding that the applicants failed to rebut the presumption of state protection in Belgium.
The Federal Court found the RAD's decision unreasonable due to inadequate reasons and failure to conduct an independent analysis of the record, remitting the matter for redetermination.
Judicial review granted; RAD's adverse credibility finding unreasonable for microscopic analysis and ignoring torture trauma.
The applicant sought judicial review of a Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) decision dismissing his refugee claim based on adverse credibility findings.
The Federal Court found the RAD's decision unreasonable because it engaged in a microscopic analysis of peripheral details, failed to consider the applicant's affidavit explaining issues with the RPD hearing, and failed to account for the impact of the applicant's claimed torture on his ability to give consistent testimony.
The application for judicial review was granted and the matter remitted for reconsideration.
Habeas corpus application challenging involuntary transfer to medium security dismissed as reasonable and procedurally fair.
The applicant, a federal inmate serving a life sentence, sought habeas corpus challenging his reclassification from minimum to medium security and his involuntary transfer to a medium-security institution.
The transfer was based on his inappropriate interactions with administrative staff, accessing restricted areas, and possession of a contraband cell phone.
The court applied the reasonableness standard of review from Vavilov and found the Warden's decision was justified, transparent, and intelligible.
The court also reviewed a sealed affidavit and concluded the respondent met its procedural fairness and disclosure obligations under s. 27 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.
The application was dismissed.
Judicial review allowed; VAC's denial of personal training benefits was unreasonable for ignoring past approvals.
The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by Veterans Affairs Canada denying her request for reimbursement of personal training sessions under the Veterans Health Care Regulations.
The Federal Court allowed the application, finding the decision unreasonable because the decision-maker failed to address the applicant's reliance on specific policy sections and ignored previous approvals of identical benefits, contrary to the Supreme Court's instructions in Vavilov.
The matter was remitted for reconsideration.
Habeas corpus application dismissed; inmate's security reclassification and involuntary transfer were reasonable and procedurally fair.
The applicant, a federal inmate, brought a habeas corpus application challenging his security reclassification from medium to maximum and his involuntary transfer to Millhaven Institution.
The transfer was prompted by an incident where the applicant made a threatening remark to a correctional officer.
The applicant argued the decision was unreasonable and procedurally unfair due to inadequate information sharing and insufficient reasons.
The court dismissed the application, finding that the Correctional Service of Canada's decision was reasonable given the applicant's behaviour and risk factors, and that the process was procedurally fair.