Nigel McKechnie

The Carp Agricultural Society (CAS) revoked Laurie Dillon's membership, alleging conflict of interest and breach of fiduciary duty related to her family's involvement in the sale of an estate property where CAS was a beneficiary.

Dillon sought an order to nullify the decision and reinstate her membership.

CAS brought a cross-application to declare breaches of duty.

The court found that the CAS Board breached natural justice rules in its investigation and decision-making process, including procedural flaws and lack of proper reasons.

The court also determined that Dillon was not in a conflict of interest as defined by the Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, 2010, nor did she breach her fiduciary duties, as the transactions did not involve the CAS directly but rather the Estate Trustee.

The court set aside the revocation of membership and dismissed the CAS's cross-application.

The plaintiff, General Motors of Canada Company ("GM"), brought a motion for a permanent and/or interlocutory injunction against the defendant, Chidiebube Osita-Adubasim, to prevent trespassing, harassment, intimidation, assault, and mischief at GM's premises.

The defendant, a former contract employee whose employment was terminated due to sexual harassment complaints, had repeatedly attempted to gain unauthorized access to GM's Oshawa Assembly Plant, engaging in aggressive and threatening behavior, including assaulting a security guard.

Despite trespass notices and police citations, the defendant's conduct persisted.

The court applied the R.J.R.-MacDonald test for injunctive relief, finding a strong prima facie case of tortious and unlawful conduct, irreparable harm to GM's employees and operations, and that the balance of convenience overwhelmingly favored granting the injunction.

The motion was granted, and the injunction was ordered to remain in effect indefinitely, with a term requiring police assistance in enforcing the order.

This decision addresses whether legal costs incurred to obtain a declaration that a debt survives bankruptcy under section 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) also survive the bankrupt's discharge.

The plaintiff had previously obtained a ruling that its debt against a defendant survived his bankruptcy.

The parties agreed on the quantum of costs ($50,000) for that prior motion, but disputed whether these costs were also non-dischargeable.

The plaintiff argued that the costs were an intrinsic consequence of the judgment.

The defendants contended that these were post-bankruptcy debts, separate from the original debt, and did not fall under BIA exceptions.

The court, distinguishing the case from those where bankruptcy had not yet occurred, held that it would be inequitable for the underlying debt to survive bankruptcy while the costs necessary to secure that declaration did not.

The court found the costs to be an intrinsic aspect of the judgment and therefore ordered that they also survive the bankrupt's discharge.

No costs were awarded for the present costs motion.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to declare that a default judgment debt owed by the defendant, a corporate director, survived his bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The defendant had breached the trust provisions of the Construction Lien Act by allowing construction financing funds to be used for non-project purposes.

The court found that the defendant, as a fiduciary, misappropriated trust funds through willful blindness and failure to oversee the corporation's finances.

The court declared that the judgment debt of $181,133.23 plus costs survived the bankruptcy.

The plaintiff, a former staff member for a Member of Parliament, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that her employment contract was valid and that the collective agreement had no legal force, arguing that the Parliamentary Employment and Staff Relations Act excluded MP staff from collective bargaining.

The defendant MP brought a cross-motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claim, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction due to the collective agreement's arbitration clause.

The plaintiff also sought to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim for defamation for lack of notice under the Libel and Slander Act, and to strike a paragraph referencing her counsel's political background.

The court dismissed both motions for summary judgment, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the scope of the Act and the collective agreement, and whether the defamation claim required notice.

However, the court granted the motion to strike the paragraph about the plaintiff's counsel's political background as irrelevant and vexatious.